Michel - superb deduction. I had a couple of them but struggled with the rest. Thank you for your effort. As you say, without the full breakdown we may never know - but for the purpose of my research it gives me as near as I need the figures. The 2nd AAR's do not go into enough detail which was what started me on the quest. It was also obvious when pointed out - the two vessels with 3 men onboard would be the supply boats… I am very impressed and very grateful. Well done ! Regards Gary
Mike and Gary, Thank you for your kind words, but the result is still frustrating! We only have 2 certain individual matches so far. I rummaged through my files, my books and the web and may have found a few additional interesting and/or useful snippets. From Steve Zaloga's excellent book "Rangers Lead the Way - Pointe-du-Hoc D-Day 1944", a couple of photos showing LCA 722 and (probably) LCA 887 training. Note the British-style camouflage of the craft: Next, some screengrabs from a Nat Geo TV show on Pointe du Hoc, one of a series on famous raids. Note the uniform, dark colour of the craft. LCA 884 & 883 during exercises: LCA 887: A colour photo this time, showing LCA 883 at Weymouth shortly before D Day, but without any grapnel or box for ropes: The above photos call for the following remarks: - the British camouflage pattern was apparently changed to a uniform blue colour closer to the US Navy Blue some time before D Day. This is also evident on other LCA used in the US Assault Areas. - the mother ship code and craft davit number, which do not seem very apparent, if at all present, on the first photos, are now prominently displayed in white on the hull sides, just like the hull number. The result is that they now look very much like US craft - We now have three out of the six davit numbers for BEN MY CHREE (LSI code BM): BM2 = LCA 884 BM4 = LCA 883 BM5 = LCA 887 These happen to be the three craft carrying Co. "F". Because BEN MY CHREE carried only six craft (three on each side), one could have expected, to make things easier for the troops or even for the sailor guiding them, the three craft from the same Company to be on the same side of the ship, e.g. BM2, BM4 and BM6. But, unless craft assignment to companies was changed after this clip was shot, it seems that Co. "F" had two craft on port davits and one on a starboard davit. I assume that this was done intentionally, maybe in order to reduce the probability of a whole Company being unable to land should all the davits or craft on one side of the LSI become useless, which is a distinct possibilty in case of excessive list for example. - finally, looking closely at the stills of LCA 884, we can notice a white marking on the box holding the climbing ropes/ladders between the first and second rocket grapnel projectors. A closer view can be found in another still of the same clip: Although we do not know for sure that this last still shows LCA 884, in retrospect we can see that LCA 884 does show "F1" on the side of her rope boxes. Because the same marking is repeated on different boxes on the same craft, it almost certainly means the first craft carrying Co. "F", and in all likelihood also the first Serial for the Company, i.e. Serial 1010. We would therefore have, although with a slight measure of doubt remaining, Serial 1010 = LCA 884. LCA 887 also exhibits the same kind of marking, but the image quality is not good enough to identify whether it is F2 or F3 (or something else ). More speculation later... Michel
What is your source for this? I know WN62 quite well. There are concrete platforms for wheeled anti tank guns, but I can't see the base for a pedestal mounted 50mm as at Courseulles-sur-mer or Pegasus bridge.
Sheldrake, Zaloga. D Day Fortifications in Normandy. Page 47. I may of course have misunderstood it. There are various lists of armaments and they do not all agree. Mike
Hein Severloh's WN62 states two 50mm anti-tank guns in open field positions, which I take to mean 'not pedestal mounts'. One is in the NE corner overlooking the anti-tank ditch, the other is in the SE corner covering the track up the draw and probably defiladed from the sea. The latter is also recorded as being crewed by four men from Grenadier Regiment 916. The semi-circular concrete pads were the original positions for the 75mm field guns before the casemates were completed.
By far the best (and most reliable) source about the Atlantikwall in France is in my opinion the work by Alain Chazette and his team. I purchased their two books on Gold-Juno-Sword and on Utah (the one on Omaha was not available yet), not to mention a number of other books (e.g. on Coastal Batteries), and they are just great (unlike their website ). As far as I know they are the only publications not marred with any of the errors so often found in other books. The Omaha book has since been published too. See here: Bienvenue sur la librairie Histoire et Fortifications PARIS If you need only one book on the various strongpoints at OMAHA this would be the one, without hesitation. Michel (no connection with the publisher nor any of the authors)
My knowledge of German weapons is admittedly limited but as I understood it the guns in WN62 included two KwK 50 guns. These should be the redundant tank guns which do not have field mountings and need a pedestal. Sources agree that they were mounted in pits but is it impossible for a pedestal gun to be mounted in a pit? Yours in ignorance (on this matter at least). Mike
This is supposed to be the 50 mm gun manned by Kupka and Heckmann. It is clearly a pedestal mounted, short barrelled tank gun, full title courtesy of Chazette & Co: 5 cm Kampfwagen-Kanone 38 L/42 in Behelfssockellafettte or 5 cm KwK 38 L/42 in Bh.Sk.L for short (!): Source: England and Normandy | 16th Infantry Regiment Association It is visibly not in a concrete position, although the pedestal must have had at least a minimal concrete anchoring base. Michel
Chazette & Co are not experts in the D Day landings, nor do they claim to be. But as far as the Atlantikwall in France is concerned, I still find them to be the most reliable, complete and accurate source. And, as you noticed, they do update their works as their research progresses, even if it contradicts their earlier findings, which is more than can be said of many writers. I agree with your theory. They were probably fitted on board the LSI after the Rangers had embarked for D Day, to prevent any possible leak to the enemy before the assault - and perhaps also because the presence of the grapnels and rope boxes would have made embarkation on craft berthed alongside rather difficult. See this shot of the Prince Charles LCA embarking the rest of 2nd Rangers Bn at the same location: There must have been more than two times, because we have photos/footage of the grapnel-equipped LCA exercising on at least two different occasions, one showing the craft in British style camo and the other in Navy Blue, plus the last one (of LCA 883 without grapnels) which is part of a series showing Rangers (and other troops) embarking for D Day, which includes the photo above. Michel
The Rangers wouldn't necessarily need to board 'the ships' - the LSIs - to practise and perfect their 'action on the objective', it could have been done locally with just the LCAs.
This isn't irrelevant: http://ww2talk.com/index.php?threads/rocket-firing-grapnel-hook-pointe-du-hoc-2nd-rangers.51401
The weather is awful in my part of the country. If the forecast is for good weather in the south I am in the north. If the forecast is for god weather in the north I am in the south. If the forecast is for good weather in the east... well you see the picture emerging here. I have done all the jobs I can do at this time so I am reduced to posting my thoughts and gleanings on the naval aspects of D Day on Omaha. For much of the information I am as usual indebted to members of the forum and in particular Michel and Noel. Mike.
NAVAL TASK FORCE 124. The naval forces destined for Omaha can be confusing for several reasons including: Groups of vessels could have several designations including task force, assault group and convoy numbers. Vessels could belong to different groups at different stages of the crossing and landings. The order of battle was constantly changing right up to the time of sailing. In particular beware of Assault Group O1 and Convoy O1 for example. Assault Group O1 was Task Force 124.3. Convoy O1 was a fast convoy containing the transports for Assault Group O1 and Assault Groups 2,3 and 4 as well. Below are the component groups of Task Force 124 destined for Omaha under the command of Force 'O'. Landing Force. Task Force 124.1. Army. Shore Party. Task Force 124.2. Navy. Assault Group O1. Task Force 124.3. Assault Group O2. Task Force 124.4. Assault Group O3. Task Force 124.5. Assault Group O4. Task Force 124.6. Escort Group. Task Force 124.7. Gun Support Craft. Task Force 124.8. Bombardment Group. Task Force 124.9. Sweeper Group. Task Force 124.10 Far Shore Service Group. Task Force 124.11. Despatch Boats. Task Group 124.12. Rescue vessels. Task Group 124.13. Task Group 124.1, Army Landing Force, and Task Group 124.2, Naval Shore Party, are described separately. Each of the other Task Forces are described below. Mike.
Task Force 124. Flag Group. AGC 4 USS Ancon. Flagship. PT 76. Despatch boat. DD 624 USS Baldwin. Relief Flagship on call. Ancon was a command and communications ship with an interestingly varied service history. Originally she was a standard Maritime Commission C3 C & P (Cargo and Passenger} design operating as a cargo/passenger liner running between New York and Panama (Ancon being a port in Panama). She was first taken into service as a civilian troop transport. Later she became a USN transport and then an Attack Transport before being converted to her role as command and communications ship. After serving in the Mediterranean she moved to the UK for the D Day preparations. She was off the Normandy coast for three weeks before returning to the US and then to the Pacific. Her final war time role was press communications in Tokyo Bay when Japan surrendered. As Flagship Force ‘O’ Ancon provided staff and communications facilities for the Rear Admiral Commanding Force ‘O’, Major General Commanding 1 US Division and a Colonel from 9 Tactical Air Force USAAF. It also accommodated the headquarters staff of V Corps and Engineer Special Brigade Group. There was a small British liaison party of one cipher officer and three coders. There were communications rooms for all three services and these handled some fifty wireless channels, although some were only listened in to. This number reduced when the army headquarters moved ashore. Apart from the actual wireless sets and operators there were the necessary cipher personnel and message centre personnel to prioritise and to receive and deliver messages. A comprehensive internal telephone system was also installed to connect all the various departments. A very useful piece of communication equipment was a British Wireless Set No 26 which provided six telephone channels to the UK. For the transmission of orders or information to ships within visual range British daylight signalling lamps were installed in USS Ancon (see under communications below). Each service maintained a filter room to sift the incoming information and avoid duplication before passing it to be displayed in the operations room or what would become known as the Combat Information Centre The Commander Assault Force ‘O’, was also the Commander Eleventh Amphibious Force which was the amphibious force of the US Atlantic Fleet. As such he, and his force, were as experienced as it was possible to be. They had already taken part in three major amphibious operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean. Some have thought this a disadvantage in that they may have failed to appreciate the differences between landings in the tideless Mediterranean and the tides, currents and winds of the English Channel. It may also have led to the commander not fully following the orders of the Naval Commander in Chief Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, Admiral Ramsay RN. USS Baldwin was a Gleaves class destroyer which was on stand by to act as flagship Force ‘O’. She had little accommodation or extra equipment for the role. The minimum necessary addition wireless sets, typewriters and stationary were placed on board and the destroyers personnel trained to take over some of the duties. A duplicate set of code books in a sealed bag was also put on board. Baldwin would only serve as the flagship of the Naval Commander Force ‘O’. 1 Division Stand By Headquarters was on the APA Samuel Chase and V Corps Stand By Headquarters on APA Charles Carroll. Of course these would have moved ashore before the transports left in the afternoon of D Day. The stand by Air Control was APA Henrico. The army links required until the headquarters moved ashore were. Army Command Wave. From 1 Army Headquarters. Army to V Corps Wave. V Corps to 1 Division. When ashore. V Corps to 29 Division. V Corps Command Wave. V Corps Information Wave. V Corps to British 30 Corps. 1 Division Command Wave. 1 Division Command Wave FM. Until some functions moved ashore Ancon provided the following links for the Air Force. Air Command Wave. A link from the Air Commander in the UK to Air Force representatives on the headquarters ship. Air Command Broadcast. For operational information from the UK to Air Force Representatives on the headquarters ships etc. 9 Air Force Command Wave. A wave for situation and intelligence reports to Headquarters 9 Air Force and for requests for air cover. Headquarters Ship Air Liaison Wave. A RT speech wave for person to person general liaison use. Headquarters Standby Ship Air Liaison Wave. A stand by RT speech wave for person to person general liaison use. Headquarters Ship/Fighter Direction Ship Liaison Wave. A RT speech wave for person to person liaison between air controllers and Air Force representatives on headquarters ships. Fighter Director Ship Plotting Wave. To pass radar plots from the Fighter Direction Tender to Headquarters ships. Aircraft Wave. For communication between ship and aircraft. Home Shore Plotting Wave. A broadcast wave for information from the UK on enemy or unidentified aircraft. Aircraft Movement Liaison Wave. For information from the UK on friendly aircraft. ‘Y’ HF. For watch on enemy HF transmissions. ‘Y’ VHF. For watch on enemy VHF transmissions. Naval communications included: Senior Officers Broadcast. Area Broadcast. Rear Link, Movement. Special Rear Link. Simplex Rear Link. Command Wave. Admirals Wave. Ship to Shore Calling Wave. Mine Sweeper Wave. Task Force Auxiliary Wave. Radar reporting Wave. Air Warning Wave. Screening. TBS Because of its importance Ancon was well protected. In the Transport Area it was surrounded by other vessels and protected to seaward by the screening force. More immediately it was protected by the destroyer escort USS Blessman and at dusk two Landing Craft Flak moved to protect it from attack by aircraft or E Boats. PT 76 was assigned to Ancon as a despatch boat. If required it was to carry personnel and despatches to subordinate units, to the Commander Western Task Force and Commander 1 US Army. It could also be used to transfer the Naval Commander Force ‘O’ to the stand by headquarters ship. Ancon at sea. Mike.
Internal views of Ancon. Photos have their own captions. Just some of the photos to be seen on the excellent navsource.org site. Ancon on D Day Mike
Assault Groups. Force ‘O’ consisted of four assault groups, O1, O2, O3 and O4 which was the Ranger group. Each of these was commanded by a Senior Officer Assault Group (SOAG) who was also the officer commanding the Transport Division (Transdiv) carrying the troops of that group. This differed from the British beaches where the Senior Officer Assault Group had a separate headquarters ship which remained off the beaches. The US Senior Officers Assault Group returned to the UK in the afternoon of D Day with their Transdiv, leaving the Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group on a LCI(L) in charge of naval affairs for the next three weeks. This system was designed for the more usual USN situations where the transports remained off the beaches for some time in order to support the troops ashore. It was also felt that since the Commanding Officer Transdivs were senior officers they had to be appointed Senior Officer Assault Group rather than be asked to serve under a separate Senior Officer Assault Group. Assault Groups centred on a Transport Division, Transdiv, of three ships. Assault Groups O1 and O2 each had two Attack Transports, APA, and one British equivalent Landing Ship Infantry (Large), LSI(L). Assault Group O3 had three Transports, AP, which were not equipped to full APA standard. Assault Group O4 had smaller Landing Ship Infantry (Small), LSI(S) or Landing Ship Infantry (Hoist), LSH(H) which mainly carried Rangers. Each of Assault Groups O1 and O2 also had six LST, a number of LCI(L) and forty five LCT, plus support craft and control craft. Assault Group O3 differed in having twelve LST and no support craft. Note: Since there were many changes to the Order of Battle, some made at the last minute, the following lists may not be 100% correct for D Day. Task Force 124.3 Assault Group O1. This group carried troops of 16 Regiment Combat Team to beaches Fox Green and Easy Red. Transdiv 1. This was a veteran Atlantic Fleet unit which had taken part in landings in North Africa and the Mediterranean. APA 26 USS Samuel Chase. Flagship Senior Officer Assault Group O1 APA 45 USS Henrico. Stand By Air Control. SS Empire Anvil. LCI(L) 87. Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group O1. LST 309, 314, 357, 373, 374, 376. Towing Rhino Ferries. LCI(L) 83, 85, 88, 89, 493. LCT(5) 18, 20, 25, 195, 199, 200, 201, 206, 209, 213, 271, 276, 293, 305, LCT(6) 537, 538, 539, 540 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 623, 624, 625, 626, 637, 638, 769, 814, 815, 856, LCT(A) 2008, 2037, 2043, 2273. Towing LCM(3). LCT(HE) 2049, 2287, 2339, 2424, 2487. Towing LCM(3) 18 X LCM(3). PC 552, 553. Control Craft. SC 1291, 1307. Secondary Control Craft. ML 118, 187. Navigation leaders. LCC 10, 20. Task Force 124.4. Assault Group O2. This group carried troops of 116 Regiment Combat Team to beaches Easy Green and Easy White. Transdiv 3. A veteran Atlantic Fleet unit which had taken part in landings in North Africa and the Mediterranean. APA 28 USS Charles Carroll. Flagship Senior Officer Assault Group O2. APA 30 Thomas Jefferson. SS Empire Javelin. LCI(L) 86. Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group O2. LST 310, 315, 316, 317, 332, 372. Towing Rhino Ferries. LCI(L) 84, 90, 91, 92, 94, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 540, 541, 553, 554, 555, 557. LCT(5) 27, 29, 30, 80, 147, 149, 153, 197, 207, 214, 244, 294, 332, 364 LCT(6) 535, 536, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 622, 665, 666, 703, 704, 705, 713, 714, 767, 775, 776, 813. LCT(A) 2124, 2227, 2273, 2275. Towing LCM(3). LCT(HE) 2050, 2055, 2229, 2297, 2307. Towing LCM(3). 18 X LCM(3). PC 565, 568, 618, 1225. Control Craft. SC 1332, 1353, 1354, 1360. Secondary Control Craft. ML 153, 189. Navigation Leaders. LCC 30, 40, 50. Task Force 124.5 Assault Group O3. Transdiv 97 AP 76 USS Anne Arundel. Flagship Senior Officer Assault Group O3. AP 67 USS Dorothea L Dix. AP 77 USS Thurston. LCI(L) 492. Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group O3. LST 6, 51, 75, 133, 134, 157, 285, 286, 347, 350, 375, 502. LCI(L) 93, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498. LCT(5) 7, 22, 202, 415, 431, 434, 460. LCT(6) 562, 618, 619, 628, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 657, 658, 659, 667, 706, 707, 708, 711, 712, 715, 768, 857. LSD Oceanway. Carrying LCM(3) PC 564, 565, 617. ML 193, 304. Navigation Leaders. Task Force 124.6. Assault Group O4. Assault Group O4 Carried the Rangers. All the LSI(S) and LSI(H) were ex ferries or packets. HMS Prince Charles. LSI(S). Flag Senior Officer Assault Group O4. HMS Prince Baudouin. LSI(S). HMS Prince Leopold. LSI(S). Amsterdam. LSI(S). Ben My Chree. LSI(H). Princess Maud. LSI(H). LCT(5) 413. Carrying ladder equipped DUKWs. ML 163, 304. Navigation Leaders. The Assault Groups did not cross the Channel as a Group but in convoys which were formed according to the speed of the vessels. The transports, led by AGC Ancon, formed Convoy O1. This was a fast convoy which left Portland at 1600 hours on D-1 and anchored in the Transport Area ten miles off Omaha at around 0300 hours on D Day. Times are for Ancon. It took some time for all the transports to clear Portland but they arrived as a group. LCTs sailed as Convoy O2A, a slow convoy leaving early on the morning of D-1 but arriving at much the same time as Convoy O1. LSTs sailed as Convoy O2B, another slow convoy. Mike.
THE TRANSPORTS. USN APA and AP. The transports of the amphibious force were good looking ships designed by the US Maritime Commission. They were requisitioned when the US entered the war. Some were used as transports, attack transports and attack cargo ships. On D Day the attack transports, APAs, were used to carry the assault waves while similar transports, APs, carried the follow up troops. The only real difference between them was that the APAs carried more LCVPs and carried them largely on davits. APs carried LCVPs on deck and they were hoisted out by ships derricks. There was no role for AKAs on D Day. US amphibious tactics and equipment were heavily influenced by the needs of the Pacific Theatre. APAs were designed for the long ocean voyages and the staging of amphibious landings far from bases. Each APA was more than a transport it was the mother ship for an infantry battalion combat team. It provided troop accommodation but also carried vehicles and supplies for the battalion and its supporting units. It carried landing craft capable of landing not only troops but the vehicles and supplies as well. The APA also provided a headquarters communication and command centre for the battalion group and medical centre for the treatment and care of sick and injured troops. The APAs normally remained off the beachhead for several days in order to provide support. A Transdiv was usually composed of three APAs which between them could carry a Regimental Combat Team plus an AKA (Attack Cargo) which could carry more vehicles and supplies plus the craft to land them. All APA and AKA were combat loaded. This meant that vehicles and supplies were loaded so that the most urgent could be unloaded first. The senior officer of the Transdiv was responsible for all the activity at sea and below the low water line. By the time he left there would be an organisation in place to continue the maintenance of the beach. A luffing davit was developed for the LCVPs. These could carry three craft and lower them into the water, one after the other not all at once. Normal davits could carry only one craft. Further craft including LCP(L) and LCM could be carried on deck and lifted over the side by the ships generous fit of booms and winches. These were also used for handling vehicles and supplies. Normal practice on D Day was for boats carried on davits to be loaded with troops at the rail and then lowered by the davits. Earlier types of davit were considered too weak to safely support the weight of a loaded craft but all APAs used on D Day seem to have the later, stronger, types. This method of loading was only used for the first wave of troops. For the later waves each loading port had a scrambling net which the heavily laden troops had to use to descend to the boat. In heavy seas this was not easy. The APs of Assault Group O3 had most of their LCVP carried on deck and lowered using the ships derricks. These could not be loaded before being lowered and so it was usual for them to lower all craft empty and then call them in to the ports so that troops could board them using scrambling nets. The LSI(S) and LSI(H) of Assault Group O4 were different. They were always loaded at the rail and there was no provision for scrambling net loading. Returning craft were hoisted up to the rail on davits or hoists for loading later waves of troops. The actual internal layout differed slightly between different ships but all were broadly similar. Typically a Maritime Commission C3 type had five holds, three in front of the deckhouse and two behind it. The deckhouse varied in size according to its peacetime role but there were one or two decks of cabins with the machinery space under. When converted to AP or APA the holds had permanent decks installed in them so that at the bottom a cargo space remained with access down from the hatches provided by enclosed trunking. In some cases there was no trunking but there were hatches in each deck and the space on these could be used as accommodation. When access to the holds was required the bunks etc could be rapidly removed and the hatches opened. The two decks which were installed in the holds were then filled with tiers of bunk beds, from three to five bunks high. Space nearest the central machinery area, and along the sides, were used for mess areas, kitchens etc. Catering facilities were good and provided three meals a day for 1,500 troops. Normal army rations were provided by the army and cooked by army personnel. There were comparatively large numbers of toilets and washbasins, and the added luxury of showers. There was even more luxury in the form of drinking fountains and an ice cream making machine. It was laid down in D Day instructions that the ships company were to do all they could to make life comfortable for the troops about to go ashore and into combat. Should there be insufficient food then some should be made available from naval stores. Water was a major concern. Ships had large storage tanks and were to take every opportunity to keep them topped up. Ships had desalinisation equipment. A reserve was to be provided in tanks stowed on deck and which could if necessary be loaded into craft and taken ashore. Medical facilities were good with an operating theatre, X Ray room, dental surgery, medical wards and several doctors. In the Pacific the APA was to provide casualty treatment for the personnel but on D Day only naval personnel and troops wounded while on the landing craft were supposed to be taken back to the transports. On the morning of D Day the transports anchored in the Transport Area ten miles offshore and immediately began to launch landing craft and embark troops. The army had their own speaker system which was controlled from the senior army officer’s quarters. There were speakers in all the troop quarters and on the boat decks. Troops were ordered to assemble with their kit and equipment. NCOs checked that all were present and had the equipment they should have. They were then called to the correct boat station and checked again before boarding the craft. When the first wave of craft had been loaded and dispatched the remaining troops began to assemble and check equipment so that they would be ready to be embarked on whatever craft were assigned to collect them and take them to shore. With all the boats launched and the troop sleeping quarters empty the hatches were opened so that the jeeps which were stowed in the hold could be hoisted out and loaded into waiting LCTs. Each of the APAs carried up to thirty jeeps. APs and LSI(L)s did not carry any. Loud hailers were used to call boats in to boat stations for subsequent waves and were used for marshalling craft before heading for the shore. Boat group leaders were wireless equipped and also had load hailers for communicating with their boats. There was no provision for individual boats to communicate. Mike. It is hoped that more information on the operation of APA, AP and LSI can be added later. The reports of their activities with Force ‘O’ exist and are available on Fold 3. Some excellent detailed plans of US warships are available on maritime.org/Booklet of General Plans. These include an AP and an APA but not those taking part on D Day. ‘Away All Boats’ was a 1950’s film about an attack transport in the Pacific. Pretty awful film but excellent footage of the boat operations.
