I watched a documentary this morning about Op Varsity and the well known historians (Who's opinion I greatly respect) suggested that Op Varsity was the worse operation for Allied Airborne Forces during WW2 and the Airborne Veterans (British and American) interviewed on the show seemed to be of the same opinion. So not knowing much about Varsity off I went to the net to have a look see. I am still drawn to to think that Market Garden was worse and some figures I have found would suggest the same thing. Anyone care to enlighten me as to their food of thought in Op Varsity? Casualty figures below: Op Varsity Allied Casualties - Approx 2,700 Op Market Garden Allied Casualties - Approx 17,200 The only thing I can think of is they may have been refering to the loss of Airborne troops in aircraft and gliders prior to 'Boots on the ground' due to quite a large amount of flak which I think was avoided where possible during Market Garden causing some DZ's to be some miles from some objectives. Cheers for your thoughts Andy
Are the casualty figures just airborne? for both or are MG figures total including 30 corps? I think the 17200 must include 30 corps. No doubt the fighting was just as bloody in both operations in certain areas. 15th Scottish had linked with the airborne troops on the afternoon of 24th. Ground troops had crossed the Rhine 23rd March.
A more detailed search of casualties from OMG sourced from: OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN Over 7,000 dead or missing were left in the Arnhem area. The 82d Airborne lost 1,432 killed and missing during Operation Market-Garden, and the 101st sustained 2,110 casualties. 82d Airborne finally started withdrawing on 11 November, after incurring an additional 1,682 casualties, followed on 25 November by the 101st, after they suffered 1,912 more losses. Cheers
The other thing is that Market garden link ups, took a lot longer. The Rhine link ups were, as I said, being achieved next day. The fighting might have been just as hard and bloody but over a shorter time frame.
Good point. I did also consider that... I think I either missed something on the programme (more likely) or they weren't very clear in what they were saying.
I thought Operation Varsity learnt most of the lessons of the failings of Operation Market Garden. The drop zones were not deep in enemy territory like Market Garden with link ups with the forward elements of the ground forces taking place on the first evening. There were no multiple drops, the 6th and 17th divisions deployed in one drop achieving surprise on the German's. You could say it was probably far too conservative where the Market Garden was far too ambitious. Some historians have said that Varsity was uneccesary and that a better advance east would have been made if the Airbourne's resources would have been invested in the ground forces, I'll leave that judgment to people far brighter than me though. One way you could maybe say that Varisty was a failure is if you compare the casualty rates of Varsity and Market Garden then you have a much higher daily casualty rate in Varsity. Varsity is considered only lasting one day and the casualty rate amongst the Airbourne troops is somewhere around 2500 depending on what source you look at. If you look at Market Garden in comparrison the operation took place between 17th and 25th September and the average daily casualty rate is around 1100.
Mullet, They never mentioned 'failure' they suggested that Varsity was a 'worse' operation than Market Garden. (I thought I'd mention that before another us and them starts to mannifest about OMG). By 'worse' they meant a hard time......I'm tending to go with 51 Highland's observations that Varsity was over a shorter period of time and that was what they were refering too. Cheers Andy
I was only comparing average casualty rates for both operations and saying that some people may view Varsity as a failure in this regard. For me Varisty was a very successful operation. By the way was the documentary on Military History channel today? Can't see anything on there regarding Varsity?
No I had sky plus'd it from last week. It's in the Lost Evidence series thats currently showing. There's one on today at 2pm Cheers
From memory veterans of the 6th Airborne say they suffered a lot of casualties during the last few mniutes before 'exiting the aircraft on the green light'.....1st Airborne suffered less casualties on the run...... It's aslo how you present statistics.....a previous post said 7,000 dead or missing in the Arnhem area.....entirely happy with this but soon after the battle there were around 2,500 casualties in the Airborne Hospital at Apeldoorn plus 250ish medics plus about 300 wounded at the SEH in Arnhem so already have accounted for a large chunk of this 7,000.....a couple of thousand as unwounded PoWs.... Middlebrook gives the deaths at Arnhem as 1174 1st AB, 219 GPs and 92 Poles...1485....perhaps doesn't make for gasps on TV to say only 1485 deaths....
Im currently reading Ambrose's D-Day and he quotes that the 82nd sustained a 16% casualty rate before they even got into battle. P
In my humble opinion, Market Garden was a bold plan which failed because of faulty intelligence, whereas Varsity was a very straightforward op, nothing hidden on it, the coup de gráce on the already comatose Wehrmacht. Market Garden was a better plan, although very risky, and benefited from very heroic performances by the elite troops involved, which, sadly, couldn´t make up for the basic failure of dropping them on top of hordes of armor. On the other hand, Varsity´s circumstances kind of obscured any snafus that might have been commited; it was bound to suceed no matter what, even if out of sheer weight of men and equipment.
I thought Operation Varsity learnt most of the lessons of the failings of Operation Market Garden. The drop zones were not deep in enemy territory like Market Garden... The DZs and LZs were right in the heart of enemy territory. This was a daylight landing in a heavily defended and fortified area. As to casualties: Market: 1st Airborne, Polish Bde and GPR: about 11,900 in total - of these 12.5% were killed, including those who DoW, drowned during the river evacuation or were shot during atrocities or whilst attempting to escape. 82nd & 101st: about 22,000 in total - of these about 13% were killed. This fighting took place over nine days. Varsity: 6th Airborne: about 8,000 in total - of these 3% were killed. 17th Airborne: about 9,000 in total - of these 4% were killed. These figures from two days of fighting, though the majority of casualties occured during the drop. If you add wounded then, respectively, the figures jump to 12% and 13%. Steve W.
The DZs and LZs were right in the heart of enemy territory. This was a daylight landing in a heavily defended and fortified area. As to casualties: Market: 1st Airborne, Polish Bde and GPR: about 11,900 in total - of these 12.5% were killed, including those who DoW, drowned during the river evacuation or were shot during atrocities or whilst attempting to escape. 82nd & 101st: about 22,000 in total - of these about 13% were killed. This fighting took place over nine days. Varsity: 6th Airborne: about 8,000 in total - of these 3% were killed. 17th Airborne: about 9,000 in total - of these 4% were killed. These figures from two days of fighting, though the majority of casualties occured during the drop. If you add wounded then, respectively, the figures jump to 12% and 13%. Steve W. Steve, So whats your theory on them saying Varsity was the worst Op for Airborne troops? Do you think they are refering to the 'drop day' rather than the whole thing? Cheers Andy
The Market Garden drops were also during the day in enemy territory but the initial landings did not have the high casualty rates as Varsity had. The initial German reaction to Varsity was probably a lot stronger then Market Garden which gave Varsity the high casualty rates but couldn't be sustained due to the Allies overwhelming superiority and the rapid link up with the ground forces. The Market Garden landings were pretty unopposed giving low casualty rates initially but the German opposition gradually built up to overwhelm the Airbourne troops. Add to that the logistics of the 'single road' to relieve them seriously worked against the Allies, numbing their superiority in manpower and equipment and leading to it's ultimate failure.
The Market Garden drops were also during the day in enemy territory but the initial landings did not have the high casualty rates as Varsity had. The initial German reaction to Varsity was probably a lot stronger then Market Garden which gave Varsity the high casualty rates but couldn't be sustained due to the Allies overwhelming superiority and the rapid link up with the ground forces. The Market Garden landings were pretty unopposed giving low casualty rates initially but the German opposition gradually built up to overwhelm the Airbourne troops. Add to that the logistics of the 'single road' to relieve them seriously worked against the Allies, numbing their superiority in manpower and equipment and leading to it's ultimate failure. Market Garden was such a good plan that it took the Hun by surprise, with the result that there was almost no opposition to the initial landings, and thus, light casualties during the actual drops. Varsity, on the other hand, was so strategically predictable that the Nazis knew all the way that such an operation was going to take place, but there wasn´t much they could do about it, with the resources available in that very late stage of the war; however, the defenders were on the alert, resistance was fierce with the stuff at hand, and casualties were inflicted on the paras.
Steve, So whats your theory on them saying Varsity was the worst Op for Airborne troops? Do you think they are refering to the 'drop day' rather than the whole thing? Cheers Andy Andy, If you compare the D-Day for each op then Varsity was the one where the heaviest opposition was encountered, as Mullet94 has said. The two divisions landed on top of the Germans, in some cases quite literally! That MG went on longer than expected, and the lightly armed paratroopers were fighting armoured units, obviously meant the casualty figures would rise accordingly. Steve W.
