TNA Catalogue No WO 201/720 Context: Middle East Forces; Military Headquarters Papers, Second World War, COMBINED OPERATIONS Scope and content: Operation "Flipper": Lt. Colonel Laycock's report Covering dates: 1942 Jan 5 My thanks to ADM199
Eighth Army Dear Brigadier Herewith my official report on Operation "FLIPPER". The delay in forwarding is regretted but I was stricken down on my return here with neuralgia and have not been able to put pen to paper until yesterday. Apparently I owe an explanation in that:- (i) I reported direct to your H.Q. on my return to the British lines (ii) I submitted recommendations for Immediate awards to your AMS this I did because the detachment of the ME Commandos which I commanded was taken out of G.H.Q. reserve and placed under operational control of Eighth Army in October, though I now gather from G.H.Q. here that the fact was never passed on to you by your predecessor. You must therefore have been surprised by my barging in on you at TMIMI, but I had then no idea that you were not expecting me. In addition to the enclosed report I have also prepared an extremely long winded and detailed supplementary report at the request of DOL. Its length is quite out of proportion to the size of the force employed or to the tasks accomplished, and it is only written because of the methods by which this amphibious operation was carried out were a new departure from those usual to Commando proceedure. As, however, much of it concerns the Royal Naval aspect, of the landing, I thought it might possibly be of interest to Captain GRANTHAM and am therefore forwarding a copy to him under separate cover. So many thanks for all you did for myself and Sergeant TERRY on our return to your H.Q. I hope all goes well with you and that we shall meet again in the near future. Yours sincerely R. Laycock 5 January 1942 [Handwritten:] BGS Though I doubt whether this operation achieved a great deal ... [illegible] .. it was undoubtedly a gallant effort. Will you ask AMS whether any names were submitted by LAYCOCK to him for awards?
SECRET SUBJECT: Operation "FLIPPER" EIGHTH ARMY FROM:- O.C. M.E. Commandos 1. A raid against enemy rear installations was carried out by a detachment of the ME Commandos under my command on night 17/18 November. 2. 4 Officers and 25 Other Ranks were landed from H.M. submarines TORBAY and TALISMAN in rubber boats in the vicinity of CHESCHEM-EL-CHELB 3968. Owing however to the fact that the remainder of the force (2 Officers and 28 Other Ranks) was prevented from getting ashore by bad weather, the plan had to be modified and less was achieved than had been hoped for originally. 3. General ROMMEL's house and the admin department of the GERMAN G.H.Q. at SIDI RAFA were attacked. 2 German Staff Officers are known to have been killed and others wounded, whilst several soldiers were also killed and wounded. The electric light plant was put out of action. Our casualties were 1 Officer killed, 1 Officer wounded and Prisoner of War. An attack was made on telephone and telephone communications at CROSS ROAD 632546 and petrol distribution point nearby. Results are not yet known as noone from this detachment has yet returned. 4. The majority of the force returned successfully to the RendezVous near the beach but bad weather prevented re-embarkation though we were in touch by signal with the submarine. We were eventually attack by considerably stronger enemy forces and, after a sharp encounter, in which the only remaining Officer except myself was seriously wounded, we were forced to abandon the vicinity of the beach. As previously arranged, we split into small parties, gained the cover of the JEBEL and lay up to await an opportunity of rejoining our own advance forces. 5. Sergeant TERRY and myself succeeded in rejoining the British forces 41 days after our landing and it is anticipated that the majority of the remainder of the force will also succeed in doing so though no other arrivals have been reported to date. Signed R. LAYCOCK Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding ME Commandos 5 January 1942.
SECRET SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON OPERATION FLIPPER TO: The Directorate of Landings, G.H.Q. ME Captain, First Submarine Flotilla, HMS MEDWAY Senior Naval Officer, att EIGHTH ARMY FROM: Lieutenant-Colonel R.E. LAYCOCK, RHG, OC ME COMMANDOS. REF MAP: 1:100,000 CYRENAICA, Sheet 2, CYRENE. Herewith supplementary report in detail on operations carried out by a detachment of the ME Commandos under my command in the vicinity of SIDI RAFA between 10 November and 18 November 1941. DETACHMENT PLACED UNDER COMMAND 8TH ARMY 6 Officers and 53 Other Ranks ME Commandos were placed under operations command of EIGHTH ARMY in October 1941, and were embarked in HM Submarines TORBAY and TALISMAN at ALEXANDRIA on the afternoon of 10 November 1941 to carry out Operation "FLIPPER" in accordance with Operation Order No.1 (Appendix A Attached). THE PLAN A landing in the enemy back areas was to be attempted in the vicinity of CHESCEN-EL-CHELB 3968 by the detachment paddling themselves ashore from the submarines in rubber boats. The boats each holding 2 men, were then to be made fast to a grass line towed ashore by folbots and hauled back to the submarine. We were to operate if possible on the night D-1/D1 (17/18 November) and, as objectives were some distance from the coast, we sailed so as to arrive off the beach on D-4 in time to carry out a periscope recce by daylight before landing that night. It was appreciated that the Operation might have to be postponed owing to the weather likely to be encountered at this time of year and to the fact that the beach selected was exposed to the prevailing wind. We were instructed to continue our attempts to land until such time as we considered that the condition of the troops had appreciably deteriorated through prolonged confinement in an over-crowded submarine. The chances of a successful re-embarkation on the open beach were also considered questionable and, in the event of evacuation proving impracticable, we were to split into small parties and to lie up until opportunity arose of rejoining our own advancing forces. Four primary objectives were selected and the force correspondingly divided into four detachments. No. 1 Detachment was to raid General ROMMEL's house and the German H.Q. believed to be at BEDA LITTORIA. No. 2 Detachment was to assault the Italian H.Q. at CIRENE. No. 3 Detachment was to assault the Italian Intelligence Centre at APPOLLONIA. No. 4 Detachment was to sabotage the telephone and telegraph communications at the CROSS ROADS 632546. If all went according to plan the detachments landed on the night D-4/4-3, would lie up in a Wadi (previously selected from air photographs) during D-3 and move that night to second RendezVous halfway to their objective. They were to lie up again during daylight and move on night D-2/D-1 to positions from which the objectives could be observed. A daylight recce by command??s was to be carried out on D-1 and primary objectives were to be attacked at 2359 hours night D-1/D1. Action thereafter was to be dependent on conditions encountered. The submarines were to be available for re-embarkations from the 4th to 6th nights after landing had been effected, TORBAY lying off the original beach and TALISMAN off a previously selected alternative beach about 3 miles to the Westward.
-2- ACCOMMODATION OF THE FORCE Troops and stores were loaded tactically in the submarines No. 1 Detachment and H.Q. being accommodated in TORBAY and No.s 2, 3 and 4 Detachments in TALISMAN. I had originally intended to sail in TORBAY with the SNO, but, as Captain GLENNEY 11 COMMANDO, who was to have commanded the detachments in TALISMAN, went sick and the last minute, I decided to transfer to TALISMAN since, for security reasons, insufficient information had been passed on to his junior leaders before sailing and Lieutenant-Colonel KEYES, who was the only other Officer conversant with all details, was accommodated in TORBAY. 5. WESTWARD PASSAGE. TORBAY and TALISMAN weight and proceeded from ALEXANDRIA on the evening of 10 November 1941 and the 4 day passage Westwards was made in fair weather without incident though the wind freshened gradually throughout. Conditions in the submarine were naturally somewhat cramped and surfacing after dusk each evening was a relief. All Ranks were greatly interest in what was to us a novel method of approaching our objective and the soldiers were high in their praise of the way in which they were fed and accommodated. 6. THE LANDING (A) TORBAY A successful periscope recce was carried out by both submarines during daylight on 14 November and that night TORBAY closed the beach shortly after 1830 hours. Pre-arranged signals from the beach were received from Captain HASELDEN and a folbot was launched and reached the beach though there was a considerable swell running. The folbot Officer signalled that the beach was clear of the enemy and that touch had been gained with Captain HASELDEN. The latter had been dropped by LONG RANGE DESERT GROUP and, dressed as an Arab, he had walked to meet us from SLONTA. He had interviewed friendly Arabs and generally found out the situation ashore. (NOTE: It should here be mentioned that Captain HASELDEN's activities were invaluable and this his calculated daring and physical endurance are worthy of the highest praise). On return the folbot Officer made a full report to the submarine but his craft was damaged in attempting to get it aboard. The Raiding Party then took station and, in accordance with a previously rehearsed drill, the rubber boats were brought up through the forward hatch, placed in position on the casing between the forward hydroplanes and the conning tower, inflated by foot pump, and the stores arms and ammunition lashed into them. A life-line which had been rigged fore and aft along the casing was found to be of the greatest assistance. All Ranks were 2 Mae West life jackets. All went well until TORBAY trimmed down preparatory to launching the boats when a sea came aboard and washed 4 of them and one man overboard. TORBAY regained full buoyancy but considerable difficulty was experienced in the dusk in retrieving the lost boats. She trimmed down again and a second attempt was made to launch the boats singly from just abaft the forward hydroplanes. Many of them were however swamped and much time elapsed before they could be righted. The landing was eventually completed by midnight (with the exception of one boat in which an occupant severely damaged his knee) but the evolution had taken 5 hours instead of about 1 hour as calculated from rehearsals. All boats reached the beach but many of them broached to in the surf and the majority of the landing party got ashore wet from at least the waist down. The night was cold but, since there were no enemy in the vicinity it was found possible to light a small fire screened from the landward side in a ruin on the beach.
-3- In the meantime we in the TALISMAN were unable to account for the delay in TORBAY. The weather was deteriorating and the wind came away fresh with more swell. After considerable difficulty a folbot was launched and despatched to TORBAY to find out what was happening but the Officer could not locate her in the dark and returned without news. It was now 5 hours since TORBAY had closed the beach and, unless we could very appreciably shorten the time taken for an exactly similar evolution, it appeared unlikely that we should be able to attempt the landing that night since it was essential for the submarine to proceed to sea at least 2 hours before dawn to recharge her batteries. In any case the weather by this time was far from suitable for operations in rubber boats. No sooner however had the Captain and myself decided to postpone proceedings until the following night, unless we received news by 0030 hours, when a signal reached us from TORBAY saying she had completed disembarkation. We therefore closed the beach with all despatch, took station and trimmed down. The boats were inflated satisfactorily but before an attempt could be made to launch them a heavy sea came aboard and washed many of them off the casing. The majority of the troops hung onto the life line but a few either went overboard after their boats or were washed over the side. Unfortunately most of the men swam back to the submarine instead of to their boats and only Other Ranks and myself succeeded in reaching the shore. As both folbots in TALISMAN were not out of action (one broke up in the surf on the beach and the other was smashed in an attempt to launch her) it was impossible to get the grass line ashore with which to tow our boats back to the submarine and since it was obviously undesirable for the boats to be washed up in enemy territory, I made a signal by electric torch saying:- "We will hide boats ashore. Please try and collect those adrift." (NOTE: It may here be worth recording that there were neither signallers nor sappers with the Raiding Party. The ME Commandos were formed from the remnants of LAYFORCE which had already been partially disbanded and all specialist elements and the majority of the best Officers and Other Ranks had been transferred to other units. I previously warned EIGHTH ARMY that this might prove prejudicial to the success of the Operation which was in fact the case. The demolitions attempted were for the most part ineffective since those responsible for carrying them out had only undergone an elementary and inadequate course in the use of explosives, whereas our original establishment contained a number of highly trained ROYAL ENGINEERS and ROYAL CORPS OF SIGNALS personnel). Touch with the submarine was extremely difficult to maintain since I was the only person ashore with a knowledge of the morse code and such messages as I sent were made with a torch which had no proper key but a switch which had to be pushed off and on. I do not know how many of my signals were readable. 7. STORES Arms, ammunition, field glasses, watches, compasses, explosives and rations had been wrapped in water-proof material and lashed to the boats. With a few exceptions they reached the shore undamaged in spite of total submersion. Such explosives as failed to detonate later were affected, not by the sea water, but by the torrential rain experienced ashore after they had been unpacked. 8. MODIFICATION OF THE PLAN The party ashore remained under cover in the vicinity of the beach for about 1 1/2 hours during which time all the boats were hidden in a cave. As no other personnel arrived from TALISMAN it appeared that she had abandoned all attempts to land the remainder of her party until the next night. We therefore proceeded to our previously selected RendezVous in a deep Wadi about 1 mile from the shore leaving Lieutenant PRIOR and one Other Rank (bot folbotists on the beach).
-4- We lay up in the Wadi for the remainder of the night and during the hours of daylight on the next day (November 15). It was now open to me to adopt one of the two alternatives. I could either:- (1) Await the landing of TALISMAN's party and adhere to the original plan OR (2) Despatch the party already ashore immediately to carry out a considerably modified programme, using TALISMAN's party as a reserve when it arrrived. Although obviously more was likely to be accomplished through surprise effect on all objectives if I adopted the first alternative, nevertheless I was influenced into accepting the second by two factors which I considered of paramount importance. First I had been definitely instructed by EIGHTH ARMY that any operations would be of the greatest value to our own main forces if carried out on the night D-1/D1, and secondly the weather now looked far from promising. The wind was backing and there was still considerable sea running which might well prevent further landings (which in fact proved the case). I therefore modified the plan as follows:- I limited the primary objectives to the two considered most important and place Lieutenant-Colonel KEYES in command of No. 1 Detachment. As originally planned he was to attack the German H.Q. and General ROMMEL's house. He had with him Captain CAMPBELL and 17 Other Ranks. Lieutenant COOK commanded No. 2 Detachment with orders to sabotage the communications at the cross roads South of CIRENE. I allotted him 3 Other Ranks from TORBAY and 3 of the Other Ranks who had landed from TALISMAN. (NOTE: It is unfortunate that no one from the original party detailed for this task, who were equipped with special stores and had carefully rehearsed the plan, succeeded in landing). Captain HASELDON informed me that his party were prepared to undertake to cut communications on the road EL-FRIDIA - SLONTA. I decided to remain at the RendezVous with a Sergeant and 2 Other Ranks with the dump of reserve ammunition and rations and to operate with the remainder of the force on its arrival. Detachments were to move off at last light and were to send back information at the earliest possible moment. If necessary, they were to return on completion of primary tasks, but in any case they were to come back to the RendezVous and not to the beach. 9. BEACH RECCE Detachments moved off from the RendezVous with Arab guides at 1900 hours. That night I visited the beach but the heavy surf obviously precluded any possibility of landing and no sign could be seen of either submarine. I returned to the RendezVous. 10. THE APPROACH MARCH The Arab guides leading the two Detachments refused to accompany them for more than a few miles, they therefore selected a suitable Wadi and slept for 4 hours. 16th NOVEMBER The weather, which had already impeded our landing now continued to prejudice operations. Half a gale of wind alternated with torrential rain and All Ranks were literally soaked to the skin for the second time. The nights were extremely cold. Detachments continued their march towards objectives but they lay up again at first light. They were apprehended by a party of Arabs, who proved to be friendly and who guided them at dusk to a RendezVous about 10 miles distant from BEDA LITTORIAL where they dumped surplus clothing and rations and slept for the remainder of the night.
-5- 11. BEACH PROVISIONS After dark I revisited the beach but there was still a heavy surf breaking and conditions were obviously impossible for landing 12. MOVE TO OBJECTIVES (17th NOVEMBER) Torrential rain continued. The Detachment lay up until dark and moved at 1900 hours to the vicinity of their objectives. The condition of the troops, who were both cold and soaked to the skin, left much to be desired. (NOTE: Information previously received from Captain HASELDEN was here confirmed by Arabs who were convinced that General ROMMEL and his staff Officers lived in a house at SIDI RAFA and not in the building at BEDA LITTORIA as originall indicated in our Intelligence Summary. The former was therefore selected as the objective.) No. 1 Detachment was guided to within a few hundred yards of the house by friendly Arabs and lay up awaiting Zero Hour (2359 hours). They were here apprehended by another party of uniformed Arabs, presumably Carabinier whose suspicions were however allayed by Captain CAMPBELL explaining to them in GERMAN that our forces were part of a German Unit. In the meantime No. 2 Detachment had moved off to the cross roads South of CIRENE. 13. THE ASSULT (A) No. 1 DETACHMENT Lieutenant-Colonel KEYES detailed his party at follows:- He himself with Captain CAMPBELL and Sergeant TERRY were to enter and search the house. The remainder of his Detachment, less a party of 3 Other Ranks detailed to put the electric light plant out of action, being disposed so as to prevent enemy interference. 5 Other Ranks were to watch the exits from the guard tent and car park, 2 Other Ranks were posted outside the nearby hotel to prevent anyone leaving it and 2 Other Ranks were placed on the road on each side of the house. The remaining 2 Other Ranks were left to guard whichever entrance Colonel KEYES used to gain access to the building. All parties were in position just before midnight and a recce was made of the house. Unable to find a way through the back premises or windows, Colonel KEYES' party walked up to the front door and beat upon it, Captain CAMPBELL demanding access in German. The door was eventually opened by a sentry who was set upon but could not be overpowered silently and was therefore shot by Captain CAMPBELL which aroused the H.Q. and vicinity. Two men tried to come down stairs from the first floor but thought better of it on being met by a burst of fire from Sergeant TERRY's Tommy Gun. No one attempted to leave the rooms on the ground floor but the lights in them were turned out. No enemy emerged from the guard tent or the Hotel but two Germans carrying lights appeared running towards the house where they were shot by our sentries. KEYES and CAMPBELL started to make a search of the ground floor but the occupants of the second room they entered were waiting for them and Lieutenant-Colonel KEYES who had opened the door, was met by a burst of fire and fell back into the passage mortally wounded. Sergeant TERRY emptied 2 magazines of his Tommy Gun into the darkened room and Captain CAMPBELL silenced the party by throwing in a grenade and slamming the door. Together they carried Lieutenant-Colonel KEYES outside where he died almost immediately. While he was attending to him Captain CAMPBELL was hit by a stray bullet which broke his lower leg. On the whole the enemy seems to have been taken completely by surprise and put up little resistance. Two German Staff Officers are known to have been killed and others wounded, whilst several soldiers were killed and wounded. It is however particularly unfortunate that General ROMMEL himself was absent attending a birthday party in ROME. A few shots were heard at some distance from the house, but as they did not come from the direction in which our troops were posted, it is hoped that the enemy were shooting at each other.
-6- Captain CAMPBELL, who was now lying wounded outside the house, ordered Sergeant TERRY to concentrate the Detachment and tell them to throw all remaining grenades through any available windows before retiring to their operational RendezVous preparatory to withdrawal to the beach. Captain CAMPBELL, realising that a superhuman effort would be required to carry him back over 18 miles of precipitous country entailing a descent of some 2,000 feet, ordered himself to be abandoned. In the meantime the party who had attacked the electric light plant had been partially successful. Although they failed to demolish the dynamo completely, as the match head strikers for the charges had been rendered useless by the torrential rain, they nevertheless succeeded in putting it out of action by exploding a grenade on the armature. (B ) No. 2 DETACHMENT Details of the result of the assault of No. 2 Detachment are not available since no one from it has yet been reported as having rejoined our forcses. Captured enemy documents however indicate that an explosion took place at the cross roads South of CYRENE, that a petrol distribution post (at which the attendants were unarmed) was attacked, and that our Detachment made good its escape. 14 NOW APPARENT REMAINDER OF FORCE COULD NOT LAND During the night 17/18 November I again revisited the beach but weather conditions were still hopeless and no sign could be seen of TALISMAN. I now abandoned all hope of my reserve getting ashore as the next night (18/19) had been fixed as the first on which evacuation might be possible and TALISMAN had contracted to lie off the alternative beach. 15. WITHDRAWAL TO THE BEACH (18 NOVEMBER) Sergeant TERRY led back his party during the early hours of 18 November. He was unable to find their last hiding place in the darkness and therefore decided to abandon the reserve clothing and rations which had been left there. After a short sleep they marched throughout the day and reported to meet at our original RendezVous at 1700 hours that evening. Up to this time our casualties were:- Lieutenant-Colonel KEYES killed, Captain CAMPBELL wounded and POW, Lieutenant COOK and 6 Other Ranks missing. 16. ATTEMPTED RE-EMBARKATION During the remaining hour of daylight I returned to the beach with an orderly to make a recce. Lieutenant PRIOR (the folbot Officer) who met me there reported that friendly Arabs had returned and considering that the cave in which we had hidden our boats was unsuitable, had moved them but had departed without showing us the new hiding place. A situation which was most aggravating. A survey of the weather was not wholly unpromising. The wind had continued strong but there was certainly less swell than on the two previous days. I considered that we had a fairish chance of evacuation provided that the submarine could launch a folbot and get a line ashore. Our difficulty was that we were now without boats and it would therefore be necessary to ask for a number of life jackets to be sent ashore. (NOTE: During my absence on the beach an incident occurred which I belive led to the enemy sending superior forces to locate us. An unfriendly Arab happened upon the party at the RendezVous in the Wadi and made off at great pace keeping cover as much as possible. We had been previously warned by the Sinoussi that other tribes were likely to give us away if they saw us. Sergeant TERRY did not open fire as he had no desire to start a local battle with the Arabs (in which I think he acted wisely), but sent a message reporting the occurrence to me). As it was now getting dark I sent my orderly with a message ordering the Detachment down to the caves near the beach, since I wished both to save time in re-embarkation (which I now hoped would be possible that night) and also to elude the enemy if they sent a search party to the Wadi. I left one Sergeant and 2 men to move the dump of reserve rations and water further down the Wadi and to keep a look-out for the return of Lieutenant COOK's party.
-7- Shortly after dark I sighted TORBAY through my field glasses - she was fully surfaced and about 1/4 mile out to sea. I immediately made a signal requesting her to send in a folbot with a grass line and life jackets. A long wait ensued and I began to fear that there must be more swell running out at sea than was apparent from the beach. I made several signals repeating my request, but, as already stated, my torch was not suitable for the purpose and I do not know how many of my messages were readable. "F" procedure (from beach to submarine only) had been previously decided upon but, as no enemy appeared in the vicinity after a considerable lapse of time, I concluded that it would not be prejudicial to security if the submarine showed some acknowledgement confirming thereby that she had read my signals. I therefore made:- "If you cannot launch folbot please make three dashes" this signal was not answered. I therefore left a look-out on the beach and returned to the cave and informed the troops, who were in a very exhausted condition, that evacuation that night was unlikely. Lieutenant PRIOR now reported to me that the friendly Arabs had returned and had disclosed the new hiding place to which they had moved our boats. I had not been long in the cave before the lookout returned from the beach to say that TORBAY was now signalling by morse lamp. I ran back to the beach and, as far as I can remember, the following messages were passed:- TORBAY: "No more tonight - too rough - try again tomorrow - no more (flashing?) from me tonight" ANSWER: "Thank you - good night" As I was leaving the beach for the second time I was surprised to see TORBAY open again. She made:- TORBAY: "How many are you - what have you don with your Mae Wests" I replied: "22 All Ranks - have now found boats and Mae Wests" TORBAY: "What luck your operations" REPLY: "Good work - messed up their HQ but sad casualties - KEYES Killed - CAMPBELL, COOK and 6 ORs missing" TORBAY: "If there is danger tomorrow and you would like to swim I am prepared to close point West of beach otherwise try again tomorrow night" This was indeed a tempting offer but, after close consideration I cam to the conclusion that the troops in their exhausted condition would almost certainly be drowned in attempting to swim from a rocky foreshore against surf wind and sea. I therefore replied: "Will try again tomorrow night" TORBAY made "am sending a boat with food and water" (So accurately did she gauge the direction of the wind that the boat drifted in and arrived on the beach within 20 yards of me) I replied: "Boat has arrived - thank you Good Night" having received "Good Night" from TORBAY I returned to the cave. I visited the Sentries and retired to sleep leaving instructions that I was to be awakened one hour before first light.
-8- ? -9- An hour before first light I ordered all-round defensive positions to be adopted. The main body remained in the vicinity of the caves covering our Northern front whilst 2 smaller Detachments were placed so as to protect the Eastern and Western flanks with sentry posts pushed well forward commanding an extensive field of vision. 3 Other Ranks remained in the Wadi to the North. All was quiet until about midday when a few shots were heard from the direction of the Wadi and from Westermost sentry group. At first the only enemy to be observed were "Carabinieri" Arabs known to be stationed at HANIA about 8 miles to our West. This did not worry us unduly since we were confident that we should be able to drive them off until darkness allowed us to retire to the beach for evacuation which now seemed feasible as wind and sea were rapidly abating. I sent 2 small parties from the main body to outflank the enemy but it soon became evident that they were not on a wide enough front or in sufficient numbers as detachments of Germans now appeared moving South towards us down the Western side of the Wadi, whilst further Carabinieri forces came from the West. Later, what appeared to be considerable party of Italians showed themselves on the sky line about a mile to our North but took no party in the battle. Fairly accurate fire was brought to bear on us but we were behind good cover and suffered no casualties though it was feared that the party in the Wadi had been over run. It is difficult to assess the number of casualties inflicted on the enemy but it is feared that they were few since their advance was well conducted in excellent cover. The detachment sent to outflank the enemy to the East was held up after advancing a few hundred yards but succeeded in rejoining our position. The Detachment to the West advanced about 1/4 mile before the Tommy Gunners's gun jammed and became useless. He and the Private with him were pinned to the ground, but Lieutenant PRIOR gallantly continued the advance single-handed and, using over and firing his revolver he attempted to deceive the enemy into thinking that an outflanking operation was still in progress. He was eventually shot through the thigh, but managed to crawl back to the main position. Although the enemy were not equipped with automatic weapons they were maintaining a steady advance and bringing a considerable volume of rifle fire to bear on and around our position. It was now evident that it would be impossible to hold the beach until dark against such superior forces and that our only remaining line of retreat Eastward would soon be cut off. At about 1400 hours I therefore reluctantly decided to abandon the position and to adopt the alternative plan of hiding in the JEBEL until we could rejoin our advancing main forces.
-10- Nothing could be seen of our Western Detachment whose original position was now occupied by the enemy and, as a runner sent to recce returned with negative information, I presumed that they had been killed, captured or driven Westwards. I ordered the main body to split into parties of not more than 3 men each, to make a dash across the open and to retire through our Eastern Detachment to whom they were to pass on my orders. They were then to gain the cover of the JEBAL and to adopt whichever of three alternatives seemed most propitious:- 1. Under cover of darkness to return later to the alternative beach off which TALISMAN would be laying until just before first light on the nigh 20/21 November. 2. To make their way to the area of SLONTA in which vicinity the Arabs were known to be friendly and where there was a chance of being picked up by LONG RANGE DESERT GROUP. 3. To hide in the Wadis North of the CIRENE escarpment until news of our forces was received. Leaving a medical orderly with Lieutenant PRIOR, whom I feared might otherwise bleed to death I ordered them to surrender, and made goo my escape. On reaching the position originally held by our Eastern Detachment I found Sergeant TERRY waiting for me and we set off together. The first 1/2 mile of the withdrawal was unpleasant owing to the open nature of the country but the enemy's marksmanship seems to have been particularly poor, and, though we had some close shaves, I do not believe that we suffered a single casualty since Sergeant TERRY and myself would almost certainly have observed any which had occurred. ACTION SUBSEQUENT TO THE WITHDRAWAL Little is yet known of what occurred to the Detachment after it split up. Sergeant TERRY and myself succeeded in joining the British Forces at CIRENE 41 days after our landing and it is anticipated that the majority of the remainder of the force will do so though no further arrivals have yet been reported. It is feared from information received later from the Sinoussi that a certain number were subsequently killed on taken Prisoner though such information is necessarily vague as I cannot speak Arabic. Sergeant TERRY and myself attempted to gain the alternative beach on the first and second nights but were frustrated by the enema whom we contacted near the original beach and considerably further to the Northward. We therefore abandoned the project and retired Eastwards. We found little difficulty in avoiding search parties since the cover in the JEBAL is excellent and having a good pair of field glasses I could usually spot Germans or Italians at considerable distances. Our greater fear was being stalked by the Carabinieri Arabs who moved much more cleverly by tracking and who got close to us on several occasions during the first few days. Nothing could be seen of our Western Detachment whose original position was now occupied by the enemy and, as a runner sent to recce returned with negative information, I presumed that they had been killed, captured or driven Westwards. I ordered the main body to split into parties of not more than 3 men each, to make a dash across the open and to retire through our Eastern Detachment to whom they were to pass on my orders. They were then to gain the cover of the JEBAL and to adopt whichever of three alternatives seemed most propitious:- 1. Under cover of darkness to return later to the alternative beach off which TALISMAN would be laying until just before first light on the nigh 20/21 November. 2. To make their way to the area of SLONTA in which vicinity the Arabs were known to be friendly and where there was a chance of being picked up by LONG RANGE DESERT GROUP. 3. To hide in the Wadis North of the CIRENE escarpment until news of our forces was received. Leaving a medical orderly with Lieutenant PRIOR, whom I feared might otherwise bleed to death I ordered them to surrender, and made goo my escape. On reaching the position originally held by our Eastern Detachment I found Sergeant TERRY waiting for me and we set off together. The first 1/2 mile of the withdrawal was unpleasant owing to the open nature of the country but the enemy's marksmanship seems to have been particularly poor, and, though we had some close shaves, I do not believe that we suffered a single casualty since Sergeant TERRY and myself would almost certainly have observed any which had occurred. ACTION SUBSEQUENT TO THE WITHDRAWAL Little is yet known of what occurred to the Detachment after it split up. Sergeant TERRY and myself succeeded in joining the British Forces at CIRENE 41 days after our landing and it is anticipated that the majority of the remainder of the force will do so though no further arrivals have yet been reported. It is feared from information received later from the Sinoussi that a certain number were subsequently killed on taken Prisoner though such information is necessarily vague as I cannot speak Arabic. Sergeant TERRY and myself attempted to gain the alternative beach on the first and second nights but were frustrated by the enema whom we contacted near the original beach and considerably further to the Northward. We therefore abandoned the project and retired Eastwards. We found little difficulty in avoiding search parties since the cover in the JEBAL is excellent and having a good pair of field glasses I could usually spot Germans or Italians at considerable distances. Our greater fear was being stalked by the Carabinieri Arabs who moved much more cleverly by tracking and who got close to us on several occasions during the first few days.
-11- Later however, having made friends with the Sinoussi tribes, we adopted the enjoyable policy of moving each night into the very Wadis which the enemy were known to have searched during the day. Our greatest problem was the lack of food and, though never desperate, we were forced to subsist for periods which never exceeded 2 1/2 consecutive days on berries only, and we became appreciably weak for want of nourishment. At other times we fed well on goat and Arab bread but developed a marked craving for sugar. Water never presented a serious proposition as it rained practically continuously. Our failure to obtain reliable information of the advance of the British forces we found aggravating in the extreme. 20. CO-OPERATION OF THE ROYAL NAVY I feel that it should be placed on record that All Ranks under my command expressed a most sincere appreciation for the cooperation afforded to us by the ROYAL NAVY during the time in which we were in company with TORBAY and TALISMAN. Nothing seemed to be too much trouble to either Officers or Ratings in their efforts to render us every assistance and their admirable seamanship on the night of our landing undoubtedly prevented the loss of many lives. R. LAYCOCK Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding, ME Commandos
APPENDIX A to REPORT ON OPERATION FLIPPER MOST SECRET - NOT TO BE TAKEN ASHORE 9 NOVEMBER 1941 11 Commando O.O. No. 1 Ref. Map 1:100,000 CIRENE, Sheet 2 INFORMATION 1. Enemy Various German and Italian H.Q.s and Admin installations are located in the area which is many miles in rear of enemy main defences. A few coast watchers may be encountered. 2. Own Troops (i) Our main forces are making a large scale attack on LIBYA but are not expected to enter the area until later. (ii) Captain HASELDEN and three Officers GR Pool are being drooped by LONG RANGE DESERT GROUP in attempt to join us near beaches. (iii) Two Officers and two Other Ranks FOLBOT Detachment under command from 1500 hours 10th October. (iv) ROYAL AIR FORCE are bombing roads LUIGI DI SAVOIA - RAZZA and RAS BATTA - FAIDIA from 19 November onwards. INTENTION 3. Detachment 11 COMMANDO will carry out raid to inflict maximum possible damage to enema H.Q.s, Communications and Installations. METHOD 4. Embarkation Detachment will embark H.M. Submarines TORBAY and TALISMAN and will be accommodated as shown in Appendix A. They will proceed to sea under Orders S.1. 5. Beaches (i) Landing will be attempted at Beach 1 CHESSEM EL CHELA 395685 (ii) Alternative beaches 2 - 10 see tracing 1 attached. 6. Removal of Traces of Landing After landing has been completed Detachment FOLBOTS will rake over footprints and make thorough search for any stores etc which might leave traces of landing. 7. Detachments and Tasks (i) Composition of Detachments - See Appendix B (ii) Primary and Secondary Tasks Primary tasks only are given below. Detachment Commanders will ensure that opportunity objectives are dealt with wherever encountered. A thorough search will be made for telephone and telegraph communications, aircraft, dumps, convoys and DRs. Secondary tasks will NOT be engaged before Zero on the third night after landing (See paragraph 8) (iii) Detachment No. 1 Commander Lieutenant-Colonel KEYES GERMAN H.Q. at BEDA LITTORIAL Commander-in-Chief's house 1/2 mile West and comns on road (iv) Detachment No. 2 Commander Lieutenant SUTHERLAND ITALIAN H.Q. at CIRENE and comns on cross roads 632546 (v) Detachment No. 3 Commander Lieutenant CHEVALIER W/T Station and Intelligence Centre APPOLLONIA (alternative - landing group RAF billets, power station) (vi) Detachment No. 4 Commander Captain HASELDEN Comns road FAIDIA - LAMLUDR 8. Timings, Withdrawal and Re-embarkation (i) Landing in rubber boats will be carried out on first night considered suitable by ROYAL NAVY. Night Force succeeds in getting ashore will be known as the NIGHT OF LANDING, the following day as the FIRST DAY ASHORE and the following night as the FIRST NIGHT AFTER LANDING. Subsequent days will be known s the 2nd, 3rd, 4th etc. DAYS ASHORE and subsequent nights as the 2nd, 3rd, 4th et NIGHTS AFTER LANDING. (ii) Landing will NOT be attempted after night 21/22 November (iii) Night of Landing Force will move to RendezVous in vicinity 402665 and dump reserve ammunition, supplies and water. (iv) First day ashore Force lies up. (v) First night after Landing Detachments move towards objective. (vi) Second day ashore Detachments lie up. (vii) Second Night after Landing Detachments move to areas from which daylight recce of objective can be carried out. (viii) Third Day ashore Detachments lie up in concealed positions carry out daylight recce and dump material not required in assault. (ix) Third Night after Landing Detachments attack objective and withdraw to dump (x) Fourth Day Ashore Detachments lie up. (xi) Subsequent Nights and Days Detachments attack opportunity objectives and withdraw to RV for re-embarkation as situation dictates. ALL RANKS MUST BE WARNED NOT TO WITHDRAW DIRECT TO BEACH. (xii) A submarine will lie off Beach 1 on the 4th, 5th and 6th nights after landing. All personnel MUST therefore return to RV by 2 hours before first light or before moonset on the 6th NIGHT AFTER LANDING. (xiii) If original beach held by enemy, Detachments will move to beach 6 where second submarine will lie off. 9. Action of Withdrawal to Beaches or re-embarkation impossible. Detachments will restock from reserve dump at RV and will take to the hills and lie up and subsist as best they can on local resources until such time as they can join our own forces. LONG RANGE DESERT GROUP is establishing RV at SLONTA about 12 miles SOUTH of BEDA LITTORIA. 10. Limit of Manoeuvres Detachments will NOT operate beyond area covered by map. 11. Points to NOTE for NCOs. See Appendix C attached. ADMIN 12. Admin orders issued separately INTERCOMN 13. H.Q. Opens RV on night of landing. Subsequent moved notified before Detachments move off. 14. Passwords and Recognition Signs (i) Challenge - ISLAND. Countersign - ARRAN (ii) Short flashes green torch. (iii) from beach to submarine Requesting boats for re-embarkation four dashes repeated three times. 15. Arab guides Guides will accompany Detachments No.s 1 and 2. 16. Watches will be synchronised each night at sea at 2000 hours. 17. Command In event H.M.S. TALSIMAN not arrival, Lieutenant-Colonel KEYES will assume command and will attempt such operations as is considered practicable. 18. Table of moonrise and moonset See Appendix D attached 19. Zero Hour 2359 hours on THIRD NIGHT AFTER LANDING. THESE ORDERS WILL NOT BE TAKEN ASHORE. MAPS WILL NOT BE MARKED. R. LAYCOCK Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding ME COMMANDOS
Is it true that Keyes was accidently shot in the back by his own party while he was wrestling with the German sentry at the door of the HQ? Saw a t.v. show on the raid last week which mentioned it.
