Operation Varsity - how should it be viewed?

Discussion in 'NW Europe' started by GPRegt, Nov 26, 2012.

  1. GPRegt

    GPRegt Senior Member

    In Gooseman's thread on the May 1940 invasion/defence of Holland I read the following:

    Operation Varsity, being more of a show of force in the dying moments of the war on the continent, cannot be seen as a genuine airlanding operation of that kind.

    I responded:

    Gooseman

    That's a thought-provoking point of view which I'd be interested in seeing developed.

    And received this reply:

    ...let me say, that Varsity was a nice show of force against a devastated opponent, that to my opinion, was a toy-operation by Sir Bernhard, in revenge of his massive failure in the Market-Garden operation six months earlier. Because Varsity was launched against a crumbling defence and an opponent that lacked basically everything. The applause on the eleged success of the operation, that can be read here and there, I find quite unearnt. It was much like the Germans gaining a win on the Dutch army in 1940 with their airborne operation, that was sort of in the state the German remnants were in, when Varsity was launched over them. Varsity, to my opinion, was particularly something that Montgomery needed.

    I felt that this topic needed a thread of its own, where it can be discussed and debated.

    So, I’ll begin by saying that, in my opinion, Varsity was far from being a show of force and can, in every way, be considered a genuine airlanding operation. That it was launched in March 1945 was through circumstance; but for the German offensive in the Ardennes it would have happened at the end of January (It was one of three operations planned by First Allied Airborne Army to support Allied assaults into Germany).



    Even in March, after the Germans had been battered and bruised and crossed the Rhine, they were still a determined enemy which had to be overcome. The German troops which dug in around Wesel and Hamminkeln were far from finished and were not submissive; that's why the Allied Generals had to put as many men into the field as they could. The defenders of the Fatherland had to be overwhelmed and contained. This took place in a genuine airlanding operation, which learned from the lessons of Market Garden; it used tactical landings, linked up paratroops with gliderborne troops; airborne division with airborne division and these with ground troops. If it had been simply a show of force then the Germans, on seeing their attackers descending from the skies, would have thrown down their weapons and raised their hands; but they didn’t do either of those, initially, they fought hard and inflicted a lot of casualties.






    Steve W.
     
  2. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

    I see one of the main benefits of Op Varsity is that it allowed 21stAG to beat the Soviets to Luebeck.
     
  3. squeakyclean

    squeakyclean Member

    As a 'living historian' (boo, hiss), I've always been interested in the viewpoint of the man on the ground, in the air or on the water. Hindsight is a wonderful thing and today we are extremely privileged in being able to look back at history and voice our opinions, the men (or women) of the time were not afforded this luxury.

    So, what did Varsity look like to them? Of course, they had the recent experiences of Normandy and Arnhem still ringing in their ears, but did Varsity really look like 'a show of force' to them, they'd have absolutely no idea that the War would be finished within the year or that the operation would ultimately succeed, and open up the front to such an extent that Russia's forces in the East could take advantage and bring down the final hammer blow on an extremely tenacious enemy.

    I'm pretty certain that the participants of this massive airborne operation did not view the opposition as 'crumbling', surely? Quite the opposite in fact, the massive Allied casualty list is enough to disprove the 'beaten enemy' theory.

    Also, I can't see that Monty (or any of the high command for that) would've been prepared to throw away an Airborne Division at Arnhem in the first place, never mind then trying to repeat the process on a larger scale only a few months later just to make a point and/or save their necks?

    Just my to'penneth.
     
    Dave55 likes this.
  4. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Very Senior Member

    I've seen this argument in SO many forms in forums in the last few years - was this operation necessary in the closing stages of the war, was that operation necessary, etc., etc...the Bomber Command campaign against the last of Germany's undamaged major cities for instance.

    But the counter always HAS to be the same - against a brutal enemy like the Nazis, intent on taking it right down to the wire...you fight and keep fighting. Backpedalling was giving the wrong signal - and always will be! - that you are weak and not ready to go the final yard; that something will make you pause, that something will bring you to the negotiating table.

    Is this really, honestly, a signal you should be giving in wartime?
     
  5. A-58

    A-58 Not so senior Member

    The end goal of the war was unconditional surrender, and from what I've learned so far the Germans were not going to surrender while Hitler was alive and calling the shots. To not push on to that end would and to rest at the Rhine would mean what, static warfare like the type of action on the perimeter of bypassed areas? The Rooskies would have overrun more territory than was allotted to them at Yalta, and probably would not "un-occupy" those areas willfully and cheerfully and speedily. We had to keep going until the Germans surrendered. I believe that Operation Varsity should be viewed as necessary.
     
  6. Albowie

    Albowie Junior Member

    Quite simply put - yes. The majority of the qulaity German Forces were arrayed against the COmmonwealth Armies in the north unlike the scattered German forces infront of the fortuitous US crossing at Remagen. If Plunder had not taken place then these forces could have used against the flanks of the US forces. The amount of materiel and men lost by the Germans in Plunder could have delayed the Western Allied advance for weeks more and the Post War Geo political map would have been a very different makeup with the Soviets in Denmark, the Northern German Baltic Ports and probably Norway.
    The Question most of these revisionist historians should be asking in Why the US Army that was across the Rhine in force before Remagen weren't reinforced and made the point of attack? probably a case of Large EGO's in the US leadership to rival Montgomery's
    Al
     
  7. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

    The Question most of these revisionist historians should be asking in Why the US Army that was across the Rhine in force before Remagen weren't reinforced and made the point of attack? probably a case of Large EGO's in the US leadership to rival Montgomery's
    Al
    Please clarify.
    Are you suggesting that SHAEF didn't throw a greater effort behind the 12th AG bridgehead at Remagen and went ahead fully with Varsity as a slight to the Commander of the 21st AG?
     
    A-58 likes this.
  8. Albowie

    Albowie Junior Member

    Please clarify.
    Are you suggesting that SHAEF didn't throw a greater effort behind the 12th AG bridgehead at Remagen and went ahead fully with Varsity as a slight to the Commander of the 21st AG?

    Not at all, I am saying that one of the US divisions coming from the South of France was across the Rhine before Remagen but ordered back.
    I am defending Plunder as a necessary operation in response to the original thread.

    A lot of the histoies written in the last twenty years slam Varsity/Plunder as a great waste of resource however I would like a crystal ball to see what would have happened if it had not gone ahead. SHEAF rightly in my opinion went ahead with Varsity/Plunder and reinforced the 12AG group keeping the pressure on two fronts (three if you count the Russians). If they had not then the whole flank of 12AG would have been exposed as most of the German Forces were in the North and could have been used against the 12AG unhindered by the 21AG.

    My comment about Ego's is equally valid regarding Monty as it is with certain US Generals who have fuelled (erroneously IMHO) the whole Monty Debate (Sicily, Normandy, Rhine etc). Facts rarely if ever back these up.
     
  9. Wills

    Wills Very Senior Member

  10. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

    Not at all, I am saying that one of the US divisions coming from the South of France was across the Rhine before Remagen but ordered back.

    I would like to see a valid source supporting this claim.

    Above, you were saying "across the river in force", now you are saying it was a division. While it is still a large formation, it is still too large to cross a river such as the Rhine, (even narrow as it is to the south) then get pulled back without someone, especially the men of the division, noticing and raising a ruckus about it at the time and postwar. Regardless, the US 7th Army had not closed to the Rhine before the 1st Army crossing at Remagen was secured.


    A lot of the histoies written in the last twenty years slam Varsity/Plunder as a great waste of resource however I would like a crystal ball to see what would have happened if it had not gone ahead. SHEAF rightly in my opinion went ahead with Varsity/Plunder and reinforced the 12AG group keeping the pressure on two fronts (three if you count the Russians). If they had not then the whole flank of 12AG would have been exposed as most of the German Forces were in the North and could have been used against the 12AG unhindered by the 21AG.

    Huh? How would 12th AG on the west bank of Rhine be threatened by the German Army at all? Bear in mind that I am not arguing against the operation. I'm confused about your logic and reasoning.
    My comment about Ego's is equally valid regarding Monty as it is with certain US Generals who have fuelled (erroneously IMHO) the whole Monty Debate (Sicily, Normandy, Rhine etc). Facts rarely if ever back these up.
    Take it up with whomever these "certain US generals" are. But I will say this: no general (and no person, for that matter) ever makes perfect decisions. That is beauty of Monday morning quarterbacking. People can make claims pro or con about differing outcomes to a problem, but there is no way to prove any of it.B)
     
  11. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    Hindsight is always 20/20. There are several factors at play in how Varsity came to executed the way it did.

    1. It was the British Army way. If that is the same as personified by Montgomery, fine. But left to their own devices the British army played for the set pieces. There is a lot that can go wrong with a river crossing, even against an enemy which is supposedly beaten. Op Neptune, a bounce crossing of the Seine went horribly wrong at the start and lets not start on Op Market Garden.

    2. Statements about the value or irrelevance of Op Varsity may be influenced by whether the originator was pro or against strategic airborne troops or competing with their commanders for glory and post war jobs. Bradley and his boys don't seem to want anything to do with the US Airborne troops - except as extra infantry. Its Monty who is happy to play with the paras and writes a starring role. Possibly the paras didn't want to miss out on the last chance of a drop.
     
  12. idler

    idler GeneralList

    Another angle: perhaps it was seen as the final opportunity to use the airborne formations in a suitable - not overly-suicidal - role? The alternatives would have been to let them sit out the war, or fritter them away as infantry reinforcements - use 'em or lose 'em?
     
  13. majormike2279

    majormike2279 Junior Member

    Hi All

    Reading through this topic, I was interested in some of the points made. However, my research on Varsity (still an ongoing thing), I think a couple of points should be born in mind ...
    1. An opposed river crossing across an obstacle the size of the Rhine ... I can't believe that any of the ground forces weren't anything but immensely relieved to have had the airborne going in to negate the defences that they would otherwise have had to face, especially the artillery around the Scweppenburg feature or the bridges that could be used to send reinforcements against the bridgehead.
    2. A drive to destroy what was left of the German war industry would most easily be achieved from Montgomery's position, not from Remagen.
    3. 'Moderation in war is imbecility' - Jackie Fisher's comment is one I can't help but agree with.

    On the other hand, you can't help but look at the landing of the gliders for 6 Air Landing Brigade and think that a greater delay would have been prudent. This was one of the lessons to emerge, which showed that the evolution of airborne forces was still taking place.

    Overall though, as one of the previous posts highlighted, the enemy was fighting right to the bitter end. The fighting around Hamminkeln and Wesel may have been brief (certainly compared to other operations) but easy it wasn't!

    Just my tuppence worth.
     
    Joop de Lange Dutch and merdiolu like this.
  14. 17thairborne

    17thairborne Member

    Just to add to the question of Varsity; the issue of its secrecy, or lack thereof. Many of the veterans were sure the Germans had the specific information on the Operation and they were going to make the going all the more tough. I think it plays into the overall discussion of the necessity/validity of the operation.

    Addressing the issue of whether the Operation’s secrecy was compromised or not; I consider it an entire book in its own right. It would take another few years of research for me to present a case either way. My current feeling about the entire matter is that the Germans were smart enough to analyze a map and knew the strategic objective in the region well enough to rule out most of the areas where an Airborne Operation would not occur. They simply made a strategic calculation and placed their forces in a manner which would allow them the flexibility to respond to the small variations that would occur in final location.

    As for the radio broadcasts to the troops before the operation, I think a large part of it was to attempt to shatter the confidence in the paras before the jump. Knowing the nature of the tough, brawling, combat hardened men that they were, I doubt it had any adverse affect on any other than the newest and youngest replacements. Now…that still leaves open the possibility that somehow, the Germans gleaned some intelligence about the specifics of Operation VARSITY. There is evidence to that effect. Perhaps a document was copied, mouthy drunk officers spoke to freely, someone said something on a radio transmission, or there were spies at Chalons in the HQ of the 17th A/B or with the 1st Allied Airborne Army. We must wait until the final documents and after action reports are declassified. I think that will be in 2020.

    This 17th Airborne Intel Report documents the comments made by certain German prisoners. Note the report states that the knowledge of the operation was, "in the General vicinity of Wesel." This does not allow one to conclude that they knew the fine details of the plan, but there is much more information yet to be uncovered.

    I spoke with a veteran of the 17th Airborne division who was an enlisted paratrooper. He continued to serve in the Army well after WW2 and rose to the rank of Colonel. He is adamantly convinced the secrecy of the operation was compromised, and many other 17th veterans will attest to that.

    Read this article in the old 17th Airborne Newsletter:

    Bill Tom, ed. 2008. Something to Think About. Thunder Mail Call no. 2a (March). http//www.17airbornedivision.org [accessed December 31, 2011]



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