Rabaul

Discussion in 'War Against Japan' started by Warlord, Jun 25, 2017.

  1. Warlord

    Warlord Veteran wannabe

    Lads, short and to the point:

    Given that Rabaul became such a cornerstone for the defence of the SW flank of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere ( :huh: ), and figured prominently in the plans of the Imperial General HQ since as far back as late 1939, how come the powers-that-be down under tried to hold it with little more than a wing and a prayer? The tragic destiny of Lark Force :moh: bears sad testimony to this.

    Ye olde "little-myopic-slant-eyed-yellow-good-for-nothing-ba***rd" mentality perhaps? Or too much thinking poured into the 2nd AIF left brains too dry to think about the enemy at the doorstep?
     
  2. TTH

    TTH Senior Member

    I just checked Wigmore on this. He does not have much on the early plans or development of the Rabaul base. The airbase was the main reason for holding the place; the RAAF wanted bases as far north as possible to provide warning of a Japanese southward thrust, and it was also agreed the American B17s would use Rabaul as a staging point en route to the Philippines. However, the air force wanted ground defense for the airfield and Sturdee (then CGS) accordingly agreed 'with reluctance' to send a battalion group (Lark Force). I don't think the powers that be were as ignorant or careless as you seem to imply. The fact was that they had damned little to work with in 1941. The British Empire was at war in the Middle East and not doing so well there, and with one war already going on that war naturally had to take first priority. Three-quarters of the AIF was accordingly sent to the Middle East. That left just one division for all of the Far East and Pacific, a vast area. The Australian government agreed with the British that Singapore was the vital point, so 2/3 of the 8th Division went there. That left just five AIF infantry battalions for employment elsewhere, battalions Gordon Bennett was constantly asking to be returned to him. Australia had a large militia force on paper but that was poorly trained and equipped and in any case limited by law in where it could be deployed. Sturdee was not exactly a fool and I am sure he would have preferred to defend Rabaul with an army corps, but he didn't have one. No doubt he sent the troops to Rabaul 'with reluctance' because he knew very well that the force was too small to do any good in the event of real trouble, but if Wigmore is right then Lark Force was sent to placate the air force. But the real root of the problem was the general lack of means, a situation which prevailed throughout the Allied territories in the Far East and Pacific at that time. Yes, the Japs were underestimated, but a more accurate estimate of their strength, capability, and intentions would not by itself have created the means to resist them.
     
    CL1, Tricky Dicky and Owen like this.
  3. Warlord

    Warlord Veteran wannabe

    My sources are books one "Invasion Rabaul" and two "Fortress Rabaul" of Gamble's trilogy, so it is good that for knowledge's sake, bibliography gets deeper with your addition.

    Here's a small portion from the latter, which forms the basis of my initial question (specially the pieces in bold):

    IF THE UNITED STATES WAS said to be “a sleeping giant” at the onset of World War II, Australia was nearly comatose. The Commonwealth was still in dire economic straits in 1941, thanks to a painfully slow recovery from the worldwide economic depression of the previous decade. Australia was neither wealthy nor powerful, and a large percentage of its economy and military strength went to support British interests. Tens of thousands of its soldiers were sent to North Africa to fight the Germans, such that by the end of 1941 almost three whole divisions had been committed. As a result, Australia lacked adequate manpower to defend her own backyard. Her weakness was sharply criticized in official postwar assessments, which lamented the Commonwealth’s tiny navy, lack of weapons and supplies, and an air defense that was hardly more than “a paper plan.”

    Almost twenty years earlier, the Royal Geographical Society had warned against the dangers of one country gaining control over the Pacific. After visiting several island groups of Australia’s mandated territory in 1921, the Honorable J. P. Thomson had written: “On each of these groups enumerated a naval base could be established and its position rendered secure against attack by suitable fortifications and the natural advantages afforded by the coral-reef structures. Once this was done a hostile power would be in a position practically to dominate the whole of the Pacific Ocean. With submarines and a fleet of destroyers, it would be a simple matter to isolate Australia and New Zealand.”

    Thomson’s assessment was remarkably prophetic, but the Allies failed to pay attention. Canberra seemed more interested in the gold fields of New Guinea until World War II began, when the military importance of the mandated territory was finally addressed.

    The first noteworthy effort to link the islands with a communications network was achieved by Lt. Cmdr. Eric N. Feldt of the Royal Australian Navy, who set out in the fall of 1939 to enlist as many men as possible in a coastwatching organization. Traveling from island to island between New Guinea and the New Hebrides, Feldt enrolled dozens of plantation owners, traders, government officials, and other civilians into a loosely organized group. His achievement was brilliant: in the coming years the scattered coastwatchers provided useful intelligence and performed extraordinary feats, many at the cost of their lives.

    Aside from a small volunteer militia company formed in 1939 at Rabaul, there was almost no military presence on New Britain until late 1940, when the War Cabinet approved a motion to encourage Dutch warships to visit Simpson Harbor. As an incentive, the politicians voted to install a pair of 6-inch coastal artillery guns at the entrance to the harbor, though actual delivery would not take place for months. At about the same time, the RAAF established an advance operational base (AOB) for flying boats near the outlet of Sulphur Creek. Thereafter, fortification of the islands gained momentum. The War Cabinet announced in early 1941 that it was deploying the 23rd Brigade to defend what it called the “Malay Barrier,” a grandiose name for three small island bases hundreds of miles apart.


    It all sounds to me like another case of years of indolence and short-sightedness at the decision-making levels during the interwar period, with just a few brave but isolated individual efforts trying to make up for lost ground. However, this particular case has another side to it, with the Aussie military facing the giant handicap of having almost all of its strength dedicated to the 2nd AIF, fighting in distant shores.

    The fact that a pitifully small and under-equipped sacrificial lamb called Lark Force had to be sent to protect RAAF interests that became important when it was already too late, IMHO, comes as a direct consequence of all this.

    However, this is only my point of view, and that's why I dared to ask, to healthily discuss the matter with you blokes ;)
     

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