The failure to re-employ Cunningham and Godwin-Austen in front line commands

No, I meant VQMG in the run up to D Day.

Regards

Tom

 

With friends such as Mr. Stokes, who needs enemies?

https://hansard.parliament.uk/commo...3-826fadabf853/Lieut-GeneralSirAlanCunningham

https://hansard.parliament.uk/commo...8-06fb6b03416a/Lieut-GeneralSirAlanCunningham

I would expect this line of questioning to have gone down like the proverbial bucket of sick in the War Office.

All the best

Andreas

 

Well, what could you expect from the ministers and the War Office? They could hardly say out loud that Cunningham had folded under pressure just a week after the battle started. I doubt that Stokes was told the truth about that by Cunningham or whoever else was urging him on to his line of questioning.

 

I have something more 'on topic' to post when I get home this evening, but does anybody here know the details of Tom Corbett's (T.W. Corbett, Auk's chief of staff) later dismissal from command of 7 Ind Div?

Wiki cites a non-specific 'security lapse':
Thomas Corbett (Indian Army officer) - Wikipedia

 

Richard Stokes was Labour MP for Ipswich and the nephew of Wilfrid Stokes of Stokes mortar fame. The linked article says he was "independent." He might equally well be called "erratic." He spent much of the war criticizing the government, both rightly and wrongly. He was sometimes correct about things but I have a sense that he was the kind of MP whose fellow MPs rolled their eyes when he rose to speak. I would think that allowing a man like Stokes to be his mouthpiece in parliament would have been enough by itself to guarantee that Cunningham would absolutely never serve in the field again.
Richard Stokes (politician) - Wikipedia

 

Yeah, that's what it looks like to me as well.

All the best

Andreas

 

Stokes was part of the Albert Stern nexus that endlessly criticized British tank development in order to promote the TOG tank.

 

Words fail me.

 

A couple of things in 'Montgomery and the Eighth Army' edited by Stephen Brooks

Letter to General Sir Alan Brooke, 15th February 1943

"...The Army in England has got to be got ready for battle. It is vital that its organization should be in accordance with battle experience.
There is no one at Home Forces that I know of who has any battle experience worth talking about. We cannot let them ruin the army. I have given my views to Godwin-Austen on three vital points and have asked him to give them to you."

Letter to General Sir Alan Brooke, 16th February 1943

"... P.S. ..
2. Get Godwin-Austen to tell you about the tactical discussions here. They were a great success. We had rehearsed it all very carefully, and my chaps put it across really well.

Godwin-Austen will also give you my views on:
Types of Divisions.
Keeping Armoured resources fluid.
Infantry organization."

So Godwin-Austen obviously remained trusted by Montgomery. I wonder what G-A had been doing between February 1942 and February 1943?

 

Godwin-Austin was commandant of the Staff College at Camberley between Feb and Oct 42. From Nov 42 until Oct 43 he was DTI.

 

And ironically, he was succeeded in the position as Commandant by Cunningham.

It seems to have been a parking spot.

All the best

Andreas

 

The commandant of the Staff College was a job within Brooke's control and probably under Churchill's radar as it was not a field command.

 

Thanks. At least Godwin-Austin made the effort to get (back) to Africa to find out what was happening.
I wonder then if it was a mistake that "The DTI was never invited to attend the Tank Board, or the AFV Liaison Meeting"?

 

Could have been worse, he could have been made GOC Northern Ireland District, a fate that befell Gerard Bucknall after his removal from 30 Corps.

 

ISWYDT

All the best

Andreas

 

Charley posted in Post 44:

It is a curious Wiki entry for his dismissal from divisional command:

There are other gaps and almost nothing post war.

He does not appear here before Charley's post.

Could the answer be in the Churchill Archives? Which state:

The centre's bio adds a little more:

Link: Collection: The Papers of Lieutenant-General Thomas Corbett | ArchiveSearch - the college states Dr Thomas Moreman, an Indian Army historian's article on Corbett was the biography source. Alas it is behind a pay wall on: Corbett, Thomas William (1888–1981), army officer | Oxford Dictionary of National Biography

I note his demise in India is not even mentioned.

The demise could either IMHO be due to: an indiscretion over SIGINT, an affair with a member of staff or a civilian. The damage was not so severe. Wiki:

I can only identify two authors who have used his papers: Alex Danchev who edited a 2003 edition of Alanbrokke's 'War Diaries 1939–1945' and an Indian author's article 'Hopes and disillusionment'. See: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/001946469603300204?icid=int.sj-abstract.similar-articles.1

 

Nice digging.

One problem of the CISHS might have been that they got very few things done before partition.

The work they did was riveting (I have one unfinished report), but it got abandoned at an early stage.

All the best

Andreas

 

Just out of completeness, I have found the source:

Correlli Barnett - The Desert Generals

 

Thanks for this. I have now spent a bit of time with the parliamentary record and Cunningham's correspondence.

https://crusaderproject.wordpress.com/2023/08/26/the-sacking-of-gen-cunningham-25-november-1941/

My fundamental conclusion hasn't changed, Cunningham had to go. But it is also more apparent to me now that he was being treated very badly by Churchill, and his enemies in the army. Apparently Shearer went round making up stories about his removal, i.e. that Auchinleck had found Cunningham shaking and incapable of making a decision and sacked him on the spot.

It also appears that the story that was transmitted inofficially to London was at least portrayed in a way that Brooke believed Cunningham had had a breakdown. Whether that was nefarious or out of kindness is probably impossible to tell. On 29 November Smith wrote to Cunningham telling him he was not well even if he did not want to admit it.

In terms of his future, it appears to me that Brooke was quite well disposed to him then, there is a very kind letter from 9 Jan 42, and others thereafter, and he also supported his promotion to substantive Lt.Gen.

So a highly complex affair, and one where it appears to me at least that Churchill, for his own political reasons, threw Cunningham under the bus.

Barnett's passage is interesting, but I find it unconvincing. The oral evidence is just so much hearsay, and the hearsay already during the war was against Cunningham. Barnett interviewed Cunningham.

All the best

Andreas

 

Don't know where that suggestion would come from. The one Cunningham rowed with was Norrie. G-A wrote a letter to Cunnigham at midday on 24 November that ended with asking to not push the boat out too far in light of news received that morning. So rather defensive, opposite what Auchinleck wanted. In mid-December he wrote a private letter to Cunningham in which he says, and then again ends on 'I just want to serve under you again' and regrets losing Cunningham as a 'commander and friend'.

Doesn't sound like they had a bad relationship.

All the best

Andreas