An interesting and well written perspective on the actions of June 7-10 and source of a favourite quote from Lt. Col. Freddy Clifford of the 13th Field Regiment, RCA. In contrast to the popular perception of the SS supermen, Clifford, unlike many historians, is unimpressed and offers an aggressive counterpoint. “The Germans thought we were fucking Russians!” Clifford exclaimed when asked about the fighting around Bretteville. “They did stupid things and we killed those bastards in large numbers” http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1466&context=cmh
Exellent account Tim, many thanks Love Cliffords quote. As 4AGRA did'nt land untill 'D'+3, interesting that their 53rd,65th & 79th Mediums had already landed & been in action with 3 Div's 12th,13th & 14th Field for Bretteville, the CAGRA visited all the Bty's on the 10th June at Plumetot & were attacked by enemy fighter planes. Best Rob
Clifford's quote and the detailed description of the advanced preparations for a massive artillery presence in Normandy lend some credence to the suggestion that the Allies were not quite as inept as many have written. In fact, a more critical examination of German command performance is long overdue. Making the gross assumption that the tactics employed on the Russian front were appropriate for Normandy seems to be less than a brilliant decision. Equally questionable, after knowing the full capacity of British/Canadian artillery, was the rigid adherence to the swift counter attack doctrine which put their troops in the open and vulnerable to shell fire.
Such was the use of the higher ranged Medium + Heavy Regts, not only to dislodge the enemy from the position, but to constantly bombard their retreating troops for max range with night and day HF fire to discourage them from their doctrine of counter attack. More fool them if they did as Clifford discribes. Rob
Rob As the campaign wore on and the predictability of German counter attacks was almost a certainty, I've read several accounts which describe the adaptation of tactics to take advantage of the opportunity to catch the attackers in the open. FOO's were moved up quickly to ensure that newly won positions could both be defended and to set up killing grounds for the inevitable counter thrust. I suspect that artie contributed greatly to 8,569 Hitlerjugend casualties in only three months .
Tim I found this a few weeks ago. I was going to link it when I saw your previous post. The report is very compelling. It pretty much puts an end to all the commonly held views of SS superiority, equipment superiority, leadership superiority. The long and the short of it is IMO that men dug in live to fight another day. Men in the open died in great numbers. Panther Vs caught in the open were shot up in great numbers as well. When supported by artillery and dug in Canadians were as invincible as the 'fearless, superior SS'. Huge numbers of men lost lives in open ground regardless of the uniform they wore. Any other conclusion is the result of illusion and lore. Matt
The Scholars Common article was written 2 years before a more comprehensive examination was published by Marc Milner. Well worth reading:
It is a very good article by a informed champion of the RCA. Marc is the go to man if you want to find information about the Canadian artillery in NW Europe. Don't waste his time with trivia, but he is very helpful. His details are on the university website
The development of artillery command and control on D Day and afterwards interests me. The British doctrine was to fight battles at a corps level with artillery concentrated at the point of main effort to break into and fight the dogfight. In the pursuit medium artillery cpould be decentralised under divisional command (Battle drill in ATM Oct 1943) . Doctrinally the D Day assault was a break in battle fought to a predetermined plan with artillery planned and coordinated at army level. Logistically it was impossible to establish corps artillery C3I until some days after D-Day, so for the nfirst few days after D Day artillery is decentralised under divisional command. This treats D-Day as a successful assault and the seizure of the beachhead perimeter (D Day Objectives) a pursuit. Guns of Brettville is just this. Over the next few days 4 AGRA arrive, survey establishes a Corps and Army grid, flash spottign and sound ranging bases etc to dominate the CB battle.
The OR branch reported finding that the effectiveness of indirect artillery Fire was something like 1 shell in a 100 succeeded in landing in a target of 10' x 10' ...(I'm going from memory here so dont be to harsh).. it was therefore the mass of shells that did the damage not the placement.The conclusion was that better and more rapid updating of meteorological data was needed to improve the performance going forward..and guns were taken from the line and re calibrated.
Another excellent account of the Canadian artillery is The Guns of Normandy by George Blackburn. Well worth reading and, in my case, re-reading.
It is more complicated. There are physical effects and psychological effects of artillery fire. I have attempted to evaluate the effectiveness and accuracy of artillery fire in Normandy in chapters 22 and 25 of Gunners in Normandy It is relatively cheap so please forgive me if I do not simply copy from this history. There are quite a few ORS reports from 1944-45 that relate to the effectiveness of artillery. I think you have misquoted some of the numbers. The fire of a battery of eight guns will fall in a pattern about 150 x 150 yards or metres.
that is the source of my comment i read it years ago, and didn't have to to reference directly... but the point that Blackburn was making was that accuracy needed to be better.
Montgomery's Scientists has 4 chapters on Artillery. Chapter 6 Accuracy of Predicted Fire Accuracy of Predicted Fire - Operation VERITABLE (Report No. 3 1 ) Accuracy o f Predicted Shooting - Operation SWITCHBACK (Report N 0.24) Use of GL III in Forecasting Wind for Artillery Meteor (Report No.21) Chapter 7 Counter Battery Ground Support in Assault on Boulogne (extract from Report No. 16) Effect of Counter Battery Fire in Operation VERITABLE (Report No. 29) Artillery in the Counter Flak Programme in Operation VARSITY (extract from Joint Report No. 4) Chapter 8 Morale Effects of Artillery The Effect of Artillery Fire on Enemy Forward Defensive Positions in the Attack on Geilenkirchen (Operation CLIPPER) (Report No.22) Fire Support in Operation VERITABLE - Effect on Forward Defensive Positions (Report No.26) Morale Effects of Artillery (Memo No.7) Chapter 9 Artillery in the Assault on the Beaches Self-Propelled Artillery in the Assault on the Beaches (Report No. 1 ) Employment of Royal Marine Artillery in Operation NEPTUNE (Report No.2)
-- x -- A Very Hostile Night: The Regina Rifles in Bretteville June 8-9 1944 with Sean Claxton https://www.youtube.com/live/6JPSH-VnVK4?feature=share
I know the original poster is no longer active but maybe someone else knows the answer. Why weren't the Soviets able to handle the German counterattacks as well as the Canadians? They had plenty of artillery too. Was it courage and leadership? I don't know a lot about battle tactics. The anticipated Panzer counterattacks had been launched against the Allied beachhead and they had failed to achieve anything more than local tactical success. It is clear that Anglo-Canadian artillery was a key to this victory, and its power profoundly impressed the Germans who faced it during those battles of 7-10 June 1944. Hubert Meyer, GSO 1 of the 12th SS, observed later in the Hitler Youth division’s history that their familiar tactics of “surprise, using mobile, fast infantry and Panzers even in small, numerically inferior Kampfgruppe, had often been practised and proven in Russia .... This tactic, however, had not resulted in the expected success here against a courageous and determined enemy... who was especially strong in defence and could not be taken by surprise.”50 When interviewed in 2002 Freddie Clifford agreed. His regiment’s training and the army’s doctrine worked superbly. In defence of the 7th Brigade fortress, artillery stripped away the enemy infantry or prevented them from moving, leaving their tanks vulnerable. “The Germans thought we were fucking Russians!” Clifford exclaimed when asked about the fighting around Bretteville. “They did stupid things and we killed those bastards in large numbers” – not the usual interpretation one gets from the literature.
I don't think Red Army soldiers lacked courage. The difference in artillery effectiveness was probably British and Canadian command and control. British and Canadian artillery was concentrated at the highest levels of command,but controlled at the lowest level that it could be applied. The Second British Army front was covered by a network of Forward Observers, backed by a network of liaison officers (Battery commanders) at each infantry or armoured unit HQ. Overhead were light aircraft flown by artillery officers, all connected by wireless. Quite junior officers could call in the fire of a regiment (24 guns) a division (72 guns) or even an army corps (200+ guns) Logistics played a part too. The Red Army had lots of artillery equipments, but its ammunition supply was inferior to the Germans, let alone the British and Canadian.
