Who do you all think was to blame for Peral Harbor? I think somebody should have thought about an air attack, from carriers. After what the Brits did to the Italian Navy at Taranto, measures should have been taken to guard against an air attack. Italians used aircraft engine, sound detection, to protect their fleet. So, the Regia Marina (Italian Royal Navy), knew the Brits, in their Bi-Planes were comming. The US should have had a well trained and staffed, 24 hr radar station, as well as other defences. Like maybe air patrols, like the US Navy did around Midway. Also, did it make sence to create such a big target, as 7 battleships in a neat row, in a harbor, with a lot of other tempting targets. Like carriers, cruisers, dry docks, subs, oil storage etc. I know the carriers weren't there, but that was just by luck.
Who do you all think was to blame for Peral Harbor? I think somebody should have thought about an air attack, from carriers. After what the Brits did to the Italian Navy at Taranto, measures should have been taken to guard against an air attack. Italians used aircraft engine, sound detection, to protect their fleet. So, the Regia Marina (Italian Royal Navy), knew the Brits, in their Bi-Planes were comming. The US should have had a well trained and staffed, 24 hr radar station, as well as other defences. Like maybe air patrols, like the US Navy did around Midway. Also, did it make sence to create such a big target, as 7 battleships in a neat row, in a harbor, with a lot of other tempting targets. Like carriers, cruisers, dry docks, subs, oil storage etc. I know the carriers weren't there, but that was just by luck. The USN had staged war games with our own carriers against both Pearl and the Panama Canal Zone, well before WW2 even broke out in Europe. They were both successful in the games, and resulted in improved and increased AAA installations on Oahu, and the Canal Zone, but radar was not yet in the picture. The largest "oversea" deployment of troops was on the Hawaiian Islands. And like it or not both Kimmel and Short were held responsible, but I feel they were scapegoated to cover a general lack of communication between not only the services, but their respective command/control back in D.C.. Even as both CINCUS (name changed later due to irony of acronym's sound) and CINCPAC, Admiral Kimmel did not directly command Pearl Harbor. Kimmel's command was simply located there, he was under Admiral Stark, back in D.C.. His command as CINCUS literally covered the entire globe, as he was the senior officer in the Navy (CINCUS, later COMINCH was ultimately merged into CNO), and as CINCPAC, the entire Pacific Ocean area. But his command structure reached back to Stark in D.C. Kimmel and Short have always been lumped together in the public mind, but a war warning to Kimmel had an entirely different meaning than one to Short due to the disparate scopes of their respective commands. As for Short's interpretation that he was to prepare to defend against sabotage, the addendum to his copy of the war warning of Nov. 27th was to the effect that his preparations should be made in a way that would not alarm the public, keeping in mind it's large Japanese contingent. Quite naturally, he communicated his actions and preparations to Washington and received no negative response. Complicate that with the Navy was supposed to protect the harbor, the ships within it, and the sea surrounding the islands. The islands themselves were the US Army and Air Corps (Force) responsibility. Two really weird things evolved out of this set-up: First; the USAAC (it was still the Air Corps) was forbidden to fly beyond sight of land on scouting missions, for fear they would get lost and have to be rescued by Navy ships and personnel, costing time and money. This policy had been changed immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack. Second; they didn’t have shared communications abilities, the Navy radio system was higher powered than the Army's, but only slightly less susceptible to atmospheric interference. The messages sent to both men on Dec. 7th, were sent by commercial radio-telegram, because of atmospheric interference with their internal systems. The telegram system was completely commercially owned, as was the trans-Pacific undersea cable. Even Western Union had to buy time on the cable since it was owned by another company, and none of the cables had been nationalized until well after war was declared, sometime in early 1942. General Short took the late November war warning as getting ready to defend the island, but focused on sabotage since so much of the population were of Japanese decent (1/3 or better?). Adm. Kimmel brought his ships back into port after a training mission as per usual, but not only began topping off the fuel, and re-supplying any depleted ammunition, had also begun welding portholes shut in anticipation of a blue water big ship confrontation a’la Jutland. Which is why the Arizona was moored beside the Vestal repair ship, she was in the process of getting her portholes welded shut, and was one of the last in line for this proceedure. Another myth is that Kimmel and Short were out there twiddling their thumbs and planning golf excursions up until the attack. Kimmel's primary duty was to prepare the Fleet for its offensive assignment under WP-46Pac which involved raids on the islands of the Japanese mandate. He was also training PBY crews in both anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and search and rescue operations. His defensive preparations for the Fleet were in place when the attack came. Analysis of logs has indicated that all major ships commenced firing within two minutes of the beginning of the attack and the surviving Japanese pilots confirmed this after the war. Contrary to Hollywood and popular belief, wholesale liberty was not granted. The larger ships were on port and starboard liberty (alternating between ships) and the smaller ships varied somewhat because the idea was to make sure that everyone got liberty to unwind after the previous tough weeks of training. On the larger ships, duty gun crews slept at their AA guns, and ammunition was kept ready at all guns. Overall, more than 80% of enlisted personnel and more than 50% of officers were aboard when the attack came. This situation accounts for the extremely high casualties on Arizona. Short built up his fortifications, set up the then experimental radar (after being denied his first choices for location by the U S Parks Service and civilian private owner groups) sets he had been sent. He also agreed with the Navy's proposition to be jointly responsible for harbor defense at Pearl itself. Both officers were in frequent radio and telegraphy communication with Washington and were assured they were receiving ALL available intelligence information. Admiral Turner was caught in a lie regarding this point later at one of the Congressional hearings. This is not to say that they had no responsibility for what happened. Inter-service communications both in D.C. and Hawaii failed. In one example, the Army and Navy each set up its own system of numbered alert levels. Unfortunately, one system went from 1 (lowest), to 3 (highest); and, the other went from 3 (lowest), to 1 (highest), is it any wonder we use colors now? As a result, one Navy officer (Cpt. Layton?) was aghast to see the Army towing its AA guns away when the Navy had just raised its alert level to HIGHEST. Kimmel and Short were never accorded the court-martial which was their right under military law. At the only hearings (Army and Navy boards) where they were allowed to have their attorneys question witness, they were held not derelict in their duties and charges were dropped (they were later reinstated by then CNO King), who was passed over when Kimmel was appointed as CINCUS, and is known to have been somewhat vindictive at perceived insults.
. Complicate that with the Navy was supposed to protect the harbor, the ships within it, and the sea surrounding the islands. The islands themselves were the US Army and Air Corps (Force) responsibility. Two really weird things evolved out of this set-up: Very nice post. I thought the army was supposed to protect the harbor and the ships within it? Kimmel and Short were never accorded the court-martial which was their right under military law. At the only hearings (Army and Navy boards) where they were allowed to have their attorneys question witness, they were held not derelict in their duties and charges were dropped (they were later reinstated by then CNO King), who was passed over when Kimmel was appointed as CINCUS, and is known to have been somewhat vindictive at perceived insults. It's my understanding that they didn't get their court marshalls because the services had many more important things to worry about. The War. Didn't some board or inquiry say that they should have been in contact or communication with each other before Pearl Harbor happened.
Very nice post. I thought the army was supposed to protect the harbor and the ships within it? No, the Navy was responsible for the harbor and the ships within, the Army was responsible for the island itself down to the shore-line, but not beyond. Weird division of labor, and it bit us in the butt Dec. 7th. Another weird one was the Ford Island installation inside the harbor itself. Filled with Navy stuff, but protected by the Army (I think).
No, the Navy was responsible for the harbor and the ships within, the Army was responsible for the island itself down to the shore-line, but not beyond. Weird division of labor, and it bit us in the butt Dec. 7th. Another weird one was the Ford Island installation inside the harbor itself. Filled with Navy stuff, but protected by the Army (I think). Army-Land Navy-Water Got it! But is this the way it should have been? I kinda see the army being responsibe for the harbor. In fact, I see the army resonsible for everything on or associated with the island including the harbor. I see the navy being responsible for keeping the enemy away from Hawaii. If the navy failed at that, then I see the army coming into action.
Not wishing to put the cat amongst the pigeons but I have always felt that in lots of ways it suited both America and Britain for the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor in the way she did - and also especially as the carriers happened to be away!
Not wishing to put the cat amongst the pigeons but I have always felt that in lots of ways it suited both America and Britain for the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor in the way she did - and also especially as the carriers happened to be away! The carriers didn't "happen" to be away. The two carriers remaining in the Pacific were transporting aircraft and av-gas to the outpost islands of Wake and Midway, as planned. The Enterprise was scheduled to be back in Pearl Harbor the day before the Japanese attacked, but was held up by a storm (ironically the very storm the IJN had used as cover), and didn't make it into Pearl until later. The carriers had, indeed, left Pearl before the attack. Saratoga was still on the west coast after completing her scheduled overhaul, Enterprise had left Pearl Harbor on November 28th to deliver planes and av-gas to Wake, and Lexington left on Dec. 5th to make a similar delivery to Midway. When Enterprise left, Halsey had sent the three battleships which were supposed to accompany him to Wake back into the port as they would slow him down and he was supposed to be back in Pearl the day after Lexington departed so there would always be a carrier in the task force stationed at Pearl. Enterprise was not doing anything surprising by sailing on the 28th, this was her scheduled departure date as given in the quarterly employment schedules, and not changed. What is sad here is way back in February of 1932, US Navy’s Fleet Problem 13 was carried out. Leaving his battleships behind, taking only destroyers for protection and using a storm as cover, under Adm. Harry Yarnell’s command 152 aircraft from the Saratoga and Lexington executed a dawn surprise attack on Army air bases and US Navy facilities in Hawaii from a position over 100 miles northwest of Oahu. At dawn on a Sunday morning (sound familiar?). The US Army and Army Air Corps was caught unaware, and later contested the effectiveness of the carrier raid and also claimed their planes had critically damaged the carriers, even though Yarnell’s aircraft had conducted two separate strafing and bombing runs on the Army’s planes as they sat on the runways. The ground commanders’ protests aside, the attack served as important display of the carrier’s offensive capabilities. And the umpires declared the mock raid a success. Yarnell's planning, execution, and success was ignored and/or downplayed for ten years. Guess who copied it?
Very nice post. I thought the army was supposed to protect the harbor and the ships within it? It's my understanding that they didn't get their court marshalls because the services had many more important things to worry about. The War. Didn't some board or inquiry say that they should have been in contact or communication with each other before Pearl Harbor happened. Here is a great link to the numerous hearings into the Pearl Harbor attack, and who was responsible. It wasn't just that they were denied their legal Courts-Martial, the Congress and other hearings had pretty well covered the territory, and a Courts-Martial may have exposed King as a vindictive SOB, which we didn't need at the time. Goto: Pearl Harbor Investigation Listing Makes for interesting if long-winded, reading.
I am not arguing with what you say, but I still maintain that in lots of ways it suited Britain and America for the Japanese to attack as they did without warning. The British it obviously did as it brought America into the war. Churchill`s glee when hearing the news is well documented.
I am not arguing with what you say, but I still maintain that in lots of ways it suited Britain and America for the Japanese to attack as they did without warning. The British it obviously did as it brought America into the war. Churchill`s glee when hearing the news is well documented. Churchill was definitely a happy camper after the attack on Pearl Harbor. As far as satisfying America, perhaps you mean that it filled the United States with a vengeance to win the war. Had we gotten into the war in a less spectacular manner, we may not have had the desire to see it to the end and we may have negotiated with Japan for peace. Bob Guercio
Spot on bob. I think there were members in the Roosevelt administration as well as many senior military people, who longed to establish mastery of the Pacific over the Japanese...
