The Unnecessary Battle

Discussion in 'NW Europe' started by canuck, Oct 2, 2017.

  1. m kenny

    m kenny Senior Member

    Yes that is right. By pointing out 2 of the books you used are complete rubbish is confirmation I believe Montgomery is God's representative on earth and that he can do no wrong-or maybe confirmation I actually have read the 2 books I mention rather than just googling them and using reviews?

    I note how quickly you now default to slagging off Monty. I suspected this was root of you argument right from the start.

    So can I now make the same type of error as you and take it as confirmed that you believe Weidner when he says the UK deliberately let the Germans escape at Falaise?
     
    Last edited: Oct 22, 2017
  2. m kenny

    m kenny Senior Member

    Here you can see Weidner make the claim Bradley's Halt Order was faked by Eisenhower to protect Monty. screenshot.2017-10-22 (1)t.jpg
     
  3. idler

    idler GeneralList

    Brooke's quote in context (and hindsight):
    IMG_20171022_103553158.jpg
     

    Attached Files:

  4. Charley Fortnum

    Charley Fortnum Dreaming of Red Eagles

    I count two instances of the word 'probably' and two of the word 'may' in the crucial paragraph.

    Not taking that very seriously.
     
  5. Charley Fortnum

    Charley Fortnum Dreaming of Red Eagles

    I have the Ramsay diary for this period.
    Will check and post when I return home.
     
  6. idler

    idler GeneralList

    Psst! There are three 'mays'. How d'you expect your opinion to count if you can't

    Good call on the Ramsay diary.
     
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  7. m kenny

    m kenny Senior Member

    Sad thing is a lot of people do take it seriously. Read the reviews of the book and weep.
    The 2 books introduced (Ingersoll & Weidner) are rubbish. Ingersoll was (I think) outed as a Soviet 'friend' in the 1950s and it is claimed his book was an attempt to drives a wedge between the US & UK and further Stalin's agenda.
    Weidner wrote one of the reviews of Ingersoll's book so its all very circular.
     
  8. Charley Fortnum

    Charley Fortnum Dreaming of Red Eagles

    He had strong opinions.

    20171022_195156.jpg
    20171022_195335.jpg

    The more you read about the relationship between SHAEF and 21st AG, the more you realise what an utter disgrace it was that with large numbers of men being condemned to die as a result of their decisions that it was permitted to deteriorate to such an extent as it did. One would have hoped that the grown ups in London and Washington (Churchill/Roosevelt -- Alanbrooke/Marshall--all of whom I respect) would have taken a grip of the situation and knocked heads together, but it seems that as the end drew near everybody was in on the game, thinking of post-war politics. Monty's intransigence and bitterness were a major part of the problem of course, but some of the British figures at SHAEF (Tedder notably), seemed to loathe him more than any American.

    Thank God for Freddie, I say.
     
    Last edited: Mar 26, 2018
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  9. idler

    idler GeneralList

    The question that raises is what Ramsay had to say about Antwerp at the beginning of September?
     
  10. Charley Fortnum

    Charley Fortnum Dreaming of Red Eagles

    There are a number of references to the subject throughout the month; will upload when I get a little time.
     
  11. m kenny

    m kenny Senior Member

    Which is what I was thinking. Seems to be a lot of 'hindsight' being used to blame individuals for a collective responsibility.
    Really its boiling down to a blame -game between those who thought Arnhem could deliver a Xmas victory and those (after the Arnhem was proved optimistic) saying a chance was missed to end the war in March 1945. There is no evidence that an early attack on Antwerp could have taken it and it could have gone as badly wrong as Market Garden. The bashers have the advantage that their plan was not tested.
    I wonder how Ramsey would have reacted if Monty started telling him how to run the naval operations?
    Angels dancing on a pin-head.
     
  12. canuck

    canuck Closed Account

    Actually no. I wasn't promoting Weidner anymore than I was slagging Monty. It was a single opinion, specific to the Antwerp question, right or wrong. We aren't calling into question Montgomery's complete career and nor should Weidner's view on Falaise be part of the discussion. The entire point was to illustrate that there is more than a passing criticism of the Antwerp errors. If Brooke, Monty's superior and supporter, has reservations about that strategy how can it be surprising that others do as well. Including the Americans, who without question did have an axe to grind with Monty and would be unlikely to say anything complimentary.

    Sorry to dash your psychic powers but I really don't have a strong view of Monty one way or the other. I think he was the best of a bad bunch. Unimaginative but a true professional and a personality which did a disservice to his military reputation. As stated, Monty and Eisenhower were equal in terms of responsibility. To be honest, I am far more critical of Guy Simonds than any other general in NW Europe and I believe Patton was highly overrated. I save my accolades for true leaders like Slim and Hoffmeister, who had impeccable records.
     
  13. canuck

    canuck Closed Account

    Looking forward to seeing those Charlie. I have seen references to both Ramsay and Cunningham having warned Montgomery about Antwerp as early as September 5th. Ramsay specifically advised Montgomery to making the Antwerp and the Scheldt his main priority. As has been agreed months earlier.
    None of this should be surprising. The focus on Antwerp was not an idea which only emerged in September. Antwerp had always been heavily emphasized in SHAEF's pre-Overlord planning. That priority should have become more acute as the advance from the Seine lengthened supply lines from the beaches and no major port in operation.
     
  14. m kenny

    m kenny Senior Member

    The point is that you can not distinguish between criticism and crazy conspiracy theory. I mentioned only Ingersoll and Weidner. Both authors are deranged and your ignorance of their motives is no excuse.
    The 'reservations' of Brooke or anyone else are not in the same league as this type of hysterical overclaim.
    I can not understand how you could quote Ingersoll on anything concerning Monty. His book is probably the fountainhead of the Monty character assassination movement.
     
    Last edited: Oct 23, 2017
  15. m kenny

    m kenny Senior Member

    The planning for the Invasion made lots of assumptions. Most went out of the window once the fighting started. The US decision to turn east rather than west in late July was a gamble. A gamble because they gave up the planned CHASTITY operation. A gamble that paid off. When the Seine was reached planning had assumed a halt and gradual build of of US Forces (direct from the USA via the Atlantic ports and CHASTITY)) for the decisive battle of the interior before a slow advance to the Rhine by spring 1945. Another gamble was taken with a pursuit into the Low Countries and into Lorraine. . That is 2 gambles that reaped immense rewards. Then the fleeting chance of a Rhine Bridgehead was presented. A third gamble was taken and it failed. Why is that so difficult to understand?
    All I see is people claiming their untested alternative plan was a much better idea. It too could have failed. Instead of claiming their alternative was an unstoppable war-winning move they should correctly say they believe a gamble on an early capture of Antwerp might have been a wiser move.
    Its like watching the lottery results and telling everyone that was the numbers you were going to buy yesterday-no one believes you!
     
  16. bydand31

    bydand31 Member

    David Willey, Curator at the Tank Museum said

    : “History is re-interpreted by each generation, keen to learn their own lessons, draw their own comparisons and find their own relevance to the stories of the past. In this age, new tools have been given to the researcher, the internet, records online, e-mail, a mass audience willing to respond to questions and comment on theories – whether well informed or not.

    Well said sir.

    Who was it that said better to Jaw Jaw, than War War.
     
    Red Jim likes this.
  17. canuck

    canuck Closed Account

    For people like Cunningham and Ramsay, Antwerp was logically a key part of the original plan and remained a primary objective. The untested alternative was to ignore its importance.

    I give Monty and Ike the benefit of the doubt and believe the errors were those of omission. Others believe that he had political motivations and a more sinister plan.

    "On 9 September, Montgomery wrote to Brooke that "one good Pas de Calais port" would be sufficient to meet all the logistical needs of the 21st Army Group, but only the supply needs of the same formation. At the same time, Montgomery noted that "one good Pas de Calais port" would be insufficient for the American armies in France, which thus forced Eisenhower, if for no other reasons than logistics, to favour Montgomery's plans for an invasion of northern Germany by the 21st Army Group, whereas if Antwerp were opened up, then all of the Allied armies could be supplied."
     
  18. Charley Fortnum

    Charley Fortnum Dreaming of Red Eagles

    As promised, I've copied all of the pages from the beginning of September up until those of the 4th and 5th of October, posted above.

    (Apologies for the blur on a couple; they appeared sharp on a small screen but were not)

    20171023_234841.jpg 20171023_234906.jpg 20171023_234949.jpg 20171023_235007.jpg 20171023_235021.jpg 20171023_235040.jpg 20171023_235050.jpg 20171023_235105.jpg 20171023_235117.jpg 20171023_235134.jpg 20171023_235141.jpg 20171023_235159.jpg 20171023_235217.jpg 20171023_235232.jpg 20171023_235240.jpg 20171023_235257.jpg 20171023_235303.jpg 20171023_235325.jpg 20171023_235336.jpg 20171023_235350.jpg 20171023_235419.jpg 20171023_235441.jpg
     
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  19. Tom OBrien

    Tom OBrien Senior Member

    Canuck,

    Sorry I haven't replied before, but I see you are continuing the debate in healthy style, which is as it should be. I thought you would be amused to read what Montgomery said about the whole thing in his Memoirs:

    "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part - I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get the free use of that port. I reckoned that the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong." I have searched in vain for a similar mea culpa from his contemporaries!

    So, no I don't think that Montgomery could never make a mistake. Equally I don't think that anyone else correctly estimated the "difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp" and would suggest that many historians have since done the same and continue to do so.

    As for your remark that "The focus on Antwerp was not an idea which only emerged in September. Antwerp had always been heavily emphasized in SHAEF's pre-Overlord planning". That's not actually true to the extent that the American focus on Antwerp was absolutely an idea which emerged in September as in the original logistics plans Antwerp was only going to be used by the British! I'll post up some primary sources that support that remark if you like.

    I always smile when I see the reference to Ramsay's signal of 4 [not 5th] September as it certainly didn't contain words which support your contention that "Ramsay specifically advised Montgomery to making the Antwerp and the Scheldt his main priority. As has been agreed months earlier." Firstly, Antwerp and the Scheldt were not assigned as his main priority "months earlier" (beating the Germans in Normandy was his main priority then!) and Ramsay did not advise Montgomery to make "the Antwerp and the Scheldt his main priority". What he actually said on 4 Sep [in his signal to both SHAEF and 21 AG] was that to be able to open Antwerp and Rotterdam quickly {of course no one talks about his thought that Rotterdam would soon be captured!) the enemy had to be prevented from "mining and blocking Scheldt and new waterway between Rotterdam and the Hook" and that "both Antwerp and Rotterdam are highly vulnerable to mining and blocking" and that it would "be necessary for coastal batteries to be captured before approach channels to the river routes can be established". No matter what 2nd Army did on 4 Sep they couldn't stop the mining happening.

    All useful advice, obviously, and just what you would hope a Naval C-in-C would be advising, however, I think we should then look at the readiness of naval forces to support these objectives. Unfortunately, the amphibious forces needed to capture Walcheren had been allowed to disperse after the Normandy operation and it took until the end of October for a combination of fire support ships, landing craft and amphibious units to be ready. It actually does not appear that this was recognised until Simonds' appreciation of 19 Sept. There were no spare minesweeping forces hanging around either.

    Incidentally, Montgomery asked Crerar on 13 September whether he could capture the Pas de Calais ports and Antwerp at the same time, and "offered to give up operations against Calais and Dunkirk to speed the opening of Antwerp". [Source: Moulton: Battle for Antwerp] I've been looking for Crerar's response to that offer for years - any ideas?

    Again, the actual historical record is so much more complicated than your opening post makes it sound which is what encourages me to join in the debate.

    Regards

    Tom
     
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  20. canuck

    canuck Closed Account

    I will agree Tom that the record is complex and often with conflicting statements.

    Monty's quote, for example, "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part - I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get the free use of that port. I reckoned that the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong."

    He had specifically assigned the Canadian units the lowest priority for supplies and that only changed when, on Oct. 9th, Ike issued him a direct and explicit order to begin furnishing the supplies needed by the Canadians in order to open the Scheldt.

    Some have questioned whether Crerar would have done so given the relationship or that it would have had any effect on Montgomery. It seems to be an elusive piece of information.
    The under strength Canadian 1st Army was certainly denuded of resources, formations and supplies after September 3rd, in support of Market Garden, so, at the very least, Monty could not expect the advance to accelerate.
    The Canadian 3rd Infantry Division alone required 1,000 replacements at the time and had to give up their bridging equipment to support MG. Simonds was purported to have requested an additional division to meet the tasks assigned.
     

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