Goebbels did let the "Werwolf" station go on air, but not much more happened. By 1944 there was already not enough material left to equip the Volkssturm even halfway decently, the traffic and communications infrastructure had completely collapsed, and most decisively: ALL Nazi officials without exception had vanished like fog in a breeze. The "Werewolf" was as much a stillborn as the "Freikorps Adolf Hitler". In this respect, at best, completely uncoordinated individual actions were still possible - But this mainly concerned Germans and foreign workers I dare say that the 200 Americans mentioned above drank methyl alcohol: This was an extremely widespread cause of poisoning, among Germans, foreign workers - and even occupying troops
Wasn't the newly by the Allies appointed mayor of Aachen, Franz Oppenhoff, killed by the Wehrwolf on 25 March 1945 (Unternehmen Karneval ("Operation Carnival")) ?
That was a fraudulent labelling scheme. In fact, it was a special commando: the werewolf certainly had no access to transport planes, whose members were supposed to operate locally as guerrillas. This shows just how feeble-minded the concept was. Or can anyone seriously imagine a German civilian as a partisan? Without any regulations or legal protection?
I enclose relevant passages from Biddiscombe and his source notes "Each Werwolf carried fifteen to twenty pounds of explosive material, plus footmines and unexploded American incendiary sticks, of which the Germans had collected a total stock of approximately two hundred and fifty thousand. Americanand British weapons were obtained through parachute drops in Holland, by which the Allies had hoped to equip Dutch patriots, but which actually fell into the hands of the "SS USFET MIS Centre "Cl Intermediate Interrogation Report (CI-IIR) #24 - O/Gruf. Jurgen Stroop", 10 Oct. 1945, pp. 3-4, OSS XL 22157, NA; SHAEF Cl War Room "The SS Guerrilla Movement", 9 April 1945, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. Miscellaneous Interrogation Reports 1944-46, RG 332, NA; BAOR Int. "Appreciation of the Werwolf Movement"; EDS Report #34 "Notes on the 'Werwolves'"; 12th US Army "Werewolves", 31 May 1945, p. 1; MFI 5/752 Note on Werwolf equipment, 27 April 1945; USFET MIS Center "Intermediate Interrogation Report (HR) #18 - Krim Rat. Ernst Wagner", 30 Aug. 1945, p. 5; and 21 AG Int "Appendix 'C' to 2 Can. Corps Sitrep", 22 June 1945, pp. 2-3, all IRR File XE 049 888 "Werewolf Activities Vol. I", RG 319, NA; Moczarski, pp. 241- 242; Rose, pp. 136, 153; Hugonnet, p. 58; and SS Werwolf Combat Instruction Manual, pp. 13-15. the entire project was soon turned over to the purview of Department IVb of Dienstelle Priitzmann. along with large quantities of poisons. By early 1945, tests on the injection of lethal doses of methyl into alcohol had been carried out — this had already been decided upon during the October Conference as the best means of poisoning liquor — and further tests on more exotic chemicals were underway. 1st Canadian Army "Intelligence Periodical" #3, 30 May 1945, pp. 14-15, WO 205/1072, PRO? The Times. 4 Oct. 1945? CSDIC (WEA) BAOR, "Sixth Combined Interim Report - Stubaf. Kopkow, Stubaf. Thomsen, Stubaf. Noske", IR #62, 31 May 1946, ETO MIS-YSect. CSDIC (UK) Interim Interrogation Reports 1945-46, NA? and USFET MIS Center, "Cl Intermediate Interrogation Report (CI-IIR) #24- O/Gruf. Jurgen Stroop", 10 Oct. 1945, p. 4, OSS XL 22157, RG 226, NA. RSHA Amt VI also had an extensive poisons program conducted under Hauptsturmfuhrer Winter at the Jaadverband training camp in Neustrelitz. Amt VI developed poison cigarettes which only became toxic when heated, and it was rumoured that one million of these were distributed in Yugoslavia during 1944. SHAEF Cl War Room, "German Terrorist Methods", 2 April 1945, p. 2, WO 219/1602, PRO? Capt. L.S. Sabin, US Navy to Director, CAD, 28 April 1945, Enclosure "A" - "German Use of Poison for Assassination Purposes", CAD 014 Germany, RG 165, NA? and OSS Report from Yugoslavia #GB-2787, 26 Nov. 1944, OSS 105325, RG 226, NA.
I know similar sources. They all have one thing in common: there is not a single syllable to indicate that any of them has been used in practice to any significant extent. For the masses of Germans, the matter was very simple: war is over, change of management, new orders, "Alles hat seine Ordnung!" Anyone who does anything else is a criminal. And the population was very familiar with mutual denunciation
Surely OB Nordwest? This is an excellent thread. Apologies for the plug, but I have made an analysis of why certain Wehrmacht units - in particular marine infantry - kept fighting to the end the subject of the Epilogue to my book (Theirs the Strife | Military History Book | Helion & Company). For those interested in the closing months/weeks/days of the war I unreservedly recommend Professor Ian Kershaw’s book ‘The End’ (The End by Ian Kershaw | Waterstones)
secondary source, but reliable Kriegsmarine had a special position: the commanders were still haunted by the 1918 November Revolution, hence the extreme discipline
It must have been a surprise for the Kreigsmarine and Donitz when the latter was turfed out of the Naval School at Flensburg after his "government" had been in existence for less than three weeks in May 1945. The only opposition put up was a complaint that it was humiliating for his group who expected more dignity to be shown by the British Army.
Indeed They actually believed they could just carry on as if someone else had lost the war and they were the insolvency administrators. If you read the preserved transcripts, you could think of drug-induced delusions
The Canadian Army inexplicably declined to pursue arrest and prosecutions against many known SS war criminals in 1945. They did not cover themselves in glory with this incident either: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1121&context=cmh
As said: Victims of circumstances The real scandal was that the naval judges had usurped a legal sovereignty that they no longer had de jure. And it can be assumed that these bastards made a good career for themselves as upright democrats in post-war Germany (A certain Hans Filbinger even made it as far as the Minister President of Baden-Württemberg)
For instance Marine-Oberstabsrichter Dr Kurt Goeller who, on 28 Apr 45, sentenced to death 17-year-old Matrose Kurt Albrecht of Marine-Grenadier-Regiment 5, who had fled the field of battle. Albrecht was shot by firing squad the same day and has no known grave.
My reference is Kurt Mehner’s Die Deutsche Wehrmacht 1939-1945, Fuehrung und Truppe. Mehner lists Busch as OB Nordwest to 5/45. He lists Kesselring as OB West until 22 Apr 45 when it merged with OB Sued (sorry, can’t do umlauts on my iPad!).
I´m pretty well sure after 12 years of research ;-) Report Gen. Geyer, B-414: This fact is further attested by General Blumentritt and several other sources see also: OKW/WFStab Op/H Nr. 003342/45 g.Kdos v. 7.4.45
Report Gen. Blumentritt: see also: KTB des OKW 7.4.45: Das Fallsch.=Jäg.=AOK übernimmt den Befehl über den bisherigen Abschnitt der Armeegruppe Student (ohne LXXXVIII. A.K.), diese den Befehl über die im Bereich der Hgr. H eingesetzten Teile der Wehrkreise X und XI sowie die 2. Marine=Inf.=Div.
I was just questioning your post #15 which seemed to suggest that on 17 Apr 45 Busch was OB West when he was actually OB Nordwest, as confirmed in B-414. I think we’re in violent agreement!
Ernst Busch was a deep seated Nazi who knew nothing but obedience to Hitler.The father in law of Martin Bormann,a brutal man,he enjoyed the party line in sitting on the Peoples Court Tribunal,a body well known for its frequent policy of invoking the death penalty. The rise in his military career was not noted as exceptional but it changed for the better when Hitler took power.His military career reached a watershed in June 1944 after the battles of Vitebsk- Minsk when he insisted on following Hitler's directions to the letter of hold on at all costs.The result was that the 4th and 9th armies were virtually destroyed. While it is considered that von Paulus accounted for the greatest loss of manpower in German military history by losing 230.000 men at Stalingrad,Busch lost at least 300.000 men at Vitebsk-Minsk.Hitler dismissed him on 28 June 1944 as a failure and made him the scapegoat for the defeat even though he was following orders. He became broken and depressed after being forced out of service to Hitler and it appears that he was suicidal.Finally after existing in obscurity,Guderian suggested to Hitler after prompting from Reinhardt, C in C Army Group Centre,that it would be a good gesture and a token of Hitlers continued esteem to bring him back into the fold.Hitler allowed him to give the oration at Hitler's chief adjutant Schmundt's funeral who had died of wounds from the 20 July 1944 attempt on Hitler's life.Busch from there was able to worm his way back into Hitler's good graces which led to him being appointed on 20 March 1945 as the C in C OB North West As C in C OB North West,his "army" formation in reality was under quality personnel thrown together consisting of a single battle group.a small number of RAD battalions impressed into the Wehrmacht,a Senior Engineer Command,a few Hitler Youth,Volksturm and other miscellaneous units.(Surprisingly at the total collapse of the Third Reich,this is recorded in a OKW report dated 30 April 1945) His domain for operations was the North Sea coast,Schleswig Holstein and a section of eastern Holland still in German hands.His command discharged his party traits of impossible directives and flying courts martial discipline.Although some fought with tenacity,there was little respect for him and his methods from troops and junior officers alike. When the end came on 4 May 1945, he appeared in Montgomery's tent on the Luneburg Heath to sign the German surrender of all German forces in North East Europe.His POW days did not last long and he died in British captivity at Aldershot on 17 July 1945.He was destined to have appeared along with rest of the surviving Third Reich leadership at the Nuremberg Tribunal for alleged war crimes. Busch was first buried without ceremony at Aldershot under a false death certificate.However when the Cannock Chase German Military Cemetery was opened in the mid 1960s his remains were transferred to this dedicated cemetery following the Anglo German agreement on the establishing of consolidated military cemeteries. Field Marshal Ernst Busch, the would be military commander of Great Britain, had these islands fallen to Hitler,in the end had his own little place in England which will be forever German. Interesting historical military frames here without doubt. Military Histories - The Lüneburg Heath Surrender (Additonal Images) https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/nazi-who-britains-ruler-germany-8628504
Aaarghh, You go through your manuscript 1000 times, but some little mistake always escapes you Rest is typical translation error, long live the language barrier
The successful Rhine Crossing of the 21st Army Group by the end of March 1945 posed a severe threat for General Blaskowitz' Heeresgruppe H. On 28 March, faced with an imminent collapse of his left wing, he sounded the alarm by sending simultaneous reports on the situation to OBWest and to OKW , thus bypassing his immediate superior. In his message Blaskowitz suggested, in order to preserve the integrity of the German front, to retreat his entire command to North West Germany, anchoring on a new defensive line that ran from the River Weser to the North Sea coast somewhere in northern Holland. This meant that the Heeresgruppe had to give up the positions held by 25. Armee in the western part of Holland. Otherwise, he argued, the Allies might easily cut off and isolate the 25. Armee in Holland, where it was of little use to the defense of the Reich. Predictable, the immediate and rigid reply of the OKW was that under no circumstances ground may be given. Instead the OKW ordered a counterattack to restore the frontline. An attack by II. FJ Korps from the north, in conjunction with an attack by the XLVII. Panzer Korps from the Ruhr Industrial area in the south, was to close the gap created by the Allied advance across the Rhine. To all, but the German High command, it was obvious that the situation could no longer be saved. Not even with desperate measures, like the creation on April 1st of a new conglomerate force under command of the paratrooper General Kurt Student, which carried the grotesque name of 'Armeegruppe Student'. It was to General Student that the OKW entrusted the execution of the projected counterattack, rather than to the 'untrustworthy' General Blaskowitz. That the counterattack never substantialized is hardly surprising under the given circumstances. While the II. FJ Korps, with 7. and 8. FJ Divisions with the rest of 1. Fallschirm Armee were pushed back to the NE, towards the interior of Germany, the detached 6. FJ Division fell back to the N and NW into Holland. The 6. FJ Division eventually was subordinated to the LXXXVIII. Armee Korps of 25. Armee and shared its fate with that of the 25.Armee, bottled up in the western part of Holland, just as Blaskowitz had predicted. During their advance north of the Rhine, the Canadians saw a retreat of 25. Armee from western Holland as a real possibility, and were constantly alert for enemy troop movements from west to east. Fallen into disgrace at OKW, General Blaskowitz, on 6 April 1945 was appointed - actual a demotion - to Oberbefehlshaber für den Niederlanden (OB Niederlanden) and was subordinated to the newly formed OB NordWest, General Busch, who in turn was under direct command of the OKW. In his new capacity as OB Niederlanden General Blaskowitz only retained command of the 25.Armee and the security forces of the Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber Niederlande (WBfN) under General der Flieger F. Christiansen. The 25.Armee had been almost completely stripped down during the previous months in order to provide reinforcements for the 1. Fallschirmarmee, heavily involved in the battle for the Rhineland. General Christansen had moved his HQ to Delfzijl, in northeast Holland. Here, on 7 April 1945, he had a last meeting with General Blaskowitz, during which in all likelihood the authority over all troops in Holland was transferred to the latter, as Christansen thereafter did play no formal rule anymore. During the night of 7 to 8 April, Blaskowitz left Delfzijl with his driver and travelled by car across the Afsluitdijk to western Holland. At Hilversum he took over command of the 25. Armee, which subsequently became locked up with 130.000 men in what was to become known as Festung Holland. See also: RHINE CROSSING 1945: The Rees bridgehead (30 Corps in operation 'Turnscrew')
