There are a couple of interesting bits in British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944: Following on the observation that 21st Armoured Group employed narrow-front assaults, "One of the obvious key advantages of mechanized armoured forces is mobility, and a requirement of operations is the space to employ this potential. Fourth County of London Yeomanry, badly mauled at Villers Bocage, complained that their freedom of movement was curtailed by the requirement of keeping to a limited area of penetration, thus exposing their flanks to counter-attack on the morning of 13 June." Talking about the mismatch between higher command ambitions and what could actually be achieved with armoured units: "The inappropriateness of planning was again demonstrated shortly after D-Day during Operation Perch. This bold venture called for 7th Armoured Division to burst through an opening in the German lines and drive on to Villers Bocage, thus turning the flank of Panzer Lehr and beginning an encirclement of Caen from the east. ... That the operation was botched and that Hinde, Erskine and Bucknall demonstrated lack of flair is not in question, but Dempsey's stinging criticism of them and his view that much more could have been achieved illustrated the poor appreciation of the realities of armoured operations by 1944 and of the capabilities of British armoured force structures. A very narrow, largely unsupported penetration deep into enemy territory, with resistance hardening in the shape of 2nd Panzer Division and 101st SS Heavy Tank Battalion as well as elements of Panzer Lehr was hardly likely to succeed. The nature of the operation was bold, but the force structure of British armoured divisions, the 7th in particular, was inappropriate for such actions, the leadership was unprepared for the methods of fighting in northwest Europe, and the techniques employed by 21st Army Group were inconsistent with these deep penetrations."
7 Armd Div can hardly be blamed for being unsupported and, despite his faults, Bucknall can't really be blamed for not supporting them when there was very little to support them with. 7 Armd's own infantry brigade had only just assembled, having landed some time after 22 Armd Bde. Montgomery might have been prepared to accept the total loss of an Armd Bde if the situation warranted it. The Bde was understandably less keen on that. Hindsight suggests that was a good call as the German response didn't call for a suicide mission, just containment.
Re. Chronological maps of the Normandy campaign: I recently saw this: Published on 27 May 2015 U.S. Army Daily Situation Maps – Invasion of France - June 6 through August 25, 1944 Beginning at midnight on D-Day, June 6, 1944, a daily situation map was prepared identifying the location of Allied Army units (U.S. and British) and an estimate of the positions of Germany Army units. The pace of the advanced outran the original map on August 5th where a new map was used to encompass the battle lines. Description of how to interpret Army Map Symbols: http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwi... High resolution images of the individual maps can be found at: https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1133515 Wittman's been mentioned, researched in quite a great deal, but largely to the detriment perhaps of allied successes, and memories etc. of allied tank "aces" and just the overall allied efforts and aims. Sometimes when you follow the Normandy campaign you get a list of allied defeats one after another and yet meanwhile the allies are expanding the bridgeheads and allied victories seem to go largely unmentioned and by-the-by, until the "big breakout" etc.
Fixed that for you! I can't help feeling the main reason Ike let Monty fight the campaign was so that SHAEF could concentrate on rewriting history as it was made.
I found one the replies to his Twitter post of that really interesting. If nothing else, I've never read such an insouciant war diary (awfully bad luck all round). 'I rather think' the platoon was in such-and-such a position. 1 Bn Rifle Brigade. Source: Neutopia Weather Bird on Twitter
Re. Post #43 above the item is published on youtube by "US National Archives" And I suppose it's highly likely that they have published more like that - US National Archives Perhaps tho. in separate items for various different campaigns etc. Not sure though, at the mo. of the best way to search for such, as they have posted quite a lot on that channel ;-) Google usually is my "fall-back" but then you also see other's efforts at mapping various campaigns etc. though you can get google just to "search" the "US National Archives" on "youtube" - I think. Looking at the description "Beginning at midnight on D-Day, June 6, 1944, a daily situation map was prepared identifying the location of Allied Army units (U.S. and British) and an estimate of the positions of Germany Army units." So some details on them may differ from what was actually where, but on the other hand they give an idea of what the allies thought at the time the Germans had where etc. I didn't notice a big WITTMAN symbol (warning) though amongst the "Description of how to interpret Army Map Symbols" ;-) for some reason all of the focus on these maps seems to be about most of the other Germans that had to be fought and defeated there.