Was Market Garden Worth It

Discussion in 'NW Europe' started by Gerard, Feb 6, 2006.

  1. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    In this thread much controversy has raged over whether Market Garden was the right option. Various opinions have been formed and in some respects have polarised.

    In a view to try and sort out what was the idea and thinking behind it I came across an Article commissioned by the U.S. Army’s Centre for Military History entitled Command Decisions. The link is here:

    http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/70-7_0.htm
    It has a chapter relating to the Decision to Launch MARKET GARDEN.

    What is interesting about this article is that Eisenhower was put under pressure by Generals Marshall and Arnold to use the First Allied Airborne Army in a Strategic Role
    To quote a paragraph from it:
    General Arnold wanted the airborne army used because he felt that missions of troop carrier planes were not "comparing at all favorably with combat plane missions (other than supply and training)....

    However these plans were not without their critics:
    But some commanders, notably General Bradley, believed that this was as it should be. Impressed by the success his ground troops were achieving, Bradley wanted continued use of the aircraft to supply his ground columns.To be fair to Bradley who can blame him, The aircraft were supplying his Army Group with Fuel and ammo and he was seeing results because of it.
    The Article further disputes the claim that the US Forces would have walked through the West Wall. And remember folks this is a report commissioned by the US ARMY not some historian with an axe to grind:
    Whether General Bradley's armies could have gone considerably farther than they did had air supply not again been halted by Operation MARKET is a matter of conjecture. It should be noted that the halt of both the First and the Third Armies in mid-September cannot be attributed specifically to the lack of everyday supplies that airlift might have provided. The halts were due more to a combination of many causes, among them the rugged terrain along the German frontier, the presence of the West Wall, the exhaustion of American combat units, the worn-out condition of their equipment, the rebirth of German strength, and, it has been argued, the thinly spread formation in which American troops approached the German frontier.


    Its not really a case of Market Garden stopped the Americans from crossing the Rhine then!!!!
    Now having quoted the above there is one more part of the report that I feel should be posted here and that is, why MARKET?
    Alternatives aside, Operation MARKET had certain advantages of its own. In the official history of General Eisenhower's headquarters, Forrest C. Pogue has listed these in a manner that bears repeating. Operation MARKET, he has written, ... seemed to fit the pattern of current Allied strategy. It conformed to General Arnold's recommendation for an operation some distance east of the enemy's forward positions and beyond the area where enemy reserves were normally located; it afforded an opportunity for using the long-idle airborne resources; it was in accord with Field Marshal Montgomery's desire for a thrust north of the Rhine while the enemy was disorganized; it would help reorient the Allied drive in the direction 21 Army Group thought it should go; and it appeared to General Eisenhower to be the boldest and best move the Allies could make at the moment. The Supreme Commander realized that the momentum of the drive into Germany was being lost and thought that by this action it might be possible to get a bridgehead across the Rhine before the Allies were stopped. The airborne divisions, he knew, were in good condition and could be supported without throwing a crushing burden on the already overstrained supply lines. At worst, General Eisenhower thought the operation would strengthen the 21 Army Group in its later fight to clear the Schelde estuary. Field Marshal Montgomery examined the objections that the proposed route of advance "involved the additional obstacle of the Lower Rhine ... as compared with more easterly approaches, and would carry us to an area relatively remote from the Ruhr." He considered that these were overridden by certain major advantages: (1) the operation would outflank the Siegfried Line defenses; (2) it would be on the line which the enemy would consider the least likely for the Allies to use; and (3) the area was the one with the easiest range for the Allied airborne forces. [34]
    Contrary to appearances, the military climate at the time of the MARKET decision was unsettled. Erratic winds were blowing in several directions. There was also the likelihood of a calm, a period of recuperation after the whirlwind of the pursuit. In this turbulent period emerged the decision to launch Operation MARKET-GARDEN.
    The operation was a daring strategic maneuver that failed. That the decision to launch it has not prompted the kind of controversy surrounding other command decisions is somewhat singular. Here was no southern France, where one ally wanted it, the other opposed. Here was no Argentan-Falaise, where either ally could accuse the other of fault in failing to close the pocket. Even General Bradley, surely one of Field Marshal Montgomery's severest critics, has reserved his more pungent criticisms for other decisions.
    Perhaps the reason for the lack of acrimony can be found in the narrow margin by which MARKET-GARDEN failed. Or, perhaps more to the point, in the license afforded commanders under conditions of success such as existed in September 1944. As British Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig put it on 22 August 1918, "Risks which a month ago would have been criminal to incur ought now to be incurred as a duty."

    Now whether or not you agree with this assessment you cant deny that it is interesting. I think we can say Sapper’s assertion that it was indeed worth it is fairly correct . And this from the U.S. Army itself!!!
     
  2. jimbotosome

    jimbotosome Discharged

    This seems like a dubious opinion especially where it came from. Counterfactuals are mere opinion, to say they are guaranteed unbiased based on the fact they come from US Army sources, is highly astonishing since it was a US General that gave the approval for Market Garden. Conspicuous by its absence from even the slightest mention, in the entire assessment is the importance of Antwerp, which is the single biggest issue of why MG was not a good idea.

    It’s a really, really bad career move to smoke the biggest strategic war decision of a five-star-general and the future Commander-In-Chief of the US, especially a general that ignored intelligence that advised against the invasion. There are many more counterarguments that are not addressed by the assessment that makes it seem more like a rationalization to cover Ike's butt for authorizing it than true in depth retrospective. Here are some of the more blatant issues “coincidentally” left out of that “assessment”:

    -If the American troops were tired, the Germans were more so, ill supplied, demoralized, retreating, and abandoning critical heavy equipment that could not retreat fast. According to the German generals, the incessant bombing during their retreats were causing the front to collapse. By pushing your enemy to the brink, you are highly likely to affect surrender. Why give your enemy a much needed rest and time for a desperate re-supply when you can rotate reserves in and give yours a rest? The airborne divisions could have given respite to any infantry divisions who are the ones that get the most tired.

    -XXX Corps would not have been unopposed by the Germans any more than the Allies were. The German army's primary objective was to stop the Allies from pushing into Germany. It is incredibly naive to ignore the fact that they Germans would simply move more armor up to support the forces north. Just the idea that if you simply take the bridge at Arnhem, the Germans are going to move troops away rather than up in front of you is so utterly ridiculous that it begs description but yet the constant inference made by those that support MG.

    -XXX Corps would be halted and dug in as they wait for the opening of Antwerp, allowing scads of time for the Germans to reinforce and dig in as well.

    -XXX Corps could have easily have been cut off and we lose an entire Army corps with all its divisions and equipment. It goes way beyond just risking all of the paratroops.

    -One huge predicate of the invasion was Monty’s selling that the crossing of the Siegfried Line was too difficult and could only be done at a certain place. Patton and Bradley disagreed. Patton crossed it later in three place (even when they had dug in to it), places of his own choosing.

    There was simply no reason to believe that the offensive would stall. Patton didn’t believe it, in fact believed just the opposite that if the Germans got pounded anymore they would capitulate. This was why he was so irate. His belief was never cut your enemy a break when he is at his absolute weakest and at the point of collapse.

    Lesson here: Never underestimate politics, even in the Army.

    But there is more to the story. Patton wanted a separate front than that of Monty. Monty wanted a single front to do a “dagger thrust” (led by himself of course). The operation Market Garden was one of entirely “split the fronts”. If this was not a desperation act by Monty, in fear that the Americans were about to break loose in Germany, then why did he suddenly have a change of heart on his most passionate fundamental assertion of the drive to Germany?
     
  3. sapper

    sapper WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    I obviously have a vested interest having taken part in Market Garden.

    Let me put it this way: and see what you think, For years you have been at war with this evil regime, then at last the time comes to return to Europe. After a murderous campaign in Normandy (another that I took part in) then, after what could only be described as a shattering defeat in Normandy.

    This overwhelming defeat engineered by Monty, with his usual utterly ruthless style, culminating ten days ahead of schedule in the Falaise pocket..(Again I took part) Now the utterly beaten enemy is on the run. not a orderly retreat ...far from it ..Falaise was a scene of carnage almost beyond description. You had to see it to believe it....

    It was a helter skelter run, at full tilt, The scurrying back to their borders.
    Now you are the chasing army, at every opportunity you are at their throats, all the way across France Belgium and Holland. Day and night, you never stop the chase of a beaten enemy. On, ever on! Up through Belgium into Holland.

    Now let me pose this question...WHERE DO YOU STOP? Logically you go as far as you can while you have the momentum. To stop and consider your next move in a fluid war is stupidity of the greatest order. You go that one mile further... while you can.... Nothing should stop the drive forward until you win all, or you are stopped... To stop to think "Should we continue to chase the beaten enemy or stop and give him relief"

    To stop in the middle of a headling chase is CRIMINAL, and may at some later date, when the enemy has recouped and rearmed, cost many lives that would not have been lost, if you had continued the chase.

    Now let me pose this question to all that read this posting. Would you chase until you are stopped in this headlong chase...OR would you have stopped and thought "What do I do next"????

    The answer is... you chase him to destruction, if possible. never give a sucker an even break. When the chasing army is stopped by superior forces, men will lose their lives....That is war and fighting men lose their lives. Arnhem was a battle lost. in a war that was won. Not a bridge too far, but a bridge where the enemy made a stand. It could have been anywhere, it happened at Arnhem.

    The Holland operations were in fact, some pretty convincing victories. It was only one of that last bridge we did not get.

    Out of the seven bridges to Arnhem, only one was not achieved. The other six lay safely in our hands, The first one my company took.
    Sapper
     
  4. angie999

    angie999 Very Senior Member

    Wasn't Groundhog Day last week?

    I don't think my poor brain could stand taking part in yet another MG thread right now.
     
  5. Gerard

    Gerard Seelow/Prora

    Angie, Jimbo, Sapper, my intention was not to spark another war of words. However when I came across this article, given the level of interest that the discussions engendered. I felt that people, even though they might not agree with it, would at least find it an interesting read.

    As to the Dubiousness of the Source, Jimbo. I fail to see how a report commissioned by the US army can be that dubious. Sure it might not be a view that you subscribe to. But to call it dubious?????
     
  6. jimbotosome

    jimbotosome Discharged

    (Gotthard Heinrici @ Feb 6 2006, 01:45 PM) [post=45366]Angie, Jimbo, Sapper, my intention was not to spark another war of words. However when I came across this article, given the level of interest that the discussions engendered. I felt that people, even though they might not agree with it, would at least find it an interesting read.

    As to the Dubiousness of the Source, Jimbo. I fail to see how a report commissioned by the US army can be that dubious. Sure it might not be a view that you subscribe to. But to call it dubious?????
    [/b]
    It has nothing to do with my personal view. It has to do with common sense and knowledge of human behavior and knowledge of bureaucratic organizations. Look how sensitive the issue of MG is here and none of us were involved with the decision to stage the operation (few of us even born). Our vested interest is strictly superficial. There is absolutely ownership to these kind of decisions. There is no doubt that some men died as a result of this decision. We can debate the chain reaction of problems that fell out from it but at least those in the operation itself are without question. If we, having nothing to do with the decision itself, see it as a sensitive/personal issue by simply questioning its wisdom, then imagine how the chief power broker would feel having this decision of his questioned by a subordinate (the one charged to make this "assessment"). The subordinate certainly knows the score. We have a term in the workplace called CLM which is an abbreviation for "Career Limiting Move". This is a term that is used when you say something that brings accusation or shame to your boss, and can adversely affect your chance to ever advance again. The higher the boss you execute a CLM on, the less chance of advancing up to and including the point at which you may even lose your job.

    If a subordinate slammed a 5-star general who is said to have political aspirations for top job in the US government, then he would find himself “passed over” for promotion from that point on and once passed over, you are expected (and advised) to resign. You simply don’t cross that line if at all possible. Did you see the movie “A Few Good Men”? It was centered around cronyism and not offending a powerful man, the marine colonel that had aspirations in moving into the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If it were made by a retired officer with no desire to go into public office or back into the service, then you would expect some level of objectivity especially if he or she had no personal ties to the issue under discussion. But that’s not the case here.

    The US Army is not a mindless machine not run by independent minded objective, non-career people. I have heard (not being in the military myself I can only take their word) that politics is greatest in government branches especially the armed service and cronyism and political correct behavior is at its peak. This is precisely why Patton was going to resign in Jan 1946 so he could go public with Ike's communist sympathy and the problems it created for the German people. He couldn't do that as a General Officer for fear of receiving demotion or discharge or tried of insubordination.

    This was not a tactical analysis. This is a philosophical retrospective of a single decision made by a single man. To judge it is to judge the man himself.
     
  7. Herroberst

    Herroberst Senior Member

    Does anybody else think that Market Garden was kind of a Drop and Hope strategy? What if the Germans had dropped Fallschirmjäger on the far bank of the Volga? Discuss.
     
  8. trumpetplayer992

    trumpetplayer992 Senior Member

    Yea, if they did that, it would have been their "Market Garden", in my opinion.

    Yes, it is like a drop and hope thing, because their was no "guarentee" like D-Day was.
     
  9. trumpetplayer992

    trumpetplayer992 Senior Member

    Is that movie good?
     
  10. Run N Gun

    Run N Gun Discharged

    yes its very good. you wont see tons of gore like SPR or BOB but it has a very good storyline.
     
  11. mrya

    mrya Junior Member

    No, it's that simple. It was an ill fated operation that Monty used to boost his ego....
     
  12. airborne medic

    airborne medic Very Senior Member

    A vital point in my view that is often overlooked is that V2 rockets were being launched at Lonodn from Holland. As everyone knows there was no defence against these except over-running the launching areas......OMG as well as supposedly helping to end the war would also have solved the V2 problem......
     
  13. spidge

    spidge RAAF RESEARCHER

    I have not put forward many opinions on Market Garden previously except to point out there were glaring inefficiencies, not so much in the planning at HQ level, but in the logistics and intelligent network.

    I preface this with “I do not have a great deal of respect for Montgomery”, as he proved himself to be an extrovert and egotist looking for glory. I am entitled to that opinion however those who would say (with the advantage of hindsight) that he would send “his” troops into an operation that did not have a chance of succeeding is ridiculous.

    He would have IMO, believed that this operation could be brought to fruition and would shorten the war and yes he would be seen as a hero. Those who think that he deliberately gambled with the lives of these men need to be wrapped up in a straight jacket.

    There were many things that went wrong however IMO Market Garden was an operation that, without the bad luck, would have succeeded.

    My opinion may seem somewhat simplistic, without the normal intricacies however the details below would put any operation in doubt.

    MG was the monumental intelligence stuff up of this period of the war! The Ardennes fiasco was still to come.

    D-Day was an intelligence coup, MG was the complete reverse.

    Reconnaissance aircraft photos showed images of the Panzers that were there however this evidence was ignored as broken down junk and that it would not pose a threat.

    The British radios did not work.

    Their long-range VHF sets were delivered with the wrong crystals, thus operating on a frequency no-one was listening to.

    Their shorter-range sets for use between the brigades did not work and the various battalions were completely cut off from each other.

    Plans for the operation were found by a German soldier in a crashed Glider. This was possibly one of the major reasons contributing to the failure as the Germans were able to accurately pinpoint movements of their own troops to each pre-arranged allied objective. Without this information they would have been spread thin on the ground to cover all possibilities.

    The normal ability of the Allied force to evaluate each others position and arrange for intelligence was virtually unavailable in the crucial early part of the operation.

    These were not Montgomery’s personal mistakes but he would have to wear them.
     
  14. Kitty

    Kitty Very Senior Member

    Market Garden. This debate will rage for at least another 40 years.
    IF it had been morr thoroughly planned, IF fewer problems occured, IF vital intelligence had been heeded, IF the gliders could have been towed together, instead of in three waves over several days, and IF a resting German unit had not been close by, then yes it would have worked and shortened the war.
    IMO Market Garden was worth it, but it didn't pan out the way hoped at Arnhem. I speak as a person who lost a family member in the second wave of paras.
    Market Garden was a success overall, but Arnhem was botched. My opinion and nobody elses.
    Kitty
     
  15. sapper

    sapper WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    MRYA.
    That sort of comment shows just how little understanding of war, or the situation at the time you have. By makiing remarks like that you dishonour the memory of men that gave their all for the good of the many.

    I will say again. At Monty's feet lay the one great chance to finish the war by Christmas, it was an outside chance. But the prize was the glittering prospect of saving tens of thousands of young mens lives. Of having the whole of Germany on our hands.

    Was that worth a try? Too bloody right it was! Fortune favours the bold and we took the best part of Holland in one swoop anyway, So it was not a failure
    The great gamble was about 80% successfull. It was a great chance.not all was won...BUt with that great prize of saving many thousands of mens lives..Should he have sat on his hands and done nothing. Not in Monty's ideas. I am ofetn amused by the comments, if some here had their way they way they would sit on the backsides and do nothing.

    Men gave their lives for that long chance, even though there was small chance of success.
    Sapper
    Market Garden Vet
     
  16. parkerpen@btinternet.com

    parkerpen@btinternet.com Junior Member

    To to try and fail is better than to have never tried at all!
     
  17. drgslyr

    drgslyr Senior Member

    To to try and fail is better than to have never tried at all!

    I'm sure the Germans were thinking this in 1946.
     
  18. Cancerkitty

    Cancerkitty Member

    I would have to side with those who say it was worth the gamble. Obviously there were loads of intelligence problems, and the lack of communication after men were on the ground was lamentable, but if it had worked thousands of live would have been saved and the Cold War would have been a lot different. That last comment said with the benefit of hindsight of course.
     
  19. Kyt

    Kyt Very Senior Member

    I just thought you’d be interested in this:

    “The main factor reducing the impact of the airlandings was not a ‘betrayal myth’ (now refuted), that SS Panzer formations were pre-positioned to defeat a n airbourne assault: improvisation and a rapid build-up of forces blunted the attacks. This arose from aggressive and swift counter-measures implemented by IISS Corps already located in situ and other ad hoc combat groups which were rushed to its aid” (pg 304)

    and

    “Quite simply, the Allies were unable to win the reinforcements race” (Pg 314)

    From “’It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944” by Robert J Kershaw
     
  20. Kiwiwriter

    Kiwiwriter Very Senior Member

    A fine idea, poorly executed.

    Had Monty's tanks broken through to Arnhem, they might not have ended the war by Christmas (German resistance was stiffening up as a general rule), but they would have been in position to liberate most of The Netherlands, shut down the V-2 sites, and cut off the German defenses of the Scheldt Estuary from their supplies, making clearing the Scheldt a much easier proposition than it really was.

    However, the weaknesses of Market-Garden in execution have been stated above. The biggest was that the biggest airborne operation in history was whipped up in a week, which led to the many failures at the operational level, like the radio sets with the wrong crystals, and the famous incident of the supply canister being full of useless berets.

    I believe the big failure was Montgomery's and the other top leaders. Unlike many of his other battles, he failed to exercise personal leadership in this situation. He was absent from the scene. I am certain that had he been at Nijmegen, the tanks would have kept moving. He would have put pressure on commanders to move faster. Also absent from the scene was 2nd Army commander Gen. Miles Dempsey, who showed up late in the battle to make one decision, to pull the British 1st Airborne out of Arnhem. He should have been there earlier. And Lt. Gen. Brian Horrocks was not as forceful as normal, due to a case of the flu. Horrocks was very frail for most of the 1944-45 campaign, due to effects of his wounding in Tunisia.

    Absentee leadership hurt the British 1st Airborne, but not deliberately. We all know that Maj. Gen. Roy Urquhart was trapped in an attic for two days, unable to command his division, while the two senior brigadiers argued out who was in charge.

    The British intelligence failure to accept Dutch Underground reports is not entirely from British arrogance. For three years, the Germans had taken over the Dutch Underground's radio transmitters, via "Operation North Pole," and the RAF and SOE had been delivering supplies and agents into German hands, believing they were running a massive resistance operation, that only existed in the minds of the German radiomen and intelligence guys at the other end. Having been fooled and burned once, the British were understandably reluctant to be fooled and burned again, and did not accept Dutch reports at face value any more. Score one for German counterintelligence.

    The SS panzer divisions at Arnhem were not in great shape, having been battered in the Falaise fighting a month before. They were understrength, and many of their vehicles were being repaired. So I'm not surprised their efficiency would be discounted. However, the British should have made greater allowance for the German flexibility in battle, and how the Germans could put together effective Kampfgrupped in crisis situations from assorted and motley units, which they did at Market-Garden.

    Market-Garden also suffered from "victory disease." With the Allies driving the Germans back pell-mell all across Northwest Europe, the Allied leaders believed that one more good shove would knock out the trembling German edifice. They did not reckon with their own supply problems and German resiliency.

    Finally, Market-Garden was 90 percent successful. It liberated a 60-mile corridor into The Netherlands, which was expanded, freeing two major Dutch cities, Eindhoven and Nijmegen, and giving the Allies a springboard into Germany later.

    Monty did admit later that he thought the 1st Canadian Army could open the Scheldt at the same time, which it could not do, because of its own supply problems, and stiff German defenses. We should recall that the 1st Canadian Army fought harsh battles to open the Channel ports, and did not even open Dunkirk, simply investing it.

    Many things went wrong with Market-Garden, but such happens in war. It's a gambling and risky business...easy to start, hard to end.
     

Share This Page