Which British units were left in India before and at the time of Partition?

This hand drawn map of the area is from the RSF Journal; it does not show the East Lancashire mission to Dehradun.

 

An Indian take on the issues has appeared in an Indian online newspaper: British army could have prevented Partition riots

The author concludes:

It cites sources I had not found:

I am aware of the Sussex archive though and White-Spunner's book does not refer to this paper.
Link, so far not read: https://www.jstor.org/stable/311867 You need JSTOR (free) access.

I have cited Daniel Marston's work, though not this pre-Partition aspect:

From the book The Indian Army and the End of the Raj (2014).

Then a University of Vermont paper:

White-Spunner's book does not refer to this paper.
Link, so far not read: https://core.ac.uk/download/84397770.pdf

The safety of Britons in India has featured in several, recent posts here and today I have found a paper on this. The Abstract:

Link: so far not read: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23726108 You need JSTOR (free) access

 

It may be worth keeping in mind that Montgomery and Auchinleck did not like each other at all. I can't remember the details but M was insubordinate to Auchinleck while under his command in Home Forces. Then this was a major factor in Auchinleck appointing Ritchie to command 8th Army - to avoid having to work with Monty again!

 

A free evening today and I have now read the three articles / papers referred to in Post 42. Not much about the British Army nor why they were not involved in countering the violence. Some useful information and they do help to provide the context.

A 1974 journal, ‘Modern Asian Studies’ has a thirty-one page article ‘The Punjab Boundary Force and the Problem of Order, August 1947’ by Professor Robin Jeffrey, is based on several Partition documents, including the 1,200 pages held by Sussex University belonging to the late Major-General TW ‘Pete’ Rees, who commanded the PBF, as a ‘neutral force’ for a month August-September 1947.
Link: The Punjab Boundary Force and the Problem of Order, August 1947 on JSTOR (Note JSTOR is available free after registration, downloads have to be paid for).

The PBF was formed 19/7/47 and within days was deployed to the Punjab, a province that would be divided between India and Pakistan. An area the size of Ireland, with 14.5m people; the PBF had its maximum has 23k soldiers. In seventeen infantry battalions, one cavalry regiment (armoured cars) and supporting elements – organised into eight brigades[1]. Rees had been commanding the 4th Indian Division since February 1946. The PBF’s composition was: 40% Hindu, 35% Muslim, 20% Gurkha, 5-10% Sikhs and non-caste Hindu; 50% came from the Punjab itself. All the units knew which army they would go after Partition. The PBF’s role to – following a long Indian Army tradition – was to provide military aid to the civil power (MACP), except the civil power had or was near to collapse – for many reasons, including the Punjab police were 70-80% Muslim and in some districts were disarmed. In the assumptions and planning refugees were not expected to move. Ten thousand refugees on the move, mainly by road, sometimes by trains, would have an escort of an officer and twenty men. In an unclear incident in Amritsar two British officers were killed. In essence the PBF mission was impossible.

In Lahore Area Command, the city being Punjab’s capital, there were 45k troops not available to the PBF as they were in the process of being reorganized into the two new armies. (Ends)

A long, 351 pgs., 2017 University of Vermont Master's dissertation ‘Imperial Influence On The Postcolonial Indian Army, 1945-1973’ quotes many sources and several Indian authors on the imperial influence on the post-colonial Indian army. Most interesting was the revelation that Viceroy Lord Archibald Wavell, a British military veteran, and his military chief Field Marshall Claude Auchinleck were on the same page in resisting repeated Whitehall interference, which they considered detrimental to the peaceful transition of power.
Link: https://core.ac.uk/download/84397770.pdf

Pgs. 109-113 are a chapter ‘Planning Partition India 1945-1947’ provides a useful context. Plus, pg. 120 states the Punjab Border Force (PBF) casualties were twelve killed and thirty-two wounded, from the 4th Indian division mainly, a force of nine thousand amidst a population of fifteen million and three hundred thousand armed men fighting. Pg. 124 refers to small parties of British & Indian soldiers killed crossing into the Punjab. The 2nd Gurkha Rifles were still in a North-West Frontier post when Partition happened (unable to quickly verify this; this battalion transferred to the British Amy). (Ends)

The safety of Britons in India has featured in several, recent posts here and today I have found a 2013 paper, 19 pgs.: ‘Safety First: The Security of Britons in India, 1946-1947’ by Professor Ian Talbot, in the journal of the Royal Historical Society.

The Abstract:

A month into his viceroyalty, Lord Mountbatten took time out from sounding Indian political opinion about independence to discuss the future security of British residents with his provincial governors. By this stage, the concerns stemmed from fears of a general breakdown in law and order and Hindu—Muslim conflict rather than nationalist assault. Detailed plans were developed for a sea-borne evacuation. In the event, the only Britons who were evacuated were those airlifted from Srinagar in November 1947 as they were in the path of an invasion of the disputed Kashmir territory by Pashtun tribesmen from Pakistan. Despite numerous articles on the British departure from India and the aftermath of Partition, little has been written about either the airlift or the broader strategic planning for European evacuation. The paper will focus on this neglected corner of the history of the transfer of power. It argues that while anti-British sentiment declined from a peak around the time of the Indian National Army trials, of 1945—6, the memories of the wartime chaotic flight from Burma and Malaya and the irreparable damage this had done to British prestige in Asia coloured the safety first approach adopted in 1947.

Link: SAFETY FIRST: THE SECURITY OF BRITONS IN INDIA, 1946—1947 on JSTOR

A month after Mountbatten became Viceroy he held a meeting with the provincial governors, on 15/4/1947, to discuss the security of British civilian residents in India and detailed plans were prepared for a seaborne evacuation. There were 80k British residents, including 50k children and women; a quarter were in Bengal (14k in Calcutta, the provincial capital); others were scattered and 20% were in at risk areas.

Concerns for civilians is attributed to the impact of the retreat from Burma and the loss of Malaya. Plus, indications of a threat from domestic Indian factors: the trials of Indian National Army (INA) members, which led to widespread communal disorder, the mutinies within the Royal Indian Navy (primarily at Bombay) and protests in Delhi before and during Victory Day celebrations.

By April 1947 the general political situation as less threatening and the evacuation plans were not needed. There was a small-scale evacuation of civilians from Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, when irregular forces (mainly from the North-West Frontier) advanced and the Indian Army intervened. Two RAF transport squadrons, based near Karachi, were used.(Ends)

I have also made contact with Barney Spunner-White, the author of the book that started my research.
[1] Listed in: 4th Infantry Division (India) - Wikipedia

 

There is a separate thread spun off from this thread on 'The 2nd Gurkha Rifles were still in a North-West Frontier post when Partition happened (unable to quickly verify this; this battalion transferred to the British Amy)'. See: Where were the 2nd Gurkha Rifles at the time of Partition?

 

108 LF was The 108th Regiment Royal Armoured Corps (The Lancashire Fusiliers) (108 RAC). It was an armoured regiment of the British Army's Royal Armoured Corps during World War II.

See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/108th_Regiment_Royal_Armoured_Corps

 

Edmund,

Welcome aboard. Your identification is a puzzle, as Wiki suggests the unit never left the UK and was disbanded at the end of 1943. So, if you are correct it was in India in 1947. One day I shall have a look around online. can you add any more?

Edmund Dantes alas joined, posted and did not return (added 3/11/23).

 

Albeit a RAF officer's obituary in the Daily Telegraph today (behind a pay wall) has this paragraph:

:

The officer being:

From: Squadron Leader Eric Downs, flew supplies in the ‘Yangtse Incident’ and refugees during India’s Partition – obituary

Wiki has one sentence for this period:

From: No. 10 Squadron RAF - Wikipedia

On a quick search little else could be found about this period.

Looking at some old research I found this passage in my article:

 

108 LF would appear to be an error. Probably should be 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers who were in India at the end of the war as part of 4th Infantry Brigade.

Richard

Edit: “S/A 24 Feb 47” most likely refers to Suspended Animation.

 

Richard,

Thanks for this pointer. Their presence is confirmed on this regimental website: 1-8bnLFindia1945-47

The 1/8th Lancashire Fusiliers were there 1945 till being disbanded in 1947, possibly @ Calcutta. There are photos of them in March 1946 and and February 1947 @ Jullunder (now Jalahandar), in in the Punjab and has a cantonment (large barrack town). No other information, or imagery especially for their leaving India,