Why no adequate radar system in Oahu ?

Did Lt. Kermit Tyler ever make Captain?

 

Did Lt. Kermit Tyler ever make Captain?
You just beat me to it Andy!! Whatever happened him?

 

Opana Pointer...

Do you know what happened to Lt. Kermit Tyler ?

Regards
Andy

 

Opana Pointer...

Do you know what happened to Lt. Kermit Tyler ?

Regards
Andy
He had a rather normal career in the Air Force, finished up the war as a Lt. Col. The Army Board noted that he was just a shave-tail in a job with no authority or resources, and didn't censure him or anything. And he had a story he could dine out on for years.

 

How bizarre.....Arguably one of the United States biggest Fubars by an individual and you make Lt. Col. from Lt. in four years !

I thought you was going to tell me he was lynched by a rather annoyed mob of US sailors

 

How bizarre.....Arguably one of the United States biggest Fubars by an individual and you make Lt. Col. from Lt. in four years !

I thought you was going to tell me he was lynched by a rather annoyed mob of US sailors
First off, you should note that Eisenhower was a Lt. Col. in 1940. Just for contrast, of course.

Second, Tyler's actions were secret, confidential or better, so it wasn't noised about too much.

 

Isn't that what they do on the forces ? Promote you to get you out of the way.
Jeez I'm cynical.
David

 

Isn't that what they do on the forces ? Promote you to get you out of the way.
Jeez I'm cynical.
David
Could be. I'll have to refresh my memory about Tyler's career. He gave rough details at the Hearings. I don't know if he ever had a bio done.

Basically, he was just a schmoe who happened to be there at that time. Not even bad luck, just something that happened.

 

Really. the Lts supervisors had gone to breakfast. Their supervisors did not even show up for a Sunday morning training function. Did the Lt even know what phone number to call? And, would anyone have been there above the rank of corporal to pick up the phone? The Commander of the destroyer Ward did send a radio message imeadiately that he had spotted and attacked a submarine at the harbors entrance. The message drifted through the hands of low ranking clerks and junior shift supervisors for over a hour before it reached anyone who could make a decision. That was not unlike the delayed Alert order sent from Gen Marshall earlier that morning.

As a management consultant once told me "The fish always rots from the head first." Kimmil and Short got hammered for the disaster. No point in beating on a Lt. Its not likely he ever made that mistake again.

 

The linch pin of the British defence system was the Radar CHH (Chain Home High) which gave early warning of incoming aircraft but it was recognised that it had a disadvantage in the that it could only detect aircraft at a altitude above 10000 feet which was good enough to pick up waves of aircraft which were typical of the tactic used by the Germans in the Battle of Britain.The disavantage was realised and resulted in the development of the CHL (Chain Home Low) which could pick up aircraft down to a very low level.Even so a policy was adopted by both sides of dropping low to get under the radar screen. (I remember in the early 1970s the RAF Phantoms testing the British radar systems, sweeping very low over the North Sea approaching the radar station at Stanton Wolds,near Scarborough, then suddenly climbing over the Stanton Wolds at minmum height)

As with all technical gear radar has to be adequately specificied for the task,reliable and maintenance free as much as possible.Personnel with the appropriate aptitude have to be trained to operate and maintain it in addition to the procedures for the correct interpretation and handling of its intelligence.Personnel only become competent with the technology as they gain experience but with new installations it is important to appreciate the handover of commissioned gear when it becomes "yours"

One feature found regarding the accuracy of CHH was that the Lincolnshire CHH installations picked up individual aircraft from as far as nearly 300 miles distance and on one occasion picked up a "return" from an aircraft in the Bremen area.

 

From some of my reasearch Ive also heard they couldnt have notified the Aircrews or navy fast enough from the site due to a lack of communication equipment at the radar site.

 

The linch pin of the British defence system was the Radar CHH (Chain Home High) which gave early warning of incoming aircraft but it was recognised that it had a disadvantage in the that it could only detect aircraft at a altitude above 10000 feet which was good enough to pick up waves of aircraft which were typical of the tactic used by the Germans in the Battle of Britain.The disavantage was realised and resulted in the development of the CHL (Chain Home Low) which could pick up aircraft down to a very low level.Even so a policy was adopted by both sides of dropping low to get under the radar screen. (I remember in the early 1970s the RAF Phantoms testing the British radar systems, sweeping very low over the North Sea approaching the radar station at Stanton Wolds,near Scarborough, then suddenly climbing over the Stanton Wolds at minmum height)

As with all technical gear radar has to be adequately specificied for the task,reliable and maintenance free as much as possible.Personnel with the appropriate aptitude have to be trained to operate and maintain it in addition to the procedures for the correct interpretation and handling of its intelligence.Personnel only become competent with the technology as they gain experience but with new installations it is important to appreciate the handover of commissioned gear when it becomes "yours"

One feature found regarding the accuracy of CHH was that the Lincolnshire CHH installations picked up individual aircraft from as far as nearly 300 miles distance and on one occasion picked up a "return" from an aircraft in the Bremen area.

A few other points on the British defense. The radars were not the only warning system.

1. Signals monitoring specialists quickly learned the German pilots had poor radio discipline. When forming up raids they used the radios enough the Brit analyists could obtain a fair idea of the locations and size of the German air groups as they assembled. That warned the Brits even when the aircraft were forming below the altitude and range the Chain Home stations could detect them.

2. Picket boats in the Channel & North Sea. There were enough of those maintained, despite German efforts to drive the off, that the German air groups could be spotted, counted, and flight path tracked as they crossed the water.

3. As pointed out by other here the British had a fully operational fighter control system. On Oahu the radar operators could call their HQ, but the the system for alerting the pilots and vectoring the aircraft was not yet setup. Lt Kermit could call the Army or Navy CP, but that was the extent of it. he had no way to direct any fighter aircraft, or even to alert the pilots himself.

 

From some of my reasearch Ive also heard they couldnt have notified the Aircrews or navy fast enough from the site due to a lack of communication equipment at the radar site.
The Opana Point radar site had a telephone that morning. They used it to contact the Fighter Intercept Center. The FIC was the end of the road for the information, however. There's a good reason for that, it wasn't operational at the time. The Army was still learning how to use radar and hadn't establish a full protocol for intercepting boogies. There was no structure in place to get planes in the air on order of the FIC.

It also should be noted that the FIC operated from 4 am to 7 am that morning, and the phone call from Opana Point came in after every regularly assigned officer had left for breakfast. The sole officer there, 2nd Lt. Kermit Tyler, was there simply to observe the procedures. Every pilot on Hawaii was to eventually do the same so they'd know what the other end of the chain of information was do when it went into service. Tyler was only there because he was told to be there from 4 am to 8 am, by a senior who probably meant 4 to 7.

It's of some small interest that Tyler's career in the Army was not affected by this faux pas. He finished the war as a Lt. Col.

 

OLD THREAD, NEW REPLY...

Most of these great points have been argued in war histories, too, and I think there was not only a monetary cautiousness towards "new technology" but the Anti-Limey Mentality undoubtedly prevented the Americans from ASKING for Brit experiences. "What's the best settings?" for example would clearly indicate "I have no clue on how this stuff works, so you're the expert - tell me."

Yeah. Right. Like you'd see some up-and-comer Annapolis grad asking his CO or XO for permission to talk to British experts? I think he'd reasonably assume his request would receive a NO WAY in far harsher language.

And there wasn't just an Anti-Limey sentiment - there was a large amount of "I can't possibly reveal how little I know about this new technology!" which has been part of Human History, too.

As for Adm Kimmel, yes, I find it hard to believe that navies all over the world have blamed the only the CO for organization-wide disasters.

 

Bit of necro: The US Army borrowed a radar expert from the USN to help them set up their Fighter Information Center. The gentleman was a former Eagle Squadron Commander (Taylor by name) (Scotland-based) who showed them how to work the system the Brits used. He then went back to his "regular" job on USS Enterprise. Taylor's testimony about events is in the Hearings.