Artillery Controversies Normandy and NW Europe

Discussion in 'NW Europe' started by Sheldrake, Feb 4, 2023.

  1. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    I am doing some research on British and US artillery in Normandy and North West Europe. I would like to tap the collective brain of WW2talk. What controversies or debates exist concerning their use, doctrine, technology tactics or effectiveness. If you can offer a reference even better!
     
    Last edited: Feb 8, 2023
  2. Bedee

    Bedee Well-Known Member

  3. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    Thank you
     
  4. Ramiles

    Ramiles Researching 9th Lancers, 24th L and SRY

    Re. Tilly-Sur-Seulles 1944

    On the British front on 7 June, the name of one village was to relegate all the others into the background and especially Caen, one of D-Day's strategic objectives. A name that history would remember as one of the most tragic episodes of all the Battle of Normandy: Tilly-sur-Seulles. Tilly-sur-Seulles, Lingèvres, Cristot, Boislondes, la Senaudière, Saint- Pierre: so many names which symbolise the bitterness of the fighting marking the first three weeks following the landings between Caen and Bayeux. Although it wasn't an objective for the Allied troops, Tilly-sur-Seulles became the lynchpin for the Battle of Caen and one of the first Norman villages to be destroyed in the fighting. It was captured and recaptured 23 times by the belligerents in almost one month ; 70% of the village was destroyed and almost 10% of its population was lost. Hundreds of soldiers died trying to break through or hold the front at Tilly. The British battalions lost on average 200 men a day during this period. The combats which took place in the sector are still studied at Sandhurst, the military academy. Using numerous maps, photos and eye-witness accounts most of which are as yet unpublished, as well as the unit log books, the author, the dean of the Museum at Tilly sur-Seulles, presents a day by day, hour by hour account of the hard fighting which took place on the Tilly Front opposing XXX Corps' divisions and two elite SS divisions from the I.SS-Panzerkorps: the 12.SS-Hitklerjuegend and
    the Panzer Lehr. These titanic combats took place in the middle of the civilian population who also paid a heavy tribute to the battle.
    Revised, corrected and enlarged edition with unpublished photographs.

    ----- x ----- x -----

    Recent article : from 5th February 2023...

    Le Tilly-sur-Seulles d'hier présenté en photos sur la façade de la mairie

    Translation : Le Tilly-sur-Seulles d'hier présenté en photos sur la façade de la mairie
     
    Last edited: Feb 6, 2023
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  5. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    Sorry if I am being a bit think, but what debates and controversies concerning artillery are you referring to or is this just a plug for the book?
     
  6. Ramiles

    Ramiles Researching 9th Lancers, 24th L and SRY

    This is recent... Le Tilly-sur-Seulles d'hier présenté en photos sur la façade de la mairie

    And it details the remembrance of "The fighting in June and July" which in "1944 destroyed the town center of Tilly-sur-Seulles (Calvados) causing irreparable damage. In addition to the many human losses , the entire city center was razed and it is hard to imagine, 79 years later, what the town was like and the life that was organized there."

    https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/search?query=Tilly-sur-Seulles

    I think that there is some sound recording from the time of the artillery firing on the town etc.

    Battle of Tilly: Set Piece Attack (Albeit not currently online)



    D-Day 75: A corner of Norfolk forever in a foreign field - a peaceful gift of a gun that repelled Nazis

     
    Last edited: Feb 8, 2023
  7. Gary Kennedy

    Gary Kennedy Member

    I don't know that there are any controversies in the proper sense of the word. The RA and RCA and the FA all accomplished the tasks asked of them in France, Belgium, Holland and Germany, though not without encountering problems that they eventually overcame.

    I have come to suspect, and this is just personal observation so worth what you pay for it, that there is some low level animosity between advocates of the British RA and US Field Artillery about which was 'better'. To date, I don't think any historian has chosen to weaponise the debate and it remains a case of supporting 'your' system, because it worked in the actuality of battle and brought the desired results. Perhaps such debates need to involve Generals (or Field Marshals) or tanks to generate the required toxicity that demands a book...

    On a more constructive note, there may be more questions regarding the response to certain problems than definite controversies. Just a few for thought...

    Was the major investment in anti-aircraft units seen at the start of the campaign truly justified given the less than spectacular involvement of the Luftwaffe in the West during1944 in particular? Pros being that after having been savaged by the German airpower during 1940, 1941 and 1942, and it not having been exactly clear blue skies in the Med in 1943, then sending the AEF to Normandy with anything less than the maximum AA support available would have been inexcusable. Cons being that there were an enormous number of AA units in both the British and US orders of battle that saw 'relatively' little usage until the emergence of the V1, and even then AA units were still available to be broken up to reassign personnel as infantry replacements.

    One of the biggest killers of infantry in Normandy was the mortar, both the generic 8-cm and knock-off 12-cm (copied from the Red Army weapon), and the Nebelwerfer. Counter mortar capability seems to have been developed on the hoof in both Italy and Normandy, with no prior preparation beyond counter battery techniques. The 8-cm was hardly a surprise in 1944, though I think the 12-cm had not been much used in Italy prior June 1944. I don't know how much of a shock the Nebelwerfer came to Allied forces in Normandy in particular. Pros being that techniques were developed, new equipment introduced quickly, like 4-pen recorder, and the capability of radar in the ground role was recognised and implemented. Cons being that it wasn't until late 1944 that Br/Cdn Divs got a Counter Mortar Officer's Staff in NWE, a few months behind the Counter Mortar org used in Italy. The Counter Mortar Batteries raised in the UK as a direct response to the threat of German mortars do not appear to have had any impact on ops in NWE; as I understand it, the first three CM Btys did not arrive in NWE until around Mar/Apr 1945, and were put under 17 AGRA, which was then involved in the siege of Dunkirk, and they CM Btys did not serve with any Br/Cdn Divs. The US opted to simply absorb CM work into the Fire Direction Centres, though the Infantry Regiments intended for the invasion of the Japanese Home Islands were to include a 'counter-fire' subunit.

    There is also the constant duel with the tank, but as every internet warrior knows, bringing anti-tank guns into debates about tanks is just confusing matters...

    I'm sure I've seen suggestions that the big artillery preparations did not always deliver the expected results, at least in the eyes of the infantry and armour following up directly after such. So was perhaps suppression of defenders being misconstrued for destruction of defences? Was there a sufficient amount of heavy artillery (say 155mm and upwards) in the West?

    And there is always the US ammunition shortage, or supply chain issue in modern parlance perhaps, of late 1944 into early 1945.

    For contemporary US viewpoints on what worked, what did not, and what changes were recommended following the campaign in the ETO, I would always recommend the snappily titled 'Reports of the General Board, US Force, European Theater', produced in the immediate aftermath of the end of the war in Europe.

    Home - Reports of the General Board, U.S. Forces, European Theater - Home at Combined Arms Research Library, CARL, CGSC (libguides.com)

    This includes sections on the Field Artillery, AAA and TD.

    Gary
     
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  8. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    Thank you. Very herlpful.
     
  9. Tom OBrien

    Tom OBrien Senior Member

    A couple of thoughts from a complete amateur inspired by reading lots of opinionated historians!

    A. Did German devolution (if that’s the right word) of light artillery down into infantry formations in light and heavy infantry gun companies deliver quicker and more relevant support than the British system - despite the undoubted professionalism of the RA.
    B. 25-pdr saw service throughout the war - was there a need for a heavier weight of shell? Especially in the attack?
    C. Did the undoubted excellence of RA training, etc, stifle innovation. No rockets, same guns, strange mess rules, etc.

    Good luck!

    Tom
     
  10. The problem is there were few 12cm sGW in Normandy, they were just being introduced. Sturm-Btl.-7 A.O.K. had four and Fs.Jg.-Regt. 6 had nine but otherwise they came in later. Fs.Gr.Werf..-Btl. 3 may have received some before they deployed to Normandy but that is uncertain.
     
  11. Juha

    Juha Junior Member

    I'm not an artillery expert at all, but to the point B. In my opinion, British fire support was based more on suppressing than destroying. To be able to completely destroying the enemy's fire network with artillery fire was extremely unlikely, but it was easier to suppress it for a short time. The lighter shell had a smaller danger zone, so the attacking infantry could advance closer to the barrage and therefore reach the enemy positions sooner after the last shells hit. AGRAs had 5.5-inch gun/howitzers, which could destroy pinpoint targets.
     
  12. TTH

    TTH Senior Member

    Some which occur to me:

    1. Relative value of towed vs SP anti-tank guns, especially towed 17-pdr vs M10.
    2. Proper deployment of anti-tank regiments. I ran across this in the 102nd (Northumberland Hussars) Anti Tank war diary. It seems that inf units wanted the guns (and especially M10s) up close and under their own control, whereas 102 AT wanted them further back and under the regiment.
    3. Usefulness or otherwise of the 95mm howitzer. This doesn't seem to have been generally regarded as a good weapon, but the Royal Marines seem to have done OK with it even when mounted in the Centaur tank (another equipment usually described as a dud).
    4. Mobille medium artillery for the armored division. Apparently Monty drew up an ideal armd div scheme which would have given the armored division its own medium guns. The US M12 SP was considered for this role, which may be why 987th US FA Btn was attached to XXX Corps in Normandy.
    5. The surfeit of AA artillery, and what to do with the excess guns and gunners when they were no longer needed in their intended role.
     
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  13. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    Thanks all. Keep 'em coming.
     
  14. Chris C

    Chris C Canadian

    Adding to what TTH wrote. I'm not sure if these are debates per se or just issues.

    1) the uselessness of the FAT as a towing vehicle for the 17-pounder gun

    2) The proper use of SPs. I'm not sure this is really a debate per se, but as I understand it doctrine was evolved separately in Italy and in NWE about how best to use SPs. The booklet on the tactical use of the M10 would not come out until Jan or Feb 1945. The other aspect of "use" I've seen is with respect to them in infantry divisional regiments but maybe also in armoured divisions: are the SPs allocated per battery and deployed with the towed guns in defence of different brigades, or are they viewed as a reserve to be deployed when the situation warranted it?

    A part of the question of doctrine is, how offensively can they be deployed?
     
  15. Quarterfinal

    Quarterfinal Well-Known Member

    Perhaps something you have already looked at, but:
    Tactics and the Cost of Victory in Normandy
    reflects:
    Operation 'Epsom'. 26 June 1944. The British were not as well versed in infiltration tactics as the Germans. Instead, they relied on traditional attacks behind a rolling artillery barrage to suppress enemy positions. Failure to keep up with, or 'lean into', the barrage meant troops were exposed to the full weight of enemy fire ..... indicative of an issue with effects on the preservation of combat power, perhaps also picking up the entry of:
    https://www.15thscottishdivisionwar...d/29af12_7d93a32d4baf4842979f1770f4625e8f.pdf
    and "Cas were incurred ....... by shorts in the barrage......" and discussions at slippers thread:
    Somewhere I read that there were about 350 guns involved in the Division's creeping barrage fire planning ... might the FP still exist? Comms issues?
     
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  16. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron

    Didn't the American professor Williamson Murray cover this in one of his books long ago? Looking through the list on Wiki it could be: 1991: Military Effectiveness: Three volumes: The First World War, The Interwar Period, and the Second World War (co-editor with Allan R. Millett) and / or 2001: A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (co-author with Allan R. Millett). From: Williamson Murray - Wikipedia

    Same time period, didn't a master Gunner write a multi-volume set on the RA in WW2? Too heavy for me, the obvious place where some reflections or "lessons learnt" should be.
     
  17. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    Thanks for the heads up re Williamson Murray.

    Re the master Gunner. Ian V Hogg was a Master Gunner (WO1 Instructor in Gunnery) who wrote shed loads of books about artillery. However these were almost all about the ordnance itself rather than tactical use.

    There is a multi-volume history of the Royal Regiment of Artillery in WW2 with two volumes written by General Sir Martin Farndale who was THE Master Gunner St James Palace - i.e. the senior serving Gunner officer. I am very familiar with the volume on the Normandy campaign - Gunners in Normandy.
     
  18. idler

    idler GeneralList

    Not sure it rates as a controversy, but I recall some observations that a battery's 3 FOO parties fell short of the 4/5 needed for each of the supported battalion's subunits. It was a criticism of the 4.2-in mortar platoons' organisation as well, as I think they could only manage the one. Was available firepower compromised by lack of control?
     
  19. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake All over the place....

    Interesting point. You are correct.

    There were not enough FOOs to provide one per company or squadron, but the companies were rarely all in line. A two up one/two back being customary and little or nothing to observe or report from the rear. Thus the FOO would stay with the forward sub units. Poor old FOO you might think, But the FOO could be relieved by an officer from the gun position. E.g. Lt Harry Goslin, of the Wartime Wanderers died as an FOO, although his regimental appointment was as a troop GPO. Canadian artilleryman George Blackburn, a battery CPO, served his first tour as an FOO on Hill 112 as a relief. Pity the poor infantryman who had no opportunity to pop back for 24 hours out of mortar range.

    The British were better served than the Germans.

    A British infantry division with three field regiments provided three Regimental HQ Tac parties (CO) , nine battery commanders parties and eighteen FOO parties, for three brigades and ten fighting units, including the recce regiment.

    A German artillery regiment organic to a division might have three or four battalion commanders and nine or twelve battery OPs for seven or ten infantry or recce units.
     
    Last edited: Feb 24, 2023
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  20. Gary Kennedy

    Gary Kennedy Member

    I was surprised to see that US FA units only really introduced dedicated forward observers around June 1944. The 105-mm Battalions in the Infantry Divisions were allowed one FO Party per Battery under a change of 16 June 1944, prior to that the Battery had four officers to find its FOOs from. These were the commander, his executive officer, and the transport and reconnaissance officers. If the Battery was supporting an Infantry Battalion with two Rifle Companies forward it feels a small pool of officers to furnish FOOs from, even after a fifth was added.

    Gary
     

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