Crossing the Rhine.

Discussion in 'Home' started by Trux, Sep 13, 2018.

  1. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    DD Tank Operation.

    For the Rhine Crossing it was not intended that the DD tanks should be used in an assault role but that they should be used in order to have armour support for the infantry sooner than would be possible using ferries. The infantry would make an assault crossing in the hours of darkness in the early morning while the tanks waited until daylight.

    Once ashore DD tanks were to be used in the same way as a normal tank regiment. It was considered important that they should be used in a concentrated fashion rather than be spread across the whole front and that being specialist equipment and in limited supply they should be withdrawn as soon as possible and replaced by a standard armoured regiment.

    A major problem for DD tank operations, and one that affected all aspects of the plan for river crossing was finding suitable exit points on the far bank. Failing this then exit points should be improved before DD tanks can cross.

    79 Armoured Division set up G Training and Experimental Wing to solve the problems of exiting a river. Platypus grousers were used to reduce ground pressure but were of limited value. The longer British version spread the weight and reduced ground pressure but was easily damaged. The shorter US version was more secure but less effective. Carpet laying devices on AVRE had been used on D Day and the idea was developed and adapted to the Buffalo. A set of rails was mounted on the Buffalo and a carpet of chespalings linked with cables was placed on top. As the Buffalo emerged from the water it lowered the end of the carpet which went under the tracks. This pulled the rest of the carpet down and rapidly laid a 75 foot length. Sherman DD tanks could mount the banks using this carpet to give grip.

    Finding suitable points for DD tanks to enter the river was less of a problem since if the tank lost grip it would slide into the water where it should be anyway. Obviously the entry point should be chosen to make entry as safe and easy as possible but the most important factor was finding a site which would allow the tanks to cross to the exit point with a minimum of effort and risk. This raised the problem of navigation on a wide river. Tanks would have to make allowance for the current and be able to identify the exit point.

    J Wing was established to study the problem of navigation. Three methods were developed. The first was a radio direction keeping equipment which used two Wireless sets No 19 to give a beam which DD tanks could use as a guide. The traditional magnetic compass was used together with gyro compasses. Tabby infra red headlights and infra red beacons were developed but not much used as DD tanks crossed in daylight. It was decided that since the DD tanks could not effectively use their armament in the dark they should not cross the river until dawn.

    Of course when you solve one problem you often create others. If there is only one exit then there are two risks. One is that a tank will become bogged down or otherwise block the exit. This was solved by providing multiple tracks at each exit so that only one tank in each wave would use each track. Second is that if the current carries a tank past the exit it will not be able to get out of the river unless there is an alternative exit point provided further down stream.


    The DD regiments employed in the Rhine Crossing were normal armoured regiments which received some special equipment and training.

    Regimental headquarters had three Sherman DD tanks instead of normal tanks.

    Headquarters Squadron had the following special equipment:
    - The Reconnaissance troop. This troop was to cross the river ahead of the main body and select good landing places for the DD tanks. There was a headquarters section with LVT II and three sections, one per squadron. Each section had two LVT II with carpet laying equipment and one LVT IV carrying an airborne bulldozer to improve the chosen landing places.
    - The Intercommunication troop. This troop was issued with nine M29 truck 10cwt tracked (M29 Weasel). Although these Weasels seem to have been the amphibious M29C version they were carried across the river in LVT IV since the width and flow of the river were thought beyond their capabilities. They were particularly used on the river banks and flood plain where their low ground pressure gave them good mobility.
    - Administrative troop had two 3ton 4 X 4 DD compressor to recharge air cylinders for inflating the flotation screens. Small compressors were also available for use in inflating the screens.

    Each of the three squadrons had the following special equipment:
    - Squadron Headquarters. This had three Sherman DD instead of normal Sherman and twelve DUKW instead of 3 ton 4 X 4 GS. These carried mainly fuel and ammunition.
    - Each troop had four Sherman DD tanks.

    The DD tank used in the Rhine Crossing was a Sherman MkIII (M4A2) with diesel engine. It was modified for flotation by fitting a canvas screen which was erected using canvas tubes inflated by compressed air. As the screen rose it lifted a tubular metal frame that maintained the shape of the screen. The frame was supported by metal struts which were locked into position manually when the screen was fully inflated. The canvas flotation screen was divided into three parts. The lower part was three layers thick to give strength where it was most needed. A second part had two layers and the highest part had only one. Experience had shown that when DD tanks climbed ashore there was a danger that water would lap over the rear of the screen so an extra raised screen was added at the stern. Once ashore the screen could be very quickly lowered hydraulically and the tank was ready for action without further work being necessary.

    Propulsion when afloat was by two propellers. These were driven by an ingenious, if complicated, drive system. The Sherman tanks tracks were driven by drive sprockets at the front. The DD Sherman had drive sprockets fitted to the rear idler wheels and these were driven by the tracks. The propellers were raised and lowered hydraulically. When raised they were not driven but when lowered they engaged with the sprockets on the rear idler and provided propulsion on water. The tracks remained driven so that there was no break in transmission when the tank entered or exited the water.

    Steering when afloat was by swivelling the propellers. Steering presented problems since the driver’s position was under water when the tank was afloat. The driver was provided with a periscope but this gave limited vision. There was a second steering position behind the turret. The tank commander could stand on a platform and use a tiller to steer the tank. The driver had a gyro compass to enable him to maintain a course and the commander had a magnetic compass.


    The Assembly Area.
    Tanks should be carried on transporters to the Assembly Area. This should be some three miles from the river and have good natural camouflage. There should be suitable routes forward to the crossing site. The tanks should arrive at least 48 hours before the planned crossing date to allow a full maintenance service to be carried out. Final adjustments will be made and any damage suffered en route repaired. Crews will be briefed and rested and liaison with the infantry carried out.

    The Inflation Area.
    For a river crossing the DD regiment needed a well planned and reconnoitred approach. The squadrons were called forward from the Marshalling Area to an Inflation Area with the canvas flotation screens lowered to avoid detection and to avoid damage to the canvas. The route must be carefully checked and improvements made if necessary.

    The Inflation Area is a forward area in which the DD tanks can halt and inflate their flotation screens and from which access is available across open country to the river. Passage through woods, hedges, bushes etc ruins the equipment once it has been inflated. The Inflation Area should also be sheltered from view so that the DD tanks can inflate the screen without attracting attention. A route to the river would be marked out and a site found where the tanks could enter the water at a suitable angle.

    The DD tanks will need to travel as near to the crossing site as possible before inflating the flotation screens. The screens are very liable to suffer damage from any trees or other obstacles so the route must be checked and if necessary improved. Good signing and traffic control will be needed to avoid conflict and delays. The route will probably cut across routes earmarked for other users.

    The inflation area should be some 1000 yards from the river and away from troops, vehicle concentrations and other likely targets for enemy artillery. It should be large enough for tanks to be dispersed and there must be a direct and easy route to the launching sites.

    In the inflation area the flotation screens should be erected and propellers tested. Unit fitter and LAD detachments, including fabric refitters accompany the tanks to the inflation area to make sure that all is in good order. DD units have a Ford WOT6 compressed air lorry which ensures a supply of compressed air cylinders for erecting the screens. An ARV should accompany each squadron to ensure that routes are not blocked by casualties.

    The route from the Inflating Area to the river was more than a mile long and cut across routes designated for an LVT ferry so careful timing and control was required. The crossing was timed for 0545 to allow it to have cleared the river and bank area before the follow up storm boat ferry operation started at 0600. Reconnaissance sections of the regiment had crossed earlier to find and improve landing places for DD tanks.


    Far Bank Reconnaissance.
    Each DD regiment provides two reconnaissance parties, each carried across the river in a LVT.

    LVT No1 carries:
    DD Officer.
    LVT NCO.
    3 LVT crew.
    3 DD other ranks.
    2 RE other ranks.

    LVT No 2 carries:
    LVT Officer.
    3 LVT crew.
    DD NCO.
    2 DD other ranks.
    2 RE other ranks. Airborne dozer and mate.

    Each LVT carries the following stores:
    4 Lane marking lamps.
    4 Lane marking posts.
    5 red and yellow flags with posts.
    15 green and white flags with posts.
    Floodlight and stand.
    Signalling lamp.
    10 long angle iron pickets. To fasten down carpet.
    10 short angle iron pickets. To fasten down carpet.
    2 sledge hammers.
    Pick.
    2 Shovels.
    15 yards of chespale carpet. Reserve for repairs.
    Airborne bulldozer.
    Large lane marker for use by day.
    Tow rope.

    The DD officer commands the reconnaissance and carpet laying party and always takes the upstream lane in LVT No 1. He will lead the two reconnaissance LVTs to the far bank. On landing he reconnoitres two landing lanes accompanied by the LVT officer and NCO and his own NCOs. He selects lanes, marks them with flags and allots tasks to the bulldozer. When the lanes are sited he calls over the LVT carpet layers by radio. He reports to his regiment by radio when lanes are completed and ensures that DD guides are posted on the lanes. He keeps the lanes repaired until the completion of the DD landings and controls one remaining LVT for radio communication and recovery. One DD other rank acts as runner.

    DD NCOs are posted one on each lane. They are responsible for marking out the lanes as ordered by the DD officer. He ensures that the homing signals for the carpet laying LVTs are in place, reports progress and guides DD tanks into lane. Two DD other ranks assist the NCO in marking the lane, picketing the carpet and maintaining it. One will be detailed to operate the landing signal when required.

    The LVT officer goes with LVT No 2. He accompanies the DD officer on his reconnaissance and makes sure of the DD officers requirements regarding carpet positions. He guides the carpet layers and reports to the DD officer when both lanes are complete. After the carpet layers have laid carpets he unloads his own 15 yards of carpet and leads the carpet layers back to the DD inflation area. When released from the DD regiment he leads his troop to the LVT collecting area.

    The LVT NCO supervises the laying of the carpet on his lane and reports completion to the LVT officer. He remains on the far bank with his LVT to assist the DD officer in radio communication and recovery. The LVT crews operate communications between the reconnaissance party and DD regiment. They assist in unloading and carrying stores. They lay the reserve 15 yards of carpet if required.


    In case the above is insufficiently clear the instructions lay down the following sequence of events.

    The DD reconnaissance party marks the approach from the Inflation Area to the launching site.
    Two reconnaissance LVTs launch, No 1 leading, and land in the centre of the area.
    DD officer and two DD NCOs and LVT officer and two NCOs dismount and carry out a reconnaissance of the landing area.
    Stores and equipment are unloaded at the lanes when they are sited.
    DD NCOs and assistants mark lanes.
    When lanes are sited the DD officer calls forward carpet laying LVTs by radio.
    A signal operator on each lane starts sending a homing signal. Each lane has its own signal.
    Signal operator switches on floodlight for bulldozer work and carpet laying if required.
    LVT officer and NCO direct carpet laying on their respective lanes.
    LVT officer informs DD officer when carpet laying is complete.
    DD officer reports that lanes are complete to DD regiment.
    LVT No 1 and LVT officer remain near the lane until DD landing is complete, assisting with radio communication and recovery.
    When released LVT officer brings back DD reconnaissance party to the Inflation Area.
    LVT officer leads his troop to the LVT Collecting Area.


    The Navigational Aids.
    Before moving to the Forming Up Place gyros will have been checked by the drift chart. If circumstances permit the compass will be swung.

    In the Forming Up Place the gyro will be switched on and cage on the bearing given by the squadron or troop commanders. The quickest and simplest way to cross a river is to steer at right angles to the current. A simple calculation can then be made to determine the point at which the craft will beach. It is necessary to know the speed of the current, the speed of the craft and the width of the river.

    When moving from the Forming Up Place to the Launching Point the prismatic compass will be set. By night the route will be marked by lights and on a stretch at least 100 yards long the route will be marked on both sides. This part will be absolutely straight and the gyro compass can be set by it.

    During the crossing the driver will steer on the given gyro course. The commander will check by using the prismatic compass and correct the course if necessary.

    DD tanks will enter the water at right angles to the bank and follow the gyro course until just before reaching the far bank when he will turn slightly in the direction of the current. Since the current will tend to swing the stern round when the bow is on shore this slight turn should allow the DD tank to climb the bank at the correct angle.

    In the above it has been assumed that while the crossing will be made in daylight the movement on the near bank will take place in darkness.


    A word of caution.
    The above is based on tactics and organisation recommended by 79 Armoured Division. It cannot be guaranteed that it applies to the Rhine Crossing in every particular, although it was based on that operation.

    Plunder DD.jpg

    Mike
     
    Last edited: Jul 21, 2021
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  2. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Stormboat Operations.
    The stormboat was intended for use on wide and fast flowing rivers. The previously used assault boats were canvas and propelled by men with oars, or paddles. It was not practicable to cross a river like the Rhine in such a craft in an assault role although it could be used as a ferry with a cable to prevent drifting downstream, and perhaps a winch. This was hardly suitable for an assault role.

    The stormboat was a powered wooden boat 20 feet long and 6 foot 6 inches wide. They were designed to nest inside one another for transport.

    The boat had an oak frame with sides and bottom clad in plywood. There were seats running down each side and these could be used as tracks for 6pdr anti tank guns and jeeps. The flooring between the seats was hinged to allow for bailing out water.

    The boat was powered by a 55 horse power outboard motor. The stern was cut away to provide a mounting for the motor and this allowed the motor to be tilted so that the propeller was clear of the river bottom.

    Stormboats were carried in 3 ton lorries. Three boats could be nested together with the three motors inside the top boat. They were loaded with the stern to the front of the lorry. Ramps were also carried to allow anti tank guns and jeeps to be loaded and unloaded.

    The boat weighed 800 pounds without motor or ramps. The motor weighed 180 pounds and the ramps 250 pounds. The boat had a crew of two men and could carry eighteen fully equipped infantrymen. Fully loaded the speed was 10 miles an hour but 20mies an hour could be reached if empty.


    15 Division did not use stormboats in the assault role but as ferries for follow up and reserve personnel.

    Stormboats were heavy and were therefore moved into camouflaged hides which were near enough to the river for them to be manhandled. Each boat required fourteen men to carry it and each outboard motor required a further three. Carrying parties came from pioneers of the Bank Group. The hides were close to the Stormboat Waiting Area where personnel waited to be called forward to board for the crossing. An Infantry Track linked the Marshalling Area to the Waiting Area. This was a marked path which kept personnel separated from vehicle traffic.

    Ideally stormboats should be launched in sheltered water out of sight of the enemy. The launching parties are vulnerable in the final approach and launching. Care must also be taken to start the outboard motors only when they are in more than three feet of water otherwise they may be damaged. Once launched and manned by the Royal Engineer crew the stormboats should be taken to the waiting infantry. The boats should be manoeuvred so that the bows are against the river bank and the motor in deeper water. Infantry may then board over the square bows, using ramps if necessary.

    Moving stormboats to the hides is an engineer responsibility, as is the operation of the ferry itself. All movement is under the control of the Bank Unit. They will carry the boats to the water, call troops forward, supervise loading and unloading and direct infantry to their assembly area.

    It is not practical to operate more than twenty four stormboats at one ferry point. This is a sufficient number to rapidly transport all the required infantry personnel. The number is maintained by providing a reserve of a further twenty four boats. Vehicles cross separately and rejoin the personnel in the Assembly Area on the far bank.

    Extra stormboats or other craft may be provided for rescue and recovery tasks. The loss of boats due to enemy shelling remains a danger for some time. A greater danger is that of the outboard motor failing and allowing the craft to drift. This not only endangers the crew and passengers but is a threat to any ferry or bridging operations downstream.


    stormboat.jpg

    Mike
     
  3. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Now the plans have been made, orders issued, men and equipment moved forward, the weather is good and the river levels normal so if you are ready lets go and cross that river.

    15 DIVISION ASSAULT.

    The first objective in an assault river crossing has to be the securing of a deep enough lodgement to prevent an enemy firing on the crossing sites with small arms. In the case of the Rhine crossing this meant clearing and holding the bund, the manmade flood defence which was some distance from the river and some five metres high. If the enemy held this, or any part of it he could dominate the crossing sites, the river bank and the area between the river and the bund. If friendly forces held the bund then the enemy could not see the crossing places or fire on them with small arms. Artillery would remain a problem.

    The second objective was to clear the far bank to a point where the enemy could no longer observe the river crossings and be in a position to direct artillery fire. Unobserved artillery fire would still be possible but this was never nearly as effective as observed fire. This second objective meant clearing the higher land which was further away from the river. In 15 Divisions area this would be partly done by the airborne forces

    The third objective was to clear a bridgehead deep enough to prevent all enemy artillery fire reaching the crossing places.


    Despite the seemingly overwhelming concentration of artillery, the special assault equipment, the over establishment infantry, air support, airborne forces and meticulous planning it should not be thought that the assault was to easy. Opposition and losses varied widely but there was much tough fighting before the assault units could consider the far bank secure.


    When 15 Division launched its assault 1 Commando Brigade had already landed upstream and secured the right lank while 51 Division had landed downstream and secured the left flank.

    With troops established on both flanks the assault on the centre was launched by 15 Division at 0200 hours. 44 Brigade and 227 Brigade each deployed two battalions, each with assault troops in Buffaloes and a follow up in stormboats. Soon 46 Brigade was ferried across also.

    The Rhine was considered too wide and too fast flowing to allow the use of assault boats manned by infantry. Buffaloes were used for the assault waves. Stormboats manned by engineers and powered by outboard motors were used instead. Buffaloes also replaced the lighter rafts since they could carry light weapons, 6pdr anti tank guns, jeeps, 3.7” howitzers and carriers. Some were converted to carry 17pdr anti tank guns. Stormboats could also carry jeeps and 6pdr anti tank guns.

    Once the assault force and close support weapons were across the river Buffaloes and stormboats ran a ferry service while the raft ferries were constructed. The raft ferries continued in operation until the bridges were completed.

    In the following posts the actions of the following will be described.
    44 Brigade.
    227 Brigade.
    4 Armoured Brigade.


    Mike.
     
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  4. 51highland

    51highland Very Senior Member

    From 5th Camerons regimental History; rhineCrossing.jpg
     
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  5. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    44 BRIGADE ASSAULT.
    Operation Poker.

    ’44 Brigade will capture and hold area Schuttwick-Loh-Bislich’.


    Plunder 44 Brigade map..jpg

    Black = Initial objectives.
    Green = Second objectives.
    Red = Final objectives.

    44 Brigade.
    8 Royal Scots.
    6 Royal Scots Fusiliers.
    6 Kings Own Scottish Borderers.

    Under command:
    ‘B’ Machine Gun Company I Middlesex Regiment.
    Detachment 194 Field Ambulance
    One Provost Section.

    In Support:
    11 Royal Tank Regiment (LVTs).


    44 Brigade had the easier task in that the area it was to clear and hold was fairly clear and open, without the many lakes and channels left elsewhere by the Rhine’s meanderings. It also had a shallower area to clear between the river and the airborne forces which would arrive later in the morning. There was little risk of a counter attack once the airborne forces had arrived since the Commandos were to the right, 227 Brigade to the left and airborne forces in front.

    44 Brigade was the right assault brigade of 15 Division and moved to its concentration area during the night of 22/23 March. Battalions moved direct into the Brigade Marshalling Area where they linked with 11 Royal Tank Regiment who would carry them over the Rhine in their LVTs. The brigade was to assault with two battalions up, 6 Royal Scots Fusiliers on the right and 8 Royal Scots on the left. The initial objective was to clear the line of the far bank bund west of Bislich between Fahrhaus and Ronduit, and to occupy the western half of Bislich. 6 Kings Own Scottish Borderers would then cross the river, pass through 6 Royal Scots Fusiliers and occupy the remainder of Bislich. The entire brigade would then advance to the line Loh-Muhlenfeld-Vissel.

    Soon after midnight 23/24 March the assaulting battalions embarked on their allotted LVTs in the Marshalling Area. Infantry and LVT crews had already trained together. Each infantry company was allotted six LVTs and a further twelve per battalion carried Battalion Headquarters, support weapons and detachments of machine guns from 1 Middlesex Regiment (MMG). In addition the first wave of LVTs carried Forward Observation Officers parties RA, advanced parties of 5 Berkshire Regiment (Bank Group) including medical personnel and engineers plus reconnaissance parties of DD tank regiments.

    Some LVTs had been prestowed with vehicles before arriving at the Marshalling Area. The Corps plan allowed each battalion four 6pdr anti tank guns and their Carrier tractors, three Jeeps (one each for Commanding Officer, Medical officer and RE Reconnaissance Officer) and four Carriers (two for ammunition, one for Forward Observation Officer and one for the battalion signal officer).

    At about 0030 hours on 24 March the LVTs set out in single file from the Marshalling Area. As they approached the bund each battalion moved along a separate route which was marked with shaded lights. Sappers had breached the bund under cover of darkness to allow the loaded LVTs to pass through. The columns paused at the bund to check timings and then the first flights of three companies per battalion passed through the gaps, fanned out into line and entered the water at H Hour, 0200 hours. At this time the artillery bombardment was falling on the far bank. 2½ minutes later the bombardment shifted to the far bank bund and then after a further 2½ minutes it shifted to the area beyond. One can see the importance of good time keeping. The bombardment would be maintained until called off by the Forward Observation Officers.

    The LVTs crossed the river in some four minutes and then mounted the far bank to land troops dryshod. The crossing place had been carefully selected not only for the ease of approach on the near bank but also because the far bank at this point had no groynes which could be dangerous to LVTs in the dark, and there was an inlet which protected the landing place from attacks from downstream. By 0220 hours all the leading companies were across and moving towards their objective, the bund. There was some artillery and mortar fire, and some machine gun fire but most casualties were suffered by 6 Royal Scottish Fusiliers, caused by mines and an attack on a defended house.

    The second flight of LVTs followed as soon as the leading companies were established ashore. By 0305 hours all initiative objectives had been taken and by 0330 hours all the ground up to the bund was cleared and consolidated.

    When LVTs had discharged their loads they returned across the river to the LVT Collecting Point and then on to the LVT Loading Area. From 0230 hours until 0800 hours on 26 March the LVTs then operated a continuous ferry service. They carried a total of 407 vehicles across on 24 March and a further 726 on 25 March.

    6 Kings Own Scottish Borderers, the follow up battalion of the brigade, crossed the river by stormboat. They left the Marshalling Area about the same time as the LVTs, but they were on foot. They followed a marked route to the Stormboat Waiting Area where they sheltered in cellars of the houses of Luttingen. At 0310 hours they received the order to cross the river, which they started to do at 0330 hours. The battalion was all across by 0430 hours and by first light had secured their initial objectives.

    By 0415 hours 6 Royal Scots Fusiliers were on their second objective and were beginning to receive their vehicles from the LVT Ferries and the battalion was preparing to advance further eastwards. At 0700 hours the Brigade Commander crossed the river and saw all his battalion commanders in turn.

    At 0830 hours 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment (Bank Group) reported that all their wireless links were ready to operate on the far bank and the full forward control came into operation at 1000 hours. Up till this time the Near Bank Crossing Control, situated next to Brigade Tactical Headquarters, had controlled the forward movement from the Marshalling Area to the LVT ferries. Serials were called forward in a prearranged sequence, although this could be varied as the tactical situation demanded. On the far bank Unit Landing Officers, provided by the unit themselves, directed vehicles to their destination on landing.

    At 0945 hours 8 Royal Scots launched attacks to clear Vissel and Jockern. The attack on Vissel was supported by a squadron of 44 Royal Tank Regiment which was moving west along the bund in support of 46 Brigade which was diverted to assist in the clearing of Vissel.

    At 1000 the airborne landing began and thereafter enemy resistance faded away as the airborne troops overran gun positions and rear defence areas. All battalions reached their final objectives by early afternoon. At 1400 hours 6 Kings Own Scottish Borderers linked up with 17 US Airborne Division, and at 1510 6 Royal Scots Fusiliers also linked up. At 1515 hours 8 Royal Scots made contact with 6 Airborne Division at the bridge 2,000 yards north east of Bergen. The bridge was captured intact. At 1545 the Brigade Commander and Commanding Officer 8 Royal Scots drove to the Headquarters 3 Parachute Brigade.

    At 1800 hours 6 Kings Own Scottish Borderers were ordered to concentrate at Bergen ready to operate to the north east next day. The other battalions concentrated in the areas they had reached. All battalions then rested.


    25 March.
    Brigade Headquarters was established at Bislich at 2200 hours and an Order Group was held at 2230 hours. 44 Brigade was to lead 15 Divisions advance to secure exits from the bridgehead for 53 Division which was expected to pass through at first light on 26 March. 44 Brigades objective was the bridge over the River Issel at Gervershof which would be an essential route forward for the breakout. 44 Royal Tank Regiment, less one squadron under the command of 6 Airborne Division, was placed under command of 44 Brigade for this operation.

    6 Kings Own Scottish Borderers was to form the advance guard with the following under command: 44 Royal Tank Regiment, less one squadron, elements of 15 Reconnaissance Regiment, one troop Self Propelled anti tank guns and Royal Engineer parties. 8 Royal Scots and 6 Royal Scots Fusiliers were to follow. 4 8 Royal Scots and 6 Royal Scots Fusiliers were to follow. 4 Royal Horse Artillery with SP 25pdrs was in support, although it fired from the near bank until it could cross the river in the evening.

    The advance did not start until 0850 because of delays in regrouping. Patrols of 15 Reconnaissance Regiment led the way and were followed by the two leading companies of 6 Kings Own Scottish Borderers carried on the tanks of 44 Royal Tank Regiment. The remainder of the battalion followed on foot to clear the woods along the road and protect the route until relieved by the main body. At 0930 contact was made with 5 Parachute Brigade where the rail line crossed the road.

    At 1020 hours the advance ran into enemy opposition. There was considerable fire including anti tank guns and the infantry were forced to deploy. ‘A’ Squadron 44 Royal Tank Regiment redeployed at 1150 hours under cover of smoke while artillery concentrations were brought down onto the suspected enemy positions. ‘C’ Squadron was ordered to pass through under the cover of ‘A’ Squadrons fire and continue the advance. By 1335 hours they had reached a partially constructed autobahn when they were heavily engaged. Four tanks were knocked out by self propelled guns and at 1544 hours they were ordered to withdraw under cover of smoke. This was completed by1700 hours. ‘A’ Squadron remained in its position west of the wood all day.

    8 Royal Scots remained under cover of the woods north east of Bergen for the whole day. 6 Royal Scots Fusiliers moved into a defensive position in the area of Hulshorst. Both battalions suffered casualties from mortar and artillery shelling.

    Since it had proved impossible to leave the woods and advance over the open ground to the autobahn in daylight it was decided to make a night attack. This would be undertaken by 6 Kings Own Scottish Borderers to secure the bridge at Gervershof. 44 Royal Tank Regiment were to concentrate, refuel and re ammunition and join 6 Kings Own Scottish Borderers at first light on the 26th. 8 Royal Scots were to occupy the area on either side of the line of advance after its capture.

    6 Kings Own Scottish Borderers moved forward at 2100 hours and by 2245 hours were 1000 yards beyond the autobahn. They met only light opposition but this stiffened and before the bridge could be reached the enemy had destroyed it.

    Mike.
     
    Last edited: Jul 30, 2021
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  6. alberk

    alberk Well-Known Member

    I posted this picture before but I still think it is necessary to remind ourselves that even succesful operations have their cost. And that quite a few men paid the highest price. This is the grave of Pte Walter Sharkey of 6 K.O.S.B., KIA on 24 March 1945 in Bislich at the age of 20.

    I have not been able to find out much about him - as far as I know he was from Liverpool.

    ABB_069.JPG
    doc3105840.JPG
     
    Last edited: Jul 30, 2021
  7. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    227 BRIGADE ASSAULT.
    Operation Nap.

    ‘227 Brigade will capture and hold area Haffen-Mehr’.


    Plunder 227 Brigade Map.jpg

    X 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders objective.
    Y 10 Highland Light Infantry objective.
    Z 2 Gordon Highlanders objective


    227 Brigade.
    10 Highland Light Infantry.
    2 Gordon Highlanders.
    2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

    Under Command:
    ‘C’ Machine Gun Company I Middlesex Regiment.
    Detachment 153 Field Ambulance.
    One Provost Section.

    In Support:
    East Riding Yeomanry. (LVTs.)


    227 Brigade had the more difficult task. The area it was to clear and hold was physically difficult since it had many streams, lakes and stretches of old river left by the Rhines past meanderings. These made movement difficult and threatened to split units. The task was also difficult because the defenders were from parachute units who, although depleted in numbers, fought with determination. Finally it was found that the river bank sites chosen for the LVT exits were largely soft silt brought down by the river. These made landing difficult, and in some cases impossible.

    227 Brigade was the left assault brigade of 15 Division and moved to its concentration area during the night of 22/23 March. Battalions moved direct into the Brigade Marshalling Area where they linked with East Riding Yeomanry who would carry them over the Rhine in their LVTs. The brigade was to assault with two battalions up, 10 Highland Light Infantry on the right and 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on the left. The initial objective was to clear the line of the far bank bund between Overkamp and Lohr. 2 Gordon Highlanders would then cross the river and relieve 10 Highland Light Infantry on the right and 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. When relieved these battalions were to advance to Bellinghoven and Wisshof.

    Soon after midnight 23/24 March the assaulting battalions embarked on their allotted LVTs in the Marshalling Area. Infantry and LVT crews had already trained together. Each infantry company was allotted six LVTs and a further twelve per battalion carried Battalion Headquarters, support weapons and detachments of machine guns from 1 Middlesex Regiment (MMG). In addition the first wave of LVTs carried Forward Observation Officers parties RA, advanced parties of 5 Berkshire Regiment (Bank Group) including medical personnel and engineers plus reconnaissance parties of DD tank regiments.

    Some LVTs had been prestowed with vehicles before arriving at the Marshalling Area. The Corps plan allowed each battalion four 6pdr anti tank guns and their Carrier tractors, three Jeeps (one each for Commanding Officer, Medical officer and RE Reconnaissance Officer) and four Carriers (two for ammunition, one for Forward Observation Officer and one for the battalion signal officer).

    At about 0030 hours on 24 March the LVTs set out in single file from the Marshalling Area. As they approached the bund each battalion moved along a separate route which was marked with shaded lights. Sappers had breached the bund under cover of darkness to allow the loaded LVTs to pass through. The columns paused at the bund to check timings and then the first flights of three companies per battalion passed through the gaps, fanned out into line and entered the water at H Hour, 0200 hours. At this time the artillery bombardment was falling on the far bank. 2½ minutes later the bombardment shifted to the far bank bund and then after a further 2½ minutes it shifted to the area beyond. One can see the importance of good time keeping. The bombardment would be maintained until called off by the Forward Observation Officers.

    The LVTs crossed the river in some four minutes and then mounted the far bank to land troops. Unfortunately the leading companies, ‘A’ and ‘C’, of 10 Highland Light Infantry were landed several hundred yards to the right which caused some confusion. It also left a wide gap between them and 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. They found the bund was strongly held by three German Parachute companies. There was also a strongpoint at Wolffskath. The two companies suffered considerable casualties including all the officers of ‘A’ Company, killed by mortar fire.

    Of course confusion is not unusual in a night action but considerable thought had been given to the problem of navigation. Headquarters craft had ‘Tabby’ infra red equipment and wireless beacons but these could not be used until they had been established on the far bank. In the meantime the assault waves were guided by Bofors LAA guns firing tracer along the main axes of the crossings. These fired every 100 seconds from H-3 minutes until H+15 minutes. Additionally coloured marker shells could be ordered to be fired from field artillery if required.

    The second flight of LVTs followed as soon as the leading companies were established ashore. These carried ‘B’ and ‘D’ Companies who started to push towards their objective unaware that the bund had not been cleared. The second wave also carried Battalion Headquarters which landed too far too the right and was stranded in no mans land. It came under attack and was only extricated at 0500 hours.

    ‘B’ Company was ordered to clear the bund westwards while ‘D’ Company formed a firm base from which ‘A’ and ‘C’ companies could press on to their original objectives in Overkamp. Progress was slow but ‘B’ company cleared the bund as far as the battalion boundary and eventually made contact with 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders at 1200.

    At dawn ‘A’ and ‘C’ companies were entering Overkamp and the order was given for the third flight of LVTs to cross. This carried the support company and priority vehicles. When LVTs were had discharged their loads they returned across the river to the LVT Collecting Point and then on to the LVT Loading Area.

    In the meantime 7 Seaforth Highlanders of 49 Brigade had crossed the river in stormboats and landed in 44 Brigade bridgehead. The were ordered to cross at 0600 hours. They then moved northwards into 227 Brigade area and made contact with 10 Highland Light Infantry at about 1200 hours. Slightly ahead of the 7 Seaforth Highlanders, at 0545 hours, the DD tanks of 44 Royal Tank Regiment crossed into 44 Brigade bridgehead and also moved northwards. At 1300 hours 7 Seaforth Highlanders supported by 44 Royal Tank Regiment passed through 10 Highland Light Infantry and advanced towards Haffen Mehr. 10 Highland Light Infantry were then able to concentrate at Overkamp.

    At 0830 hours 5 Royal Berkshire Regiment (Bank Group) reported that all their wireless links were ready to operate on the far bank and the full forward control came into operation at 1000 hours. Up till this time the Near Bank Crossing Control, situated next to Brigade Tactical Headquarters, had controlled the forward movement from the Marshalling Area to the LVT ferries. Serials were called forward in a prearranged sequence, although this could be varied as the tactical situation demanded. On the far bank Unit Landing Officers, provided by the unit themselves, directed vehicles to their destination on landing.

    At 0945 hours 8 Royal Scots launched attacks to clear Vissel and Jockern. The attack on Vissel was supported by a squadron of 44 Royal Tank Regiment which was moving west along the bund in support of 46 Brigade which was diverted to assist in the clearing of Vissel.

    At 1000 the airborne landing began and thereafter enemy resistance faded away as the airborne troops overran gun positions and rear defence areas. All battalions reached their final objectives by early afternoon. At 1400 hours 6 Kings Own Scottish Borderers linked up with 17 US Airborne Division, and at 1510 6 Royal Scots Fusiliers also linked up. At 1515 hours 8 Royal Scots made contact with 6 Airborne Division at the bridge 2,000 yards north east of Bergen. The bridge was captured intact. At 1545 the Brigade Commander and Commanding Officer 8 Royal Scots drove to the Headquarters 3 Parachute Brigade.

    At 1800 hours 6 Kings Own Scottish Borderers were ordered to concentrate at Bergen ready to operate to the north east next day. The other battalions concentrated in the areas they had reached. All battalions then rested.

    2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had difficulty in getting the LVTs ashore on the right of their sector. Here sandbanks and mud obstructed the exits. On the left ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies landed without problems but on the right ‘D’ Company lost its commanding officer, the LVTs could not land at the selected place and one platoon was lost for a considerable time. There was considerable resistance from houses at Hubsch but this was cleared by ‘D’ Company by first light. A patrol along the bund failed to find 10 Highland Light Infantry as arranged and on their return met with fire from machine guns which had recovered when the artillery concentration lifted. ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies reached their objectives in the Wayerhoff area but an attack on Hoperhof failed and when daylight came it was found to be heavily defended by the enemy.

    Soon after first light ‘D’ Company had re organised and was concentrated with ‘C’ Company in the Hubsch area. At this time it became apparent that the enemy had recovered from the bombardment and had re occupied parts of the bund and the housed east of Hubsch. This threatened to interfere with the brigade sector ferry paln and ‘C’ Company was ordered to clear the bund and at 0615 the follow up battalion, 2 Gordon Highlanders, was ordered to send a company across the river to assist.

    ‘A’ Company 2 Gordon Highlanders was selected but it was found that the stormboat ferry could not make use of the bank opposite since it was held by the enemy. The stormboats had to make a journey of 1,200 yards downstream, under enemy fire. A number of boats were lost and one officer and three men were killed with another ten injured. ‘B’ Company 2 Gordon Highlanders was also ordered to cross but was mortared while attempting to embark. Since there was also a shortage of stormboats the crossing was postponed.

    ‘D’ Company 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders with ‘A’ Company 2 Gordons under command, attacked in the direction of Lohr at 0815 hours. Considerable resistance was encountered from the enemy in Hagenshof and Riswickhof. At the time artillery support was not available because of the restrictions imposed by the arrival of airborne forces. Machine gun support was provided and Lohr was occupied at 1330 hours. Enemy resistance slackened after the arrival of the airborne troops but remained strong.

    ‘C’ Company 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders continued to clear the bund. They suffered considerable casualties but the bund was completely cleared by 1200 hours. At 1030 hours sufficient had been cleared to allow the remainder of 2 Gordon Highlanders to cross the river. The battalion landed in the same place as ‘A’ Company, some 1,200 yards downstream from the place of embarkation. They formed up north of the creek at Hubsch, where they suffered casualties from mortaring, and then moved up behind ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

    At 1715 hours ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies 2 Gordons passed through 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in the direction of Haffen. Artillery support for the attack had to be called off because tanks of 44 Royal Tank Regiment unexpectedly appeared from the east. The western part of the village was occupied.


    25 March.
    ‘D’ Company 2 Gordon Highlanders relieved ‘B’ Company 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders who then concentrated, except for ‘A’ Company which could not be extricated in time. At 0945 the battalion came under the command of 46 Brigade and moved to an assembly area near Bergen, to the west of Diersfordter Wald. During the evening ‘A’ Company was relieved by 2 Gordon Highlanders who used Wasp flame throwers to clear Hoperhof.

    10 Highland Light Infantry rested in Overkamp all day and at 2300 hours were ordered to assist 46 Brigade by taking over positions in the Haffen Mehr area. 2 Gordons remained in positions in the Haffen Wayerhof area and made contact with 51 Division on the left.


    26 March.
    A complete junction was made with 51 Division one mile east of Rees. The bridgehead was then continuous over the whole of 2 Army front.


    East Riding Yeomanry.
    The assault waves of LVTs had considerable difficulty with mud on the far bank exits. Some of the LVTs allotted to 10 Highland Light Infantry did not cross until first light. As a result of these delays the LVTs were not loaded and ready to start the ferry service until 0830 hours. Even then ferrying could not begin because the enemy were still holding out on the bund. Some special sorties were made to carry ammunition and bridging materials, and bringing back casualties but the ferry service did not start until 1100 hours. Difficulties at the far bank exits continued and the ferry sites had to be ,oved more than once.

    By 1820 hours 180 craft loads had been taken over and at 2015 hours ferrying stopped until 0800 hours the following day. The ferries finally closed down at 1950 hours 25 March by which time 345 loads had crossed.

    Mike.
     
    Last edited: Jul 31, 2021
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  8. ted angus

    ted angus Senior Member

    Mike. Typo para 2 you say 227 were the right assault brigade surely you mean left ?
     
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  9. alberk

    alberk Well-Known Member

    Mike - thank you for the well researched & detailed thread! I hope you don't mind that I am adding some photos?

    Bildschirmfoto 2021-07-31 um 12.54.28.png
    Above: 7 Seaforths waiting behind the dyke on the morning of the 24th. This photo was taken a little downstream from Bislich, near an area called Ronduit. These troops were part of of 46 Bde, which was the reserve for the two assault brigades. Lots of photos were taken in the 44 Bde area but none in the sector where 227 Bde attacked. The German resistance there was more stubborn. As usual - when there is a lot of shooting you'll find very few photos (I am talking about photos available in the IWM). Still these pictures bring across the atmosphere of that morning.

    Below - dealing with the first prisoners. As you'll notice the two men on the left appear to be civilians. There were quite a few foreign workers on the farms - forced labour in some cases, some Dutch men also worked as farm hands, they were valued as experts in dairy farming and replaced Germans of military age who had been drafted. In the first hours the Allied soldiers did not care much who was who - they all were regarded as a potential threat, put under guard and searched.
    Searching.png
     
    Last edited: Jul 31, 2021
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  10. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Ted,
    Thanks. I have corrected it. You are right of course, or is it left? I have to admire your eagle eye and careful scutiny. A warrant officers training I suppose.

    Alberk,
    I have many photos but I am deffinately lacking any for the infantry assault phase. Thank you.

    The photo of prisoners reminds me of a story told by a senior RAF officer. He was flying missions although he was well over the usual limit for his rank. He was shot down on the far bank and captured before the crossings started. He was held overnight and in the morning it was put to him that the German unit of about a hundred men were willing to be his prisoners if they let him cross the river and tell the troops there that they were indeed prisoners and awaiting collection. Our officer crossed the river and reported to a group of Scots infantry. They asked only one question 'Have they got any watches'.

    Mike
     
    Last edited: Jul 31, 2021
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  11. alberk

    alberk Well-Known Member

    Collecting German watches was very popular indeed! Some more watches coming for the Scots...
    POW.png

    And in the other direction - armoured support for 227th Bde:
    DD-tanks.png
     
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  12. ted angus

    ted angus Senior Member

    I might have a warrant officers eagle eye but my many efforts to liberate a service issue watch always failed ! The 227 assault was of particular interest as my dad's 20 field co 'RE was normally with 227. Thanks for your hard work with this Mike .regards Ted
     
  13. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    4 ARMOURED BRIGADE.

    4 Armoured Brigade was under the command of 15 Division. It consisted of:
    Scots Greys. Sherman tanks.
    3/4 County of London Yeomanry. Sherman tanks.
    44 Royal Tank Regiment. Sherman DD tanks.
    4 Royal Horse Artillery. Self Propelled 25pdr.
    2 Kings Royal Rifle Corps. Motor Battalion.

    For this operation the brigade also had 129 Battery of 86 Anti tank Regiment under command. This Battery was equipped with Achilles 17pdr self propelled guns.

    44 Royal Tank Regiment is covered separately so is not included when 4 Armoured Brigade is mentioned here.


    4 Armoured Brigade concentrated south of Udem on the night of 17/18 March. The intention was to form a mobile striking force, be prepared to support 6 Airborne Division and be prepared to come under the command of 53 Division when they passed through15 Division. The exact role would depend on the situation at the time.

    4 Royal Horse Artillery was under command of CRA 15 Division for the prepared artillery plan and it moved separately into 15 Division gun area. Since it was to cross the bridges as soon as possible it was sited close to the Armour Waiting Area. It could thus give fire support over the river as long as possible before moving. It was in action on the 24 March.

    The brigade remained in its concentration areas on the 24 March except when a troop of Brigade Headquarters tanks was sent forward to shoot up enemy posts on the far bank in order to assist 227 Brigade in clearing the bund.


    25 March.
    4 Royal Horse Artillery was to cross the Rhine on the highest priority but due to delay with the Class 50/60 rafts due to shelling they were not able to cross until the evening. They did however continue to give support from the near bank.

    The Scots Greys were next in priority for crossing and were also delayed. They spent the whole of 25 March in the Armour Waiting Area and did not cross until the early hours of 26 March, using the Class 40 Bailey Bridge.

    3/4 County of London Yeomanry left the Concentration area at 1930 hours and crossed the river without passing through the Armour Waiting Area. They were thus on the far bank soon after midnight, before the Scots Greys.

    It had been intended that 2 Kings Royal Rifle Corps should cross the river on the tanks of the Scots Greys, leaving their own vehicles to cross later. Because of the delays in ferrying the tanks across it was decided that they should cross the river on ferries on the 25th and were concentrated in Vissel by 2100 hours.

    The squadron of 49 Armoured Personnel Carrier Regiment was also delayed and crossed the Class 40 Bailey Bridge at 0200 hours on 26 March. They were then to pick up a battalion of 44 Brigade.

    4 Armoured Brigade Tactical Headquarters crossed immediately after 4 Royal Horse Artillery on the evening of 25 March. The Brigade Commander had crossed in an amphibious Weasel during the morning and had spent the day with 44 Royal Tank Regiment.


    Mike.
     
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  14. alberk

    alberk Well-Known Member



    At timecode 4:10 British armour is ferried across the Rhine at Bislich...
    Which unit was equipped with all those Stuart light tanks?
     
    Last edited: Aug 1, 2021
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  15. stolpi

    stolpi Well-Known Member

    Alberk - each Armoured Regiment, besides three squadrons of medium tanks, also held a separate Reconnaisance Platoon, equipped with 11 light tanks (Stuarts), within its HQ Squadron .

    See for a TO&E: British Armoured Regiment TO&E
     
    Last edited: Aug 2, 2021
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  16. twinotterpilot

    twinotterpilot Active Member

    Mike.
    Great insight and appreciate the effort. I have added a YouTube link to a Pathe video. (Hope I did it right).
    We Cross The Rhine
     
  17. Chris C

    Chris C Canadian

    What is the vehicle at 3:56? Is that a Sexton?
     
  18. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    I just have to get 46 Brigade safely across the river then I can hand over to River Control under CAGRE 11 AGRE. He will control the ferries and then supervise the construction of the bridges. I will try to link the various sections to the wonderful video provided by Alberk. This may take some time.

    Thanks twinotterpilot. Another fascinating resource which I will study at leisure.

    Mike
     
    Last edited: Aug 1, 2021
  19. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    46 BRIGADE.
    Follow Up.

    46 Brigade.
    9 Cameronians.
    7 Seaforth Highlanders.
    2 Glasgow Highlanders.


    The battalions of 46 Brigade concentrated in their Assembly Area on the night of 21/22 March. As the follow up brigade the intention was to capture and hold the area Mehroo-Clasenho and be prepared to complete the capture of the bridgeheads of 44 and 227 Brigades if necessary. The plan had to be flexible and allow for the three options. 7 Seaforth Highlanders with 44 Royal Tank Regiment in support would cross into 44 Brigade sector while 9 Cameronians and 2 Glasgow Highlanders would cross into 227 Brigade sector.

    At 0600 hours 7 Seaforth Highlanders crossed by stormboat and was ready in its Assembly Area at 0725 and was joined by 44 Royal Tank Regiment. At 0930 hours ‘A’ Company with tank support set off to clear the bund. The rest of the battalion followed as far as Wolfskath and then turned north. At 1300 hours they passed through10 Highland Light Infantry, riding on the tanks of 44 Royal Tank Regiment, and moved towards Mehr. ‘A’ Company consolidated at Lohr and then followed the rest of the battalion to Mehr, which was cleared by 1745 hours. The enemy was holding the water obstacles of the Lange Renne and Hagener Meer and the battalion was unable to advance further.

    The crossing of the other battalions was delayed as 227 Brigade had difficulty clearing the bund and reaching its objectives. 9 Cameronians began crossing by stormboat ferry at 1430 hours . They were sent to attack and occupy the Haffen area. They occupied the south eastern part of Haffen by 1750 hours and pushed patrols forward before being held up by automatic fire on open ground. 2 Glasgow Highlanders crossed at 1645 hours and moved from the Assembly Area to take up a position on the right of 9 Cameronians at 2300.

    During the evening enemy patrols were active to the east of 7 Seaforth Highlanders but they were driven off by fire from ‘C’ Squadron 44 Royal Tank Regiment and ‘F’ Battery 4 Royal Horse Artillery. At midnight a considerable counter attack was launched by the enemy and 7 Seaforth Highlanders positions were infiltrated causing some retirement. Between 0300 hours and 0330 hours 25 March defensive fire was called for in the south east corner of Mehr and medium artillery engaged the wooded areas to the north and north east of the town. Between 0430 hours and 0630 hours the right of 2 Glasgow Highlanders was attacked and ‘C’ Company withdrew under smoke. The position in 7 Seaforth Highlanders sector was stabilised by 0500 hours and the enemy was cleared from the town by 0700 and companies re occupied their former positions.

    The Brigade Commander was delayed in crossing on the morning of 25 March but arrived at 0900. He ordered that 2 Glasgow Highlanders would move by route march round the southern end of Lange Renne, an old arm of the Rhine, and obtain a footing in the southern edge of the wood east of Lange Renne. 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, already in the area of Bergen were placed under command of 46 Brigade and the two battalions were to clear the wood northwards. When 2 Glasgow Highlanders reached the east end of bridge over the northern outlet of Lange Renne they were to make contact with 7 Seaforth Highlanders which was to start clearing the wood to the west and north. 9 Cameronians were to capture the area Bruckshof-Wisshof as soon as possible after dark.

    2 Glasgow Highlanders set off on their route march at 1100 hours, reached its forming up place in the Bergen area and was established in the wood at Hoodmanshof by 1515 hours. The battalion pushed through the wood with its left flank on the Lange Renne and by1830 was on the northern edge of the wood.

    2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, less one company, followed 2 Glasgow Highlanders on their march and moved through the woods to the east. This battalion was placed under command of 46 Brigade for this action but one company could not be relieved from its previous location in time. By nightfall they had reached the northern edge of the wood and dug in. They were counterattacked while doing so

    7 Seaforth Highlanders remained in the area of Mehr until contact was made with 2 Glasgow Highlanders at the bridge, which was partially demolished and suitable only for foot traffic. They then cleared the wood to the west and sent patrols towards Belling-Hoven.

    9 Cameronians repulsed a counter attack during the afternoon and at last light began its attack on the area Bruckshof-Wisshoff. All objectives were taken by 2130.

    Plunder Follow Up map.jpg

    The area around Lange Renne.
    This series of old courses of the River Rhine formed a considerable obstacle. 227 Brigade advanced up the western side of the lake but was unable to cross the only bridge, just at the northern end of the lake. The bridge was held by the enemy and partially demolished. A second lake to the north prevented an advance there also.

    In order to clear the enemy from the east of the brigade front and form a line with 7 Seaforth Highlanders and the remainder of the brigade 2 Glasgow Highlanders had to take a circuitous route which took them south to avoid various water obstacles. The largest of these was the Lange Renne. They then turned east and finally made their way through the woods to the east of Lange Renne.

    2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had a longer march since they were setting off from the far right of the brigade area.

    Route March.
    2 Glasgow Highlanders moved ‘by route march’. This is taken to mean that the battalion marched as a formed body along a predetermined route along roads and tracks. They did not need to take the precautions necessary when moving in an area where the enemy might be encountered. Companies would march in three files with a space between companies. Men were not expected to march in step. Breaks would be taken at stated intervals, this being the most efficient means of getting troops to their destination rapidly but in good order and ready to go into action.

    Mike.
     
  20. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    FERRIES.
    LVT Ferry.
    Stormboat Ferry.
    DUKW Ferry.
    Class 9 Raft Ferry.
    Class 50/60 Raft Ferry.

    The LVT ferry and the Stormboat ferry have already been described now there are two more phases under the command of the assault division. The Ferry Reserve is the reserve battalion of each assault brigade and is ready to cross in LVTs and stormboats as soon as possible after the assault waves have crossed. The Ferry Wave follows and comprises the remaining essential vehicles and equipment of the assaulting battalions which have not been able to accompany the assault wave and the personnel and essential vehicles and equipment of the reserve battalion. This wave is carried in the newly established stormboat and LVT ferries.

    The Follow Up phase comes immediately after the Assault Phase and immediately before the Build Up Phase. In fact it may overlap the Assault Phase as the Class 50/60 Ferries may be ready to start ferrying over armoured vehicles of the Follow Up Phase before the Ferry Wave has ended. This phase is the crossing of the Reserve Brigade and Armour with the Mobile Striking Force a high priority.

    River Control.
    As already described in the Engineer Plan the main 12 Corps engineer dump with some 5,000 tons of engineer stores on wheels was established in the Kevelaer area. This site had good road access. The dump held all bridging equipment and other stores estimated to be needed for 12 Corps assault.

    Before H Hour only assault crossing equipment, including Class 9 rafts and stormboats, was moved forward to carefully concealed hides. A US Army camouflage unit assisted in forming the hides which were hidden from the enemy across the river, but identifiable from the air. Class 50/60 rafts were held back because of the difficulty of hiding them.

    Overall control of the river, including ferries, bridges and immediate landing places and bridge approaches, was in the hands of the CAGRE 11 AGRE. He was based at 15 Division Tactical Headquarters, with the GOC, and had a number of CREs working under him to supervise individual ferry and bridge sites.

    Ferry timings.
    Class 9 raft.
    It was planned that these would be operational by H+5 hours. The raft in 44 Brigade area was actually ready by H+4½ hours. The raft in 227 Brigade area was not fully operational until H+10½ hours although some individual loads were carried earlier.

    Class 50/60 raft.
    It was planned that this would be operational from H+5 hours but shelling of the sites delayed the start of construction and they were not operational until H+16½ hours.

    DUKW ferry.
    It was planned that this would operate from H+12 hours and was actually operating from H+13 hours.



    DUKW Ferry.

    There was only one DUKW ferry in 15 Divisions area. This was intended to carry supplies across the river and on to supply points established on the far bank. It is always a wise precaution to build up adequate dumps in case the enemy should somehow manage to interfere with the ferry and bridging operations, leaving the troops on the far bank without ammunition, petrol, food and essential stores.

    The operation of the DUKW ferry followed that of the LVT ferry. Launching and landing places were prepared by engineers under the command of CRE 7 Army Troops. In particular the DUKW needed a prepared hard on both banks to enable them to get out of the water. These hards were to be fifty to sixty feet wide and slope gently down and into the water until a water depth of two foot six inches was reached. This allowed the driven front wheels of the DUKW to grip firmly as soon as they grounded. The width was to allow for the DUKW being carried further downstream by the current than was intended. Launching sites could be simpler but should have a gentle slope and a firm surface. The DUKWs propellers were vulnerable if there were rocks or sudden drops. Width was not so important.

    Operation of the DUKW ferry was in the hands of the RASC, under the control of River Control.

    The DUKW was one of the relatively simple adaptations that the Americans were good at. By simply taking a GMC 2 ½ ton truck chassis and building a boat body round it they produced a vehicle which performed its task very well. The chassis was not the common 6 X 6 but a forward control version which both suited the purpose and was less in demand for cargo trucks. With a cargo body to take 2 ½ tons of cargo and a propeller to move it through the water it served in all theatres later in the war and continued in service for many years after the war.

    The DUKWs issued for the Rhine crossing were very tired, having been in prolonged use in the flooded Rhineland areas. It was thought that they could not be kept in use for long. A DUKW ferry was established by early afternoon of the 24th. It was decided that the DUKWs that were available were too unreliable to be used in assault roles. They had been used continuously for a long period in Operation Veritable, clearing flooded areas between the Maas and the Rhine in preparation for Operation Plunder. DUKWs were only to be used in a supply role.

    XII Corps instructions say that 84 RASC DUKWs were assigned to the ferry operation plus a further 50 from US Army sources. This would match the establishment for a DUKW company of four platoons plus three DUKWs for Company Headquarters.

    All General Transport units were covered by the same war establishment table with notes, amendments, additions and deletions to the company and its platoons. In some cases the company was subject to so many amendments that they are difficult to follow. The DUKW company was a general transport company with special vehicles, and a much modified workshop to look after them. It also had two platoons of relief drivers.

    Each section of six DUKWs was led by a corporal on a motorcycle.
    Each platoon of five sections was led by a lieutenant and had two reserve vehicles.
    The company had four platoons. It was commanded by a major and there were three DUKWs for headqyarters use.

    In practice Section 5 was held as a reserve to allow for the heavy load of maintenance required.

    2 X Relief Driver increments each.
    serjeant
    30 X drivers IC

    The DUKW ferry was planned to begin at H+ 12 hours. It actually began at H+13 hours, 3pm.

    The DUKW loading, unloading, launching and landing sites were all on the extreme right of 15 Divisions area. This was mainly because the roads on the far bank provided a suitable set of roads to and from the Supply Point on the far bank. These included a forward route from the Supply Point, good access from the river to the Supply Point and a separate return route. The location also meant that RASC transport carrying supplies to the loading area were clear of other traffic, especially since they required a return route. Most traffic was forward moving at this time.


    THE OPERATION.
    DUKW operations were much as for other ferries. The DUKWs were called forward to a DUKW Marshalling Area on a road running parallel to the river. Royal Engineers prepared entry and exit points on the river banks. The Bank Group laid out tracks from the Marshalling Area to the river and on the far bank from the river to a Supply Point near the Forward Assembly Area. Control Posts were established on each bank.

    The DUKWs were pre loaded with the planned supplies and set off to the river bank. DUKWs carried mainly ammunition and petrol. As was normal practice the two commodities were carried and dumped separately.

    Having unloaded the supplies the DUKWs returned to the near bank. Again they entered the water upstream and landed at a prepared hard downstream on the far bank.

    Returning DUKWs reported to the DUKW Collecting Point, which in this case was the same as the DUKW Marshalling Area. This was to control returning DUKWs and prevent them from jamming narrow approach roads which may be full of forward traffic. It is dispensed with as soon as a one way return route has been organised. DUKW platoons then ran a continuous service until bridges were opened to supply traffic. Returning DUKWs carried casualties and delivered them to a Casualty Depositing Point near the Collecting Area. DUKWs gave a much more comfortable ride than did LVTs.

    The Collecting Point is where returning DUKWs are collected, maintained and re organised for their next trip. It must be far enough from the river, and have enough cover to make maintenance and re organisation possible without being observed by the enemy. At the same time it should be close enough to the river to make rapid turn arounds possible.

    The DUKWs moved into the Collecting Area and stopped in the Maintenance Sub Area where crew maintenance tasks will be carried out and refuelling take place. If the DUKW was fit it moved it waited to be called forward for loading. If the DUKW required attention beyond the resources of the crew then went the fitters and its place was taken by a reserve DUKW.

    From the Collection Area DUKWs were called forward to the Loading Area. The Loading Area should be as close to the Collection Area as practicable. It should not be under direct observation from the enemy side of the river but as close to the point where DUKWs enter the water as possible to shorten turn round times. When loaded the DUKWs moved in sections along the marked track to the point of entry to the river. The section corporal on a motorcycle led the way.

    The Supply Point was on the far bank and on the lateral road so that unit transport an readily access it. The loads will be unloaded in the Supply Point, keeping ammunition and petrol separate.

    When they had unloaded the DUKWs followed a marked route to the river bank, swam across the river to the near bank and then followed a marked route to the Assembly Area and start the cycle all over again.

    Company Headquarters kept detailed records of each DUKW including loads carried, time in and out, fit, unfit or resting. Details of loads carried are important. Ammunition does not have to be indented for but accurate records are kept of expenditure by units and deliveries to supply points in order to ensure that there is sufficient of each type of ammunition, and where it is to be found.


    It is known that DUKWs were used for casualty evacuation. They were preferred to LVTs since they gave a more comfortable ride. Before the event it was stated that those returning from the far bank could carry casualties. There are photos of DUKWs with red cross markings and flags. These seem to be easily attached and detached so probably DUKWs displayed them on the return journey with casualties.

    The arrangements for casualty evacuation do not seem to be mentioned in the documents I have.

    Supplies would be delivered to the divisional refilling point by corps transport units. Empty lorries would travel in convoy to the divisional supply refilling point and collect supplies. The lorries from each brigade would load the supplies for their own brigade. Loaded lorries would travel, preferably by a different route to avoid congestion, from the divisional refilling point to the unit supply points where units first line transport would collect the supplies. There would usually be a rendezvous point where the lorries for each brigade were met by motorcyclists who guided them to the supply point which might have moved or might be difficult to find in the dark.

    The system for the transport of petrol differed form that for supplies because all petrol was alike and was not perishable. There was no need for two echelons working a two day turn round. Supplies of petrol were delivered to the divisional petrol refilling point by corps transport where it was held until collected by the divisional transport as required. All petrol was in cans and a 3ton lorry could carry 160 jerricans.

    The system for the transport of ammunition was similar to that for petrol. Again the loads were not perishable and demand fluctuated. However petrol and ammunition were always kept separate. This was an absolute rule since ammunition was usually safe to handle and transport but petrol fires would cause it to explode. A General Duties platoon was available to assist with loading and unloading ammunition. It was a principle of ammunition supply that it should move forward automatically and need not be indented for. Clerks were required to record amounts issued, and units made returns of ammunition expenditure, so that replacement stocks could be provided. Ammunition supply was made simpler by the fact that the divisional field artillery would remain on the near bank to give support.


    DUKW.jpg

    DUKW landing ramp.

    DUKW2.jpg

    DUKW for casualty evacuation.

    Mike.
     
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