Is it worth noting that 1st Airborne had 17 successive operations cancelled prior to Op Market Garden?
Urquhart had a good record as an infantry commander, I just think he was the wrong person for the command of an elite division. Commanding any division is a completely different skill to leading troops in battle, Urquharts decision to leave his HQ was disastrous for the whole operation.
markdeml I have been thinking that you were reading the wrong books - wrong - it's your thinking that is off - a GOOD div Commander always leaves his HQ in order to assist his Brigadiers as you will note - he was with one brigadier when he was stuck for two days away from his HQ - and in turn a GOOD Brigadier is always popping up to see how his three Colonels are doing - Colonels always leave their HQ's to see how their Squadron Leaders are doing et al…….what was even more disastrous to the operation was the Air Chief - US Gen. Brereton swanning off from his HQ - not to visit Browning - but to inspect another operation venue - allowing the air forces to dictate landing grounds too far away incase they lost aircraft - 101 and 82nd failing to capture their bridges on time - thus holding back the XXX corps in relieving 1st Airborne - but most of all ignoring the two panzer divs near Ahrnem…..having learned NOTHING of the Battle for Raurey earlier in June with Infantry attacking panzers with rifles and bayonets and the odd 2" mortar…..so come on learn something about the British Army at war..and not as stupid as you make them…a Div. Cmmdr still leads his men in Battle... Cheers
The 1st Airborne was undoubtedly an unlucky formation, for one thing. The Sicilian operation saw the division scattered in separate contingents rather than fighting as a whole, and when it went back to the UK it left the experienced 2nd Para Bde behind in the Med. MARKET-GARDEN was the division's first combat drop in over a year, and from what I've read (Ryan, Farrar-Hockley, Wilmot) the command team had some problems. Urquhart was a fine soldier, as anyone who reads about his tenure with 231 Bde will discover, but his inexperience in airborne ops was not helpful. I think he would have done splendidly as GOC of a conventional infantry division. The 1st Airborne performed excellently once battle was joined, though, and I don't think the defeat can be laid at the division's door. That was due to basic flaws in the plan, and to the slowness of XXX Corps. The 6th had better luck, including the fortune to be committed to better-planned operations. It was a raw outfit before D-Day, but in Normandy it made what I think was the best British airborne drop of the war. It held a vulnerable flank throughout that campaign, and again did well. After the Rhine drop, the 6th did wonders in the pursuit across Normandy, moving far faster than a division with a limited scale of transport was expected to do. I don't think there was anything to choose in fighting qualities between the two divisions. Luck plays a greater role in war than people think.
