2692758 Henry John KERCHER, 1 Scots Guards: 27/04/1943, Djebel Bou Aoukaz

For the record:
Casualty
Lance Serjeant KERCHER, HENRY JOHN
Service Number 2692758
Died 27/04/1943
Aged 33
1st Bn. Scots Guards
Son of Albert John and Rosa Jane Kercher; husband of Annie Elizabeth Kennedy Kercher, of Buriton, Hampshire.
INSCRIPTION: LOST AWHILE OUR TREASURED LOVE GAINED FOR EVER SAFE ABOVE
Buried at MASSICAULT WAR CEMETERY
Location: Tunisia
Number of casualties: 1447
Cemetery/memorial reference: IV. D. 17.
See cemetery plan

Original field grave location given in Concentration report:

 

From The Scots Guards 1919-1955, David Erskine, Pgs 144 - 147:

AFRICA 1943: FIRST BATTALION
(iii) The Bou


April 26
Throughout the 26th the preparations for the assault went on. Up came the artillery, to place themselves directly behind the Battalion, and to attract more attention from the German artillery and aircraft. Patrols went out that night, but came back with little more valuable information than that there were Germans on the slopes of the BOU.

April 27
In the morning of the 27th, the direct order for the assault came.
The GRENADIERS, at this stage of the battle, lay on “HILLS RIDICULOUS” which they had occupied on the 26th; the IRISH GUARDS lay south of the GAB-GAB gap. The plan was that the IRISH should cross the gap and secure the eastern ridge which leads up to the summit through Points 211, 214, and 1818. Simultaneously the GRENADIERS would assault the shorter western ridge about Points 106, 154 and 171. Behind them would come the SCOTS GUARDS who would march along the MEDJERDA plain and then assault the summit of the BOU from the west and south. The summit proper was Point 26; the the north was another knoll, 157. The whole advance and attack was to take place in broad daylight, for “higher formation” discounted the enemy’s strength. The presence of mines in the plain precluded the use of tanks in support of the Battalion’s initial advance.

Despite the capture of LONGSTOP by the tanks of the NORTH IRISH HORSE and the infantry of the 78th DIVISION on the previous day, it was obvious the the Germans would have an uninterrupted view of our advance across the flat, both from the BOU and from the high ground on the left bank of the river. Such an advance of four miles, followed by an exhausting climb over a rough, boulder-strewn hillside, on which grew a grasping prickly gorse-like bush, and finally an assault on a dominant height, called for the display of all the Battalion’s finest military qualities. These qualities were displayed; the summit was taken, and only misunderstanding marred the achievement. The determination of the Battalion that day was described by one of the officers: “David BETHELL has broken out of hospital forty miles back, and is back in the Line. He still has shrapnel in the hand and chest. That shows you the spirit.”

Shortly after noon the Commanding Officer returned from the Brigade Headquarters with orders fo the attack. Time was so short that these had to be issued verbally, and platoon commanders had to give out their’s while on the move. The Battalion was in the wake of the GRENADIERS, and ahead of them the hills erupted in fire and smoke as bombers and guns pounded the slopes.

Left Flank led the advance, followed by C Company, Right Flank and B Company. The first two Companies were to make straight for Point 157, the second two, when the advance had gone far enough, were to wheel right and attack the BOU itself. “From the Start Line [Klioua Farm] to our objective,” one of the Guardsmen of Left Flank wrote, “was about two miles [1] of heavy going through cornfields all the way. After passing the Start Line we were told to deploy to a distance of ten feet between each man. From the moment we started until the time we were held up we were under heavy machine-gun and mortar fire. We hadn’t advanced far before we had casualties … This did not deter the other men, who kept the three lines as if they were on a parade ground.” The enemy were seen withdrawing in face of this advance, but as the lower slopes drew nearer the volume of fire increased until, when Left Flank was level with the BOU, it came under a heavy cross fire of mortaring from across the river and intense machine-gun fire and sniping from the wadis the cut into the lower slopes of the hill, among them an 88-mm. gun firing over open sights. At this point ten Germans of the Herman Goering Regiment gave themselves up. Immediately afterwards Captain J.S. STOCKTON, commanding Left Flank was killed by a mortar bomb that landed at his feet. It was time for fearless leadership, and one of the Guardsmen who followed him wrote that “he had show no fear at all, and was a shining example to the other men.”
[1] It was, in fact, a bit farther; it seemed much farther.

By this time Left Flank, which had only two platoons, had suffered about twenty-six casualties, and the remainder of the Company was so exposed to cross-fire that it was unable to move by daylight. It managed, however, to get into positions whence it could give coercing mortar and machine-gun fire to Right Flank and B Company, which had already broken away to the right and started to climb the BOU from the west. C Company, seeing that B and Right Flank were still able to move, left its position behind Left Flank and also moved to the right in their support.

Right Flank (which had already lost CSM D. FRASER, wounded by the 88) and B Company, advancing up the western slope of the ridge below Point 226 at about 1800 hours, came under heavy machine-gun fire from a post away to the left, an were unable to advance further. But Lord LYELL was not pinned to the ground, and realising that further advance was impossible until the post was silenced, collected the only available men - Lance-Sergeant J. ROBERTSON, Lance-Corporal LAWRIE, Guardsman J. CHISHOLM and Guardsman PORTER - and ran out into the open. The enemy post was further away than it had appeared, and close to the emplacement in which was the 88-mm. gun that was holding up the rest of the Battalion. Lord LYELL was well ahead of his companions when he reached the machine-gun, and he destroyed its companions when he reached the machine-gun, and he destroyed its crew with a grenade. At this point Sergeant ROBERTSON was killed and Lance-Corporal LAWRIE and the two Guardsmen wounded, but Guardsman CHISHOLM was still able to give covering fire from where he lay, and Lord LYELL ran straight towards the 88. He moved so quickly that it only had time to fire one more shot before he was in among the crew with the bayonet, killing several before himself being overwhelmed and killed. The survivors of the crew then left the pit, and three of them were killed by Lance-Corporal LAWRIE as they retired. Both guns had been silenced, and in the lengthening evening shadows the advance up the long slope went on. For this and other great acts of gallantry, Lord LYELL was awarded the Victoria Cross. Lance-Corporal LAWRIE and Guardsman CHISHOLM received Military Medals. They had freed the pinned-down men, and Right Flank, under Captain MANN, and B Company now under Lieutenant J.D. FORRESTER, climbed the ridge and pushed on to the summit. At the top, the Battalion’s main objective, they began to consolidate.

In the meantime Battalion Headquarters, which had followed B Company in the approach march, was caught by machine-gun fire from the far bank of the river and forced to lie down in the corn, where the only news that reached it was from a Mortar despatch rider who had last seen the companies still fighting on the lower slopes. Wireless communication failed at this time, which was about dark, when African atmospherics are at their most capricious. In consequence the success of the two companies was unknown to Colonel BARNE; soon after dark he reported the situation as he knew it to the Brigadier, and he was ordered to withdraw the Battalion to a position behind the GRENADIERS, who were established on Points 171 and 154.

On Point 226 Right Flank and B Company were busying themselves siting positions, building singers, and scraping what slits they could in shallow earth. Twenty-five miles away to the north-east the lights of TUNIS could be seen; the most formidable hill in the enemy’s defence line was in our hands. Then at about eleven, over the wireless, came the order to withdraw. All Captain MANN’s efforts to inform the Commanding Officer of the success of the Companies were frustrated by the atmospherics. The two Companies came down; they could hardly do otherwise. The withdrawal began at midnight. “It was an amazing walk back; we had no clear idea where the rest of the Battalion or Battalion Headquarters were, as no-one had got as far as intended. Nor did we how many Germans might be behind us, as he had all advanced along the plain, and, except for the last half-mile, had deliberately left the ridge untouched. The night was dark; and the ground very rough and steep. We marched in single file as quietly as possible, on a compass bearing towards where we had started from that morning. As far as I can remember we reached the Battalion area just before dawn.” By an oversight two Guardsman were left behind in the confusion of the darkness, and an hour later these were taken prisoners when the Germans reoccupied Point 226 with strong patrols.

April 28
By dawn of the 28th the Battalion was established in its new positions in support of the GRENADIERS; C and Left Flank were on Point 117, where, wrote a Guardsman, “we had a good sleep and some food”. Right Flank and B Company were forward on Point 106, where they had little sleep, and breakfast coincided with the orders for the new attack.

Inadequate communications had thrown away the fruits of a fine feat of arms. It is useless to speculate on the chances of holding the BOU had the Battalion maintained its position on the top; most probably there would have developed a grim struggle of attack and counter-attack, akin to the epic fight of the IRISH GUARDS on Points 212 and 214 which was now beginning. As it was, the BOU must be assaulted again.