2nd Irish Guards tank crew

Hello Phillip.,
One of the names rings a bell with me - Fernandez - as my father spoke of him a few times. Will check with him this evening and see if he knows anything. He was 3Bn, but you never know...
There is no mention of three of the names in the IG History, but quite a few Murphys as you would imagine. I will check them and post up anything I find which may be relevant.

Extracted from my aphabetical list for 2nd Bn from Geoff's search engine:

FANNING, MICHAEL 2718741 21/09/1944 Panel 3, GROESBEEK MEMORIAL
THOMAS, THOMAS JAMES 2723252 21/09/1944 Panel 3, GROESBEEK MEMORIAL
WATERHOUSE, RICHARD 2721799 21/09/1944 Panel 3, GROESBEEK MEMORIAL

To include the following day's dates, [though the History reports that 6 ORs were killed on 22nd Sept, there are also a further 10 from 3Bn who died on 22 Sept.]:
APPERLEY BERNARD ROLAND 2719101 22/09/1944
ARNOLD, BERNARD 2721989 22/09/1944
MACFETRIDGE, WC 268994 22/09/1944
MATHER, EF 2720350 22/09/1944
RICE, T 2723711 22/09/1944
WATTERS, WJ 2723656 22/09/1944

dbf

 

Philip,
The 3IG diary for that day states:

"The advance was resumed at mid-day, but stiff opposition was encountered soon after leaving the outskirts of the town, which later proved to be thick screens of some 7 x 7.5 cm and 2x 8.8 cm Assault Guns, supported by inf who lined the ditches with spandaus and squeeze guns.

The I.G. group were again in the lead, but the country was totally unsuitable for the employment of armour as the main road was embanked and the country on either side of it dyked and impassable to tks. Lacking the support of Typhoons, the Bn was unable to advance and was compelled to form a tight laager for the night in its present posn area 702662.

During the day, LTS. WILSON and GORDON - SHEA were wounded, which left the Bn with only two Pl Comds, and one OR was killed and 17 wounded."

The Gdsman who died was Albert Greenhill, Arnhem Oosterbeek War cemetery, a mate of my father's and whom he buried along with others who died at same time, presumably 2Bn, at the side of a road. I have an account from my father of some of that day. His No 1 Coy were taking their turn resting that day, whilst others went up to the sharp end.

dbf

 

IG History - 21<SUP>st</SUP> September
Pgs 505-507

"Information about the British Airborne trickled in from more orthodox sources. Refugees reported that only a few parachutists were still fighting in Arnhem itself. The Germans had recaptured the whole of the town and were now fiercely attacking the Airborne’s remaining positions. An officer of the Airborne Engineers, who had swum the River Lek, and walked through the enemy lines, confirmed these reports. The resources of the Airborne Division were stretched to the uttermost, he said, and if it was to remain intact as a fighting force, it must be relieve within the next twenty-four hours. There was only one way to reach Arnhem in time, and only one formation available who could possibly do it. At midday on the 21<SUP>st</SUP> the Irish Group was ordered to break out of the bridgehead and advance up the main road to Arnhem
About ten miles east of Nijmegen the River Rhine divides into two streams. The southern stream, form now on called the River Waal, flows due west through Nijmegen to the sea. The northern stream, the River Lek, or Northern Rhine, flows north-west to Arnhem some fifteen miles north of Nijmegen, and then turns west to the sea. The strip of land between the two rivers was known as the “Island.” The chemical formula for the Island is that of a patent medicine - 90 per cent. water. It was surrounded by water, based on water, criss-crossed by innumerable waterways, below water level and completely flat, so that if the rivers burst their dykes it was also under water. The soil was rich with river mud, excellent for fruit trees, which the Dutch farmers planted industriously, lining the main road to Arnhem with orchards. This road was embanked high above the surrounding fields and cut off from them by a deep drainage ditch on either side.
When the 2<SUP>nd</SUP> Battalion returned to Nijmegen later in the winter they met an instructor at the Dutch Staff College who spoke good English with a sprinkling of Army jargon. He showed great professional interest in the plan of attack on Arnhem, which the officers explained o him as well they could. The Dutchman nodded gravely and then put a broad finger on the map. “You see the main road.” The Battalion has seen only too much of the main road. “You see the side roads.” The officers had not seen the side roads. “Well, I did my training at Arnhem. Every year this attack was set as a problem in the Colonel‘s promotion examination. It was the sack for those who went straight up the main road. If the officer decided to go left flank he got a Brigade. The attack up the main road is not on - certainly not with tanks.” One look at the country was enough to tell both battalions that it was unsuitable, if not impossible, for tanks. But so had been the country north of the Escaut Canal. Here, as there, everything depended on three factors: one constant, the fighting qualities of the Irish Group, and two fluctuating, the strength of the opposition and the support. Anyway, Colonel “JOE” Vandeleur, unlike the Dutch officer, was fighting a battle, not a Staff College exercise, and had orders which were based on the principle that whatever the difficulties and casualties, it was imperative to reach the Airborne, and the main road was the only one available to the Group.
Just before dawn No. 1 Squadron had crossed the bridge and joined No. 4 Company. They saw no enemy, but knew there were plenty about for they were shelled and mortared all morning. The Americans, who were actually in contact with the Germans to the north and east, could not give much information either, except that the Germans seemed to be well established round Elst, a town halfway to Arnhem. A deserter from these Germans said that they had been ordered not to attack but to dig in and hold the road. The railway line to Arnhem runs parallel to the road a mile to the right-hand side. Half-way to Elst is Bessen station, connected with the main road by a low thickly hedged lane. On the map the station and lane were covered with the German conventional signs for anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and the whole area was dotted with infantry positions. The optimism of the Intelligence was as firm as ever; the opposition would be slight, they said, and would anyway be disorganized by the Polish Parachute Brigade, who were to be dropped round Elst that afternoon.
Colonel “Joe” Vandeleur, now recovered from his bilious attack, demanded all available artillery and Typhoon support. This did not amount to very much. The advance to Nijmegen had been so rapid that the majority of the guns had not yet caught up and there was not large reserve of ammunition. No more artillery could be brought up at short notice, as the road to the south was both threatened by the enemy and fully occupied by the 43<SUP>rd</SUP> Division moving up to Nijmegen. Worse still, there were as yet no advance landing grounds for the Tactical Air Force. Colonel Joe had to be content with a call on a limited number of Typhoons and the support of the only one of the Division’s Field Regiments, as the other one had gone south with the Coldstream Group to protect the supply route.
Pgs 508 - 510
Within an hour the Irish Group was lined up along the main road. No. 1 Squadron, without infantry, was in Lent, with its leading troop, Lieutenant T. Samuelson’s, under the railway bridge which was the Grenadiers’ forward outpost. Down the road stretched first No. 2 Squadron, carrying No. 22 Company on tank back, and then No. 3 Squadron with the rest of the 3<SUP>rd</SUP> Battalion, whose tail was in Nijmegen. An artillery concentration was ordered on the German positions marked on the captured map, but opinions differed as to where it came down, except for about twenty shells that definitely fell in the wrong place. At half-past one the Group advanced. For then minutes and two miles all went well, though the column was driving along an open road raised six feet above the surrounding countryside. The leading column reached a solitary farm surrounded by an orchard, an island in the bare open ground stretching south from the suspected enemy positions. They could see in front of them a line of trees at right-angles to the main road. Behind those trees ran the side road to Bessen. That was where the captured map marked the enemy guns. The map was right. Inside a minute the three tanks of the leading troop were in flames. The leading rifle company, No 2, under Major Hendry, dived straight off the tanks on which they had been riding into the ditches on either side. The column piled up behind the leading tank, so that the vehicles were packed head to tail in silhouette along the road. For some reason or other no armour-piercing shot was fired at the column. The Germans had seven French 75-mm guns which, as the Irish discovered later, could fire only high-explosive shells. The three leading Shermans were probably destroyed by one or two Tigers, whose tracks the Irish saw later. No one can understand why the Tigers did not knock off the remaining forty-nine tanks in a row. But they did not. German infantry in the ditches with Spandaus and “squeeze guns” kept firing down the middle and sides of the road - very noisy and uncomfortable for Captain R.S. Langton in the leading tank. The wounded crews of the leading troop were lying by their tanks in the middle of the road and could not be reached. The infantry companies found cover in the ditches and orchards. By great good fortune only one shell landed in the ditches, but that one caused fifteen casualties. On the other hand, the tanks and trucks stood up like coconuts at a cockshy for the German gunners to knock down. The deep ditches which saved the infantry were a curse to the tanks. Since they could not get off the road, the 2<SUP>nd</SUP> Battalion was force to fight on a one-tank front. Only the leading tank, if it was not hit, could fire forward; a few of the others - about seven - could fire to the flank at the houses and railway station, but most of them were masked by the orchards along the road. Both sides of the road were orchard, orchard all the way. Colonel “Joe” Vandeleur made every effort to get the Typhoon support which had been promised, but first the control set broke down and then a second set was sent forward, which also broke down, so there was no communication with aircraft. “The tanks lacked vital support at a critical moment of the battle,” said the official report, as if it was the sort of thing that might happen to anyone.
A few minutes after the leading troop had been destroyed, Colonel Giles Vandeleur and Captain Eamon Fitzgerald drove up in a scout car to Captain Langton’s tank, now the leading element of the 2<SUP>nd</SUP> Army. The Germans greeted them with a hail of fire. It was easy enough to locate the Germans, particularly as everyone already knew where to look. It was intensely irritating for the observers in the ditches, under the smooth, bare tree-trunks, to be able to see the Krauts and yet to be unable to guide with accuracy the fire of the tanks, masked as they were by the bushy-topped trees. Colonel Giles decided that the tanks would obviously be murdered if they tried to attack, and that only the infantry had a chance. He crawled away down the ditch to report to his cousin, Colonel Joe. The only available artillery support was one regiment of field guns. Few as they were, they would be better than nothing. The Group was first disappointed and then very angry that no sound came from their guns. It was an hour before the first shells landed, but it was difficult to observe effects. The 3-inch mortar platoon under Lieutenant J. Compton and Sergeant Moran, however, opened fire inside ten minutes. The enemy gunners were active, and from a quarter to three o’clock until dark a steady stream of shells and mortar bombs came down on the line of the road.
At half-past three Major J. Haslewood, the Company Commander detailed for the infantry to attack, rattled up the road in a carrier, being nearly killed en route. He joined Captain E. Fitzgerald in the ditch by Captain Langton’s tank and peered over the flat and singularly uninviting countryside. It was out of the question to bring his company up the ditch and strike right to the railway station; not a single Guardsman would have survived the walk across four hundred yards of open country. He reported to Colonel Joe that an attack to succeed, would have to go up both sides together, with the tanks supporting on the road and the guns pouring shells into the German positions. Colonel Joe fully agreed, but he could not get the artillery support. He ordered Major Haslewood to take his company and No. 3 Squadron and try to work round the right flank by the railway line. At the same time the Welsh Group were trying to loop round the left flank, but could make no progress and were engaged in heavy fighting a mile to the west.
About five o’clock the Brigade Commander, Brigadier Norman Gwatkin, came up and urged Colonel Joe to try everything possible. He was already doing so. The feeble shelling of the enemy positions did nothing to “loosen” the situation. The anti-tank guns could not be “pin-pointed,” as anyone who went forward immediately came under heavy fire. The whole roadside was one long orchard, full of machine-gunners. No 4 Company and No. 3 Squadron cleared the orchards towards the railway, but as soon as they debouched on the open ground the tanks were accurately engaged and the infantry pinned down by machine-gun fire. It was and impasse. The attack never got under way. At seven o’clock, as night was falling, the Irish Group were told to make no more efforts as a whole division, the 43<SUP>rd</SUP>, [4 Bn Wiltshire Regt.] was being brought up to clear the road. The Group withdrew a thousand yards to harbour. They had done their best and suffered heavily, but on such ground, and without air or artillery support, tow battalions could not break on such strong defences. The 3<SUP>rd</SUP> Battalion had lost Lieutenants Wilson and Gordon-Shea wounded and now only had two platoon commanders left, Lieutenants Mahaffy and Harvey-Kelly. Rupert Mahaffy, sitting in a ditch, told Major Haslewood with gloomy satisfaction that, out of all the platoon commanders who had landed in Normandy, he was the sold survivor. The Medical Sergeant in his half-track ambulance made a gallant effort to reach the wounded up the road, but the Germans forced him back with bazooka fire. The wounded lay out till it was dark enough to send out patrols."

 

Philip,
See my amendment to first post, others of 2nd (Armd) Bn who died 21 Sept.
I don't think my father is now in contact with any of 2Bn., though I have some of his pics showing them in Hamburg. Will check with him, may be late tomorrow; sadly I know of only one of his mates who is still alive ...
Diane

 

Have you tried this site, Ivor's son is continuing his work. A good place to try to get contacts.
A Site Worth Waiting for . . . . .

 

From IG History;

BELGIUM AND HOLLAND

2<SUP>ND</SUP> BN. IRISH GUARDS

KILLED OR DIED OF WOUNDS

Lieutenant W.C.T McFetridge
Major D.A. Peel, M.C.
Lieutenant J.A.P. Swann
Guardsman Ackers, W.
Guardsman Apperley, B.
Guardsman Arnold, B.
Guardsman Bell, J.
Lance-Corporal Black, J.
Guardsman Boston, C.
Lance-Sergeant Casey, C
Lance-Sergeant Cashion, E.
Guardsman Chambers, W.
Guardsman Clarke, T.
Guardsman Clisby, R.
Guardsman Cole, J.
Guardsman Connery, P
Lance-Corporal Crozier, D.
Guardsman Deehan, T.
Guardsman Dunford, C.
Guardsman Fanning, M.
Lance-Sergeant Farmer, T.
Guardsman Fearnyough, J.
Guardsman Fernandez, M.
Guardsman Greenall, H.
Lance-Sergeant Hall, F.
Lance-Corporal Hall, W.
Guardsman Heyes, J.
Guardsman Holland, D.
Guardsman Hughes, W.
Guardsman Johnson, J.
Guardsman Letchford, H.
Guardsman Loder, O.
Lance-Sergeant Mather, E.
Lance-Corporal Modler, J.
Guardsman Moore, W.
Guardsman Murphy, A.
Guardsman McGovern, T.
Guardsman Nay, D.
Guardsman Neal, H.
Lance-Corporal O’Connor, E.
Lance-Sergeant O’Neill, T.
S.S.M. Parkes, W.
Guardsman Pegg, T.
Guardsman Plant, L.
Guardsman Pratt, P.
Guardsman Quinn, O.
Lance-Sergeant Ratclife, J. (Mentioned in despatches)
Guardsman Rice, T.
Guardsman Robinson, R.
Guardsman Simcock, W.
Guardsman Thomas, T.
Lance-Corporal Walker, E.
Guardsman Waterhouse, R.
Guardsman Watters, W.
Lance-Sergeant Wildman, E.
Guardsman Wood, J.
Guardsman Young, W.