5th Canadian Armoured Division in Italy

Discussion in 'Canadian' started by gpo son, Apr 13, 2012.

  1. gpo son

    gpo son Senior Member

    I have been nibbling around the edges of this since I joined this forum after seeing the Regimental History of the 17th field regiment RCA posted in another thread. I had hoped to find new and intestesting things about the 5th CAD but have not been overly successful. I have been told a few things that I had previously heard but I was also told things that were incongruous with what I know. So I have decided to prime the pump so to speak.
    I been away from this for a few days admittedly to review some information that I have long thought to be correct. To that end I have referenced Bill McAndrew's paper 'Fifth Canadian Armoured Division Introduction to Battle' . His very concise work deals with many of the issues that plagued the the 5th CAD in it early days in Italy.
    He speaks about the conditions of the equipment (particularly the armour) that was handed to the 5th CAD when they arrived, and mentions that it was Simmonds who was given the choice to refuse it.

    "General Guy Simonds, its new General Officer Commanding (GOC), decided to await the arrival in Italy of newer gasoline powered models to replace older diesel Sherman’s, and the rest of the Desert Rats vehicles were found to be well beyond their
    useful mechanical lives. Replacements arrived slowly. By the end of the year, for instance, the British Columbia Dragoons had obtained 87
    wheeled vehicles, including some Daimler and White scout cars, but no tanks at all. In February, 11 Honey reconnaissance tanks (stripped down Stuarts) were issued and soon after the first Shermans appeared, allowing crews finally to familiarize themselves with their new weapons."
    In his book “The Liri Valley: Canada’s World War II Breakthrough to Rome” Pages 64 and 65 Mark Zuehlke goes into great detail of the conflict between Chris Vokes (GOC 1st CID) and Brigadier Bob Wyman (1st CAB and its resulting “banishment into the wilderness” of the 1st CAB (not the 5th CAB
    He, in fact details a major reason for the abject failure of the 11th bde’s first attack. Brigadier Kitching (who shared Vokes opinion of Wyman) would never have agreed to the battle plan for the 'action towards Areilli' had he known that Wyman would order his tanks not to get in a 'dog fight' with German armour.
    McAndrew’s paper mentions Montgomery left Italy in late Dec 1943 (actually Dec 29th) and would have had nothing to do with the Areilli river fiasco and its aftermath or the conflict between the Perth’s and Seaforth’s. "General Leese's (who succeeded Montgomery at EighthArmy in December 1943)".
    From most accounts I have been able to find the "Brawl" was limited to a coupe of sections.
    Interestingly he points out that during Operation Chesterfield the 13th corps was having trouble on the Canadian right and was given 'priority' over Canadian roads and/or the divisional boundary was altered to allow the 78th and 6th AD to get forward and not the other way around.
    "Moreover, when the 78th Divisionwas delayed by tenacious German rearguards, their units either moved through the Canadian sector or the inter-corps boundary was adjusted to meet their needs".
    Mark Zuehlke mentions the same corps boundary adjustment in an article written for Legion Magazine.
    It seems many Historians agree that Leese and Alexander panicked when they realized that the Americans had broken out of the Anzio bridgehead and were on their way to Rome ahead of them. By altering the divisional boundary into the 1st Can Corps sector they succeeded in exacerbating the problem by causing a 24 hour unbreakable traffic jamb. (this I know because my dad (Lieutenant acting Captain at the time) was right in the middle of it) and the direct result of it was a further delay in the expansion of the Melfa River bridge head because the guns couldn’t get forward and the Irish RoC attack had to be postponed until May26th.


    My Father (also a D-Day Dodger) left a good deal of his blood along highway 6 on the 29th of May just west of Pofi. On May 21st while supporting the 1stCID several men of his troop lost their lives in a direct hit on their slit trench, in the same action he was buried up to his neck in a near miss. His guns also fired in the first ever "William target" into the "Aquino rail yards" (which was in the 13th corps sector) Chris Vokes called this target as the 2nd CIB was being shredded by fire coming from Acquino, in his belief it was because the 78th Division was not keeping the Grendiers heads down .

    Matt Dowling
    gpo's Son
     
  2. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Matt
    The next time you read anything by Mark Zeuhlke you might have a bag of salt close by as both Gerry Chester of the 25th Tank Bde and myself of 21st Tank bde have taken him to task for fictionalising some parts of two of his books viz. Liri Valley and the Gothic Line as this kind of fiction tends to make some readers claim that any books by so called historians are the truth - the whole truth and nothing but the truth.....facts as we saw it at the time was that the brawl of the 5thAD & Seaforths mainly at Ortona was a bit more than just a couple of sections - as Monty was steaming mad and actually fired the 5th AD
    and had our two brigades brought over from North Africa as Tank support for 1stCID until they left for Belgium in Feb of '45.

    These so called Historians that you claim that both Leese and Alex were in shock when the
    Americans broke out of Anzio -well no they weren't - as that was the WHOLE plan - as you have perhaps heard that the US VI corps was to break out toward Valmontone in order to act as an Anvil to the hammer of 8th & 5th Armies coming up from the South via the Liri- or where your father shed his blood on HWY 6- along with thousands of others - Alex went into a foul temper- for him - when Clark turned his forces toward ROME - and allowed the two German Armies to escape and set up the later Gothic Line where some 14,000 British troops also shed their blood- and still lay there- while Gerry and I also shed blood - but walked away to survive
    so spare us the fictions of too many Authors - whatever they call themselves
    Cheers
     
  3. minden1759

    minden1759 Senior Member

    Matt.

    I am not sure that it is correct to say that either Leese or Alexander panicked over the success of the US breakout from Anzio. The Liri valley, and I have stood in it many times, was simply not wide enough to take the two Corps that were pushing up it: XIII (BR) Corps and the two Divs of 1 (CAN) Corps. This resulted in chaos not panic.

    The VI (US) Corps break out went very well on 23-25 May 44 and elements of 3 US Inf Div and 1 US Armd Div were facing Artena with the expectation that their objective: Valmontone, would be seized on 26 May 44. This would then shut Route 6 as a retreat option for Tenth Army. Only Clark's decision to re-direct 1 US Armd Div to the NW around the left of the Alban Hills late on 25 May 44 caused the threat to Valmontone to evaporate. Momentum was lost and by 30 May 44, VI (US) Corps had stalled.

    My point is that Leese and Alexander were not in a panic - there was absolutely nothing to panic about during the period 26-31 May 44 because VI (US) Corps were going nowhere.

    Regards

    FdeP
     
  4. ropey

    ropey Member

    A small point but has your source got the correct location for the the 'William' target? The William was brought down to stop fire from Aquino into the Canadian right flank as you say, but the railway line (hardly "yards") is well north of Aquino, on the centre-right of the XIII Corp.

    I'd agree with the others above that panic is entirely the wrong word, and the reasons for the traffic chaos had nothing to do with international rivalry.

    As far as I'm aware the 78th strayed into Canadian route without permission, and there was no change of Corp boundary (but I could be wrong on the latter). This was not the only traffic jam though - there were simply not enough good roads (and river crossing points) to keep two highly mechanised Corps moving smoothly.

    Tom is quite harsh on authors in general. An old soldier's memory is as often at fault (and dare I say it but overall perhaps more so) as an author who at least has access to a variety of records to look at the 'bigger picture'. We can see examples of this in this forum. How often the official records are incorrect vs how wrong memories can be is an historian's bread and butter. Which is not to say mistakes are not made...
     
    gpo son likes this.
  5. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Ropey-
    "Tom is quite harsh on authors in general" - that is your opinion of course and possibly shared by many- tough beans on Tom's memory- but I would disagree was I am very harsh on authors who fictionalize events in which I took part- e.g - Zeulhke " a
    faustpatrone was fired from a slit trench in front of the Churchill commanded by Lt G.F.F. Douse setting it on fire and the crew were all killed "
    Now that is a classic example of what was known much later as Bovine Scatology - I would direct you to my account of that battle in the BBC series below ....

    Another example was about a VERY well known pulitizer prize winning author's account of how the small town in the Liri valley of Pumeroli(?) was captured by the 17th battalion of the 21st Lancers- really ?

    I give credit where it is due and have great respect for people like Barrie Pitt - John Ellis - but I have to admit - I don't go on B.S.
    Cheers
     
  6. BrownN

    BrownN Junior Member

    no need
     
  7. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    BrownN
    as I pointed out to "Ropey"- THAT is his opinion - you may of course find that I am harsh in many cases with authors who fictionalise any action- THAT that is then is Your opinion
    to which you are completely entitled......BUT..I would ask you to pointout just where did I find fault with the Cape Bretons- and on which 'other ' forums but the BBC and this one ...?

    What I am harsh about is people - including myself in getting things wrong - such as your good self - in quoting the 11CID of 5 CAD when the 11th was a BRIGADE- and NOT the 1st Canadian Division !

    The Arelli Affair is a case in point - how long was the 5th CAD in Italy refusing all vehicles
    and insisting on brand new Tanks before entering battle which -I admit - does tend to take away a great deal of innocence- but that is what it is all about
    and that Battle had been planned for the 5thCAD- THEN Monty fired them for the nonsense at Ortona when the came up fully equipped..

    The other thing that can make me also harsh is some people getting things all ass - backwards- such as yourself as Montecchio - which is near the River Foglio - the Gothic
    Line - then Ceprano- Cassino- and Coriano - do check Nicholson's Official History that the OFFICIAL movement of 5th CAD was from Presenzano - where we sat alongside them - by passing Cassino into the Liri valley- bumping into the 6th Brit AD- then impeding the AGRA moving into the valley- before finally sorting themselves out in time for Ceprano - then taking a real beating at the Melfa and Frosinone before disappearing again to turn up on the Metauro to start the advance to Montecchio and finally Coriano - where I too came out of that mess on a stretchers as well

    So don't try and tell me that war is Hell- Son - as I was just 19 as well- and I do hope you might stick around for a while as you might learn a lot more than you do to-day- and sorry your Father didn't walk off that battlefield at Coriano as I recall that 6000 Canadians still lay in Italy...

    Cheers
     
  8. BrownN

    BrownN Junior Member

  9. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    BrownN
    My apologies for not recognizing your gender which can be difficult when posters fail to
    outline genders and residences etc -

    I do try to deal in facts - usually - I must admit - as I see them and one of the facts which had me going was as you relate in your extract from my BBC series when we had been escaping the war in far off Africa when - owing to the idiocy of SOME members of 11CIB in taunting 1st CID at Ortona and thus being fired and we had to then replace 5th CAD.....we were NOT happy.. now the fickle finger of fate has always pointed to the Perths as opposed to the Cape Bretons - so I have clean sheet as to your Fathers regiment !

    Your MOOT point has some merit - but notta lot as the 5th CAD point blank refused to take up the vehicles left by 7th Brit AD when they went home for and it was ONLY the friendship of Guy Simmonds that brought 50 Sherman Tanks per week all the way from the Uk in three ships over a three week period - and by Christmas they were fully equipped ! I don't know where that "Braveheart/ Bravehost entry comes from as this was quoted in myTunisia 1943 posting to the BBc series ....

    The 21st and 25thTB's were NOT technically saddled with 5th CAD as we had the task of REPLACING them as Assault Tank support for 1st CID - 25th took then through the Liri Valley while we followed on side by side with 5th CAD - then we took over until all Canadians left in February 1945 for Belgium.

    Thank you for your compliments on my writing but to take the time to write the true story of WW2 would take time that I no longer have- whether mad or sane but the last couple of years have been spent in caring for my wife who died as you may see from some postings
    in January and just this week I have lost my only brother -which again you may read in last weeks postings. NOT an excuse but a reason ....

    I you cannot get Hold for Lt.Col.Nicholson's Official History of the Canadians in Italy 43-45
    then try Dan G. Dancocks "D Day Dodgers" ISBN0-7710-2543-2
    Cheers
     
  10. gpo son

    gpo son Senior Member

    A few Pages taken from operation Timber wolf
    It seems that the First Canadian Corp was unwanted and Crerar sent this down hill in spades to the 5th CAD. they were required in the deal to acquire all their equipment in Italy and north Africa. By the way there are no 'middle men' [historians] involved here these are letters between the Men who made the history
    http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/cmhq/cmhq170.pdf
    From Eisenhower to the 1st Can Army on equipping the 5th CAD
    Problems of equipment and port facilities were more troublesome.

    The following message from General Eisenhower contains perhaps the best statement of A.F.R.Q. ‘S position:

    "The aspect which causes me most concern is that pressure I anticipate will be put upon
    me to got those troops into action at an early date. I cannot guarantee to do this
    First, the equipment being released in Sicily by 30 Corps and 50 and 51
    British Divisions is already heavily depleted and almost fully mortgaged as
    reserves for the British forces no'" engaged on the mainland who are already
    drawing upon this supply almost as fast as it can be moved up to them. We
    already import equipment as fast as port capacity will allow and this equipment
    is earmarked for formations already in the theatre. Even on the existing programme
    we have a back log which is likely. to take many weeks to clear. The
    additional commitment for re-equipment of Canadians can not therefore be met by
    additional shipments which would remain in ports undischarged.
    Second, a large proportion of the non-divisional troops will have to be
    disembarked in North Africa for administrative reasons, and will necessarily have to take
    a low priority in the long list of units to be transported overseas to Italy, since
    these priorities must be determined strictly on an operational basis. For example, we are
    now, moving forward elements to complete units already in the field, service troops
    to operate the lengthy L. of C, and will shortly begin large-scale Movement of the
    Strategic' Air Force whoso medium bombers arc now operating at extreme range.

    Third, the equipment of 7 Armed Div does not correspond with that of Canadian
    Armoured Divisions and a period of training will be essential to accustom the Canadians
    to these new types. This applies particularly to wireless equipment.
    I have elaborated these points because I would like it made clear in advance that
    necessarily there will be considerable delay in equipping the Canadians and
    bringing then into action ." (First Cdn Army file P.A. 1-18-1: Tel NAF 477, Algiers to Etousa
    signed Eisenhower, 19 Oct 43)

    and on Oct 28th from Monty to Alexander


    On 28 Oct- General Montgomery had written to General Alexander as follows:

    "U640 personal for General Alexander from General Montgomery:
    II Please send Commander Canadian Corps to see me at Tac Army at
    CAMPRHINO on 30 Oct, Or whenever he arrives. When I have explained matters
    I will send him on to 1 Cdn Div. Important point to make quite clear to him is that·
    I cannot accept a Cdn Corps HQ. in my Army at present and that the Corps H.Q.
    and Corps Troops must assemble in North Africa or Sicily and wait there until
    shipping and maintenance situation allow of their being brought over. 5 Cdn Armd Div
    can release 7 Armd Div in due course, but will be quite unable to operate as a div
    for some months.
    Crerar on how he lost the 1st CAB And as a result how the 25th and 21st BAB came to fight with the 1st Can Corp

    Although. 1 Cdn Corp's now had two divisions (1 Cdn Inf Div and 8 Ind Inf Div) to command and could be
    considered as really being in action, The absence of the other Canadian troops in Italy from the Corp Order of
    Battle was unsatisfactory to General Crerar. with the utmost vigour the Corps Commander pressed for the return
    of these. other formations to Canadian command. while successful in gaining the transfer of 5 Cdn Armd Div, in
    the case of 1 Cad Armd Bde he was forced to accept a compromise solution which continued for practically the
    entire period of Canadian operations in Italy. About 1600 hours [5 Feb] the Army Commander spoke
    to me on the secraphone, advising the withdrawal of a further formation from the Eithth Army front
    and intimating that 5 Cdn Armd Div would need to remain in the line, under command 13 Corps. I
    informed him that in spite of the administrative inconvenience that might be temporarily caused,
    there was no tactical reason that I could see, which should prevent the immediate grouping of
    both 1 Cdn Inf Div and 5 Cdn Armd Div under 1 Cdn Corps, transferring 8 Ind lnf Div to 13 Corps.

    'While General Leese was definitely reluctant to make these changes, he did not entirely refuse,
    and suggested that I prepare my arguments on the case, for an Army Conference that he intended
    to hold next day. Later, about 1900 hours, Major-General Walsh, C. of S. Eigth army
    telephoned me on the same subject. I repeated my former views and added that if they where not
    met I should have no alternative but to represent the continued undesirable situation of 1 Cdn
    Corps to the Canadian Government.


    The results of the above meeting Crerar’s response; this is how the 25 AB became attached to the 1st Canadian corp.
    Because Leese would not give up the 1st CAB no other reason.

    [6 Jan) As s result of representations made by me the previous evening, the C. of S. had worked
    out arrangements for interchange of command and reliefs which brought 5 Cdn Armd Div under
    command 1 Cdn Corps from 10 Feb 44, 1 Cdn Armd Bde being placed under command 13 Corps to give
    the latter requisite armour. (W.D., Lt-Gen Crerar, 5, 6 Feb 44)

    In response to the posts on the thread






    The next time you read anything by Mark Zeuhlke you might have a bag of salt close by as both Gerry Chester of the 25th Tank Bde and myself of 21st Tank bde have taken him to task for fictionalising some parts of two of his books viz. Liri Valley and the Gothic Line as this kind of fiction tends to make some readers claim that any books by so called historians are the truth - the whole truth and nothing but the truth.....facts as we saw it at the time was that the brawl of the 5thAD & Seaforth’s mainly at Ortona was a bit more than just a couple of sections - as Monty was steaming mad and actually fired the 5th AD
    and had our two brigades brought over from North Africa as Tank support for 1stCID until they left for Belgium in Feb of '45.
    Tom
    Yes, I agree absolutely that if an author writes a book and calls it history it should be be very close to the truth.

    But Monty was gone before the Seaforth’s and Perth’s had any contact in Italy. They were in Gravina until January 12 1944. Monty left Italy for good on Dec 29th 1943. However in my read of Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, I noticed 2 things I found interesting: 1) almost all the enforcements to the Seaforth’s in late Dec and early Jan came from the 11th bde particularly the Perths. humh. 2nd, the diary has one paragraph on the of their meeting which says roughly that. "Their (11th Bde’s) new equipment, cocky cheerfulness, and eagerness for battle caused considerable banter as they passed by the Seaforth’s who felt that the infantry men from the 'mighty maroon machine' would learn their lesson soon enough without any advice form them. The 11th brigades attack towards Arielli on the 17th brought with it a more modest demeanour when next the 2 brigades met".


    On the ‘firing’ the only thing that makes any sense here is that Monty did not want another corp in the 8th army, this is well recorded and his dislike for Harry Crerar is also well known; in fact he wanted him fired.
    My understanding is that your brigades were re-equipped and brought up to strength while you were in Tunisia is this so?
    The 5th CAB was divisional troops assigned to the 5th CAD. The 1st CAB was an independent brigade and thusly Army troops. Have I got that right? So here's the rub the 1st CAB was the most experienced AB in Italy; and as such was in great demand so Leese and Kirkman squirreled them away for their own use; siting, a conflict between Vokes and Wyman. Your brigades were also independent Brigades (army troops) therefore to be assigned where ever the need was; correct? Your brigades got the draw to support the 1st CID. None to of this had anything to do with the 5th CAD. (Yes I know you were there and I wasn’t.

    Only the Armour was refused by the 5th CAD as the beat up (thanks for the correction) Diesel Sherman’s were the leaving’s of not only the “desert rats” but also of every other division in the 8th Army. The new tanks; The Lord Strathcona's Horse received their first new tank in early February contrary to what Dancocks reports, the neat bundles did not arrive until well after the new Year. The Governor Generals Horse Guards and the Westminster's were equipped by taking all the available equipment from the division and went operational on about Jan 4th I believe in Support of the 8th Indian Division.
    Oh yes the the 5th CAB was trained on Ram tanks with 6 pounders. Must be some training lag on the new equipment even though it was the same chassis.
    the 17th Field regiment got their first new vehicle on July 17th 1944 well after the Hitler line (so much for refusing to fight until they got new equipment). In fact they turned their ‘venerable the desert guns’ over to the Dutch in early summer of 1945, I believe.
    Another important note is that the 1st Canadian Corp HQ received some 3300 new vehicles on arrival which were not shared with the 5th armoured division. George Kitching in his memoir felt Crerar refused to share them; because, of his growing dislike for Simmonds. Nicholson attributes it to Crerar’s fear that it would delay activation of the 1st Canadian Corp HQ.


    These so called Historians that you claim that both Leese and Alex were in shock when the
    Americans broke out of Anzio -well no they weren't - as that was the WHOLE plan - as you have perhaps heard that the US VI corps was to break out toward Valmontone in order to act as an Anvil to the hammer of 8th & 5th Armies coming up from the South via the Liri- or where your father shed his blood on HWY 6- along with thousands of others - Alex went into a foul temper- for him - when Clark turned his forces toward ROME - and allowed the two German Armies to escape and set up the later Gothic Line where some 14,000 British troops also shed their blood- and still lay there- while Gerry and I also shed blood - but walked away to survive

    so spare us the fictions of too many Authors - whatever they call themselves
    Cheers


    My word “panic” overstated my view "apologies' I don’t know enough about that to make that statement. My point was Alexander and Leese set the circumstances for the mess in the Liri Valley; by 1) putting 2 Corps in a 4 mile front. 2)not establishing any traffic control measures. 3) allowing the 13th Corp to push into the Canadian Corp sector.
    If by ‘stumbling into the 13 Corp sector’ you mean when the Governor Generals Horse Guard cleared Aquino in the 13th Corp sector on May 25th to guard the Corp right flank I guess they did indeed.

    But it was the 13th Corp that ventured into in the Canadian Corp sector; as they had failed to clear Aquino and needed roads forward.
    Gordie Bannerman, mentions that the 6th AD took over a Canadian Bridge at gun point on the 26th I believe “Somewhere we were told the British 6th Armoured Division took over a bridge that our engineers had just completed, They took this at gun point and history I think tells us that Gen. Leese wanted the British to get on along Highway #6 and the race to Rome was on”
    According to Dancocks interview with Ziegler 1st Div arty Brigadier the target was in fact Aquino and airfield seems i read that it was rail yards else where.
    On international Rivalry there most certainly; was, the Canadian's felt they should have stayed the course to Rome, the French
    felt that it was Alexander’s plan to squeeze them out of the battle south of Valmontone, and well Clarke we all know that story. It can't be a coincidence that Leese was given priority on highway 6 even though it passed into the Canadian sector north of Aquino. No doubt that Alexander had the strategic interests of the operation in mind but he also was in a big hurry to be the first to Rome.
    He also had a pretty good idea what Clarke might be playing at. In early May as he visited Truscott’s HQ and was shown the 4 plans that Clarke had, had drawn up for the break out from Anzio. GRASSHOPPER, BUFFALO, TURTLE, and CRAWDAD. 'Grasshopper' an attack towards the east to make contact with the main force advancing north westward. 'Buffalo', a drive north eastward toward Valmontone similar to Daidem and Shingle [before] to block Highway 6. 'Turtle' called for a northward strike astride the Anzio Rome Rd to a junction at the Rome railroad and highway 7. Crawdad was a plan to squirt the coast in the shortest route to Rome. Alexander saw the plans on May 5th and flatly rejected all but Buffalo. As it was the only plan that achieved the strategic goals of Daidem. It seems to me that the success of the US 2nd corp and the FEC, coupled with the stall of Daidem on May 18th is what sent Axelander on edge. Although Alexander asked for help from the 5th army to put additional pressure on Portecorvo. He appears to to have been concerned that if the the 8th army didn’t break the Hitler line shortly it may well have been squeezed out the battle before reaching Frosinone. He also refused to allow Juin to debouch out of the mountains on the 26th even though the 8th army had no hope of reaching Valmontone before the 29th.

    Matt
     
  11. Wills

    Wills Very Senior Member

  12. ropey

    ropey Member

    Many thanks for the link and the earlier info.
     
  13. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Matt

    Hate to drag this old thread out some more but really - some corrections have to be made to keep this thing on the rails of objective truth....and first off there is NO question that 5th CAD were invited to take on 7th AD's wrecks and it was only th friendship od Guy Symonds with some AFHQ staff embers that they had three weekly shipments of 50 tanks each in early December which allowed them to go forward in time of the Perths (sic) to upset the Seaforths - please check your dates of the Ortona Battle - which you will find was BEFORE Monty left Italy......

    AAstated earlier Alex and Leese did NOT panic when 5th US broke out of Anzio - that was the whole plan - Alex was upset that Clark dis-obeyed this orders..so would you I guess

    Rome had already been allocated to US 5th Army so there was NO race - neither there NOR at Messina difference of philosophy - Americans wanted to capture cities - Messina - Rome - Paris - British wanted to kill or capture Germans.

    Again agreed - Monty did not want another Corps HQ - what he needed was fighting
    troops - not base wallahs - can't blame him for that.

    The main reason that 21st and 25th ARMY TANK BRIGADES had been reinforced in Algeria - not Tunisia - was that they had many losses in that Campaign and needed many new tanks - best they ever had was Ml IV Churchills with the 6 pounder against th German 88mm .....they were ASSAULT Tanks and the 1st Cdn Div was an assault Division but had been hampered by 1st Cdn ARMOURED bde. - and 5th CAB was in prospect until Ortona ....
    not too many people fully understood the essential difference in Tank roles..... and on the advent of even heavier Battle Tanks in very late '44 - ALL became Armoured Brigades.

    Further I find that one of your statements is highly insulting as you claim that 1st CAB was the most experienced Tank bde in all of Italy - the Veterans of the desert war MIGHT just give you an argument and I refer to the 4th - 7th - 22nd - 23rd BRITISH Armoured Bdes in Italy at that time having managed to survive years of desert fighting - before 22nd AB went off with 7th AD for the D day thing- where they fought even more ! Not to mention 2nd - 6th -8th RTR as well as 40th- 46th and 50th RTR - with the 6th RTR managing a stint in Burma before Italy...so check out a GOOD history book - try Nicolson's Official History

    Cheers
     
  14. gpo son

    gpo son Senior Member

    Tom
    and first off there is NO question that 5th CAD were invited to take on 7th AD's wrecks and it was only th friendship od Guy Symonds with some AFHQ staff embers that they had three weekly shipments of 50 tanks each in early December which allowed them to go forward in time of the Perths (sic) to upset the Seaforths - please check your dates of the Ortona Battle - which you will find was BEFORE Monty left Italy......

    Tom the conflict between 11 bde and the 2nd brigade happened after January 12th when the 11bde took over the 2nd Brigades positions on the Ortona Front. 2 weeks after the Battle for Ortona. This is born out by statements by Kitching, it is in the Seaforth's history, it is in Scislowski's book, it's in Dancocks book and Nicholson's also; can they all be wrong.
    Those neat little bundles of tanks didn't arrive as scheduled [see Operation Timber Wolf above]."Sinews of Steel" the regimental history of the Lord Strathcona Horse says they didn't receive a single tank until the first week of Feb when they received 5 Stuarts.

    Rome had already been allocated to US 5th Army so there was NO race

    Not in Clark's view in his own communictations he was determined that the 5th army would capture Rome; therefore, woefully disobeyed Alexanders orders to destroy/close the escape route of the 10 Army.
    Monty did not want another Corps HQ - what he needed was fighting
    troops - not base wallahs - can't blame him for that

    With 30 Corps moving to England to re-enforce the Normandy Invasion he was down a corp. there is some logic in replacing it. again Back to Timberwolf.

    not too many people fully understood the essential difference in Tank roles..... and on the advent of even heavier Battle Tanks in very late '44 - ALL became Armoured Brigades.

    I understand the difference. The 1st Independant CAB was an Infantry support bde as were the 21st and 25th. The 5th CAD was a breakout division, armoured reconnaissance and SP artilley support.

    Further I find that one of your statements is highly insulting as you claim that 1st CAB was the most experienced Tank bde in all of Italy - the Veterans of the desert war MIGHT just give you an argument and I refer to the 4th - 7th - 22nd - 23rd BRITISH Armoured Bdes in Italy at that time having managed to survive years of desert fighting - before 22nd AB went off with 7th AD for the D day thing- where they fought even more ! Not to mention 2nd - 6th -8th RTR as well as 40th- 46th and 50th RTR - with the 6th RTR managing a stint in Burma before Italy...so check out a GOOD history book - try Nicolson's Official History


    There is no doubt that the 8th army formations fought on in a brutal battle of attrition in the desert for two and a half years and had every right to feel they had done more than their share of the fighting.
    I am not trying to be insulting or impertinent if I came across that way I aplogize.The point was, Italy was a different kind of country and with the 7th armoured division in England and your guys still in Africa, the new Zealanders arriving in late fall 1943,the British 1st AD, the British 6th AD, South African 6th AD, and the Polish corp, all arriving in time for Diadem, and the 5th CAD still to cut its teeth. The 1st CAB having landed in Sicily and had been in the line almost; continually, since they rolled off the LST at 900 on July 10 1943; the 1st CAB was the most experienced armoured Brigade in the close Italian counrty.
    Matt
     
  15. Wills

    Wills Very Senior Member

  16. gpo son

    gpo son Senior Member

    Those Canadain Military Headquarters Reports are quite interesting and contain the huge amounts of background and orginal writings
     
  17. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Matt - would agree with the HQ's reports to a certain extent and as your posting was also rather long - I shall need to dig out the books I have left on that subject in order to give a fair response - but have no fear - I shall return- as someone once said..
    Cheers
     
  18. gpo son

    gpo son Senior Member

    Tom
    I do like to get things right, I have a very busy schedule these days and only poke my nose in seriously when I have the time. It takes me several hours to put together a post like that, I intended it to be 2 but they just ran into each other. I truely do appreciate the dialoge and have benifitted greatly from our interaction. I to, am some what sceptical of some of the writings. One always wants to be put in the best light. If you are the one writing; then, this is a perfect opportunity to do so. Particularly in the case of Crerar who it seems was 'threatened' by just about everyone.
    I think my thesis on this should be; the Logistical problems caused by Operation Timberwolf made the 5th CAD look like a bunch of spoiled kids. Which they were not, the rank and file were all business, and were blind sided by what they handed when they arrived in Italy in the fall of 1943. After all it was no longer the dark days of 1940 when the 1st CID was 1 of a hand full of fully equipped Divisions in the UK

    Matt
     
  19. Wills

    Wills Very Senior Member

  20. Tom Canning

    Tom Canning WW2 Veteran WW2 Veteran

    Matt
    having trolled through wills' extra long winded Stacey report on the forming of the 1st Cdn Corps in Italy - i have almost forgotten what our argument was all about and there is NO WAY i am scrolling back throughout that lot and I can well understand Monty's hatred of yet another corps of base wallahs when the crying need was for more and more infantry...and not 60 pages of typical bureaucrats B.S.- so back to your posting -

    I agree most wholeheartedly that my memory is skewed on the date of the "brawl" as told to us on joining 1st Cdn Div at Lucera in the spring of '44 -some 68 years ago - and my readings of ten/ twelve years ago - and only Nicholson and Stan recall that brawl - Dancocks while essentially a copy of Nicholson's History - remains mute....

    However some corrections still required if you are to base any dissertation on these
    times as your comment on 1st CAB being the most efficient of ALL Armoured units -now amended to the close country of Southern Italy as you might find if you ever journey to both Algeria and Tunisia that the topography is similar to Southern Italy less all the rivers
    roaring down from the Appenines.

    Further corrections are also required to your statement that the 6th Armoured Div - Kiwi Div - Polish div - 1st Cdn Div - 5th AD - 1st Brit Ad and the 6th South African divs were all in place at the opening of Diadem - this is NOT so - as the 5th CAD were in reserve alongside us cleaning up after a landslide at Presenzano - the Kiwi's were withdrawn as it became obvious that they were still exhausted after their efforts at Cassino III and 1st Cdn were substituted - 6th Sth Africa AD joined AFTER Rome fell at Agnani - then went on with XIII Corps to Chiusi with 5th US Army -1st Brit AD were STILL in Tunisia and only came forward to join the fray at the GOTHIC LINE in September 1944 at what is generally known to the people who were there as the Coriano Ridge - where they took a beating which caused them to be broken up in the October ' 44 - google for "The Battle of Gemmano '
    cheers
     

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