Asaka Maru

Remainder of proceedings on 9th September, 1947. A new witness at bottom page 87, and another on page 90.

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Page 87. . . Chan

( AT 1400 HOURS THE COURT RE-ASSEMBLES)

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QUESTIONED BY THE COURT (contd.):

Q. Now we have been told in an affidavit that although men were fainting, men were still being sent into this original hold; complaints were made to the MO but were ignored and a further 100 were sent into the hold, many men fainted and were carried on deck - now, what comment have you to make on that?
A. I saw men fainting when about 600 people were put into the hold. After that, we didn't try to put in any more PoW into the hold. Already the ship was away from the quay at that time, didn't put any more PoW into the hold.

Q. Now, regarding these Lifesaving apparatus, lifeboats etc. did you at any time in conjunction with the ship's master hold a parade in which all members of the prisoners of war groups and everybody on board carried their lifebelts?
A. The unit on board the ship had their separate drill.

Q. Now, what about the prisoners of war for whom you were responsible?
A. When I mean the unit, Sir, it includes the prisoners of war also.

Q. I see, did they in fact parade with their lifebelts?
A. Yes, Sir, they put on their lifebelts.

Q. By lifebelts, do you include those rubber things which were referred to in evidence, a piece of rubber with a handle like an attache case?
A. Yes, we had that sort of thing, af ew of that sort.

Q. Several of the affidavits mentioned that these things were considered quite useless by the men and they used them as pillows, what do you say to that?
A. I have never heard that they were entirely useless, Sir.

Q. Were you satisfied before you left Singapore that there was sufficient accommodation, sufficient food and sufficient water on board for your prisoners?
A. Yes, I thought it sufficient.

Q. Were you satisfied or were you not, the answer is "yes" or "no".
A. I did not actually think it was satisfactory, but I thought we could anyhow carry on.

(Court) Any questions to put through the Court arising out of the questions asked by the Court?

( No Question)

(Defence) Next, I wish to put in Witness Onoda Sujejiro.

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Page 88. . . Chan

CAPT. ONODA SUJEJIRO, 3RD D.W., BEING DULY SWORN
IS CROSS-EXAMINED BY DEFENCE COUNSEL:

Q. Give your full name, age and rank.
A. Onoda Sujejiro, ex Navy Captain.

Q. Your age please.
A. 47

Q. What was your duty between June and August 1944?
A. From June until the middle of August I Was Staff Officer attached to the Japanese Imperial HQ, and from the middle of August I was posted as Captain of the Takao.

Q. When the Navy is asked to escort a convoy, do you know the organization and how the operation is carried out?
A. Yes, I do.

Q. Can you explain just the outline of that organization?
A. I think this is the same with the British Navy; during the voyage the convoy commander has got the right to give any order - the sole right to give any order.

Q. What was the relation between the commander and the convoy and the crews in the convoy?
A. Both crew and the passengers in the convoy were under: the direct command of the commanding officer of that convoy, that was the agreement between the Navy and the Army.

Q. Do you know how the orders given by the commanding officer is passed down?
A. I do.

Q. Can you explain how it is being done.
A. The fundamental principles were laid down between the Navy and the Army but actually orders were first passed to the ship's master and transmitted to everyone on board the ship through the ship's master.

Q. Do you know what measures were taken against the ships which were made to travel in dangerous waters?
A. I am not able to give everything in detail but I can give the outline of it.

Q. Then how will that be?
A. The first measure we had to take were measures against enemy attacks, I think it is not very necessary for me to give the measures against enemy attacks in detail. Besides that there is the usual Navigation Security. By Navigation Security I mean typhoon. We had to take measures against typhoon and against some obstacles on the route sometimes irrespective of the comfort of the passengers. on board.

Q. So on such occasion, do you think it was usual that usage of decks was prohibited and the portholes be closed all?
A. Very often in order to secure safe navigation particularly against enemy attacks, we had to sacrifice all kinds of comfort of all the passengers on board and we had to make restrictions against usage of decks and opening of portholes.

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Page 89. . . Chan

Q. Do you know whether the voyage between Singapore and Japan was dangerous after June 1944?
A. What I have experienced it was always followed by danger and the voyage was always very uncomfortable. I can explain this matter in details if required.

Q. What was the situation around Formosa during that time?
A. The most dangerous spot during that time was the Straits of Formosa. The American submarines and Air Force had concentrated their attacks on that spot and after June '44 it was even impossible to pass that Strait.

(Defence) That is all.

CROSS-EXAMINED:

Q. Have you ever served on the staff of Anchorage Command at Singapore:
A. I didn't.

Q. Do you know roughly the organisation of the Anchorage Command ?
A. I don't know.

Q. Have you ever served as an officer as a ship's captain when prisoners of war were travelling on board the ship?
A. No.

Q. If military personnel are travelling on board a requisitioned vessel, whose responsibility is it for the sanitation on board that ship?
A. It is not possible for me to answer that question because I don't know the organization of that Anchorage Command.

Q. Now this is on board a vessel as captain of the ship and there are troops travelling on board that ship. Who is responsible for the sanitation of that ship, the ship's master or the officer-in-charge of that draft of military. personnel?
A. Well, do you mean the vessels requisitioned by the Army or the Navy? When the Navy does the transportation, there is no such man as ship's commandant.

(Court) The question was quite clear, I see no reason why we should not get the answer if you know the answer. The Prosecutor makes quite clear who was responsible, the ship's master or the officer i/v military personnel?

(Witness) I don't know.

Q. Have you never travelled on a troop transport or a vessel requisitioned by the Army?
A. No.

Q. Were there any general orders issued that you know of or have heard of about prohibiting prisoners of war to land on a port and take exercise or to leave the ship for a matter of 2 or 3 hours - whether there were any general orders to that effect?
A. I don't know.

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Page 90. . . Chan

Q. Have you been Captain of a ship during this last war?

(Court) The witness has already said that he was a captain of so and so and was promoted from officer to a ship's captain.

Q. Did you ever lay down any orders of your own ship probibiting people from sleeping on deck at night?
A. My ship was a 10,000 tons cruiser and I was the commanding officer. Personnel on board were never allowed to go back to their beds to sleep. They were made to sleep by the guns.

(Prosecutor) That is all.

( No Re-Examination)

(Defence) Next, I wish to put in witness Yoshida Eiji.


COL. YOSHIDA EIJI, 4TH D.W., BEING DULY SWORN IS EXAMINED BY DEFENCE COUNSEL:

Q. Give your full name, age and rank.
A. Yoshida Eiji, age 58 years, full Colonel in the Japanese Army.

Q. From June until the end of August 1944 what was your duty?
A. Until the end of June, I was the commanding officer of No.l Shipping Transport Command and I was stationed at Eujina.
From the middle of July I was the commanding officer of the No.3 Shipping Transport Command, Malay Branch and stationed at Singapore.

Q. Did you have any regulations relating to the transportation of prisoners of war?
A. There was no specific regulation. They were treated in the same way as a Japanese army personnel was treated according to the Military Field Service Regulations.

Q. Under whose responsibility will any transport ship be equipped?
A. That is the responsibility of the Shipping Transport Command who was in charge of the ships.

Q. Who equipped the sanitary arrangements on board the ship for the passengers and troops?
A. The Shipping Transport Command HQ who was in charge of the ship equipment.

Q. Who was responsible for increasing the numbers of lavatories on board the ship or to improve the conditions of lavatories on board the ship or any troopships?
A. The fundamental arrangement and responsibility lies with the Shipping Transport Command but the troops were responsible for increasing and the Shipping Troops were responsible for increasing and improving the conditions of the lavatories.

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Page 91. . . Chan

Q. What do you mean by the Shipping Troops?
A. The Transport Command HQ and the Shipping Transport Command and its branches.

Q. Who was responsible for the lifesaving equipment on board the troopships?
A. That responsibility also lies with the Shipping Transport Command who was in charge of the ships

Q. Who supplied the food for the troopships?
A. According to the Ship's Master's demand, the different branches will acquire the foodstuffs from the Supply Depot and supply the ships.

Q, Was on any occasion any special food for sick being loaded into the troopship?
A. No special food for the sick was supplied.

Q. Was there any standard for the ration supplied to the troops in the troopship?
A. There was a scale of rations fixed by the Army and that was being complied with.

Q. Was there any discrimination between the Japanese troops and the prisoners of war relating to that matter?
A. There was no particular discrimination with regard to foodstuffs in the ship. They were having the same food.

Q. Where were the passenger troops put in on board the troopship?
A. They were accommodated in the sleeping shelves for the passenger troops.

Q. Who fixed that these people were to be accommodated in the shelves equipped to the ship?
A. That was fixed when the ship was equipped. Therefore the Anchorage Command who was in charge of the ship, I mean the Shipping Transport Command who was in charge of the ship fixed that matter.

Q. Where and who fixed the number of persons to be accommodated in the ship?
A. That was fixed at the HQ where the plan of transportation was carried out.

(Defence) That is the end of my questions.

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Page. 92. . . Chan

CROSS-EXAMINED:

Q. You have mentioned that there was no discrimination between the foods of the prisoners of war and the Japanese, do you mean to tell the Court that prisoners got the same amount of food as the Japanese did?
A. There was no difference in the amount fixed by the Army.

Q. Was that a general custom that prisoners of war received the same amount of food as any Japanese soldiers?
A. That is right.

Q. According to a statement made in the Court that if a ship needed 400 tons of water and applied to Anchorage Command they will get very often 300 tons only. They usually got less than was asked for and it is the same with other foods. Do you consider that a correct statement or otherwise?
A. I think that is wrong.

Q. Then did people who made requests very often for extra supplies legitimately, did they usually receive them if they were available?
A. What do you mean by the extra supply?

Q. Well, normal supplies sufficient to give each passenger Japanese or Allied prisoner of war the fixed amount laid down by Anchorage Command.
A. Do you mean to say when they demand extra above the fixed amount?

Q. No, when they asked for the proper fixed amount and did not receive the first time and went back and asked again at a fixed standard, was that usually given and do they usually get it?
A. Well, the supply was received in one lot. Therefore whatever received it was the ship which was responsible as to how to use it.

Q. Were they not entitled to the full fixed standard of rations as fuel, food and water as laid down?
A. Yes they were entitled to after they received the supply. The ship was responsible as to how this should be distributed, and always they were supplied with full amount.

(Prosecutor) That is all.

( No Re-Examination)

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(AT 1530 HOURS THE COURT ADJOURNED UNTIL 1000 HOURS ON 10th SEPTEMBER, 1947.)

 

Another witness: penultimate day of trial.

Page 93. . . Tan

(AT 1000 HOURS ON THE 10TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1947, THE COURT
RE-ASSEMBLES PURSUANT TO ADJOURNMENT: PRESENT THE SAME
MEMBERS AS ON THE 9TH OF SEPTEMBER.)

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TAKAGI HIROSHI, 5TH D.W., HAVING MADE SOLEMN DECLARATION.
IS EXAMINED BX DEFENCE COUNSEL

Q. Your full name, age and rank?
A. Full nane, Takagi Hiroshi, age 39, rank Captain in the Japanese Army, nationality, Japanese.

Q. Do you know lst Lt. Ino Takeo?
A. Yes, I do.

Q. How did you come to know him?
A. We were members of the POW camp in Thailand, and when he proceeded to Japan with the POWs in June 1944 from Singapore I was also at Singapore, and I was Liaison Officer between the POW Camp and the Singapore POW Camp H.Q. Therefore I know him.

Q. What did you do as Liaison Officer then?
A. I was engaged in the liaison work between the H.Q. of the POW Camp in Thailand and the different units who were engaged in traasporting the POWs from Singapore.

Q. What was the medical supply on the Asaka Maru for the POWs?
A. POWa had to have their own medicines from the POW camp.

Q. How were medicines supplied to the POWs from the camp?
A. Medical Officer Lt. Nobusawa handed over the medicines to the POW medical officer.

Q. How did you know that?
A. At the time when the prisoners were embarked I was present and I saw Lt. Nobusawa handing the medicines over to the POW doctor.

Q. Do you know the different kinds and quantities of the medicines handed over?
A. They were supplied according to the regulations of the Thai POW Camp. At that time I saw two boxes handed over to them about that size - about 3 ft. long, 1 ft. deep, 18" wide.)

Q. What about the medical supplies given to the guards who were in charge of the POWs?
A. I heard that the medicines for the guards were also packed in the same box and handed over to the POW's doctor.

Q. Then could you say that the Japanese Army personnel and the POWs had the same medicines?
A. Yes, that is right. They had the same quantity.

Q. What about rations for the POWs?

(Court) Before we pass on to rations, could we juat have this medicine box clear. We have heard of two boxes of medical supplies for POW, for them the Korean guards. Was there a separate box for the Koreans or was that included in the two boxes referred to for PsOW?
A. I heard the medicines for the Korean guards were packed into the two boxes. I heard the food was supplied by the Anchorage Command to the

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Page 94. . .Tan

Ship's Master, and he handed the food over to the Ship's Commandant.

Q. Who was responsible for the equipment of the ship?
A. I heard the Anchorage Command was responsible for that.

Q. Who supplied drinking water?
A. The Anchorage Command also supplied water.

Q. Do you know whether drinking water was always supplied as much as the Ship's Master demanded?
A. That was not always so. When the ship was alongside the wharf they used to get the full amount, but when they were on the roads I used to hear there were times when they did not receive the full amount. I heard also it was the dry season then and on a few occasions the Ship's Master did not receive the fall amount of water.

Q. Do you know whether the Asaka Maru received the full amount of drinking water according to the Ship's Master's demand?
A. I heard this later, that he did not receive the full amount.

Q Who fixed the place of accommodation for the POWs on board the ship?
A. The Anchorage Command fixed that.

Q. Who fixed the number to be accommodated into the troopship?
A. The shipping transport command fixed that number.

Q. Who made arrangements for the life-saving eguipment on board the shlp?
A. The Anchorage Command was to make arrangements as to that matter.

Q. Who designated the Ship's Commandant on board the troopship?
A. The offioer in charge of the Anchorage Command did that.

Q. Do you know when Lt. Ino was appointed Ship's Commandant?
A. One day prior to the embarkation of that ship, we held a transport conference, and I was present on that occasion. I heard then that Lt. Ino had been appointed the ship's commandant by the officer in charge of Anchorage Command.

Q. Do you know what was the position of the Ship's Master in the troopship?
A. I heard that the Ship's Master had to receive orders from the shipping transport command, and during the voyage he had to come under the direct command of the convoy escort commander.

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CROSS-EXAMINED:

Q. You said you were Liaison Officer with the Thai POW Camp. Who were you actually with in this liaison job?
A. I had to liaise with Singapore Shipping Transport, Anchorage Transport Command of Singapore, Malay POW Camp H.Q., Motor Transport Unit, Thai POW Transport Command, Transport Commandant, on the one side, and the Thai POW Camp H.Q. on the other.

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Page 95. . .Tan

Q. Prior to this embarkation of the POWs on the Asaka Maru, was it ever thought by any of the army shipping authorities that the ship was too small, that the accommodation was too small?
A. After the transport conference, one day prior to the embarkation, I went to see the ship with Lt. Ino, and I thought it was rather too small to accommodate the 750. So I approached the authority of Anchorage Command and told him about that matter, but he said the accommodation was quite enough. Therefore, being an amateur on shipping matters, I kept quiet.

Q. You stated you were present when the POWs embarked. What state of health were these prisoners in?
A. The period of voyage was to be about the month and I found the POWs fit for a journey of one month. After they were medically examined by the Thai POW Camp doctor, and after they had been re-examined by the quarantine authorities, they were again examined by the Japanese medical officer, Lt. Nobuzava and the POW medioal officer. 8 men were found to be unfit and they were put on shore. So I found they were in a fit state of health.

Q. Were the rations and water scale laid down so as to last a voyage of one month?
A. I did not see the food and water loaded into the ship myself, but at the shipping transport conference I heard all the preparations were completed.

(No re-examination)

(No questions by the Court)

(DEFENCE IS CLOSED)

(Defence Counsel asks for an adjournment in order to prepare Closing Address.)

(At 1100 HOURS THE COURT IS ADJOURNED UNTIL 1400 HOURS ON
11th SEPTEMBER, 1947.）

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11th September, 1947. Final day.

Page 96. . .Kwek

At 1400 hours on the 11th of September 1947 the Court re-assembles pursuant to adjournment.
Present the same President and Members as on the 10th of September 1947.

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Court: Are you prepared to proceed with your Closing Address?

Defence: I am Sir.

EXHIBIT 'AB' (Defence Counsel requests his Advisory Officer, Capt. Borovsky to read his closing Address. This is handed in to the Court marked as Exhibit 'AB', signed by the President and is attached to the proceedings).

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P1330915

Exhibit "AB"

CLOSING ADDRESS (ODAKE Case)
BY
ABE Taro
Defence Counsel

Mr. President and Members of this Honorable Military Court:-

Both accused, ODAKE Bunji and INO Takeo, plead not guilty to the charge. Therefore, I, Defence Counsel, in this closing address, wish to contend in reference to both the proceedings of the court and the evidences of all the witnesses, so that a fair impartial judgement may eventually be passed on the two accused.

To arrive at the truth of the case, it is necessary to know what proceedure was usually taken in transporting a draft of P.O.W.s by sea.

In this respect, I must, first of all, point out that there was the Army Shipping Transport Command in Singapore, Manila, Formosa, etc. and its Headquarters at Ujina, Japan. The Army Shipping Transport Command would notify the
P.O.W. camp as to how many P.O.W.s were requested to be transported by sea. The P.O.W. camp, in turn, would organize a draft of the requested number of P.O.W.s and make them embark a ship. This ship, properly equipped for voyage and navigation, was lent to the P.O.W. camp by the Army Shipping Transport Command. Then an officer to be in charge of the draft of P.O.W.s would be appointed. Lt. INO, the accused No. 2, was appointed the officer in charge of the P.O.W. draft. When a draft of P.O.W.s were taken aboard a ship for transport, medical supplies which were in proportion to the number of P.O.W.s, would be handed over to the officer in charge of the P.O.W. draft.

The Army Shipping Transport Command, on the other hand, was responsible for calculating how much food would be necessary for a fixed number of P.O.W.s over an anticipated number of days of voyage. The Shipping Transport Command would then put the calculated quantity of food on board the ship. The Shipping Transport Command was responsible for designating what part of the ship should be occupied by the P.O.W.s as their living quarters.

Thus, the officer in charge of the transport of the P.O.W. draft would take over the fixed number of P.O.Ws.s from the
P.O.W. camp and then make them embark a designated ship and make sure that the P.O.W.s would safely arrive at the destination.

The aforementioned points were proved by witnesses YOSHIDA Riji and TAKAGI Hiroshi.

Next, the ship's master, while responsible for the safety of both the voyage and the ship's hull itself, had a duty to obey the orders of a convoy commander. The ship's master, after receiving an order from the convoy commander, would, in case of need, relay it to the officer in charge of the P.O.W. draft. Then the officer in charge of P.O.W. draft would be bound by duty to obey the same order. This point was proved by the evidence of Navy Captain ONODA Sutejiro.

Now, I want to examine the veracity of the alleged facts on charge, as follows:-

The Prosecution blamed the two accused for the following reasons:-

1. The overcrowdedness of those holds in which too many P.O.Wos were allegedly cramped up.

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But I think the Prosecutor's allegations on this point are rather too hard, for Lt. INO lodged, through the ship's master, a strong claim with the Anchorage Command that a smaller number of P.O.W.s would be accommodated in the hold. The ship's master

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himself directly demanded the Anchorage Command on this point. But these claims and demands were rejected because the Japanese Army, which was agonizing under an unfavourable war situation at that time, issued an order that, for operational reasons, the number of P.O.W.s which had once been fixed could not be changed or altered.

To avoid observation by spies, the Anchorage Command strictly prohibited any passenger from staying on the deck as long as the ship lay alongside the dock or pier. But the accused No. 2, Lt. INO, after the ship left the dock, endeavoured successfully to quarter some of the P.O.W.s on the deck to alleviate the hardships of the P.O.W.s in the hold. ( Mr. YARDLEY Ist prosecution witness testifies, "During the time when we got on board and when the ship left dock side we were given permission to leave the hold.") The length of time during which the P.O.W.s were placed in the overcrowded condition in the hold was not more than two to three hours at the most. The separation of P.O.W.s from the hold to the deck was not an expected thing and naturally the improvised equipment, facilities and accommodation on the deck could not have been fully satisfactory. This kind of sudden change or alteration of plan can be not only good on one hand but also bad on the other hand. But it is a fact that both accused were rejected when demanding the Anchorage Command for supply of three tents as minimum. After the ship left the dock, neither of the two accused had no power or authority beyond that of utilizing the equipment available in the ship. The above-mentioned points were proved by witness TAKAGI Hiroshi as well as both accused. Furthermore, I would like to suggest that Mr. YARDLEY in his evidence contradicted the extracts of Exhibit "L" and "J".

2. The sanitary arrangements which allegedly consisted of a small number of coarse wooden boxes.

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As I already explained, the sanitary arrangements belonged to the responsibility of the Shipping Transport Command.
Lt. INO would frequently request the ship's master, for increase of sanitary arrangements and the ship's master, in turn, would press the Anchorage Command for it. But the Anchorage Command would not accept the request on the ground of shortage of materials. But the sanitary facilities which were intended for the members of the crew were actually put to the use of the P.O.Ws as proved by the evidence of Mr. YARDLEY; while the Japanese soldiers could not help using the wooden boxes in case of need. All in all, the P.O.W.s, the Japanese soldiers, the ship's master and the officer in charge of troops would commonly use both the improvised boxes and the legitimate sanitary facilities intended for the members of the crew. (Mr. YARDLEY testifies, "There were one lavatory which officers were permitted to use during the early part of the voyage.") Further, mobile commodes were used by the sick and patients. But there were many lavatories on the S.S. "HAKUSAN MARU" which was a passenger boat and these were freely used by the P.O.W.s. To prove this, you may refer to the affidavit of FRANK FALLOWS, (Ex. "H") reading, "There were good sanitary arrangements on this ship." J.N. DOWLER (Ex."K"), in his statement, says, "These sanitary arrangements aboard this vessel were much better, there being six lavatories in the ship for our use."

3. A discrimination was allegedly set up between the P.O.W.s and the Japanese troop, concerning medical supplies.

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The allegations of the Prosecutor on this point are also wrong. Needless to say, there were the following two kinds

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of medical supplies on board the ship:-

a. The medical supplies in a medicine chest which the purser of the ship received from the Anchorage Command.

b. The medical supplies which the officer in charge of the transport of P.O.W.s received from the P.O.W. camp for the medical treatment of P.O.W.s.

The medical supplies of Item 2 were actually arranged by Lt. INO to be delivered from Lt. NOBUSAWA, medical officer of the P.O.W. camp, directly to the medical officer who was a member of the P.O.W. draft. And this arrangement was put into effect without fail. The medical supplies of Item 1 were kept in the custody of the purser under the supervision of the ship's master. Only the medical supplies of Item 1 were placed within the power and authority of the ship's master. When the transport commander (Lt. INO) came on board, ODAKE showed the medicine chest which was located at the entrance of the saloon and told him whenever he required medicines he vould get it through the purser. Lt. INO made arrangements for the P.O.W. medical officer to approach the purser directly and get the medicines directly from him. When the ship was anchored at Manila there was an occasion when Lt. INO went to the Manila P.O.W. camp and received some medicines from the camp.

Therefore, it is impossible ever to say that the P.O.W.s were given an unfair quantity of medical supplies.

This point was proved by the evidences of witnesses TAKAGI Hiroshi, Mr. YARDLEY and also the two accused.

4. The P.O.W.s were allegedly given insufficient food and drinking water.

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As I already explained, the Shipping Transport Command responsible for loading the ship with food. The two accused were only authorized to cook and distribute the given food among the P.O.W.s. In the case of the two accused, the P.O.W.s were given the same food as the Japanese troops, as can be seen from the fact that the cooking and the distribution of food were done by the P.O.W.s themselves. In this respect, I wish to refer to the evidence of Mr. SIMON. When the ship ran aground off the coast of Formosa, food supplies and cooking utensils were washed away and lost. This caused the alleged shortage of food at that time. Therefore, it was not only the P.O.W.s but all other passengers aboard the ship that felt and suffered from the food shortage then. Being a freighter, the S.S. "ASAKA MARU" was not equipped with satisfactory refrigiration [sic] system, and consequently could not be loaded with a large quantity of fresh vegetables and meat for a long voyage. Only the Shipping Transport Command at the port of call replenished meat and vegetables. But still the shortage of food had to be felt on board the ship owing to the war situation which was unfavorable to Japan at that time. Therefore, you will understand that neither of the two accused
was ever responsible for the shortage of food.

From the evidence given in this Court by ship's master ODAKE, it can easily be seen how ODAKE, at INO's request, endevoured frantically to obtain a new supply of fresh water at Manila. Moreover, Mr. YARDLEY stated in the court that the food was very much better on this ship (the S.S. "HAKUSAN MARU"). He says, "We received rice and barley which were mixed. The rice was of very much better quality. They used to put little pieces of pork and vegetables in it."

5. The outbreak of disease and death.

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The evidence of the Prosecution withesses refer to malaria, dysentery and beriberi. Malaria is contracted through the
medium of mosquitoes, irrespective of whether food is bad or good. Therefore, the alleged patients of malaria on board
the ship must be regarded as sufferers of recurrent but not newly contracted malaria. Dysentery breaks out through the

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medium of bacillus, irrespective of whether food is good or bad. As for beriberi, HAYASHI Niichiro, purser of the S.S. "ASAKA MARU," in his affidavit, states, "The condition of the P.O.W.s at the time of embarkation was very poor. Many of them were suffering from beriberi." From this, it can easily be seen that the P.O.W.s before embarkation, had already contracted the cause, not to say the disease, of beriberi. All patients aboard the ships in question actually received medical treatment. Sick rooms were specially improvised in the S.S. "ASAKA MARU" which was a cargo boat, whereas, in the S.S. "HAKUSAN MARU" which was a passenger boat, there were exclusive sick rooms. In Manila, patients in serious conditions wero hospitalized. F. FALLOWS, in his affidavit, (Ex. "H") states, "On this ship we had a Japanese examination. After the first few days, we were allowed to form a hospital."

When the S.S. "HAKUSAN MARU" was navigating through the dangerous zone after leaving Formosa, her deck was prohibited from being used by any passenger, for the reasons of Military operation. But Lt. INO made hard efforts to persuade, with success, the ship's master to allow sick P.O.W.s to stay on the deck for a long time, that is, from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., so that the sick P.O.W.s might bathe in the sun or take in fresh air. The reason why there were many death cases on the S.S. "HAKUSAN MARU" was simply that the typhoon which overtook the ship off the coast of Formosa, terrified and wearied the P.O.W.s and, still worse, washed away food supplies off from the ship to starve the P.O.W. patients who, as a result, were thrown into a still more critical condition of health. (Mr. YARDIEY states, "I should say the weather was a contributory factor to the amount of sickness.") Therefore, if the result of the act of God as aforementioned is attributed to the responsibility of the officer in charge of the transport of P.O.W.s, then it will be very unfair and unreasonable in that it is tantamount to the negligence of the law of causation.

The Prosecution contends that both accused were callously indifferent to the pains and sufferings of the P.O.W.s
But, in fact, both accused were deeply concerned with the welfare of the P.O.W.s and worked hard to improve their lot and living conditions. Both accused would deserve punishment if only the alleged facts on charge had developed or sprung up out of their voluntary will or malicious intention.

Such matters as the decision on the number of P.O.W.s to be taken aboard the ship, the supply of food and medicine, the outbreak of infectious diseases, the closing of portholes which was necessary for reasons of military operation, the restriction on the walking on the deck, the enforcement of black-out, etc. were not the result or outcome of the voluntary will or intention of the two accused. In trying to punish both accused for these unintentional results and outcomes, you are as good as holding the two individual persons responsible for the intricate and yet evil result and outcome of war. This is unfair, unjust and deviating from the question of criminal responsibility.

For the aforementioned reasons, I firmly believe that both accused will be eventually found innocent of the charge and consequently not guilty.

SIGNED ON THIS 11th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1947.

/sgd./ Taro Abe

ABE Taro

Japanese Defence Counsel.

---

---


EXHIBIT 'AC' (Prosecutor reads his Closing Address, this is handed in to the Court, marked as Exhibit 'AC', signed by the President and is attached to the proceedings).

---

P1330919

Exhibit "AC"

CLOSING ADDRESS BY THE PROSECUTION

In the case of

ODAKE Bunji

LT. INO Takeo

—

Mr. President and Members of this Honourable Military Court

The accused ODAKE Bunji and Lt. INO Takeo are present to-day in the court to face a charge of being concerned in the death of some P.O.W.'s and causing physical suffering to many others of the said P.O.W. 's whilst aboard the Asaka Maru.

Lt. INO Takeo is also charged with being concerned in the death of some P.O.W.'s and causing physical suffering to many others of the same P.O.W. 's whilst aboard the Hakusan Maru.

The Prosecution will prove that both the accused are guilty by their indifference, negligence and general disinterest in the conditions of the prisoners. The prosecution will proceed to examine the actions of the accused ODAKE Bunji, the ships master.

The Prosecution was not aware of the water situation during the Japanese situation but it is quite certain that there was never any very great shortage of water. The Prosecution cannot believe the statement made by ODAKE Bunji that they were not permitted to draw their full entitlement of water owing to there being a shortage.

If the accused had to cut down the amount of water per man, he must have cut it to such a degree that the P.O.W.'s never saw it except on very rare occasions. The accused has stated that he could not draw enough water and that when he asked for 400 tons he would only receive 300. If the accused knew this then it was up to him to indent for more than he

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needed thereby ensuring that he would receive a proper amount. As a Ships master of some experience he should know that water is as essential to the passengers as is fuel to the engines, and it is up to him to rectify any deficiency. It is all very well to say that Anchorage Command would not give him enough, it was his duty to see that there was enough.

He has stated before that the ship had previously carried 3000 passengers and that during the whole time no one died or became seriously sick but on this occasion at the most there were only 900 and therefore the water situation should have been quite ample and sufficient.

Q. What about drinking water?

Mr. Simon. Our drinking water consisted of condensed steam.

Q. Apart from this condensed steam, did you ever receive any fresh water?

A. Never.

One of the witnesses has stated that the sick received a little fresh water each day. This in fact was more of a sudden
generous offer than a continuous daily issue.

Sanitation.

The accused ODAKE Bunji has stated that he was not responsible for the cleanliness of the ship other than the crew who were his sole responsibility. If, as Captain of the ship and therefore responsible for the lives of all aboard (excluding any dangers arising from warfare or weather - over which he had no control) and also if at all proud or conscious of the state of the ship, whether it be inside or the outside, he should have paid frequent inspections in the company of the Transport Cmdr. so as to assure himself that the conditions both of the men and the ship were in as good a state as was possible. This he

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- 3 -

never did and he was therefore ignorant of the conditions of the P.O.W.'s and as a result was unable to do anything to better them.

The latrines were quite inadequate and the accused realised this prior to sailing, in fact he must have realised it about seven days prior to receiving the P.O.W.'s as that was the time he first received intimation of the forthcoming P.O.W.'s. With a ship's Carpenter aboard and using pieces of wood which are always lying about a ship or quayside, it would have been no difficult task to construct some improvised latrines which would have served the purpose. The Prosecution refuse to believe the statement that there was no wood anywhere - perhaps none available through official channels but in wartime with a shortage of everything improvisation is the one and only answer.

Cleanliness of the hold was his responsibility and if he thought that accommodation and conditions would be bad, it was up to him to try and do his best for them. To shove men into a hold covered in coal dust and infested with rats and cockroaches is not a very keen and conscientious welcome to the embarking P.O.W. 's.

I will now turn to the other accused LT. INO Takeo.

His job was to conduct a draft of approx. 750 P.O.W.'s to Japan. The men that were picked were chosen on account of
their fitness. Yet from the moment they started on their voyage, men became sick and ill and the only conclusion the Prosecution can come to is the fact that conditions must have been bad and that nothing was ever done to alter this for the rate of sickness and diseases increased as the journey proceeded.

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The Prosecution contend that as Draft Commander and subsequently as Ship's Commandant he was responsible for the deaths on board and also for the high percentage of sick.

His indifference and neglect is apparent from the start. The men were shoved down a hold that was filthy and vermin infested and which should have been cleaned prior to embarkation. When the troops embarked he gave orders for all the P.O.W.'s to be placed in the hold and only after protests by the P.O.W. officers and only when he saw the P.O.W.'s fainting did he rescind this order and approach the Captain of the ship for further accommodation.

As far as life-saving equipment was concerned the accused has stated that every man aboard the Asaka Maru was
issued with a life-belt and that he saw this personally. Yet Mr. Yardley states that he himself did not have one and that there were about 150 more who were not issued with them. No form of boat drill was carried out - in fact the accused was not really interested or concerned about the lives of the P.O.W.'s should anything happen.

His inspections were so rare that even one of the P.O.W.'s who was under his command for over two months said that he only saw the accused once. It was impossible therefore for him to know of the conditions under which the P.O.W.'s
lived.

Apart from segregating the sick which was eventually done at the request of the P.O.W. doctors, no other effort was made whatsoever to help the sick. A little extra water was given on board the Asaka Maru but no palatable food, fresh

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vegetables or fruit; except a couple of bananas on one occasion, was issued to them.

The real need on board the Asaka Maru and Hakusan Maru was medical supplies. If the accused Lt. INO Takeo had had frequent inspections he would have seen that this was the one and only thing that would cure them. No effort was made at all to obtain the urgently needed supplies and the result was approximately 23 deaths. On a journey lasting only six weeks, disease must have been strife and the accused as Ship's Commandant and possessing a considerable amount of power, really did nothing to prevent the spread of disease. The other ships in the convoy would all possess medicines and the ports other than Manilla would have had some but no effort was made by the accused.

On board the Hakusan Maru conditions were slightly better but the accused, knowing that the conditions of the
P.O.W. 's was even worse than before, did nothing further to alleviate them. No extra food was given to the sick and the P.O.W. 's were only allowed up on deck once per day and for such a short time that it would hardly make any difference to their health. If the accused had really been interested in the health of the P.O.W.'s and had used some of his power as Ship's Commandant, he could have gone a long way to minimising the deaths on board the Hakusan Maru.

In conclusion.

There seems little doubt that the accused ODAKE Bunji and Lt. INO Takeo were not responsible for the fact that the ship was too small for the number of P.O.W.'s but the Prosecution contend that cramped accommodation offers no defence whatsoever for the conditions under which the P.O.W. 's were forced to live.

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The Court has heard of British Troopships in the war where acconmodation was so cramped and conditions so bad that official investigations were subsequently made. Though the journey was longer on no occasion were there any cases of disease or sickness to the same extent as on board the Asaka Maru and Hakusan Maru and there were certainly no deaths. Though bad health and low physique and lack of morale may all be conducive and contributary to these diseases, they certainly cannot be the original cause of these diseases. Cramped conditions is not another reason for an outbreak of disease though the Prosecution cannot deny that it is not contributary. The mere fact that 3,000 persons were carried on board the Asaka Maru on a previous journey without any deaths or serious outbreaks of disease is sufficient to say that prisoners can be carried in cramped conditions too, without necessarily becoming sick to any great extent. But when the lack of supervision, lack of proper sanitation, lack of water, lack of medicines, lack of food and lack of bodily resistance are all prevalent then it is not surprising that disease does break out. All this tends to throw the responsibility on to the shoulders of the two accused - the ship master who should have rectified these efficiencies or seen to it that they were cut down to an absolute minimun, and the ship's Commandant who, realising the high rate of sickness and deaths amongst the P.O.W.'s, should have made proper arrangements to stop further outbreaks and tried to cure those already sick. But nothing was done by either of the two accused except to throw the blame on Anchorage Command.

The Prosecution will admit that Anchorage Command

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was responsible for some of the conditions on board but the Prosecution contend that more iniative and a little more understanding of the P.O.W.'s conditions might have resulted in further action been taken to remedy some of the more important matters.

The ship was in the roads in Singapore for at least a fortnight prior to sailing in convoy and during that time many
things might have been achieved. The ship Asaka Maru eventually called at two or three ports before it finally ran aground but no effort was made to try and obtain the fresh vegetables, fruit, medicines and water which they all needed so badly.

The court cannot forget that these conditions did prevail and that there were 23 deaths and many sick and the Prosecution cannot believe that every effort was made by the two accused to remedy conditions on board, consequently is forced to the inevitable conclusion that the deaths and sickness on board the ships was due to the indifference, negligence and general disinterest of both accused.

/sgd./ R. Macduff Urquhart

11th Sept. 1947.

 

Page 96 continued

Court: The Court is closed for the Findings.

The Court re-opens.

FINDINGS OF THE COURT:

(Court) Ship Master Odake Bunji, the Court find you guilty of the first Charge.

2nđ/Lt. Ino Takeo, the Court find you guilty of the first Charge and NOT GUILTY of the second Charge.

The Findings of the Court are subject to confirmation.

——

Court: Have you any evidence to offer as to age and previous history so far as is known to you of the accused and any facts which may serve to mitigate the gravity of the offence?

Prosecutor: Yes Sir.


EXHIBIT 'AD" (Prosecutor reads out age and previous history of Odake Bunji, accused No. 1, this is handed in to the Court marked as Exhibit 'AD', signed by the President and is attached to the proceedings).



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Page 97. . . Kwek

EXHIBIT 'AE' (Prosecutor reads out age and previous history of Ino Takeo, Accused No. 2, this is handed in to the Court marked as Exhibit 'AE', signed by the President and is attached to the proceedings).




——

Court: Do you wish to address the Court on the above mentioned or on mitigation of punishment?

Defence: I wish that the Plea of Mitigation be read by Capt. Borovsky.

Court: Alright, carry on.


EXHIBIT 'AF': (Capt. Borovsky reads out Plea of Mitigation on behalf of both accused by Defence Counsel. This is handed in to the Court marked as Exhibit 'AF' signed by the President and is attached to the proceedings).

---

P1330928

Exhibit "AF"

MITIGATION

(ODAKE Case)

Defence Counsel
ABE Taro

Mr. President and Members of this honourable Military Court:

By way of making a plea for mitigation of sentence to be passed on the two accused, ODAKE and INO, I sincerly request you to consider the following points.

(1) The accused No. 1, ODAKE Bunji:

He, as ship's master, has earnestly and faithfully discharged his duty since April, 1941, and has had a keen sense of responsibility.

When the S. S. "TSUKIKAWA MARU" was sunk by a torpedo attack in the middle of March, 1944, ODAKE, as captain of the S S. "ASAKA MARU", was engaged in the work of rescue and salvage without taking any wink of sleep for two days and successfully saved the members of the crews and the troop on the ship, totalling one thousand in number.

He has made amends for his sin and guilt by suffering pains in the Jail ever since the 3rd of March, 1947.

(2) The accused No. 2, INO Takeo:

Mr. Yardley, one of the prosecution witnesses, stated in this court, "You asked me what was the attitude of Lt. INO towards the prisoners of war and I stated that I have never seen him maltreat any man and secondly he always spoke to our senior officers when they did get permission to talk to him and thirdly I would like to say that Lt. INO was known by us as one of the better Camp Commandants in Thailand."

The affidavit of Lt-Col. A. A. Johnwon reads, "During the time in which I was the Senior Allied Officer, he behaved much better than the great majority of Japanese Officers. Lt. INO Takeo did take some trouble to help us, and no doubt according to his own lights and standards, he behaved very well."

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"Railroad of Death" by Jhon Coast reads, "And we were particularly lucky in the Nip who commended us, a Lieutenant INO,. . ., but thanks to INO, Camp 203 was easily the best in the area. Though some may think my estimate too high, you came across about three per cent of Nips like MASHUSTA, INO, Fuji and others, who were humane, kind, thoroughly decent people."

I, Defence Counsel, want to point out that INO, like ODAKE, has made amends for his sin and guilt by suffering pains in the jail since the 24th of September, 1945.

Signed on this 11th day of September, 1947.

Taro Abe

ABE Taro

Defence Counsel

---



EXHIBIT 'AG': (Capt. Borovsky reads extracts from the Book " The Railroad of Death" by John Coast. These are handed in to the Court marked as Exhibit 'AG' signed by the President and is attached to the proceedings).

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P1330930

Exhibit "AG"


Extracts from " RAILROAD OF DEATH" (Three and a half amazing years under the Japenese) by John Coast.

—

p. 110 - 111.

"But comparatively speaking we were lucky. At 206 they had worse tents and only for a quarter of the men, and further up they had none at all. And we were partioularly lucky in the Nip who commanded us, a Lieutenant named Ino. It is never easy to read a Nip's character when you seldom see him, but wherever Ino went in Thailand he had a better camp than anywhere else around. Whether this was due merely to a more tolerant attitude arising out of his natural laziness - for he just liked to lie and read and not be bothered - or whether it was due to positive kindliness, it was difficult to decide; but thanks to Ino, Camp 203 was easily the best in the area."

p.243.

"To their credit side they are well disciplined, brave, clever imitators and hard workers. Though some may think my estimate too high, you came across about three per cent of Nips like Mashusta, Ino, Fuji and others, who were humane, kind, thoroughly decent people."


This copy is correct.

Taro Abe Defence Coumel

11th, September, 1947

---



Court: Have you anything to say besides this?

Defence: Nothing to say Sir.

Court: The Court is closed for consideration of the sentences;

SENTENCES OF THE COURT:

( court ) The Court sentence the accused, Ship Master Odake Bunji to be imprisoned for six months.

The Court sentence the accused, Lt. Ino Takeo to be imprisoned for three months.

The sentences of the Court are subject to confirmation.

 

Recommendation of reviewing officer ( at beginning of file ): to not confirm.

REGISTERED
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

BM/ JAG/ 65246

Office of the DJAG,
General Headquarters,
Far lEast Land Forces.

29th Septenber, 1947.

Commander,
Singapore District.

Subject:
War Crimes Trial.

Reference proceedings of the trial of

(1) Ships Master ODAKE BUNJI

(2)Lieut. TAKEO
both of the Imperial Japanese Foroes.

2. The accused were tried by military court at Singapore on the 2nd September 1947 on a charge for committing a war crime in that they, as ships master ind draft conducting officer on the Asaka Maru, were concerned in the ill-treatment of a draft of PsOW contributing to the death of some and to the suffering of many others. In addition the 2nd accused was charged on a second count on the same lines as draft conducting officer on the Hakusan Maru. Both accused pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. They were convicted on the lst charge and sentenced to 6 and 3 months imprisoment respectively. The second accused was acquitted on the second charge.

3. The facts of the case are briefly as follows:-

A draft of approximately 750 PsOW were enbarked on the Asaka Maru for Japan. The master was the Ist accused and
the Japanese draft conducting officer was the 2nd accused. That the accommodation was inadequate is undeniable.
Similarly regarding medical supplies and sanitary arrangements. The food was not all it might have been, and the journey in convoy was long and slow. A typhoon was encountered and the ship eventually ran aground. All on board the Asaka Maru were taken off by destroyers and eventually contined the journey to Japan on the Hakusan Maru. Thus the life saving equigment on the Asaku Maru in which the PsOW had so little faith was never in fact put to the test. On the Hakusan Maru conditions were much better and the life saving gear was admitted as being satisfactory.

4. The defence pointed out that the number due for embarkation was fixed by Anchorage Carmand and was not the responsibility of either the ships master or the draft conducting offlaer. They could do nothing regarding that matter. The Asaka Maru was a cargo boat which was requisitioned and had once carried 3000 troops. Conditions then were far worse. Rations were issued on a fixed scale and could not be altered; sanitaxy equigment was also the responsibility of Anchorage Coumand. Both accused gave evidence to show that each in his sphere had done all that was possible in very difficult circumstances but that war conditions and the port authorities made their task well nigh impossible.

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5. On the Hakusan Maru living conditions were better because the ship was larger and better. Life saving equiment
was more satisfactory but, as that on board the Asaka Maru, said to be serviceable by the accused, and doubted by the PsOW, was never tested, that iasue should not make much difference,

6. One prosecution witness gives evidence regarding some specific instance of beating by the guards but it does not implicate the accused as neither was proved to have known of it. There is no other proof of this type of offence.

7. A fairly accurate description of the position which gave rise to the charge will be found at pages 21, 22 and 23 of the proceedings. This evidence is given by a prosceution witness who was himself one of the PsOW officers on that draft.
The gist of this evidence is that unless another ship was found living conditions could not have been improved - the 2nd accused has never been seen to ill-treat anyone and was known to be one of the better Camp Commandants in Thailand from whence some of the PsOW had come. The ships crew were friendly and there was some exaggeration in the affidavits of prosecution witnesses (vide also p.24). The evidence of the Ist accused pp. 46/47 and pp 51/52 appears to be a fair summary of the difficulties he had to contend with and the sane sort of thing applied to the 2nd accused (vide p. 65).

8. In my opinion the evidence fails to show that the accused so conducted themselves as to make thanselves liable for being concerned in ill-treatment with which they were specifically charged. Shore authorities and the exigencies of the war were responsible for such sufferings as the PsOl were made to endure. That there should be an acquittal on
the 2nd charge goes a long wey to support this contention as he draft of PsOW and the Japanese officer had not changed . The Hakusan Maru was a better ship on to which they had been transferred.

9. Considering all the foregoing I advise that the weight of the evidence is against the findings and that the proceedings should be not confirmed.

/sgd./ N.H. NEW
Brigadier,
D.J A.G. Far East Land Forces.

NNN/ RAP.

Final report:

 

End of file.

 

Curious former life of the Asaka Maru from Cabinet papers in 1941:

CAB 66/15/1
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
Printed for the War Cabinet. Februury 1941.
SECRET.
W.P. (41) 28.
February 8, 1941.
Copy No. 28
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.
It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.
WAR CABINET.
THE "ASAKA MARU."
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

THE case of the Asaka Maru presents His Majesty's Government, probably by design, with an awkward problem which, if mishandled, may have serious consequences.

2. The ship is normally a cargo liner, but has been taken over by the Japanese Government, who are sending her to Lisbon manned by naval ratings and flying the naval ensign. She is armed with two five inch guns. She left Japan on the 16th January and was due at the Panamá Canal on the 7th February and at Lisbon on or about the 20th February.
She was described by the Japanese Ministry of Marine in a communication to the naval attaché at Tokyo as "a special service ship of the Imperial Japanese Navy sent to Lisbon on a Mission to protect Japanese residents in Europe and to transport changing military and naval attaches to Embassies and Legations." It appears that she will also be carrying about 30 members of the Japanese Naval Mission to Berlin as well as some "observers" to obtain technical information for the Japanese Navy. In the communication to the naval attaché referred to above the Ministry of Marine requested the " whole-hearted co-operation of the Royal Navy in regard to the protection of the ship from any danger."

3. In the words of Sir R. Craigie, this request for our protection for a ship bearing large numbers of officers going expressly to our enemies in Berlin to organise a joint front against us "is in itself impertinent." But apart from
this, it is almost certan that the voyage of this ship is an attempt to break through our blockade and that the excuse that the utilisation of the ship is due to difficulty in obtaining facilities for the journey of the Naval Mission via Siberia is a mere pretext There is, in fact, evidence that the ship will be used to take contraband, if not on her outward voyage to Lisbon, at any rate on her return. The Japanese admit that the ship is "taking some naval stores only to Lisbon" and that "some cargo intended exclusively for the Japanese Navy will be brought back, coming possibly from France, Germany or Italy." These admissions appear amply to confirm our reports that it is intended to ship from Lisbon 3,000 tons of machinery and some smaller items. It is also suspected that it is intended to bring back in the same ship guns from the Oerlikon factory in Switzerland

4. Legal opinion has been sought as to the right of a belligerent to intercept a warship, and, broadly speaking, our view is that the normal immunity of a warship from contraband control is lost if she fails to confine herself to her functions as a vessel of war; and we should be the more justified in claiming the

11288 [22212]

- 2 -

right of search in that in the recent case of the Nagara Maru, which we allowed to depart from Italy with certain German and Italian goods on board, we made it clear that this was the last occasion on which we could countenance enemy exports to Japan.

5. From the point of view of economic warfare all the arguments are thus in favour of intercepting the ship. To allow her through would open the way to a new and serious leak in the blockade and, in Sir R. Craigie's view, if the Japanese succeed in this case they will resort to the same methods on an increased scale. This in itself is perhaps of less importance than the effect which might be produced elsewhere if it became known that we had knowingly allowed the blockade to be evaded in this way. The Argentines are preparing to send a naval auxiliary to fetch some German war material which they desire, and we are only proposing to allow them to have it in return for concessions satisfactory to ourselves. The Brazilians are deeply dissatisfied with our refusal to allow them to have more German arms. The Chileans are pressing us for German arms and other goods. If we permit the Japanese to make this shipment it will be almost mpossible to maintain our control of enemy exports to South America in anything approaching its present state of efficiency, and the way will be open to a flood of German exports with all the consequent benefit to the enemy and loss to ourselves. Indeed, it is probably not an exaggeration to say that a system could be rapidly organised which would practically stultify our control.

6. The objections to interception are essentially political. Sir R. Craigie has expressed the view that the strongest possible reaction is to be expected if this vessel flying the Japanese naval ensign is intercepted, and that, as the vessel may be expected to resist, a first-class incident may be anticipated.

7. The question turns largely on whether the Japanese are prepared, on grounds of major policy, to join Germany in the war against us in the immediate future. Unless they are so prepared we could no doubt afford, without undue risk, to take a firm line towards any attempt such as this to break our blockade. But if they are ready for war with us action against the Asaka Maru might clearly provide the necessary spark and we might thus be placed at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis the United States. It is essential that, if we become involved in war with Japan, it shall be as the result of clear aggression by Japan, and it would be disastrous, from the point of view of American sympathy and assistance, if it could be represented that we had provoked war on such an issue as the searching of the Asaka Maru, especially if the incident arose out of the control, not of enemy imports, but of enemy exports, the importance of which is, unfortunately, not as yet fully appreciated in the United States.

8. Viewed in this light it may be argued that the interception of a mere 3,000 tons of machinery would certainly not be worth the risk, and that the best course would be to let the cargo pass and concentrate on so handling the matter that it did not become a dangerous precedent.

9. Account must, however, be taken of the nature of the cargo. If the Japanese are bent on war the breaking of the blockade in itself will have no real value to them, and the explanation of their attempt to do so must in that case be sought in the intrinsic importance of the goods which they are endeavouring to bring away from Europe. It is possible, in fact, that the machinery may be of a type which is a vital necessity to the Japanese fleet.

10. The request for protection is easily answered on the lines that, as the Asaka Maru is entering areas where our enemy is engaged in unrestricted sea warfare against us, we cannot undertake any responsibility for her safety. I propose, subject to the concurrence of the Cabinet, to instruct Sir R. Craigie accordingly.

11. To this it would be possible to add a communication on the following lines :—

In view of the Japanese statement that the ship will be carrying cargo from Lisbon, His Majesty's Government cannot regard her as immune from control and must insist on the normal proof that the cargo is not of enemy origin; that is to say, that it should be covered by certificates of origin and interest issued by His Majesty's consular officers. As the Japanese Govern-

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ment are aware, His Majesty's Government only permitted the shipment of certain goods in the Nagara Maru on condition that no further enemy exports were shipped. To this decision His Majesty's Government must adhere, and if goods of enemy origin are to be on board they will hold themselves free to intercept the ship, seize the goods and place them in prize.

12. But to state our intention without attempting to carry it out, or to reserve a right without exercising it, seems likely to have every disadvantage. will doubtless agree, therefore, that whether any communication regarding interception is made must depend on whether we are in fact prepared to intercept the ship in the last resort. If we are not prepared to do so it may be better to blink the fact that cargo is being carried and to say nothing, at all events until interception is no longer physically practicable, when a protest might be necessary to save us from admitting an awkward precedent.

13. When we first suspected that the Japanese were preparing to utilise the Asaka Maru for the shipment of goods, Lord Halifax was instructed to explain our suspicions to the United States authorities and to ask whether they would be prepared to ascertain whether the vessel was carrying cargo when she passed through the Panama Canal. I have not yet received any report on the reactions of the United States authorities to this proposal. Before coming to a decision on the larger question, my colleagues may wish to try to ascertain how far the United States Government and the President himselt would consider it justifiable to take the risk of war implicit in any attempt to subject the Asaka Maru to contraband control. If this is agreed I would propose to telegraph accordingly to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington simultaneously with instructing Sir R. Craigie to make a communication to the Japanese Government confined solely to the question of protection on the lines of paragraph 10 above. I would also propose to inform His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon of the position and to request him to institute all possible enquiries into the nature of the cargo which the Asaka Maru intends to take on board there.
A. E.
February 8, 1941.

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CAB 65/17/15

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Monday, February 10, 1941, at 5 P.M.

Blockade.

Application to Japan. The Asaka Maru. ( Previous Reference: W.M. (4) 295th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

5. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in regard to the Asaka Maru (W.P. (41) 28).

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that this ship, normally a cargo liner, had been taken over by the Japanese Government, who were sending her to Lisbon in order to collect machinery of great value to the Japanese Navy. The Japanese Government had asked that the ship should be protected. From the point of view of economic warfare all the arguments were in favour of the interception of this ship. The Chiefs of Staft (with whom this
matter had been discussed) thought that the Japanese might be trying to create an incident by the despatch of this ship, knowing. . .

"A": that its interception would raise the type of case from which we should get the least sympathy from the United States. He suggested that before coming to a decision he should telegraph to Lord Halifax and ask him to find out what President Roosevelt's attitude would be, and whether he would consider it justifiable to take the risk of war implicit in any attempt to subject the Asaka Maru to a contraband control. At the same time he would instruct Sir Robert Craigie merely to inform the Japanese Government that we could not undertake any responsibility for the ship's safety.
He would also endeavour to ascertain the nature of the cargo which the Asaka Maru intended to take on board at Lisbon.

The Minister of Economic Warfare said that he agreed with the course proposed by the Foreign Secretary. From the point of view of contraband control he emphasised there was no case for not stopping the ship

The Prime Minister said that it was important to ascertain the nature of the cargo which the ship proposed to take on board at Lisbon.

The War Cabinet agreed that the Secretary of State for Foreign Aflairs should take action as at "A" above.

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CAB 65/17/17

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Thursday, February 13, 1941, at 5 P.M.

Blockade.

Application to Japan. The Asaka Maru. ( Previous Reference: W.M. (41) 15th Conclusions, Minute 5.)

3. The Prime Minister said that he thought the best course to take with regard to the Asaka Maru was to allow her to load up at lisbon and to detain her if necessary on her return journey. This would give more time for consideration of the action to be taken in regard to this vessel.

The War Cabinet took note of this statement.

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CAB 65/17/19

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W.1, on Thursday, February 20, 1941, at 12 NOON.

Blockade. Application to Japan. The Asaka Maru. ( Previous Reference: W.M. (41) 17th Conclusions, Minute 3.)

It was explained that, in reply to the telegram sent to him after the meeting of the War Cabinet on the 10th February-(W.M. (41) 15th Conclusions, Minute 5), Lord Halifax had said that he thought it would be unwise to make an approach to President Roosevelt on the lines proposed; and that he doubted whether we should obtain much sympathy from the United States if a crisis arose from an attempt to control enemy exports. A further telegram (No. 935) had been sent to our Ambassador, pointing out that these particular exports might consist of munitions of war of vital importance to the Japanese Fleet

The Prime Minister said that, while he did not think we need be too apprehensive of the results of subjecting the Asaka Maru to contraband control, he favoured postponement of a decision whether action should be taken in regard to this ship until the latest possible date. In any case, action should not be taken until the ship was on the return journey.

The War Cabinet expressed general approval of this view.

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CAB 65/17/20

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Monday, February 24, 1941, at 5 P.M.

Blockade. Application to Japan. The Asaka Maru. ( Previous Reference: W.M. (41) 19th Conclusions, Minute 3.)

3. The War Cabinet were informed that Lord Halifax had now consulted President Roosevelt about the Asaka Maru.
The latter had advised against interception of this vessel.

The Asaka Maru had sailed from Lisbon that morning for an unknown destination. We had as yet no reliable information about her cargo.

Relations with Japan. ( Previous Reference: W.M. (41) 19th Conclusions, Minute 4.)

The Prime Minister reported that he had had an interview with the Japanese Ambassador in London. The Ambassador had said that his country had no aggressive intentions against Australia, Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. He had handed the Ambassador a Memorandum in reply to the message from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Eden (Telegrams 216 and 217 to Tokyo).

Sir Robert Craigie had also had an interview with the Japanese Foreign Minister. Relations between this country and Japan seemed easier.

The War Cabinet took note of the above statements.

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CAB 65/18/4

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Thursday, March 6, 1941, at 6 P.M.

Blockade. Application to Japan. The Asaka Maru. ( Previous Reference: W.M. (41) 20th Conclusions, Minute 3.)

4. The First Lord of the Admiralty asked for a decision on the case of the Asaka Maru. The War Cabinet were familiar with the arguments for and against intercepting this vessel, The recommendation of the Board of Admiralty was on the whole against interception.

The Minister for Economic Warfure said that there was reason to believe that the vessel had on board a cargo containing coastal guns, Oerlikon guns, heavy cases of machinery and mercury. The War Cabinet were informed that the Asaka Maru was still at Bilbao. It was not certain whether she would return via the Panamá Canal. The Japanese had suggested that she might go home round the Cape. We had stated in reply to enquiries that if the vessel put into a British port, she would be subject to the normal British contraband control.

The War Cabinet—

Deferred a decision for a week.

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CAB 65/18/7

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Thursday, March 13, 1941, at 5.30 P.M.

Blockade. Application to Japan. The Asaka Maru. ( Previous Reference: W.M. (41) 25th Conclusions, Minute 4.)

9. The War Cabinet were informed that the Asaka Maru had left Bilbao on the 12th March, and was believed to be returning to Japan via the Cape. It was not known at what ports she would call.

There was some indication that the Japanese anticipated that we should not do more than make a strong protest in this case, in which event they would, no doubt, again have recourse to this expedient of "Special service ships" The case was, therefore, important.

The War Cabinet—

Deferred a decision as to the action to be taken, but asked to be kept informed of the Asaka Maru's movements.

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CAB 65/18/9

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W.1, on Thursday, March 20, 1941, at 12 NOON.

Blockade. Application to Japan. The Asaka Maru. ( Previous Reference: W.M. (41) 28th Conclusions, Minute 9.)

4. The War Cabinet were informed that the Asaka Maru had left Bilbao on the 19th March and might intend to call at Colombo to re-fuel. Or, again, she might call at any British or Allied port on the Cape route to Japan. Instructions must be issued to deal with this, but there should be no publicity about our intentions.

The War Cabinet decided as follows :—

(1) The First Lord of the Admiralty was authorised to instruct all British ports at which the Asaka Maru might call that no facilities should be aftorded unless she submitted to our normal Contraband Control. If the Asaka Maru did not comply, she would not be allowed to take supplies on board, or to remain in port.

(2) Since the vessel might call at some South African port, the Dominions Secretary was asked to send a telegram to the Union Government, explaining the position and the action we intended to take.

(3) The Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was asked to inform the Netherlands Government in due course of the action proposed, and to invite them to act accordingly.

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