Bringing Structure to Chaos: The Organisation of the Dunkirk Defence Perimeter

Dear friends,

When the first BEF-units arrived on the western Belgian coast, there was precious little time to organise defences along the perimeter which had been defined at the Cassel Meeting of May 27th 1940. For the British, this meant manning and holding the whole area along the canals running from Bergues to Furnes and finally Nieuport. In spite of the ambient chaos, this had to be accomplished very swiftly if Operation Dynamo was to have any chance of succeeding. However, though this undertaking was vital, not very much seems to be known with regard to how this was conducted.

It would appear that the initial draft of what was to become the British sector of the perimeter was defined by LtCol Viscount BRIDGEMAN: III Corps was to defend the western end of the perimeter, I Corps the centre and II Corps the eastern stretch.

Though it is understood that the overall responsibility of this undertaking was assumed by Gerneral Sir Ronald ADAM, during the course of my research related to the BEF's rearguard actions at De Moeren/Bulskamp and along the Furnes-Nieuport canal, I consistently came across two names:

Brigadier Andrew 'Tommy' CLIFTON
Brigadier Edward 'Fred' LAWSON (4th Baron Burnham)

Unfortunately, I wasn't able to find much though the usual channels. Did they wrote any accounts regarding their ordeals in late May 1940? Or memoirs?

From my perspective, based on everything I learned so far, both these men seem to have played a capital role in the overall organisation of the Dunkirk Defence Perimeter. Lawson and Clifton had to translate Adam's orders into practical guidelines for all the units that were to be deployed. This must have required quite some expertise, leadership, resolve... and huge improvising skills.

Any insights you might provide in gaining a better understanding of this subject would be most welcome.

Kind Regards,
Happy New Year,
Christian

 

Clifton does not appear here, so started research.

A clue:

From: British Army Officers 1939-1945  -- W

The clue is taken from a MC recommendation for a medal @ Dunkirk. in the vicinity of Nieuport 28-30 May and the junior officer was part of Adamforce (France).

A.J. Clifton's full name was: Arthur John Clifton aka "Tommy", b. 3/2/1897, he served in the RA and infantry, moving in March 1918 to armour and was an Acting Brigadier 29.04.1940-(04.1941). He never had a combat command afterwards.
From: British Army officers 1939-1945  -- C and Biography of Brigadier Arthur John Clifton (1897 – 1956), Great Britain

His London Gazette entries: 1335 Brigadier Arthur John CLIFTON, OBE, MiD, RTC Service Number 1335.

An online search did not identify any book(s) or memoirs and no trace with: https://www.kingscollections.org/catalogues/lhcma Which is where I'd expect any papers would be lodged. Given his tank life perhaps Bovingdon Tank Museum? Was he a witness for the Bartholomew Report?

 

Now to Brigadier Edward 'Fred' LAWSON (4th Baron Burnham). Full name Edward Frederick Lawson, b. 16/6/1890, d. 4/7/1963, a TA soldier and newspaper manager / owner. DSO & MC (Palestine 1917). See: Edward Lawson, 4th Baron Burnham - Wikipedia and Biography of Major-General Edward Frederick Lawson (1890 – 1963), Great Britain He never held a field command after France 1940. Previously served in the cavalry and artillery up till WW2. Plus a vignette bio: https://bmmt.co.uk/wp-content/uploa...ditionary-Force-1940-An-Online-Exhibition.pdf

It appears the long family association with Beaconsfield led to the local archive having the family's personal papers. See: https://www.beaconsfieldhistory.org.uk/content/catalogue_item/lawson-family The index shows nowt for France and military service. Perhaps worth asking them?

Brief mention in 2017 in what appears to PR for a book: https://medium.com/omgfacts/the-real-story-of-the-miracle-of-dunkirk-68ae995c1d84 Likewise little here: https://ww2talk.com/index.php?threads/major-general-lord-burnham.25363/

No trace with: https://www.kingscollections.org/catalogues/lhcma Which is where I'd expect any papers would be lodged.

Lawson is cited briefly in: https://ww2talk.com/index.php?threa...landers-campaign-1940-by-jerry-murland.76414/

An online search did not identify any book(s) or memoirs.

 

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Hello Christian.

Regarding your question/observation (extracted below):

"Brigadier Andrew 'Tommy' CLIFTON
Brigadier Edward 'Fred' LAWSON (4th Baron Burnham)

Unfortunately, I wasn't able to find much though the usual channels. Did they wrote any accounts regarding their ordeals in late May 1940? Or memoirs?"

Clues within the appendices of Hugh Sebag-Montefiore's mighty tome of a TNA held file that may be of interest to you.


See note number 8 and other references regarding Brigadier Clifton's "report" (and many other officer's reports):



Here's a screenshot of the TNA Discovery entry for file WO 197/119, followed by a link to same (please note that it's not been digitised, but given your interests it may well be worth investing in a copy via forum member Drew5233 (who may already have it) or one of our other forum members who offer TNA file copying services).



Evacuation of B.E.F: reports by Commander Dunkirk area and other Officers | The National Archives

Good luck with your research Christian. Hopefully this file, should you choose to get it, will help you along the way.

Kind regards, "books and memoirs" maybe not, but knowing where to look, and how to look, helps; always,

Jim.

 

Splendid !
Thank you all for your inputs and reference sources ; at least I now have a basis for further research and enquiries

Meanwhile, I also received a PM suggesting me to have a look into CAB 106 and WO 217.
It would appear these files contain personal accounts and diaries (?) - including those I am looking for (need to check).

Please note that it is not at all easy as a Continental to search, compile or consult relevant sources in the UK - especially since Brexit...
For example: I just ordered a book in the UK for which I shall need to pay a postage/custom fee worth more than the actual price of the book itself...
Also, whilst 'hopping over' to London used to be a walk in the parc, it has now become a costly and harassing 'red-tape safari'

So, allow me to seize this opportunity to express my gratitude for all the invaluable help forum members have provided me over the years.

KR,
Christian

 

Please note Christian, that my "sign off" in post #5 above was not referring or even hinting towards you, but our googling "linkers" who google seemingly without end and post more links of little to no relevence to questions being asked, and even fewer answers! It is often little more than spamming up a thread.

Kind regards, keep doing what you are doing Christian, always,

Jim.

 

Hallo Jim,

I proceeded as you suggested and contacted Andy regarding WO 197/119. This file indeed includes a report by Brigadier CLIFTON which is captivating. As a bonus, it also contains an account by LtCol FRYER - another unsung hero.

Meanwhile, I also ordered a copy of Hugh Sebag-Montefiore's book.
Anyway, thank you so much for having provided me with this very useful lead !

Both Brigadier CLIFTON's and LtCol FRYER's accounts are much more revealing than traditional war diary inputs, as they contain fascinating details and personal impressions that wouldn't normally get mentioned in an official document.

Now, I still have to find if Brigadier LAWSON committed something in writing to posterity.

KR,
Christian

 

Well done Christian, and thank you, 'Drew is a top chap for helping out.

I don't give up hope that there may be something in writing from Brigadier Lawson somewhere. If I turn up anything I will be sure to let you know.

Keep up your excellent work, always,

Jim.

 

The more I learn about the organisation of the defensive positions along the Dunkirk Defence Permimeter, the more I get the impression that it was in fact a masterclass in improvisation and crisis management. Directives and guidelines were issued from the top, and it was up to the subalterns to patch the holes with what was at hand. The whole process seems to me to have been reactive rather than proactive, as one crisis followed the other crescendo. Although the fiercest combat took place on the 30th and 31st May 1940, the danger to the BEF was never so acute as during the 28th and 29th.

Since I have been able to read some reports and personal accounts, I now better comprehend how precarious the situation was. After the Belgian Army was forced to surrender on the early hours of May 28th 1940, the Germans could advance without opposition towards the the Perimeter. The sector around Nieuport and Wulpen was especially vulnerable as most British infantry units, still engaged in rearguard combats around Ypres and Comines, were not due to reach the coast before May 30th… Meanwhile though, only a handful of officers and men were available.

Brigadier A.J. Clifton, who took charge of the perimeter defenses around Nieuport and Wulpen, adequately summarised the situation he found when arriving in the sector (cfr. WO 197-119) :

“About 200 dismounted R.A. personnel, armed with rifles and about 50 mixed R.E. R.C.S. R.A.S.C. and four 18 pounders were in the process of taking up a position from Nieuport to the sea under the command of LtCol. Brazier, R.A. A party of about 20 R.A. personnel, with A.T. rifles and rifles, organizing a bridgehead at Wulpen under the command of Major Barker, R.A. One Sqn 12 L carrying out a reconnaissance the with 1 troop in Nieuport. This troop reported that the main road bridge over the canal in Nieuport was not blown and that enemy motorcyclists, motorized infantry, and a few "large" tanks were immediately north of the canal and that it was not possible to cross the bridge or blow it. The bridge had been prepared for demolition by the Belgians, but the leads were on the wrong side of the river. The road running parallel to and south of the canal Furnes from to Nieuport was crowded with retiring Belgian (sic) horsedrawn artillery and cavalry.”

Just a couple small remark on my part (please feel free to comment):

• The horsedrawn artillery mentioned by Brigadier Clifton were not Belgian but French (the 50ième Régiment d'Artillerie, which was part of the 60ième Division d'Infanterie).
• One should also not forget the troops led by LtCol Brittain (2nd Med Regt R.A.), who held the canal banks between Nieuport and Wulpen with only 40 men of his Regt, which he organized as a rifle platoon, himself acting as the platoon commander.
• The only “large” tanks in the vicinity could either have been French Somua S-35 or the smaller Hotchkiss H-35 belonging to the 2e DLM. The Germans, however, were indeed closing in. Aufklärungspanzer (armoured reconnaissance vehicles) belonging to AA.25 were already actively scouting the vicinity. Elements belonging to the 6.MG Btl. (most probably the motorcyclists mentioned by Clifton) were also probing in order to identify any weaknesses in the British lines (cfr. KTB 56.ID).

Being a local, I can easily imagine how difficult it must have been for the British. For those unfamiliar with the area, Nieuport and its surroundings are a maze of converging routes, canals, sluices and bridges which must all be covered in order to avoid enemy infiltrations. They also had to secure the whole western bank of the Yser estuary. This had to be accomplished with roughly only 300 officers and men – most of which never having served together. If anything, this is a tribute to the leadership of the commanding officers - especially LtCol Brazier.

All in all, until being relieved by elements of the 12th Brigade in the early hours of May 30th, Brigadier Clifton may have deemed himself very lucky being able to entrust and delegate the sector’s defences to very capable officers.

Fortunately for Clifton and his men, the Germans were delayed in their advance by retreating French troops belonging to the ill-fated 60ième Division d’Infanterie. It took the Germans the best part of May 29th to deal with the French. The French, in spite of valiant efforts, never stood a chance. Nonetheless, they bought the British invaluable time during which Perimeter defences could be proprely organised.

The Germans had missed their window of opportunity. By the time the bulk of the German forces arrived and were ready for an offensive trust, Clifton's men had been relieved. Instead, units of the 12th Brigade were ready and waiting.

KR,
Christian

PS: I have been unsuccessful in finding a picture of Brigadier Clifton. Could anyone help me out?

 

Christian,

His full name was Arthur John Clifton, b. 1897 and d. 1956. Service Number 1335. He never held a combat command after France 1940. He transferred to RTR in 1921. From:British Army Officers site (unable to cut & paste). I did general research in Post 2, not for a picture.

Thread here (no photo): 1335 Brigadier Arthur John CLIFTON, OBE, MiD, RTC

Not surprised no photo readily found. On e site suggested the Tank Museum might have something from his time in India, with armoured cars. See: tankmuseum.org

 

Brigadier Clifton's report contains paragraphs that I found rather peculiar.

II Corps HQ were requiring a Senior Officer "to assist in the organization of defensive measures to stop the gap, under the orders of ADAMFORCE." He also mentions "My general instructions were to organize a defensive line from the sea near Nieuport and along the line of the canal to Furnes, and to hold on to that line until relieved by other troops which might be expected in the course of the next day." These orders were issued to him, probably by LtGen Sir Ronald Adam himself, on May 28th. So far, no ambiguities.

Somewhat later, however, he was contacted by Brigadier Lawson, who apparently had been entrusted with the same mission. Again, according to Brig Clifton: "Shortly after reaching Wulpen I received a message from Brig. Lawson, stating that he was already organizing the defences in the Furnes area and we arranged mutually that my responsibility should be from incl. Wulpen-line of canal through Nieuport to the sea."

Was LtGen Adam notified of this arrangement? What is Brig Lawson's version?

Fact is that organising defences from Furnes to Wulpen (excl.) is pretty straightforward: a stretch of flat terrain bordered on both sides by a canal with a few farmhouses which were ideal to turn into defensive positions. Also, most importantly: except for Furnes, no bridges. All in all, a much less complex proposition than the area encompassing Nieuport which was extremely vulnerable.

Personally, reading between the lines, I can't shake the impression that Lawson had done his homework and managed to transfer the hot potato to Clifton who had just arrived in the area...

I'd be grateful for any comments and insights.

KR,
Christian

 

Brigadier Clifton's report's final paragraph, just before his signature, was manuscript. Unfortunately, I am hopeless when it come to decipher handwritings. Could anyone help me out with this fragment?

 

During the morning, 29 May, valuable assistance was ?provided? by the Royal Navy which shelled the enemy in the Nieuport area and this undoubtedly went a long way towards ?saving? presence in that sector.

 

Splendid ! Thank you David !

 

I'd read it as "assistance was rendered" and "a long way towards easing pressure."

 

It's only in re-reading this thread that I realise I have come across Brigadier Clifton before. He receives a number of mentions in Steve Pearce's privately published volumes relating to 22nd Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade's actions on 17th / 18th May around Assche. It would seem that some of Clifton's decisions contributed to the loss of much of 15th/19th Hussars. I wonder if that is why he didn't receive a further active command.

Steve did manage to find a photograph of him and also provides some background information. Clifton had only embarked from U.K. at the end of April to assume command of the newly formed 2nd ARB. Prior to that, 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards and 15/19 KRH had been divisional cavalry for 3rd and 4th Divisions. It all seems to have been a bit ad-hoc and the brigade only became operational on 16th May.

I've mailed Steve to see if he can add more and perhaps share the photo. (He posts on here as battleofassche).

 

Fantastic ! Thank you Rich

 

Rich, here is a bit more background on Clifton and his command of 2 ARB in May1940.

The 43-year-old Brig. Clifton, commander of 2 ARB, was born in February 1897 in Lambeth, London. He had served in WW 1 with the Durham Light Infantry and received the OBE, several MiDs and the French Croix de Guerre and rose to the rank of Major in 1918. In early 1939 he was the Commanding Officer, 5th Battalion Royal Tank Regiment before becoming the Chief Instructor, Driving & Maintenance Wing, Armoured Fighting Vehicles School in August 1939.

From the book Encirclement and Defeat, Vol 1:

"On the morning of May 16,1940, the British 2 Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade (2 ARB) was ordered to become operationalized by HQ 2 Corps commander Lt. Gen. A.F. Brooke. The withdrawal of the British Expeditionary Force, (BEF), from the Dyle River at Louvain Belgium had been ordered on May 16 when it became apparent that the German Army had broken through further south in the Ardennes Forest region at Sedan. The German advance across the Meuse was threatening encirclement of the BEF and to cut off their retreat routes to the Belgian coast.

The 2 ARB, under command of 43-year-old Brig. Arthur John (Tommy) Clifton, OBE, was to form the rearguard for the staged withdrawal of the 3 and 4 Infantry Divisions, (3 ID and 4 ID), of 2 Corps from the northern flank of the BEF front from the area west of Louvain. The responsibility of the rearguard was to secure 2 Corps from German surprise attacks, provide security during any rest stops and gain time for their withdrawal. Brig. Clifton’s mechanized cavalry regiments would be closely supported by regiments of artillery, anti-tank, and heavy infantry weapons under his direct command. The 2 ARB rearguard activities would also be supported by engineers who would be responsible for constructing road obstacles and demolishing bridges over water obstacles at the Charleroi/Willebroeck and Dendre Canals. The engineers would be supported alternately at canal bridges by 3 and 4 ID artillery, infantry, anti-tank guns, and heavy infantry weapons. Initially, all the canal bridges on withdrawal routes being prepared for demolition by engineers would be garrisoned and protected by at least one AT and one heavy infantry weapons platoon.
The 2 ARB would attempt to achieve these rearguard goals by covering and blocking the east/west roads through this sector of the front. They would fall back in bounds to temporary covering positions and maintain periodic contact with German forces employing a number of delaying tactics. These delaying actions would include defensive engagement, limited objective attacks, and feints using artillery and infantry heavy weapons. The objective of the delaying actions was to cause the German pursuit to halt and needlessly spend time unlimbering weapons for defense. These tactics needed to be employed wisely in order to avoid possible German pursuit outflanking and overtaking their positions, executing an encirclement, and cutting off rearward retreat. The mobility and speed of the mechanized cavalry was thought to enable them to withdraw rapidly from any German engagement and close rapidly with the main body of 2 Corps. However, if the Germans advanced rapidly in force, then the rearguard withdrawal must transition to a defense, even at the risk of heavy loss, in order to guarantee time and distance for 2 Corps to withdraw.

The 2 ARB had come into existence on March 30, 1940, and was originally envisioned as the reconnaissance brigade for the future 2 Army when it was to be formed in the summer of 1940. Brig. A.J. Clifton had arrived in Arras France on March 29, 1940 to start to form the brigade. The 2 ARB was to consist of three mechanized cavalry regiments the 15/19 Kings Royal Hussars (15/19 KRH), the 5 Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards, (5 RIDG) and 1 Fife and Forfar Yeomanry (1 FFY). However, the 15/19 KRH and 5 RIDG at that time were still officially under command of 3 and 4 Infantry Division respectively and 1 FFY was still in training at Fienvillers and had not yet joined the 2 ARB. The 1 FFY had not yet had any experience firing their weapons since arriving in France, with the exception of 5 rounds per man with revolvers. An inspection in late December 1939 by the Inspector of the Royal Armoured Corps had considered the regiment not yet fit for war and needing at latest three months training with a full war establishment. By early May 1940, the 2 ARB was still not fully formed and staffed and was still below official war establishment and considered nonoperational. Brig. Clifton had managed to cobble together an HQ staff of 7 officers and 112 ORs with 4 Mk VIb tanks, 12 BSA M20 motorcycles, 4 WD 8hp Austin 2 seat cars and a handful of Morris CS8 15 cwt trucks. Unfortunately, the Mk VIb tanks were delivered from Base Ordnance Depot, (BOD), without their armament of machine guns. On May 10 Brig. Clifton had been attached to 2 Corps HQ and moved forward with them into Belgium. Then on May 16, he was ordered to operationalize 2 ARB and take command of 15/19 KRH and 5 RIDG without 1 FFY and perform rearguard actions for 3 and 4 Infantry Divisions in accordance with Operational Order No. 5. He had a small compliment of men, equipment and vehicles from his Brigade HQ with him at the time."

 

More from Encirclement and Defeat, Vol 3....

"The encirclement and defeat of half of Brig. A. Clifton’s 2 Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade, (2 ARB), on May 18 can be attributed largely to exposure of his northern flank to German forces. This was caused by successful German advances against Belgian forces defending the Willebroeck Canal and the establishment of bridgeheads on the western canal banks at Cappelle au Bois and Humbeek/T’Sas. These outcomes then initiated a series of events and questionable command decisions that eventually lead to a perfect storm of negative outcomes for 2 ARB. British forces were further disadvantaged by their command-and-control infrastructure and their style of training and lack of combined arms experience. In addition, British forces were disadvantaged by lacking combat experience, utilizing obsolete AFVs, and being under strength in comparison to German forces. All of these factors combined to form a recipe for assured defeat. Only the bravery of individual men of 2 ARB in the face of overwhelming odds prevented complete encirclement and much greater British losses in men and equipment."

"Brig. Clifton was responsible for several questionable decisions which lead to delays in the withdrawal of his brigade and ultimately to heavy losses in men and equipment. Brig. Clifton had issued orders at Assche at about 0900 hours May 18 to Lt. Col. Frazer that 15/19 KRH was to remain on Position B until he explicitly gave orders for its withdrawal. This was despite poor communications that were largely reliant on dispatch riders, who were targeted by German forces, and Lt. Col. Frazer’s alleged maintenance of radio silence. When communication could not be established with Lt. Col. Frazer Brig. Clifton would then make the unwise risky decision to proceed by himself with a handful of men to deliver withdrawal orders to 15/19 KRH personally. He risked his capture along with 3 ID operational orders and withdrawal maps."