British/French alliance/understanding prewar

Hi all,
exactly what alliance or understanding did Britain and France have before WW2? All the books assume one and talk about agreements to send 4 divisions etc. but what was the details, name of the agreement etc.


Len
(who should know)

 

I beleive it was built on the Entente Cordiale (SP, I'm rubbish at French)

The overall strategy for a continental war with Germany was built on Blockade, Defensive front on the French/German border and a massive air campaign on german industry.

When Germany was feeling the full effect of the blockade (which wouldn't have been as effective in 1940 as when the plan was drawn up) and the air campaign had strangled german industry (A tad optimistic as we know how the airwar went)

A massive counterstrike by the combined armies.
The British contribution was naturally based on the massive Royal Navy, and the fledgeling RAF. The BEF would deploy as quick as possible. During the initial stages Britain would raise a larger Field Army (I seem to remember 32 divisions but that can be the wrong figure) that would join in on the big push.

yours
Jaeger

 

Did you find all the answers you were looking for over the past 12 years?

 

If memory serves, as signatories of the treaty of Versailles both Britain and France would have been bound to guarantee the provisions of the treaty. I don't know if they ever had any more formal arrangement than that prior to the crisis period of 1938-39. As the European situation deteriorated during the 1930s, the alliance between Britain and France became frayed. France was formally bound by treaties of alliance to some at least of the "Little Entente" powers in eastern Europe--Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc. The French had built the Little Entente as a counterweight against Germany at least in part because of the reluctance of Britain and the absolute refusal of the United States to undertake any commitment on the European continent. Chamberlain, at least, was not anxious to be pulled into war on France's side in defense of the Little Entente, Czechoslovakia being the first test case. Daladier knew that Munich was a bad deal, but he felt helpless to act without British support. British defense policy during these years was based on "limited liability." In case of continental war, Britain's contribution would be almost solely aerial and naval. In formulating this policy, the British government and armed forces seem to have entirely failed to take possible French reactions into account; it was complacently assumed that the French Army would shoulder the burden of the land war without demur. Only the rapid deterioration of the international situation in the months after Munich forced the British government to recast its strategy in favor of a major land commitment. This obliged the British Army to undertake a very rapid expansion for which there had been no adequate preparations. If we sometimes wonder why some of the French became so violently anti-British under Vichy, then all we have to do is look at the failure of Britain to stand more firmly beside France in the interwar years.

 

Now that is a really good question and takes me back to my school era history learning about how WW1 and WW2 happened.

Jaeger posted:

No, that was the pre-WW1 agreement. Ency. Britannica states:

No more on that matter.

So a quick browse found these items, which confirm the UK took a long time to make a new 'continental commitment'.

So here I go. A chapter Abstract:

From: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230554481_5

Then that strange, very late episode the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in this article (available via JSTOR): End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade': Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939 on JSTOR End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade': Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939 on JSTOR or a complete US website article: Marks on Carley, '1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II' | H-Diplo | H-Net

A 2011 journal article (via JSTOR):

A guarantee to Poland by the French and the UK: What’s the context? 31 March 1939: the British guarantee to Poland - History of government
Link: French Security and a British ‘Continental Commitment’ after the First World War: a Reassessment*

Interesting to see this neglected aspect of the relationship pre-WW2 return to the fore after a pause since 2009. Not my focus, so I'd be interested if anyone has found a book, preferably slim similar to that classic 'The Continental Commitment' by the late Professor Michael Howard.

 

I understand this topic was done to death several decades ago by the academic and (serious) historian. The last hurrah being the Soviet angle getting a better airing after their archives were partly opened 30 odd years ago.

In that sense it seems less neglected but simply done and dusted.

That having been said, the topic pops up quite regularly on the internet with all manner of inaccuracy and poor understanding. The 'wiki effect' no doubt of amateurs selling dubious research and professional storytellers offering entertaining history reads.

Recently I've been looking at some elements of the topic by going through (copies of) files I've acquired from Kew. From that, I can see that the subject has indeed been covered in depth - although, of course, perhaps the reality doesn't exactly match the interpretations given by some writers.

TTH,
You mention an interesting point regarding British strategy not aligning with French requirements. Very true. But why should it? I don't see any reason for the French to get upset that the British didn't act in the way that suited their interest. Did the British get so hot and bothered when French effort failed to meet the requirements of British interest?

 

Which element(s) of the topic are you interested in? Is it...
- the attempts by the Anglo-French to woo the Soviets in 1939;
- the reasoning behind the Anglo-French 'guarantee' to Poland;
- the nature of Anglo-French co-operation in defending France and Benelux; and/or
- British national policy, strategy and effort leading up to September 1939?

There are very simple answers which go a long way to understanding each of the above.

 

MarkN,

The topic I would chose:

My knowledge of the first two topics was reinforced by Laurence Rees documentary series recently.

Thanks

 

I'm very interested in the proposed Franco-British Union of 1940.
It seems earth shattering to me and I'm surprised there isn't more written about it.
Would Britain have gone through with it if the French approved it and were there provisions in it for dissolving it at a future date?


The final "Declaration of union" approved by the British War Cabinet stated that[1]

France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations, but one Franco-British Union. The constitution of the Union will provide for joint organs of defence, foreign, financial and economic policies. Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain, every British subject will become a citizen of France.

Franco-British Union - Wikipedia

 

Dave55,

You are correct it was a stunning offer to make in those desperate times.

 

I have no knowledge of what Laurence Rees thinks, believes or passes on to others. This is just my own personal belief and understanding.

Britain and France had no formal bilateral alliance or agreement to do anything to help one another in any way to defend France and/or the Benelux countries.

Nevertheless, they shared many common interests and goals on the international stage and thus chose to work very closely in their (joint) diplomatic efforts and then military preparations.

Britain's legal obligations were guided by its understanding of what it should do as a member of the League of Nations and its international obligations flowing from the Locarno Treaties, 1925. Britain was thus under no legal obligation to send a single soul across the Channel to help the French.

However, morally, HMG felt obliged to do everything that it could - which, in the greater scheme of things, was very little. (Detail on what exactly that help was, when it was offered etc, can be read in the OH Grand Strategy Vol.I Rearmament Policy by Gibbs) (MarkNote: I have some details from the archives if you want more specific details not mentionned by Gibbs or further clarification)

Whilst the two countries shared may interests and goals, there were still several key areas where they did not coincide. Principal to this discussion is the simple geographical reality that France had a common border with Germany - and was easy got at via Benelux too - whereas Britain sat behind a wide watercourse with the world's most powerful navy to hand. That reality had great impact on how they each chose to resolve the issue. The French needed as many boots on the ground as possible; the British prioritized investment in naval and airforces.

Both Britain and France believed, even after the fall of Poland and up to about a week or so into Germany's advance, that they had enough combat power and nous to stop the Germans, hold the Germans for a couple of years, then push them back to .... (Berlin?).

So, the nature of the Anglo-French co-operation in defending France and Benelux?
Two independent sovereign states working in very close cooperation to face up to a common foe but who both misunderstood, and were then overcome by, the way the Wehrmacht had rewritten the tactical warfare handbook.

If one understands the Anglo-French relationship up to about 17th or 18th May 1940 through the prism of two states supremely confident in their ability to first deter, and if that fails, stop, hold, then push back the Germans, it all pretty much makes sense. It only looks a bit strange when you factor in the knowlege it all went pear shaped for them.

 

How much have you read about it? I think there is a more than enough out there for such a minor non-event as it was.

I have the British Cabinet minutes where the idea was conceived as a necessary political expedient and the authority for its presentation. All documents can be downloaded from the TNA website for free.

I also have the Shlaim's 1974 paper on which the wiki warrior has based his/her scribbles and the early French language paper from 1956 that Schlaim uses as the basis of his paper. They go into the detail of how the various parties (politicians, civil servant etc) went about their work: who said/did what, when etc etc.

I don't have, but I'm sure it exists, the French government documentation.

Don't see what's missing from the history. Can I help you with anything specific?

Yes.
Not that I remember reading.

 

I think more of a 'desperate offer in stunning times'. Churchill knew once France was defeated the UK would be in a dire situation until more Hessians could be found. It should be seen more as The UK trying to keep its 'Army' in the fight and not as some great favour for France.

 

The idea was no favour to France at all. And whilst some, such as Reynaud, felt acceptance was a necessary evil others took a rather different line. Ybarnegaray, for example, suggested at the cabinet meeting making the decision to accept or not, 'Better be a Nazi province. At least we know what that means’. (Shlaim, 1974) and he '...declara que l'Angleterre voulait ravaler la France au rang d'un simple dominion.' (Noel, 1956)

Britain was not offering a solution to 'save' France - Metropolitan France was already lost - hence why the offer was so easily rejected; HMG was trying to prevent the French giving the entire resources of its empire to the Germans. Something that would have made Britain's efforts to defeat Germany that much harder.

For Britain, the offer was not about how dire the short-term outlook appeared but how to make the long haul of defeating Germany a bit less unpalatable.

 

I seriously doubt anything 'long-term' was a factor. It was all about surviving the moment. With France out of the fight Churchill knew that the UK alone could not defeat Germany.

 

That's not how it was recorded at the time. Perhaps that's how some perceived it as time passed by.

The documentary evidence shows, even as France was collapsing in mid-June 1940, that thought was going into how to defeat Germany (without the French) not how to survive. The resources of the French empire, the French navy and whatever remnants of the French airforce and Army that could be gathered together were being considered from the perspective of defeating Germany not saving Britain.

 

I have read the relevant chapters in Hinsley on the 'long-term' strategy during 1939-40. Seems pretty unrealistic to me. I have no doubt there was a department doing nothing but this sort of long-term strategy but I bet 90% of the rest was devoted to lasting out 1940. In every case a nation will put its own survival above all else-including the survival of its Allies.

 

you are right
Lasting out 1940 would have been key

 

I'm reading War Cabinet meetings and Chiefs of Staff reports and appraisals.

Why have you changed the discussion from own survival v win war to own survival v French survival?

The offer of a Anglo-French Union was not about the survival of France as the proposal was predicated upon Metropolitan France being completely overrun.

The proposal did nothing for Britain in the short term. What Britain 'gained' from the Union would do almost nothing to prevent a German attack on the British Isles in 1940. The most it offered in tgat respect was the French Navy - but if the Royal Navy wasn't strong enough alone the addition of a few French ships would not change anything.

The Union offered nothing to Britain's survival in 1940. The Union, perhaps, allowed the defeat of Germany to come a bit quicker and a bit easier.

 

Albeit not guaranteed, lasting out 1940 was assumed. HMG and the senior military leadership were still thinking (mid-June 1940) about defeating Germany not just surviving.

The prevailing belief was that the British Empire - with the continued support of the Dominions already involved - could/would ultimately defeat Germany and Italy. The Chiefs of Staff report of 11 June 1940 stated "we should still [post French capitulation] have a good chance of winning the war single-handed if we received full Pan-American economic and financial co-operation". Yes, they felt it necessary to have that economic and financial support, but they were not expecting/demanding boots on the ground nor even a declaration of war by the US - just their co-operation in finance and the economy. Read the detail of what they were looking for and you see how the resources of the French Empire being firmly under British control rather than German was pretty important how the future played out.