From The Bomber Command War Diaries. Middlebrook - Everitt 19 August 1942 The Dieppe Raid. 2Group flew 62 Boston smoke-laying and bombing sorties in support of the Canadian landing at Dieppe; some crews carried out more than one flight. 3 Bostons were lost.
The only lesson and the most important to be learnt from this farce was that it revealed that it was unlikely that a working port could be captured to support an invasion of France. From this came the idea of WSC, who it was reported,said we will take our own port.Hence the conception of the Mulberry harbour.
From The Bomber Command War Diaries. Middlebrook - Everitt 19 August 1942 The Dieppe Raid. 2Group flew 62 Boston smoke-laying and bombing sorties in support of the Canadian landing at Dieppe; some crews carried out more than one flight. 3 Bostons were lost. Hi Peter, Looking up that date for RAAF deaths, I have one buried in the Dieppe Canadian War Cemetery. NEVILLE, HENRY GEORGE - Sergeant He is listed as 13sq for "posting at death" and cause of death "Flying Battle" (France). Do you have any info on the aircraft and the crew?
The only lesson and the most important to be learnt from this farce was that it revealed that it was unlikely that a working port could be captured to support an invasion of France. I believe they'd learnt this lesson already, one could even say that for centuries it was known that seaborne assaults on ports rarely succeed and capture from the land is the standard practice. I don't think we'll ever fully know the true motives for Dieppe, particularly if it really was a most effective signal (or even 'lesson' as Alanbrooke appears to have put it) to the Soviet & US allies calling for an immediate '2nd' front that the French coast would require much more preparation. Such realpolitik decisions would be exceptionally hard to candidly admit in public and thus are equally hard to prove, but I begin to lean more strongly towards the theory, if only because it adds more meaning to the sacrifice of those 907 Killed & 1874 POW's(?) Just pottered onto this rather good page while trying to check casualties: Combined operations - Dieppe Cheers, Adam.
Hi Peter, Looking up that date for RAAF deaths, I have one buried in the Dieppe Canadian War Cemetery. NEVILLE, HENRY GEORGE - Sergeant He is listed as 13sq for "posting at death" and cause of death "Flying Battle" (France). Do you have any info on the aircraft and the crew? Hi Geof Chorley gives no losses for 13 Squadron on that day, they were at that time operating out of Odiham flying the Blenheim IV. I have taken the liberty of adding your request for info on the rafcommands web site with the hope of a result.
Hi Geof Chorley gives no losses for 13 Squadron on that day, they were at that time operating out of Odiham flying the Blenheim IV. I have taken the liberty of adding your request for info on the rafcommands web site with the hope of a result. All credit for the following info goes to Steve Pegge and the rafcommands web site. He was killed after his Blenhiem (V5380/D) was shotdown during an early morning mission dropping 100lb smoke bombs. PO C.L. Woodland and Sgt A.S, Boyd died with him. The Blenhiem was one of six 13 Squadron aircraft taking part and it appears the aircraft was hit by flak from a coastal battery near Berneval (they claimed a 'Hampden' at the same time), but there is also a chance that the aircraft was hit by 'friendly fire' from the Allied naval force. Four more of the squadrons aircraft suffered varying degrees of AAA damage.
All credit for the following info goes to Steve Pegge and the rafcommands web site. He was killed after his Blenhiem (V5380/D) was shotdown during an early morning mission dropping 100lb smoke bombs. PO C.L. Woodland and Sgt A.S, Boyd died with him. The Blenhiem was one of six 13 Squadron aircraft taking part and it appears the aircraft was hit by flak from a coastal battery near Berneval (they claimed a 'Hampden' at the same time), but there is also a chance that the aircraft was hit by 'friendly fire' from the Allied naval force. Four more of the squadrons aircraft suffered varying degrees of AAA damage. Thank you Peter for the information. Please pass on my thanks to Steve Pegge for his efforts.
A little more info on this subject. Credit to Graeme - rafcommands web site. From 'The Greatest Air Battle', Norman Franks. "13 Squadrons Blenheim IVs had been given the task of blinding 2 well positioned anti-aircraft batteries commanding the cliffs on the left side of Dieppe - the east headland, code named 'Bismarck' by the Allied planners. The pilots had had difficulty in forming up in the dark and so the pilots made individual approaches, all made successful drops to landward, the resulting smoke effectively screening the 2 hostile batteries. Five of the Blenheims flew back from the attack but PO Woodland's machine was presumed hit by AA fire for it failed to return 24year old Cecil Woodland, from Hampshire with his crew, Sergeantshenry neville and Austin Boyd from Belfast were posted as missing. The RAF's first casualties of Operation Jubilee"
A little more info on this subject. Credit to Graeme - rafcommands web site. From 'The Greatest Air Battle', Norman Franks. "13 Squadrons Blenheim IVs had been given the task of blinding 2 well positioned anti-aircraft batteries commanding the cliffs on the left side of Dieppe - the east headland, code named 'Bismarck' by the Allied planners. The pilots had had difficulty in forming up in the dark and so the pilots made individual approaches, all made successful drops to landward, the resulting smoke effectively screening the 2 hostile batteries. Five of the Blenheims flew back from the attack but PO Woodland's machine was presumed hit by AA fire for it failed to return 24year old Cecil Woodland, from Hampshire with his crew, Sergeants Henry Neville (RAAF) and Austin Boyd from Belfast were posted as missing. The RAF's first casualties of Operation Jubilee" Thank you for the update Peter. Please pass on my thanks to Graeme.
The only lesson and the most important to be learnt from this farce was that it revealed that it was unlikely that a working port could be captured to support an invasion of France. From this came the idea of WSC, who it was reported,said we will take our own port.Hence the conception of the Mulberry harbour. I disagree. I think there where some good lessons learnt, not all of them tactical. The operation was a bit of a bastard child, its fuzzy planning and management was rectified. Comms was poor. Co ordination between the beach and support vessels non existant, even with thing going wrong they stuck rigidly to the plan.The smoke screen layed to protect the ships prevented accurate covering fire. The churchill tank was to slow and offensively weak to be able to put down the fortifications unaided. Kev
The operation was a bit of a bastard child, its fuzzy planning and management was rectified. Comms was poor. Co ordination between the beach and support vessels non existant, even with thing going wrong they stuck rigidly to the plan.The smoke screen layed to protect the ships prevented accurate covering fire. The churchill tank was to slow and offensively weak to be able to put down the fortifications unaided. Kev[/quote] Kevin, I think you are agreeing with me. The raid was a failure, not even a glorious failure. Of the 6086 men involved in the land operations,3623 became casualties; of the 4963 Canadian personel who landed on the Dieppe beaches,3367 were killed, wounded or captured.Indeed some of the Canadian units were virtually wiped out.The RAF suffered 13% casualties and lost 106 aircraft against Luffewaffe losses of 46 aircraft. If Jubilee was intended to embarass the Luffewaffe,it failed dismally. The RN lost a destroyer and 33 landing craft and lost 550 officers and ratings,wounded, killed and missing. German losses were very light with the Wehrmacht suffering 591 casualties including 297 killed. Rundstedt was able to telegraph Hitler at 1740 hours to declare "No armed Englishman remains on the Continent".Later in his official report to the Fuhrer he concluded "They will not do it like this a second time" Indeed it he was correct. WSC who endorsed the raid gave a different view."My impression of Jubilee is that the results fully justified the heavy cost" he wrote.Some thought differently as General Sir Alan Brooke did, who, was rather critical of the operation afterwards which he thought entailed a show of Fighter Command over France to dilute the Luffewaffe's presence in Russia. Lord Moran records Brooke's off the record,adverse comment at the extent of the casualties. Success and failure are never final.Dieppe was a failure and any post analysis made the best of the adverse experience. Looking at the spead of naval support for the D Day landing beaches,the support from the sea was overwhelming. Every German heavy battery that could direct fire on to the beaches was targetted from the sea and air.This planning was the result of carefully collected intelligence from aerial reconnaisances and agents on the ground, something that was missing in the preparations for Dieppe. Honour to the brave of Dieppe.
Beautiful restoration (with a teeny bit of 'artistic license') of a Churchill in Calgary Regiment Dieppe markings, recently carried out at the Tank Museum: Bovington Churchill restoration.
I report this for what it is worth, for the company sailed along the French coast near Diepe, here is the extract from that time. The Company was billeted In a "holiday camp". Sgt. Jack Davies and 3 Platoon went off on a mysterious detachment with a company of the Suffolk Regiment. Dressed in ‘battle order’, cap comforters, rifles and small pack, and l5lbs of gelignite. Using the public ferry back to Southampton, they were embarked on a flotilla of motor torpedo boats, personnel craft, and a minesweeper. Then they were away down the Channel in darkness and during that night were sailing just a few miles off the French coast until the small fleet turned back to the south coast of the Isle of Wight, where the sappers made a landing and blew up a mock up of’ a radar station. An exercise? or an armed minesweeping run along the French coast ? The Company never knew, but a few days later in that August of 1942, the Dieppe Assault Landing took place. Soon after, they left the Isle of Wight and were engaged again on the construction of coastal defences in the area Broadstone Littlehampton Swanage. After a short period at Fordingbridge there was a move again to the New Forest and Bournemouth Area. Sapper
I believe they'd learnt this lesson already, one could even say that for centuries it was known that seaborne assaults on ports rarely succeed and capture from the land is the standard practice. I don't think we'll ever fully know the true motives for Dieppe, particularly if it really was a most effective signal (or even 'lesson' as Alanbrooke appears to have put it) to the Soviet & US allies calling for an immediate '2nd' front that the French coast would require much more preparation. Such realpolitik decisions would be exceptionally hard to candidly admit in public and thus are equally hard to prove, but I begin to lean more strongly towards the theory, if only because it adds more meaning to the sacrifice of those 907 Killed & 1874 POW's(?) There is quite a good argument that the raid was not even approved by high command, but was done by Mountbatten on his own authority. (which he did not have). The chiefs could not later admit that this had occured, and could not easily rebuke him, as he was the cousin of the King. Not only was the "Second Front" pressure from USA & USSR a factor, but "Rutter/Jubilee" (Dieppe) might have been permitted through the planning stage by Brooke as a "lesser of many evils" (i.e. "Jupiter" or "Imperator" or "Sledgehammer" would have been FAR more disasterous) I would advise anyone wanting to know more about Dieppe to read Brian L. Villa's book "Unauthorized Action", a very interesting book, it goes into great detail on the political reasons for this disaster. The Canadian government shares a good chunk of the blame too.
Freebird - I wopuld recommend anyone researching to read Villa with a pinch of salt. It is all very conspiratorial. For Villa the simple answer is that Mountbattne acts without authority. This is simply not the case. There are sevral CoS entries related to the relaunch of RUTTER. A counter arguement to Villa has been provided by Peter Henshaw who has pointed out these minutes and the various decision making processes that went into the operation. Ross
The Raid on Dieppe: August 19, 1942 I want to read this link, but everytime I click on it and start reading, after a few seconds it defaults to another page. Does anybody else have this problem, and is there a way I can view the first page only? cheers
