Dieppe Raid, Operation Jubilee

The Enigma argument is all about hitting modern obsessions with secret technology and spies and secrecy indistinguishable from conspiricy theories. If there was a plan to seize an enigma machine it did not need an infantry division, two battlaion sized commandos and a regiment of tanks. The Bruvenval raid is a good example of a raid..

There were rational reasons for attempting a large scale raid on the French coast in Summer 1942.
- Testing the techniques deve;loped for large scale landings
- Fulfilling the commitment to carry out a landing to satisfy Soviet demands.
- Forcing the German airforce into the air so the RAF could engage them on favourable terms.

. However much someone has immersed themselves in Dieppe these stand by themselves.

 

And perhaps about selling a book?

 

Not letting your enemy know his codes are compromised is quite important so that he doesn't just change them. The destruction and chaos of the 'raid' may have been the means to that end.

What data was a divisional shore-to-shore operation expected to provide that a sea-to-shore one (IRONCLAD) hadn't?

And the big one: why resurrect a cancelled and arguably compromised operation at relatively short notjce for objectives that could have been achieved by other methods given a little time?

I do actually need to sit down and read his book sometime...

 

I'm in the process of reading his book, but can't follow the logic of needing the deploy the best part of a division to hide the capture of enigma material, when similar 'pinch' operations in Norway were mounted on a much smaller scale.

In my opinion, the Dieppe Raid was the result of COHQ having a division sized landing force and wanting somewhere to use it. Sadly the (very detailed) plan lacked any kind of flexibility to deal with any sort of setback. Fate intervened to disrupt both landings to the east of Dieppe, thus freeing the defenders to focus on defeating the landings on the main beach and at Pourville.

As someone who has also immersed himself in the raid, from the German reports, it is clear that the low point for the defenders was at about 08:00, when they had lost contact at Pourville and with 813 Battery and expected further waves of Allied landing forces. If No3 Commando and The Royal Regiment of Canada had been able to achieve successful landings to the east of the town, then who knows what panic may have gripped the defenders. However with the failure of these two landings and the rigid plan causing reinforcements to be thrown into the firestorm of the main beach, rather than attempting to exploit the successful breakthrough at Pourville, the raid failed. This failure can be put down to an inflexible plan, which failed to allow for any sort contingency for friction/disruptions (such as the convoy clash or the RRC being late landing at Puits) and didn't provide any allowance to that wise adage, that the enemy also has a say. And in this case, the lowly 302.Infantry Division certainly had something to say...

 

I don't want to get off topic, but aside from Dieppe, the middle of 1942 also saw Operation Agreement in the Med, which might rival it in complexity and foolhardiness.

 

Quite... It was like they transferred to same planners to the Med and launched that foolhardy and costly operation.

 

Regarding the enigma theory, having read the book 'One day in August' I'm still not convinced by it. Yes they planned to secure enigma material, but that was just part of the raid and not the 'reason' for launching it.

As for his immersion whilst researching the raid, sadly the book it littered with silly mistakes... For example mixing up the armaments of coastal artillery batteries either side of the town or implying that Lt Col (later Maj Gen) Roberts, evacuated the guns of his regiment under fire from the beaches of Dunkirk, rather than from the calmer setting of the quayside of Brest port two days before German forces arrived, that he actually did. None of these errors would be noticed by a casual reader or detract from the enigma theory, but if you're setting out to produce a credible new Dieppe book, you really should try and avoid them.

 

I'd imagine that a copy of that page was distributed amongst the Allied POW's as an explanation/justification of the why the German's started to tie up Allied POW's on the 8th October 1942. A practice that continued for over a year.

To quote www.canadiansoldiers.com/procedures/prisoners.htm

"During the Raid, a copy of the extensive operation order was taken ashore (against instructions) and captured by the Germans. A small passage in the order noted that German prisoners were to have their hands bound as a security measure. Tying hands was a common procedure for the British Special Service Brigade (ie the Commandos). As Dieppe was planned with heavy influence from Combined Operations staff, the clause, after some discussion with the Canadians, had remained in the order.

On 2 September 1942, the Germans announced their intention to chain Commonwealth prisoners of war; the British War Office issued a statement that the order to bind hands had been cancelled. On 7 October, the Germans issued an order, based on further investigation on their part as well as an incident at Sark on 4 October, in which German prisoners in a minor raid had had their hands bound. On 8 October 1942, British and German prisoners in Germany had their hands tied with ropes. Later, the ropes were exchanged for metal handcuffs. On 8 October also, the British War Cabinet decided to take reprisals by binding an equivalent number of German prisoners in British camps. The Canadian Government was asked to participate, and though dubious, did so. On 10 October 1942, a number of German prisoners in the UK and Canada were handcuffed. German resistance to these reprisals resulted in much media attention, and shots were fired at Camp 30 in Bowmanville, ON, though no one was killed.

The shackling was seen as unpleasant and the British and Canadians unilaterally ceased the shackling on 12 December 1942, hoping the Germans were discontinue the practice also. The Germans demanded guarantees that similar orders would not be promulgated in future, and the British and Canadians issued a Army Council Instruction and Canadian Army Routine Order, respectively, forbidding the binding of prisoners except in case of operational necessity on the battlefield. The Germans objected to the reservation in this clause, and Canadian and British prisoners remained shackled until 22 November 1943, when the International Red Cross Committee and German authorities resolved the issue, and the Germans ceased the practice without formally rescinding their orders. No attention was paid to this matter in the British or Canadian press, out of fear for the prisoners' interests, and to prevent giving the Germans an excuse for further reprisals.

As for Canadian prisoners in Germany, the shackling came to be a routine, with handcuffs going on only for twice daily "check parades". Some Canadian prisoners found the handcuffs could be opened with keys from tins of condensed milk they received via the Red Cross. The German prison staffs for their part did not usually demand the handcuffs for extended periods of time."

Regards

Steve

 

That is an awesome document Sir: do you have the rest of this and maybe even some more Nominal Roll Calls of the Essex Scottish Regiment in this era?

 

Thank you for update re; CANUCK, (sorry that he left this forum) My ancestor Horace Frederick BRADBURY -A22078- Essex Scottish Regiment - (son of a great war sapper from the 1st Canadian Tunneling Co) - was wounded on Dieppe Raid and made it back to England and after the war made it back to CANADA but he died in 1977 before i was able to get any information from him about Operation Jubilee.

My Mom told me he never really "talked about IT!" Mom is gone now as well.

For many years I have been piecing together documents and official documents and statements from those that were involved in the Dieppe Raid and i have enjoyed reading and thinking about all the different opinions on this site regarding this infamous day in Dieppe in 1942 regarding success and or failure. 1. Because political persons often tell untruths and 2. history has many "omissions" and 3. there were many men back then that would take an entire secret to their grave. and 4. Secrets of power/influence and resulting wars; and thus i am completely convinced there is still much more to uncover because even the historian/author Mr. Okeefe's info is NOT the end of the true story by any means.

I do understand that there is a clear difference between a raid planner and the soldier and as time marches on it becomes clearer and clearer. (Even up to Ukraine and now the Middle East scenarios. I do understand that from all the information about The Dieppe Raid THAT IT IS the soldier's perspective is that the raid was a failure a fiasco a disaster a bloodbath! On the other hand, from a raid planners' perspective i am completely convinced that at the top levels they will use "any means necessary" to achieve their objective(s)

In summation this conflict of interest in war, between war planners and the soldiers becomes more obvious as time marches on. My position re; Operation Jubilee, i agree with the soldiers wholeheartedly and will not change my position unless a raid planner discloses true documented facts that will easily prove TO THE SOLDIERS that they did not risk their lives in error or in vain! The soldiers did not fail, the planners did! according to what info is public.

The soldiers did their part and it is time planners do their part!

I believe that "the Truth will set us free" We all have work to do, and always remembering the hero's !

Frederick Leonard Bradbury