Fighting men are there to FIGHT....Not to be selective where and when they fight! I cannot recall at anytime the British army saying. Oh! don't lets go there. we may suffer to many casualties. By the way, Normandy and Falaise was Monty's triumph and no one else. This idea that you select where to fight was born out in a very vivid way at Overloon. Where the Americans were going to take Overloon and SWEEP down though Venlo. After taking casualties, they retired to the South, never to be seen again, The British Third Infantry Div took on the task. Their casualties were three time that of the Americans...But on the 18th after a particular bloody battle...the town lay in out hands. Took part in it! still don't like to think about it..... YUK sapper
Correct me if I am wrong but if I recall the American div that vanished from Overloon was the 7th American Armoured div, and I do recall they had a nickname. I think but not sure?? it was called the Ghost Division??????? I recall they were gone. The Third British infantry had been watching the American attacks with an increasing feeling of foreboding. YUP! they were gone. and we were given the job. Miserable, fierce, dogged battles, heavy shell and mortar fire, With mines everywhere in amongst the pine trees, and the deep sandy soil... The battle for the dog shaped wood was rough! Though what made anyone thing it looked "dog shaped" I could never understand. Overloon finished my war....And then some... For the results were to last a life time. Sapper
monty ordered brad to disregard interallied boundries on august 16th.there were still the remnants of 5 panzer divs in that pocket.brad had 2 corps that could,and should have moved north to close that noose.i reckon he was well,a w----r.
i reckon dempsey has never had the credit he deserves during this whole period.does any one know if he ever wrote memoirs.
Looks interesting Owen. I'll have to read it later on my dinner. These horrid customers keep interupting me.
monty ordered brad to disregard interallied boundries on august 16th.there were still the remnants of 5 panzer divs in that pocket.brad had 2 corps that could,and should have moved north to close that noose.i reckon he was well,a w----r. Really?? There was the issue of overextending the lines giving the Germans a greater chance to break through and also the issue of a possible engagement between meeting Allied forces at the pocket. As far as I'm aware only Pattons Corps was available to close the pocket. I would like to point out Lee that you may not like Bradley but there is no call on this board for using that term. In fact in all our discussions here we have never used that term even when we are referring to men more deserving of that title. You may have antipathy towards the US Army, actually make that you DO have antipathy towards them, but at least show some respect towards men that fought and died so that you can express your opinions. If you dont believe me just google "american war cemetaries" and see what comes up. They laid their lives on the line for the Allied cause and deserve better than to have one of their commanders called that.
Looks interesting Owen. I'll have to read it later on my dinner. These horrid customers keep interupting me. Just read it. very interesting. It's these type of accounts that I crave for. Something from the soldiers eyes. Much better than reading dates and figures. Cheers Owen.
very well funky dj.i am very sorry for calling general bradley a w....r,i shall not call him that again.back to the specifics of the falaise gap.about the 16th of august is it not true that the american armies in the southern area were in a very fluid state and the commanders did not keep in touch with montgomery on a daily basis, thus not being able to facilitate his plan to trap the enemy against the seine.for example one corps commander was unable to keep his french armoured div under control which aimed east to paris,instead of north in an attempt to trap any germans which may then have been destroyed.maybe it was montys inability to keep a firm grip on the battle at this stage,which allowed many more germans to escape than should have.maybe the poles and canadians could have attacked sooner.of couse this is all with the benefit of hindsight and ones own opinions.but i think elements of the u.s first and third armies could have done more considering the strengths and positions of both.yours very sincerely.lee.
yes,pattons 5 corps and 20 corps were ordered to attack north by him,but bradley ordered patton to halt.
Some video of "Totalize" the attack to Falaise. The 1st Canadian army attacked southward astride the Falaise road, 3rd Canadian Division on the right and 51st HD on the left.
Great video Richard, cheers. I sure some of that shows the A & SH of Canada and the SAR at St Lambert.
Based on the rooflines and bomb damage, I think the segments at around "3:10", "2:57" and "2:45" on the clock were filmed on the main street of St. Lambert. Great footage. Kieran
Bump! We seem to have travelled from Paris down to Falaise in one particular thread so lets bring this thread back as it contains good discussion of the pocket.
What I find so annoying is that much of what is printed here, is garnished from books many of them quoting each others material, Thus continuing to publish the same inaccuracies over and over again. When an eye witness speaks about what did happen not what some author wrote about the event. Folk doubt that truth. Odd Sapper
Ok then....why not look at Falaise as being the end product of a dramatic confrontation that had been building over a spectrum of 'technics' in the application of battle method that were bearing fruit at this time......all concurrently.... 1/ The most important development, in my humble view, was the final product in on-going development by the Allies of Army co-operation with the Tactical and Stategic air Forces....These operational methods had their genesis with British army and air force co-operation in the Western Desert fighting.... 2/New types of dual-role attack aircraft and the battle methods of munition delivery were bearing fruit just at this time..... 3/ German Army units had by this stage of the war NOT solved the eessential problem of tactical movement in daylight under a sky they did not control.....One of the great supposed 'what if's of Normandy is the assumption that had Field Marshal Rommel had complete control of the wonderful divisions of the OKW Panzer Reserve, that his "set them up on the water and push them into the sea in the first week or so" plan may have been able to do just that......cancel "Overlord" for the time being, if not the rest of the year.....I say BUNK......Rommel indeed had experience in moving groups of divisions by road without air-superiority, but at Falaise, If Rommel had gotten his way, most of the units that he would have set in place would have been utterly IMMOBILE for an indeterminate length of time.....in effect cancelling out the effects of units he had placed incorrectly to begin with (Normandy wasn't the only coastal region defended). And finally 5/....the very nature of the fighting at Falaise was a bit of a shock to the Germans all round.....in all three phases leading up to the climaz of the "Pocket", German ground forces were taken by surprise at the commencement of each phase...a)Breakout from St.Lo region ( Operation Cobra) ............b) Patton ordered to swing the newly activated THIRD ARMY towards the Biscay coast...a grinding series of attrition battles that cost Patton dearly...bypassing them as they COULD have been....but Eisenhower was smarter or luckier because...Hitler ordered his freshly arrived divisions that had been delayed by difficulty of movement in daylight, and Launched them into an attempt to cut Patton from the rest of the Allied Forces at MORTAIN....a complete disaster for the Whermacht. ..........c).....This enabled a still mobile Third Army to swing back virtually the way he had come and..... ...............d) Last but not least.....'Monty' had been pulling in and 'pinning' one german division after another into Caen...all the while launching 'spoiling attacks (Operations like Goodwood')....to say these operations these 'failed'mis-construes the tatical purpose Monty had stated when the Original planners of COSSACK command got together to plan "Overlord"...Monty is qouted at the briefing for final briefing for Normandy as gesturing toward the map with his hands and saying in a clear voice, repeating his words for 'emphasis' "The British Forces will move towards Caen...(sweeps hand).towards Caen..(sweeps hand AGAIN)" ALL of these factors came together to make Falaise something very bloody awful, with Russian Front veteran divisions like LAH declaring that they had not seen the application of tactical airpower anywhere heavier and delivered more efficiently as the Allied Tactical Air-Forces....with over 14,000 aircraft available at the time....you can understand why airpower at Falaise was considered far far worse than anything in Russia, and from vets who had seen tactical airpower on a grand scale from the Soviets, ..... The pictures and films of the number of armored fighting vehicles that went down at Falaise tell all their own stories.......Bittrich's IISS PZ Korps suffered the loss of more AFVs and other vehicles in Falaise than anywhere else up until that time.....and Bittrich was no fool... Falaise truly was "The Killing Ground"
Just as a postscript to the possibility of success for Rommel's edge of the water strategy, think of the Japanese, who had from their experience against amazing American firepower for amphibious ivasions had come to exactly the same conclusions as RUNESTEDT set forth in his alternate plan for the defence of Festung Europa....The Japanese had discovered at the island of BIAK that to put up resistence at the water was tanamount to passing control of the battle over for your own forces, and completely surrendering the initiative to counterattack to the landing forces.... This is yet another reason why Pacific Marine divisions would drive forward and take casualties from the very 'go' atmoshere...but they got the beach-head clear and the invasion fleet away from the battle zone QUICKLY....at least that was the plan.....Kuzumi at Biak and others that copied him sat in positions inland ....The Japanese retained the ability to conduct offensives this way...rather than as happened at Tarawa, where they lost all communications very early on, and had to rely on individuals and small groups to use their initiative...sorry situation.... Okinawa was the woirst bloodletting of Marines in the war, and the landing on April fools day 1945 was UNOPPOSED....AND William Manchester mentions the POOR performance YET AGAIN of the ARMY 27th division, and how different their philosophy was to the entire problem presented by the invasion fleet and it's contiued presence...and the Kamaikazes....the worst of all.....terrible battle, Okinawa.... But....then they all are.
