Formosa and Luzon or worst plans executed or avoided

Discussion in 'War Against Japan' started by CaptainJTuttle1951, Jan 25, 2021.

  1. I am not entirely allowed to begin a thread , however the fine print suggests that I can offer an observation.

    As the US approached the Philippines in two lethal prongs , a debate naturally developed between Nimitz and MacArthur. King and Marshall. The Navy presented a plan to bypass Luzon and utilize Mindanao as a staging area to launch an invasion of Formosa. The strategic interest in Formosa included presenting a blocking force between the Japanese home islands and her resources , and a logistical pipeline to Chinese troops resisting the IJA. At first glance , this appears to be a fair argument. Upon further review , I am shocked and dismayed that any real planner would consider such a move. If I didn't know any better , I might suggest that the USN just didn't like MacArthur and they were building a strategy that they themselves didn't entirely trust. Just once , I would enjoy seeing a Navy historian admit that Peleliu was a tweak that was not necessary in the first place. This was certainly a waste of time , materials and Marines after the objective Formosa move was summarily discarded.
     
  2. CL1

    CL1 116th LAA and 92nd (Loyals) LAA,Royal Artillery

    You have started a thread and stated an opinion

    Might have more legs on our sister forum WWII Forums
     
  3. Dave55

    Dave55 Atlanta, USA

    Sounds like something King might do. Class A jerk from start to finish.
     
  4. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Old Hickory Recon

    Formosa certainly would fit more closely with the Navy's desire for a Central Pacific campaign only.
     
  5. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron

    Formosa is two-thirds mountains, with a plain on the western coast - not the easiest to conquer I'd wager - and with very roads then through the mountains. Having been occupied since 1895 the Japanese could have had ample time to prepare defences.
    Wiki has a good aerial photo: Taiwan - Wikipedia

    Just under 14k square miles; Okinawa is a minnow at 463 sq. miles.

    Incidentally the opening post refers to:
    My recollection is nearly all the Chinese mainland coast was controlled by the Japanese, although I cannot readily find a map.
     
  6. As you point out , if not understate , Formosa would have been a logistical nightmare against at least 170,000 Japanese troops. Given the terrain and the fact that Japan was entrenched there , which is an interesting story by itself , a direct assault at this Island should not have been an option. An equally interesting story is exactly how Spain traded the Philippines to the US for cash considerations , and a player to be named.

    MacArthur was right. Aside from basic strategy , the US owned the responsibility to remove the Japanese from Luzon and continue to liberate the Philippines. While its true that Manila was destroyed against Yamashita's orders and the Japanese held out until the end of the war in northern Luzon , the US seized a crucial staging area.

    By the time that Nimitz presented the Formosa option to FDR , the Japanese merchant marine no longer existed. There was no effective supply chain between Borneo and Tokyo. As for what amounted to absolutely nothing , the idea that Formosa was a better option than 'over the hump' , as it were , was a useless objective at great cost.
     
  7. I hope you people don't mind if I reply to myself here with another opinion.

    How did the USN manage to not just win the battle of Midway , but alter the course of the war by sinking 4 Japanese Carriers fully six months after Pearl Harbor? The USN was heavily out numbered in every category , but not so much in carrier aircraft. It's one thing to intercept enemy communications , it is quite another to take full advantage of this breach in security.

    It's important to remember that the battle of the Coral Sea is considered to be a strategic victory for the USN. The best two Japanese carriers were either damaged or their air group's were weakened. An IJN light carrier was sunk. The USN lost the Lexington (CV-2). The Yorktown (CV-5) was damaged but managed to limp back to Pearl Harbor trailing oil . She was patched up just in time to set sail for action with repair crews aboard , as we all know.

    Japanese Admirals were faced with a critical decision given that the Zuikaku and the Shokaku would not be ready within the established timetable. Consideration should have been given , by the IJN , to cancelling what many historians have claimed was intended to be a diversionary move at Dutch Harbor and the Aleutians. This thought process never made sense and it's more likely that IJN planners counted on a victory at Midway and at the same time secure what they felt was an exposed northern flank. That's 2 light carriers that were entirely misused.

    The general consensus is that operations MI (Midway) and AL (Aleutians) were a breach of the IJN's initial strategy to utilize the time gained as a result of Pearl Harbor to fortify a perimeter in the central Pacific , or what became known as victory disease. The problem was that the IJN failed to accomplish the objective on December 7th and they felt that they had to improvise in an effort to draw out the few USN carriers available while they held an apparent advantage.

    This was not an entirely bad idea but , and most crucially , the IJN failed to utilize its ability to direct navy gunfire at Midway and wasted its carrier aircraft. The plan revolved around the assumption that the USN would be deployed to protect its most important base , which appears to have been reasonable , however that's no way to pursue an adventure as risky as operation MI.
     
  8. I noticed some confusion about Barbarossa.

    Hitler's entire strategy was based on how best to seize land for the German people and his greatest dream was an empire that stretched to the Urals. He envisioned German farmer soldiers fighting off constant incursions from Asia. Early in this process , Hitler worked with Stalin to minimize Ukraine and destroy Poland. Hitler felt that this gave him time to remove France as a threat and force the British to capitulate , a basic strategic prerequisite to any full scale move to the east. Some say that this is were Hitler made his first serious mistake.

    Sealion was nothing but a bluff or a last resort after victory was achieved. Herman Goring had no idea how seize air supremacy over the Channel , let alone over southern England. He failed to grasp the limitations of the Luftwaffe and its design flaws towards its ability to project power. In an effort to force the British to surrender , Nazi Germany wasted a crucial element within its combined arms doctrine that would be much needed on what was inevitably to become the Eastern Front.

    I am not suggesting that this is the immediate reason why Hitler's invasion of Russia was misguided and doomed to failure , I am saying that the Luftwaffe never really fully recovered. It was the approach itself on many levels beginning with the complete failure by Hitler and his Generals to fully grasp and in fact simplify the issue. In essence , Hitler played poker while Stalin was playing chess. I will not delve into the fact that Hitler could have enlisted Ukraine. I submit that June 22 was a little late in the season and that Kiev and Leningrad should have been the focus. Chess , not poker.
     
    Chris C likes this.

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