I’m trying to find out how exactly a port outer engine on a Halifax bomber being on fire would cause the bomber to crash. I am keen to know the actual mechanism involved. Thanks in advance. Cheers, Jay
For about 100 reasons TBH . You can buy or find the Halifax pilots notes published by the RAF in WW2 on the internet
If correct drills applied then one engine fire is not catastrophic and either outer is the least onerous loss for continued flight. Flying and landing possible with two engines failed. However if the initial fire cannot be put out or the prop cannot be feathered by normal drills then response rapidly escalates to abandonment before structural failure. Engine Driven Accessories Stb Outer 500 Watt 24V AC Generator for ARIs Port Outer 1,500 Watt 24V DC Generator Stb Inner 1,500 Watt 24V DC Generator or tandem 1,000 Watt DC with 24 AC if ARIs fitted Pesco vacuum pump for bombsight or emergency instrument flying panel Lockheed pump for hydraulics Port Inner 1,500 Watt 24V DC Generator Pesco vacuum pump for instrument flying panel Heywood compressor for pneumatic system RAE compressor for supply to autopilot All DC Generators connected in parallel so loss of function compensated for As the loss of the Halifax you were asking about in a previous thread was due to enemy action rather than solely mechanical failure then you should consider visible engine fire as just one of numerous invisible parallel failures all either contributing to loss or unseen failures having possibly a more significant effect. Ross
If you will indulge me in a thread diversion. To try to convey what happens in an aircraft under night fighter attack and how many issues are caused for the crew to respond to I usually trot out the astounding case. Wellington DV819 of 1474 Flight 3rd Dec 1942 Special duty flight. Operation took place across the N. coast of France to an area near to Frankfurt. The aircraft was engaged on the 18th sortie on a particular investigation, which necessitated the aircraft being intercepted by an enemy nightfighter and up to this sortie, all efforts to get such an interception had failed. At 04:31 hrs, the aircraft was in position 4954N 0739E and set course for position 5030N 0737E. The Special Operator, P/O Jordan, had been reporting that he had been receiving signals on his special wireless equipment which he thought were the ones requiring to be investigated. He warned the crew to expect a fighter attack. On this Northerly leg the signals grew stronger and Jordan repeated his warning. A code had previously been arranged, so that if the signals were picked up, the frequency would immediately be sent back to base, it being absolutely vital that this information should reach base at all costs. Position 5030N 0737E was reached at 04:42 and the aircraft set course for the homeward leg. The Special Operator passed the coded message to the Wireless Operator for transmission to base, giving in the message the required frequency and that this frequency was very probably the correct one. Jordan warned the crew that his receiver was being saturated and to expect an attack at any moment. Almost simultaneously the aircraft was hit by a burst of cannon fire. The rear gunner gave a fighter control commentary during the attack and identified the enemy as a JU88. Violent corkscrew turns were used as evasive action. Jordan was hit in the arm on this first attack and realising that now there was no doubt at all about the signal being the correct one, he changed the coded message, a change that would tell base that the frequency given was absolutely correct and that it applied without a doubt to the signal being investigated. Although hit in the arm, he still continued to work his sets and to note further characteristics of the signal. The Rear Gunner fired about 1,000 rounds on this attack, but his turret was hit and made completely unserviceable and he was wounded in the shoulder. On the second attack, Jordan was hit in the jaw, but he still continued to work his sets and low the results and told the captain and crew from which side to expect the next attack. On the third attack, the front turret was hit and the Front Gunner wounded in the leg. The Wireless Operator went forward to let him out of the turret but he was hit in both legs by an exploding shell and had to return to his seat. P/O Barry, Navigator, then went forward and let Grant out of the turret. Jordan was hit once more, this time in the eye, and although he continued operating his equipment and noting further details of the signal, he realised that he could not continue with the investigation much longer, owing to his condition and seeing that his inter-comm had also been shot away, he went forward and brought back the Navigator and tried to explain to him how to continue operating the equipment and so bring back some more valuable information. By this time he was almost blind but although he tried hard to show Barry what to do, he realised that it was an impossible task and in the end gave up the attempt. F/Sgt Vachon had by this time come out of the rear turret and had taken up position in the Astro Hatch, from where he continued to give evasive control but he was hit again in the hand and Barry went back and took over from him in the Astro Dome. During this period the aircraft had lost height from about 14,000 feet down to 500 feet above the ground, violent evasive action still being taken by the captain. After 10 or 12 attacks the enemy aircraft broke off his engagement and disappeared. Hits had been scored on the Wellington in 5 or 6 of the attacks, resulting in the following damage:- 1. Starboard Throttle Control shot away (starboard engine stuck at +3 boost all the way home). 2. Port Throttle jammed. 3. Front and rear turrets unserviceable. 4. Starboard Ailerons unserviceable and trimming tabs having no effect at all. 5. Air Speed Indicator reading zero in both positions owing to the pitot head or pipes being holed. 6. Starboard petrol tank holed. 7. Fabric shot and torn away on starboard side of fuselage. 8. Hydraulics unserviceable, 9. Both engines running irregularly. The Wireless Operator Sgt Bigoray, in spite of his injuries, transmitted the coded message back to base but receiving no "R" for it continued to send it in the hopes that it would be picked up. It was received at 05:05 hours. The Captain kept the aircraft on the course for home and managed to climb up to 5,000 feet, at which height he came back. At 06:45 hours the aircraft crossed the coast at about 10 miles N.E. of Dunkirk, where searchlights tried to pick it out but these were dodged by evasive action and coming down low over the sea. When they were switched off, the Pilot again managed to gain height. The Wireless Operator put the I.F.F. on to Stud 3, sent out an S.O.S. and a message to the effect that they had been attacked by an enemy aircraft. He again transmitted the coded message in case it had not been received the first time. At approximately 07:20 hours the English coast was reached. The Pilot tested the landing light to see if he could ditch using it, but decided it was impossible. He decided to wait for daylight before ditching and asked the crew if anyone preferred to bail out rather than ditch. The Wireless Operator stated that he preferred to jump, as one of his legs had stiffened up to such an extent that he thought he would not be able to climb out of the aircraft in the water. He made his way to the escape hatch in the rear of the fuselage, from where he intended to jump, but having reached that position he remembered that he had not clamped down the transmitting key and in spite of his injury he returned to his set, clamped the key down, and warned the crew not to touch it. He jumped out over Ramsgate and made a safe landing. The pilot ditched the aircraft at approximately 08:24 hours about 200 yards off the coast at Deal. The dinghy inflated but had been holed by cannon fire. The Special Operator tried to make it airtight by holding some of the holes but it was impossible and the crew got out of the dinghy and climbed onto the aircraft. About 5 minutes later a small rowing boat appeared, took them off and rowed ashore. The following signal has been received from the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Portal, G.C.B, D.S.O., M.C., for P/O Jordan, P/O Paulton, P/O Barry, F/Sgt Bigoray, F/Sgt Grant, F/Sgt Vachon:- "I have just read report of your investigation flight carried out on Thursday, 3rd. December and should like to congratulate you all on a splendid performance." AIR27/1156
What an incredible story. I have read about Bomber Command’s “fishing” to find the night fighter frequencies but I’ve never read the story you posted. Thank you for doing that. With regard to my uncle’s Halifax what if the source of the fire was holed fuel tanks? His attacker, Martin Drewes, used his Schrage musik cannons which he typically aimed between the two engines. Would the ensuing fire disturb the flow of air over the wing thereby meaning there was drag on the port wing? Are there any old pilots out there that can fill me in? Cheers, Jay
Blows my mind to think that the Canadian crew of DV819 and others from the flight went out night after night (this was the 18th sortie!) with the sole aim of being attacked. They were awarded DFC and DFM all round for what Portal described as "splendid performance". Halifax was quite tough and had incorporated most of the lesson learnt from the early war years on surviving nightfighter attacks. LW682 was fitted with a manned mid-under gun specifically to address Schrage musik attack and stop pilots like Drewes lingering under the bomber. All fuel tanks were self sealing types- so while some initial fuel loss may occur the rubber quickly expanded to seal the flow. Even the vapours in the tank were addressed with an inerting system being turned on at the start of the flight. With cannon fire the integrity of the wing surface could be compromised but you are now entering the realm of the myriad of consequential results of a nightfighter attack combined with fire. To compensate for drag of a failed engine full load, flaps an u/c up, at climbing power control is stated as being retained by rudder and aileron providing speed not below 150 mph IAS. Below that speed throttle manipulation is necessary on the opposite outer until rudder trim applied. Drag of the dead prop is eliminated by feathering. If the engine was still on fire when LW682 went into the bog it suggests that either the fire suppression system was either not triggered/failed to suppress/fire flared up again after the single shot use. If the prop feathering failed then windmilling could over heat failed oil cooled systems leading to hot spots but typically this would be a definite time in flight after the failure. Karl is really your best guide to crash recovered Halifax systems and condition states. Ross
Just to underline the Halifax ability to continue controlled flight, all be it with loss of height, with the excessive drag of a Starboard Outer windmilling prop. This is the accident card for a Halifax 30th Nov 1944 selected at random which shows failure of feathering during night Ops and the subsequent controlled return to Manston Master Diversion Aerodrome before successful belly landing on the runway. Ross
The largest risk to any engine on fire is if the engine firewall/fire plate fails due to the intensity of the fire and penetrates the wing structure. Then there is the upmost danger that the wing structure fire would lead at the worse to a collapse of the wing and the ultimate break up of the aircraft. If an engine fire risked the integrity of a wing, then, no doubt, the skipper this situation would order the abandonment of the aircraft and order the crew to bale out. Some pilots might before this stage exercise a steep dive in an attempt to extinguish the fire as a last resort depending on the circumstances. HCU pilot training would involve three engine handling. At the Halifax HCUs,60 minutes were allocated for three engine overshoot and landing with the instructor occupying the right hand seat of dual controlled HCU Halifaxes assessing the pilot's competency. Some might remember that the BBMF Lancaster PA 474 had a similar incident a few years ago which led to the aircraft being u/s for some considerable time while repairs were undertaken.
Thank you (RAFCommands) for your offerings. What a humbling story. In between your submissions, I looked for the associated Supplements to the London Gazette, one herewith: https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/35858/supplement/267/data.pdf “Fortitude and devotion to duty in exceptionally hazardous circumstances” indeed! Going out again and again and again etc specifically to become a particular form of target. Interesting that their Unit is not mentioned in the Supplement, unlike squadrons for other awardees. This will have meant something to some readers. And of course, they could not disclose why. DSO for Jordan. Old Crows.
Schrage Musik was noted for being for being lethal, one of the reasons it was so effective was that aircraft hit were lost, and so did not return to tell of how they were attacked. Basically if you hit a fuel tank with 5 or 6 20mm cannon shells, it's going to be punctured and burn fiercely, and not go out. And that's exactly want Schrage Musik did. There is information on this in The Nuremburg Raid by Martin Middleton, which while about one specific raid, does give a very good background to all the relevant aspects of the bomber war in a clear manner and copes can be got very cheaply eg 9780140081145: The Nuremberg Raid - 30-31 March 1944 - AbeBooks - Middlebrook, Martin.: 0140081143 The effect was magnified by aircraft equipped were assigned to the better crews. The nighfighters aimed for the wing tanks as if they hit the bomb bay they were likely to blow up and take them along as well. Often bomber crews did realise how badly they had been hit. One report in the book is of a crew that shot down 4 bombers that night, and when they returned they had fired 56 rounds. Ross mentions LW682 above? is this the aircraft your are asking about? If so, a look at Air Britain says LW682 "Shot down by nightfighter, Grosmaische, 31.3.44, on return from Nurnberg " so there maybe some info on the book (mine is on loan or I'd check) but if you have not read the linked book, I think you would find it of interest.
The scientific war 1939- 1945 The Lichtenstein SN2 interception radar gathered by No 1474 (Wireless Investigation Flight) operating out of RAF Gransden Lodge provided a solution to the RAF rate of losses from this airborne device from the first kill registered using it on the night of 8/9 August 1941.TRE's response was to structure a new wireless information gathering unit in the summer of 1941. Intended to be equipped with the Mosquito, the unit had to make do with Wellingtons, a much slower aircraft with a greater risk of loss. By the success of the collection of Jordan's data, TRE were able to connect the Ground Controller transmission of "Emile", "Emile" to the Luftwaffe fighter as the code to deploy the Lichtenstein radar View attachment 344238 View attachment 344238 . Identification of the Lichtenstein frequency was a vital dimension of the task for Jordan which enabled TRE to deploy ECM against it and jam it. There was very important gain from this exercise which led to the development of Window as an ECM. Its deployment for the first time for the raid on Hamburg on the night of 24/25 July 1943 paralysed the German night fighter Lichtenstein radar leading to the Germans developing an improved version of its airborne radar from August 1943. The whole account of the work of TRE and it successor, the RRE was revealed by RV Jones in the The Secret War series aired by Yorkshire TV in 1977. R V Jones also had the account ,The Secret War published in 1978.Both sources of information are a must for those interested in British Scientific Intelligence activity during the war. Harold Jordan was a prewar teacher at Lefranc Senior School for Boys, Croydon. He remained in the RAF until 1957 and died in early 1986.. View attachment 344238
