Hamminkeln Sign - Ulster Rifleman

A couple more photos. BU2299 was shot from behind the school house on Mehrhooger Strabe. Across the street the brewery complex can bee seen with tall building. BU2300 shows the next building to the west which may have been the headmaster's house. I suspect the sign would have been just before that house near its front garden wall.



Regards ....

 

I’m normally on my phone looking at this, logged on using my computer and obviously looking at pictures on a big screen! I think you might be right with that pic being on Mehrhoogerstr. Even the telegraph pole on the other side of the road fits.

Alex.

 

Harry Oakes Footage

Jim Christie's cine partner, Harry Oakes also shot the sign and half-track on entering Hamminkeln.



Regards ...

 

In case is ogf interest and you haven't seen before then there is quite a lot of detail about the operation and locations held within the Regimental Journal on my site at:

2nd Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles in WW2: Documents

There are a few group photos aswell (albeit not great quality).

Quis Separabit

 

That's an excellent map.

Oddly enough I just added these maps to the PDF, "The Hamminkeln Sign - Operation Varsity". Yours, however, is much more relevant.



The “Crash Site” is where the glider carrying cameramen Sergeants Christie and Oakes came down and comes from the PDF, “Christie & Oakes on LZ 'R' - Operation Varsity”.

Regards ...

 

1st Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles Journal Account of the Landing (May 1945) - full copy at 2nd Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles in WW2: Documents

The scanned copy of the document is a bit "chunky" to download from online so I've copied and pasted the relevant section regarding the Operation Varsity Landing here in case of any interest...

THE AIRBORNE LANDING EAST OF THE RHINE

TOWARDS THE END of February the Battalion was withdrawn from the line in
Holland, and after a few days spent in Belgium flown back to England. It was
known at this time that the Bn. was returning to prepare for an airborne operation,
and that this would take place in the near future. On arrival in England all ranks
were granted a week's leave. Planning for the operation commenced immediately
after the Bn's. return from leave.
On 20th March the Bn. moved to its transit camp, this time in East Anglia. Here
we found the arrangements very similar to those we had experienced whilst waiting
for D Day in June of last year. During the time spent in the transit camp final
preparations were made, and. all ranks were fully briefed for the part which the
Bn. was to play in the operations covering the Rhine crossing. Briefly, the plan
was as follows:—
The assault across the Rhine was due to commence at 11.30 p.m. on 23rd March.
Crossings were to be made at several places. A very large airborne force, of which
the Bn. formed a part, was to be landed during the morning of 24th March in an
area some seven miles north-east of the town of Wesel. The principal task of this
force was to prevent the movement of enemy reserves from the east against the
Allied bridgehead. It was intended to land the force in as short a time as possible
and so to swamp the not inconsiderable enemy opposition which was expected.
Intelligence reports had shown that the landing areas were occupied by enemy
artillery and infantry units, also it was known that elements of a Panzer Division
were being held in reserve some miles to the eastward. It was appreciated by all
ranks that the successful completion of this task would make it impossible for the
enemy to hold the river line, consequently the enemy was expected to react most
strongly to the airborne landings.
Three tasks were given to the Bn. The seizing of the bridge over the river Ijssel
east of Hammenkeln, the seizing of the level-crossing and station (as shown on
sketch map), and the prevention of penetration into the Divisional area from the
south-east. _
The Bn. plan was that "D" Coy. (Major A. J. Dyball) should land on L.Z. U1
and should seize the river bridge by a coup-de-main; "A" Coy. (commanded by
Major C. E. Vickery) was given the task of seizing the level-crossing and station
area and was due to land on L.Z. U2. The remainder of the Bn. would land on
L.Z. U3 and would concentrate in the area marked A on the map. Thence they
would move across country to a dispersal point, marked B, and so complete the
occupation of the Bn. defensive locality, which would include the objectives already
gained by "A" and "D" Coys. The landings on all three L.Zs. were due to
commence at 10.20 a.m. An American parachute unit was to land at the same time
on our right, with the remaining battalions in our Brigade landing to the north and
north-west of Hammenkeln. All these landings were to take place simultaneously.
Artillery and air support was to be provided on a considerable scale, particular
attention being paid to hostile A.A. positions covering the landing zones.
The Bn. moved to the airfields in the early hours of the morning of 24th March.
The weather was excellent, and the take-off commenced at 7 a.m.
The flight, which was scheduled to last over three hours, was uneventful, until
the Rhine was approached. As the aircraft neared the river it was apparent that
jthe smoke from the battle then proceeding, mingled with that from burning
buildings and crashed aircraft was seriously obscuring the landing areas. Once
across the river A.A. fire became heavy, and many gliders were hit, causing
casualties and damage to equipment. It was extremely difficult to pick up land-
marks on the ground owing to the bad visibility, with the result that recognition
of the L.Zs. was almost impossible. As was to be expected in the circumstances,
the gliders landed over a very wide area, only a small proportion of the aircraft
coming down on their correct landing zones. Crash landings were numerous, and
several gliders caught fire immediately on landing, this causing considerable losses
of vehicles, guns and other equipment.
That the enemy was surprised by the scale of the landing there can be no doubt.
Nevertheless, strong opposition was experienced from the A.A. and machine-gun
posts, which were scattered throughout the area, whilst some armoured cars and
self-propelled guns shot up the L.Zs. and accounted for a considerable proportion
of the casualties incurred in the landing.
The events which followed the. landing can best be followed by considering each
of the three Bn. landing zones separately.
The gliders carrying "D" Coy., and due to land on L.Z.I were to be put down
as close as possible to the bridge. The first glider, carrying the Coy. commander,
landed at 10.25 a.m. The landing was a heavy one, and some of the occupants of
the aircraft were thrown out through the nose. Immediately on landing, the glider
was shot up by a machine-gun from a post some 75 yards away. The 38 set operator
was killed, and so communication by wireless with the other platoons in the
company was impossible. The survivors from this glider engaged the enemy post
with a Bren gun, but having knocked it out were immediately fired at from another
position some thirty yards to the left. In spite of this the party managed to reach
the wood north-west of the bridge, killing two Germans in the process. The enemy
were still holding the bridge, although some were seen to run away. Making use of
a German trench, Major Dyball and his party reached the houses near the bridge.
It was then found that another platoon of the company had landed on the other
side of the road and had cleared the enemy from the remaining houses around the
bridge, taking twenty-five prisoners in the process. The situation had now become
too much for the defenders of the bridge, and another twenty-five were captured;
the number killed ran to over twenty.
The objective having been gained, all the available troops were sited so as to
cover the bridge against the counter-attack, which it was felt the enemy would
almost certainly launch. At this time the force holding the bridge consisted of two
platoons of "D" Coy., some R.E., a few men from the Oxf. and Bucks L.I., and a
small number of glider pilots.
Those of the enemy who had escaped from the bridge had withdrawn eastwards
across the autobahn. Although fire from machine-guns and snipers was directed
on the bridge, no serious attempt was made to counter-attack the locality, whilst
the early occupation of Hammenkeln by the Devons prevented an attack being put
in from the west.
"A" Coy., whose task was to seize the level-crossing and station, were due to
land on L.Z. U2. Unfortunately only two of the company gliders succeeded in
landing in the correct place. These carried platoons commanded by Lieut. Laird
and Lieut. Stewart. Both platoons moved off to their objectives, but found that
there was no organised resistance on the level-crossing, although 20mm. guns were
shooting up the area from the direction of Hammenkeln. One platoon of the Devons
was found to be in position about one hundred yards west of the railway, where
they had found fifty-two German soldiers quietly awaiting capture in a large barn.
Lieut. Laird organised the defence of the level-crossing with the three platoons
available. Shortly afterwards Support Coy., H.Q., and two machine-guns arrived
from the north, but there was still no sign of the other platoons of "A" Coy., or
of the remainder of the Bn.
As in the case of "D" Coy., no counter-attack was launched against the locality.
About twenty minutes after the occupation of the area three self-propelled guns
emerged from Hammenkeln and, passing over the level-crossing, crossed the Ijssel
bridge and disappeared to the east. At this time there were no anti-tank guns
available, and "A" Company's Piats were out of action, but apparently the
A.F.Vs. were making a getaway, and neither saw nor fired on our troops, who
were moving on the road within a few feet of them. One gun was hit by a Piat
bomb as it crossed the bridge, but although damaged was not knocked out.
The prisoners, who now numbered nearly a hundred, were caged in the railway
station, guarded by glider pilots.
Contact was made with "D" Coy. on the bridge, and the realisation that both
the Bn. objectives had been taken gave great encouragement to all ranks.
Meanwhile, the landing of the remainder of the Bn. was proceeding on L.Z. U.3.
Here the landing was also dispersed, with only a small number of the gliders landing
close to the Bn. R.V. At 10.30 a.m. the Adjutant, as senior officer present, took
command of those troops that had arrived. These consisted of some Bn. H.Q.
personnel three platoons of "C" Coy., two platoons of "B" Coy., some "B" Coy.
H.Q. personnel, and two anti-tank guns.
One platoon of "C" Coy. had landed within seventy yards of the houses at the
Bn. R.V. Their glider had caught fire and the survivors had been beaten back
from the houses by heavy machine-gun fire. It was established afterwards that the
houses were held by over a hundred Germans well supplied with automatic weapons.
Major Rigby decided to organise an attack on the houses from the road and
orchard. This attack went in and resulted in the houses being cleared, with the
capture of about a hundred prisoners, many more Germans being killed. Whilst
this attack was going in, two armoured cars came up the road from the south. The
leading vehicle was held up by a burning glider which had crashed on the road, and
both A.F.Vs, .were then knocked out by a six-pounder gun commanded by Cpl.
Durrant. The crews were either killed or taken prisoner.
By 12 noon it was clear to Major Rigby that no more sub-units from the Bn.
would reach the concentration area, and it was decided to move off across country
to join up with any parties which might have reached the objectives. Shortly after
this contact was made by wireless with "D" Coy.
The Medical Officer, Capt. R. L. Rees, remained at the concentration area to tend
the casualties which had occurred during the landing on this L.Z. and during the
battle for the houses.
During the move tq the Bn. dispersal point, marked B on map, more Germans
were encountered and were either disposed of or taken prisoner. When the Bn.
H.Q. party arrived at the level-crossing they were considerably outnumbered by
was found to be in position about one hundred yards west of the railway, where
they had found fifty-two German soldiers quietly awaiting capture in a large barn.
Lieut. Laird organised the defence of the level-crossing with the three platoons
available. Shortly afterwards Support Coy., H.Q., and two machine-guns arrived
from the north, but there was still no sign of the other platoons of "A" Coy., or
of the remainder of the Bn.
As in the case of "D" Coy., no counter-attack was launched against the locality.
About twenty minutes after the occupation of the area three self-propelled guns
emerged from Hammenkeln and, passing over the level-crossing, crossed the Ijssel
bridge and disappeared to the east. At this time there were no anti-tank guns
available, and "A" Company's Piats were out of action, but apparently the
A.F.Vs. were making a getaway, and neither saw nor fired on our troops, who
were moving on the road within a few feet of them. One gun was hit by a Piat
bomb as it crossed the bridge, but although damaged was not knocked out.
The prisoners, who now numbered nearly a hundred, were caged in the railway
station, guarded by glider pilots.
Contact was made with "D" Coy. on the bridge, and the realisation that both
the Bn. objectives had been taken gave great encouragement to all ranks.
Meanwhile, the landing of the remainder of the Bn. was proceeding on L.Z. U.3.
Here the landing was also dispersed, with only a small number of the gliders landing
close to the Bn. R.V. At 10.30 a.m. the Adjutant, as senior officer present, took
command of those troops that had arrived. These consisted of some Bn. H.Q.
personnel three platoons of "C" Coy., two platoons of "B" Coy., some "B" Coy.
H.Q. personnel, and two anti-tank guns.
One platoon of "C" Coy. had landed within seventy yards of the houses at the
Bn. R.V. Their glider had caught fire and the survivors had been beaten back
from the houses by heavy machine-gun fire. It was established afterwards that the
houses were held by over a hundred Germans well supplied with automatic weapons.
Major Rigby decided to organise an attack on the houses from the road and
orchard. This attack went in and resulted in the houses being cleared, with the
capture of about a hundred prisoners, many more Germans being killed. Whilst
this attack was going in, two armoured cars came up the road from the south. The
leading vehicle was held up by a burning glider which had crashed on the road, and
both A.F.Vs, .were then knocked out by a six-pounder gun commanded by Cpl.
Durrant. The crews were either killed or taken prisoner.
By 12 noon it was clear to Major Rigby that no more sub-units from the Bn.
would reach the concentration area, and it was decided to move off across country
to join up with any parties which might have reached the objectives. Shortly after
this contact was made by wireless with "D" Coy.
The Medical Officer, Capt. R. L. Rees, remained at the concentration area to tend
the casualties which had occurred during the landing on this L.Z. and during the
battle for the houses.
During the move tq the Bn. dispersal point, marked B on map, more Germans
were encountered and were either disposed of or taken prisoner. When the Bn.
H.Q. party arrived at the level-crossing they were considerably outnumbered by
their prisoners. These were sent to join their companions in the railway station;
the total now being nearly three hundred.
Bn. H.Q. was established in the wood south-west of the level-crossing, whilst
"B" Coy., "C" Coy., and supporting weapons consolidated their positions as
planned. The Glider Pilot Squadron, commanded by Major Jackson, took over
the task of protecting the station and level-crossing area from "A" Coy., who
moved to a locality covering the exits from Hammenkeln.
A number of wounded, including the Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Col. R. J. H.
Carson, had been collected in a house beside the railway, where they were attended
to by a captured German doctor. All wounded were eventually evacuated to the
M.D.S. which was established later in the Bn. area.
By 2.30 p.m. the fighting had died down, leaving the Bn. firmly established on
its objectives. Many parties which had landed out of the Bn. area succeeded in
rejoining during the afternoon, amongst them being that with Major G. P. Rickcord,
who assumed command of the Bn. Almost without exception these parties had had
to fight their way back to the Bn., some over considerable distances.
The casualties sustained by the Bn. during the day amounted to sixteen officers
and two hundred and forty-three other ranks.
The success of the airborne landings was undoubted, and had a disastrous effect
upon the enemy's efforts to prevent the enlargement of the bridgehead on the
east bank of the Rhine. Statements by officers of the assault Divisions all show
that the enemy resistance, hitherto considerable, collapsed in dramatic fashion
with the arrival over the river of the leading aircraft carrying the airborne force.

 

1st Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles Journal Account of the Landing (May 1945) - full copy at 2nd Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles in WW2: Documents


THE BRIDGE
(By MAJOR A. J. DYBALL)
AT 10.25 A.M. my glider crashed 150 yards from the bridge as planned. It was the
first to hit the deck, but it was only a matter of seconds before two other gliders
crashed quite close. Unfortunately these last two gliders did not contain any of
my party. As my glider crashed all those in the front were thrown out through
the nose. Those in the back did manage to get out through the door; during this
the glider was being riddled by M.G. bullets from a range of seventy-five yards.
Only one man was killed and three wounded. As the man who was killed was the
wireless operator I could not get in touch with any of my front platoons, the set
having received part of the same burst. One good thing about the crash was that
one of the wings had made a small trench in the ground, into which some seven
of us crawled. In a matter of seconds we had a Bren in action and it silenced the i
M.G., but another started up some thirty yards to its left. I could still see no signs
of my other platoons. I decided I would make a dash across the open and get into
a small wood and see if I could contact anyone there. The Bren covered me across,
and I contacted two glider pilots, two men from the 52nd, and a few R.E. They
had got into a good firing position covering the house I wished to assault. I then
moved the rest of my H.Q. into a wood and we cleared it, killing two Germans.
We then took up a position. From where we were a continuous trench ran up to
the house and bridge. The Germans were still holding the house, although we could
see a few retiring. A small party were advanced towards us; we let them come
until they were within twenty yards and then threw a 36 grenade. Unfortunately .
it did not fall into the trench, though it exploded by its side. At once all hands
went up. I with two glider pilots and another two went off down the trench towards
the house. As we got to the house 21 Pin. arrived from the other side of the road
in fine form, having cleared the house and captured twenty-five prisoners. About
another twenty-five were also rounded up. I then went across the bridge and found
that 22 Pin. had done their job in clearing the houses. Although the Pin. Comdr.
had been killed, the Pin. Sgt., although wounded in the head, arm, leg and thigh,
led the platoon against strong opposition, which was dug in. The bridge was in
our hands, and an all-round defence was quickly organised, consisting of four
groups made up of the two platoons, Coy. H.Q., some glider pilots, anti-tank
gunners without their guns, and a few men from the 52nd.
Although it was originally planned to capture the bridge with four platoons, it
was in fact done with two platoons (fifty men), and a few of Coy. H.Q., helped
by a few glider pilots, R.E., and two or three men from the 52nd.
During the attack five German S.P. guns came down the road. One was hit at
twenty-five yards' range by a Piat, but it was not knocked out. They showed
no fight and retired as quickly as they could. About fifty prisoners were taken,
and about twenty Germans were killed.
The highest praise must be given to the two platoons and their commanders for
the work they did that morning. It was team spirit and leadership within those
platoons which enabled them to capture their objectives, which were strongly held
by dug-in enemy. It must not be forgotten that the platoons had crashed on landing
and had been under fire until their objectives had been taken.

 

1st Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles Journal Account of the Landing (May 1945) - full copy at 2nd Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles in WW2: Documents

ACCOUNT OF GLIDERS WHICH LANDED ON BATTALION L.Z. U3
(By CAPT. R. RIGBY)
THE PARTY landing on L . Z . U3 was supposed to consist of the whole Bn. less "A"
and "D" companies. When my glider landed at approximately 10.30 a.m. I found
the situation to be as follows:—
The houses in the concentration area were occupied by approximately one hundred
and fifty Germans, who were probably using them as billets. There was a fair
volume of fire in all directions, coming principally from the area of the houses
round the moat, and as my glider was within eighty yards of them and fairly
badly smashed I did not attempt to unload the jeep, but got everybody into the
ditch on the side of the road. Between ourselves and the houses a "C" Coy. glider
was burning and with the ammunition exploding. About two minutes later about
half a platoon of "C" Coy. (the occupants of the glider) came across the open
ground towards us from the direction of the houses. I questioned these men and
was told that they had crash-landed and the glider had almost immediately caught
fire. About two-thirds of the platoon got out alive and had moved towards the
houses, but had met considerable opposition and had to come back. By this time
another platoon of "C" Coy. had come up from the south, and was also in the
ditch firing at the houses. Very shortly after this a third platoon of "C" Coy. and
one platoon of "B" Coy. arrived with about twelve prisoners from the houses on
the west side of the road. One or two of "B" Coy. H.Q. were also there, but Major
Donnelly had been killed. As this appeared to be the sum total of the Bn. which
landed so far on this L.Z., I decided to leave a small fire group in the ditch and
move round to the right and attack through the orchard, but just as I was about
to move I saw another platoon of "B" Coy. (Lieut. O'Hara-Murray's) starting
to move through the orchard. I therefore had some 2-inch mortar smoke put down
and attacked the houses from where we were, going in at right angles to Lieut.
O'Hara-Murray's platoon. Fire, was spasmodic only, and a very half-hearted
defence was put up, most of the Germans throwing their weapons away when we
got to within forty or fifty yards of them. Quite a lot of Germans were killed by
grenades and Stens in and around the houses and barns, and in about 15-20 minutes
they had all been rooted out and the whole area appeared to be fairly clear, so
I sent "B" and "C" Coys, to the position laid down in the original plan and
put a few glider pilots that we had (about sixteen in all) in charge of the prisoners,
who numbered about one hundred. By this time it was about 11.15 and I got
wireless communication with "D" Coy., and heard that they were on the bridge.
I could not get in touch with "A" Company. I decided to wait until 12 noon in
case any more of the Bn. should arrive, and very shortly two six-pounders
and some M.M.G. personnel turned up. The M.M.G. men went to "C" Coy., and
the two six-pounders took up positions to cover the road running south from
Hammenkeln. They had been in position about two minutes when two armoured
cars came up the road from the south and were promptly knocked out by the
six-pounders and the crews taken prisoner. Shortly after this the L.O. and S.O.
arrived with a 62 set link to Brigade and some of B.H.Q., followed by the M.O.,
who had been collecting casualties on the L.Z. We had been in touch with brigade
prior to this through the'F.O.O. set. As there appeared to be no sign of any more
of the Bn. on the L.Z. U3 I decided to move at 12.15 along the original Bn. route
to the dispersal point and from there "B" and "C" companies were to go to the
positions as given in the original plan. As there was no sign of the Recce. Pin.,
one platoon of "C" Coy. did left flank guard and one platoon rear guard, with
the two anti-tank guns moving in bounds on the left flank. The right was by now
safe as American gliders were landing on our immediate right during the move.
Lieut. J. R. Wright joined the column en route, and we also met about two platoons
of the 52nd. On arriving at the railway crossing we met Major Liddle, who had
a platoon of "A" Coy. and the M.M.G's. on the level-crossing.

 

1st Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles Journal Account of the Landing (May 1945) - full copy at 2nd Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles in WW2: Documents

ACCOUNT OF LANDING OF SUPPORT COY. H.Q. GLIDER ON 24th MARCH
(By MAJOR E. A. D. LIDDELL)
THIS GLIDER, flying from Rivenhall, contained seven personnel of Support Coy.
H.Q., jeep, trailer, and motor-cycles. The pilots, P/O. Rushworth and Flt/Sgt.
Gillate, were R.A.F. personnel attached to Glider Pilot Regiment. The flight was
uneventful until the Rhine was approached. Flying at 2,500 feet, it was apparent
that the whole of the battle and landing areas were obscured by thick haze and
smoke. It was difficult to fix the exact position of the aircraft when crossing the
river because of bad visibility. The release point agreed upon in the flight plan
was not positively identified, but 3rd Para. Bde. D.Z. was picked up on account
of the large number of coloured parachutes visible on the ground. Shortly after
this the release signal came from the tug aircraft, and it was decided by the pilot
and myself that we should cast off although not certain of our position. At this
stage A.A. fire was considerable, but as far as is known the glider was not hit. In
an endeavour to locate the L.Z. it was decided to maintain height for as long as
possible, and the first pilot kept the glider flying east whilst gradually losing height.
In spite of the efforts made with maps and photographs it was not until the glider
flew over the autobahn east of Hammenkeln that an idea of our location was
obtained. On seeing the autobahn the pilot was asked to turn left-handed. This
was done and the railway line was identified together with a level-crossing. The
smoke prevented more accurate observation, and I was under the impression that
the level-crossing seen was that given to the Bn. as an objective. We therefore
continued to turn left so as to fly southwards and thereby land on the Bn. L.Z.
When the aircraft was flying at about 500 feet visibility improved, and it was
immediately apparent that we were flying over the L.Z. of the 2nd Oxf. and Bucks—
i.e., about one mile north of our own Bn. L.Z. By this time, however, the pilot
could maintain height no longer, and it was decided to land immediately. The first
pilot made a successful landing in a small field beside the level-crossing in the Oxf.
and Bucks area. The glider was damaged to the extent of losing one wing and the
starboard landing wheel, the result being that it was lying on its right side when
it came to rest. No one was injured during the flight or landing.
Unloading of the glider through the nose commenced immediately, but took some
twenty-five minutes owing to the angle at which the aircraft was lying. Enemy
interference consisted only of fire from a 20mm. A.A. gun situated in a field on the
other side of the railway. This caused no casualties, although the glider and jeep
were hit. Whilst the unloading was proceeding I made a recce, to fix our exact
position, and then decided to move south along the railway to link up with the
Bn. on its objective, it being apparent to me that we could not reach the Bn. R.V.
before the Bn. moved off. The railway line had been cleared by 12 Devons, but
was under fire from a 20mm. A.A. position to the north of Hammenkeln. However,
by making use of the cover offered by the railway wagons and store dumps, I and
the first glider pilot, accompanied by our runners, made contact with Lieut. R.
Ellis and two M.M.Gs., which were in action on the line some three hundred yards
north of the Bn. objective. The rest of "S" Coy. H.Q., with the vehicles, were
moving behind by bounds. I decided to leave Lieut. R. Ellis and his guns in
position where they were engaging enemy 20mm. positions. P/O. Rush worth and
I proceeded down the line and eventually made contact on the level-crossing with
Lietit. Laird, who had organised the defence of the crossing with two platoons of
"A" Coy. and a platoon of 12 Devons. Lieut. Laird informed me that some few
men of "D" Coy. were holding the Ijssel bridge. I accompanied Lieut. Laird
around the locality and decided that it was essential to hold where we were on the
objective and await the arrival of the Bn. from the south. At this time enemy
interference was slight, being confined to spasmodic 20mm. fire. About ten minutes
after arriving at the level crossing three enemy S.P. guns passed Lieut. Laird and I
on the road moving east. Although within a few feet of them we were not observed,
but unfortunately being armed only with pistols no effective action could be taken
against them. One S.P. gun was hit by a Piat of "D" Coy. as it crossed the
Ijssel bridge, but was not immobilised. Although a counter-attack was expected
at any moment none materialised, and some sixty minutes later the remainder of
the Bn. arrived under the Adjutant, bringing with them a large number of prisoners,
to which were added some fifty more who had been found hiding in a barn near
the level-crossing by the platoon of 12 Devons which was under our command at
the time.

 

1st Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles Journal Account of the Landing (May 1945) - full copy at 2nd Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles in WW2: Documents

THE FINAL PHASE
MARCH 24th — MAY 18th, 1945
DURING the rest of the day of the 24th March there was little enemy artillery activity,
but two or three S.P. guns appeared on our front, and Typhoons were called in
to assist. Enemy troops were still holding the houses on the east of the bridge, and
there were armoured elements moving in Ringenburg and in the nearby woods.
Prisoners of war still continued to be collected, and by nightfall there were 650 in
the brigade cage—a very large number of these having been taken by the Bn. and
handed over to the glider pilots for safe custody.
There was not a great deal of activity on the Bn. front during the night, but at
2.30 a.m. enemy attempted to rush the northern bridge from the Ringenburg area,
and it was blown by 2nd Oxf. and Bucks, who held it, at 2.40 a.m. Approximately
one hundred enemy attempted to break into the brigade area from the west, but
they suffered severe casualties at the hands of the Devons.
All this time and for another twenty-four hours our wounded lay in the cow-byres
and buildings of the M.D.S., which was filled to capacity. Lieut.-Col. Carson,
wounded on the previous afternoon, Lieuts. Maidment and Bryant were all in the
same cowshed. The Col., although he does not remember it, complained of acute
hunger. Fortunately his batman was able to provide boiled eggs to supplement
his diet.
At 7.30 a.m. on the 25th March, just as breakfast was being brewed up, two
Panther tanks with infantry aboard attempted to rush our bridge over the river
Ijssel. They came at full tilt down the road. The first was knocked out and set on
fire by a very able six-pounder gun crew of our own Support Coy., and the second
damaged. Morale immediately rose to an even higher level, and breakfast was
eaten with zest and in peace.
By 9.30 a.m. we were able to report that no enemy remained in our perimeter.
A cab rank of Typhoons was overhead and were at call. During the day tactical
reconnaisance aircraft reported only slight enemy movement on roads leading into
our area, and we heard that 52 (Lowland) Division was coming up to relieve us.
At 10.45 a squadron of D.D. tanks and S.P. anti-tank guns of the land elements
had reached the brigade area from the Rhine. At 7.30 p.m. the sound of approaching
enemy tanks was heard, but nothing further came of it except that at 8 p.m.
an S.P. gun which laid behind the river bank shelled Hammenkeln.

 

Time

Approximately when was the Hamminkeln Sign photo taken?

It took sometime for the cameramen to get underway due to the fact that their glider crashed which resulted in casualties that had to be dealt with. They were also fired upon by nearby German opposition which was eventually suppressed with the help of American Paratroopers.

One time indicator was the photo taken by Sgt. Christie of a Liberator aircraft over Hamminkeln as they approached the village. This supply mission occurred sometime around 1:00-1:30 P.M.



It would appear that the glider carrying Rev. James McMurray-Taylor came down off course as he and the pilot arrived on the west side of Hamminkeln several hours late, still making their way to LZ 'U'. The following statement in Quis Separabit's report attracted my notice:

" ... By 2.30 p.m. the fighting had died down, leaving the Bn. firmly established on its objectives. Many parties which had landed out of the Bn. area succeeded in rejoining during the afternoon, amongst them being that with Major G. P. Rickcord, who assumed command of the Bn. Almost without exception these parties had had to fight their way back to the Bn., some over considerable distances. ... "

Also from Major Rickcord's citation:

" ... In particular on 24th March 1945, Lieutenant-Colonel (then Major) Rickcord displayed great gallantry. As Battalion Second-in-Command he landed many miles away from the Brigade Area and right amongst certain enemy positions. He at once organised his men into a fighting team, and throughout the day fought his way back to the Battalion locality, suffering casualties and, in turn inflicting casualties and taking many prisoners. On arrival at Battalion Headquarters this officer discovered that his Commanding Officer was badly wounded and immediately took over command holding the position which was vital with skill and vigour against enemy counter attacks. ... "

Major Rickord was 2i/c and would have flown on one of Battalion HQ gliders. Was the Padre on the same glider? Speculation of course, but a possibility I suppose.

Regards ...

 

F/O. John Arnold

RAF glider pilot F/O John Arnold was the No. 1 pilot and was paired with F/Sgt John Crane. He does get a mention in the war diary confirming he was with 'F' Squadron, GPR and that they left from RAF Gosfield on Op Varsity.

"F" Squadron
Month and year : March 1945
Commanding Officer : Sqn Leader Reynolds DFC
Place: Gosfield
...
3rd April 1945
Place: Fairford

0800 - Sqn Leader Reynolds DFC on leave. Capt McMillen MC assumed command. F/O Arnold assumed duties of IO vice F/O Atkinson, wounded. 5 and 19 flights proceeded on leave until 16 April 45. 7 crews and 1 1st pilot detached to RAF Booker. Crews from sqn flew on dual checks.

'F' Squadron was composed of 5, 15, and 16 Flights and provided 60 crews for the Operation. I doubt they would have placed the Padre on a Coup-de-Main glider, so perhaps he was on one of the RUR gliders in Serial lift B9 - CNs 73-93.



3 RAF Squadrons provided tug aircraft to pull the 'F' Sqn, GPR gliders - Numbers 271, 512 and 575. No idea at the moment what chalk numbers they were each pulling.

Regards ...

 

Major Gerald Percival Rickcord

From the 6th Airlanding Brigade HQ War Diary:

24th March 1945
Place: Bulford (Ref 1:25,000 Sheet 4205 GERMANY)
...

1540 - 1 RUR report that Second in Command (Rickcord) has arrived and taken over the battalion.

I have often wondered who Brigadier Bellamy is talking to in this photo.



A comparison to Major Rickcord in later life - similar ears. Pure speculation, of course.



Regards ...

 

Major Eddie Warren, 12th Devons



Maj. Rickcord

 

I think the coup de main glider was flown by F/O Ince and Sgt Ayliffe of 'F' Sqdn. F/O Ince was awarded the DFC for his actions on the operation. The senior officer on his glider would have been Major Dyball. P/O's Ince's DFC citation states that he flew the leading glider of 8 which were to land in a very confined space close to a bridge across the River Issel and that he landed his glider within 50 yards of his briefed position. His 2nd pilot an RAF Pilot Sgt E W Ayliffe stated in a letter he wrote that Sixteen gliders led the first armada . The first eight were led by Captain Carr made for the Northern bridge and the second eight led by P/O Ince made for the second bridge. He goes on to describe the landing and the attack on the bridge.

Hope this fills in some missing information.

Cheers

Arnhem

 

A quick addition Sgt Ayliffe also stated that the load they carried comprised of a jeep trailer ful of ammunition and explosives together with the officer commanding the bridge party and some of his men from the RUR.

 

Thank you both,

David I was having some doubts about my theory and your pics of Major Rickcord prove I was probably wrong. Interestingly Harry Oakes (cine) also captured Major Warren on film at exactly the same time. Need to readjust the PDF again ...

Arnhem, yes it can be confusing as 'F' Sqn., GPR, flew in men from both 1 RUR and the Ox and Bucks. At the moment I don't believe the Padre was on a coup de main glider and it is still speculation that he flew with Major Rickcord. Needless to say they were both late arrivals.

Regards ...

 

Major Warren, 12th Devons

As captured by Sgt. Christie's cine partner, Sgt. Harry Oakes.



Regards ...

 

Staged Shooter

Though hardly significant this posed photo was probably taken just behind the sign.



Regards ...

 

Unknown

This short clip by Oakes immediately preceded his one of the Hamminkeln sign. No idea who the man is, but going by the blood and scrapes on his face he appears to have had a rough landing.



Regards ...

Later - Could this be F/O Arnold? Paired glider pilots generally travelled together after landing. Finding another photo of him to confirm or deny might be difficult.