Do mean the operations or intelligence journal for August 1944? I am not certain that there will be an AAR (After Action Report). There might be a monthly summary of operations. Can you elaborate on what you want? Regards, Marc
Marc, Operation overview, as detailed as possible. For August, particularly 8-14 August. Hodges' 1 Army went south from Mortain to Mayenne. I want to know why not east, directly to Alencon. For me, that would have been the logical thing to do. Just wandering, so many questions. There are authors, who believe that Patton's left flank at Argentan was very exposed, when Bradley ordered him to stop advancing to Falaise. I think they have a point.
Marc, Operation overview, as detailed as possible. For August, particularly 8-14 August. Hodges' 1 Army went south from Mortain to Mayenne. I want to know why not east, directly to Alencon. For me, that would have been the logical thing to do. Just wandering, so many questions. There are authors, who believe that Patton's left flank at Argentan was very exposed, when Bradley ordered him to stop advancing to Falaise. I think they have a point. It might be said that no one anticipated that the experienced German army could be out-flanked and cut-off. Initially US Third Army's mission was to drive south and west into Brittany in conformance with the original OVERLORD Plan. The US First Army was to protect the Third Army east flank which involved continuous groping for the extending German left flank. I don't think there was a clear road from Mortain to Alençon. As the Third Army drove south they realized they could also go east on a path of least resistance. Once they reached Le Mans they also realized the Germans were not pulling out of Normandy and there was an opportunity to move north and make a pocket. I imagine you are trying to sort out the who knew what and when. In my view, Patton's free hand was purchased by First Army grappling with the German strength on the left of their line. From the map it shows Third Army's XV Corps moving north. Later First Army's V Corps would take over most of those divisions and complete the link up with the Canadians and Poles. http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/norfran/p16%28map%29.jpg
I imagine you are trying to sort out the who knew what and when. Yes! It's like a puzzle and fun to do! I do find that a lot of "publications" are copies, from copies, etcetera.
The map may explain why XV Corps (3rd Army) closed the pocket rather than VII Corps (1st Army). The XV Corps seems to have had a good road from Alencon to Argentan. What were the roads available to VII Corps like? Was there anything running NE from Mayenne that could have handled the traffic?
The front "line" shown on the map gives the wrong impression about the maneuver V Corps was performing. They were actually pulling units from their left and moving them to their right in a leap frog manner (attached). Units then advanced northeast until they came to German resistance they could not overcome. XV Corps was mostly advancing against German rear echelon troops. http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=101615&stc=1&d=1363104327
Yes, I did have a look at a map. There are routes running NE from Mayenne but they don't look very accommodating and they run through wooded country as well. I don't wonder that VII Corps advanced so slowly. The 3rd Army and XV Corps, on the other hand, were in more open country and had broken free of the toughest German defenses.
There must be someone who can help me so that I can move on! ..about Montgomery's intensions, from Normandy until 7 :smile: October. What is with 7 October 1944 ? (googled: Die Bombardierung Freibergs am 07.Oktober 1944 ?)
Now I get it... It's a familiar US Army maneuver. The 1st Army pinned the Germans frontally with a holding attack, while 3rd Army executed the flanking attack. US commanders did that maneuver routinely, at all levels.
..about Montgomery's intensions, from Normandy until 7 :smile: October. What is with 7 October 1944 ? (googled: Die Bombardierung Freibergs am 07.Oktober 1944 ?) On 7 October, Montgomery informed Eisenhower that 21 Army Group did not have the strength to carry out an eastward thrust towards the Ruhr and had to devote what strength it possessed to a) clearing the Scheldt estuary b) securing the Nijmegen salient and clearing its flanks. In other words, Montgomery more or less admitted that MARKET-GARDEN had failed to achieve its main objectives and a new plan would be required. It was back to the drawing board.
To illustrate the potential of the US Army official history in studying these questions, I have been extracting excerpts that touch on these decisions. Because the history was intended to provide a comprehensive overview of all units in action, it constantly jumps from tactical operations to command decisions and enemy reactions. I am trying to extract those command decisions. My first reaction to the writing style is that the commanders do seem to get all the credit. The student of military history must know how staff operations work and that much of what commanders know come first from the staff studies. Nonetheless, keeping the staff work in mind, we can follow the official interpretation. Full credit to HyperWar and OpanaPointer and his crew. HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Breakout and Pursuit Exclusive of Brittany, the mission outlined for the Third Army by General Bradley on 3 August had both offensive and defensive implications. General Patton was to secure a sixty-mile stretch of the north-south Mayenne River between Mayenne and Château-Gontier and to seize bridgeheads across the river. He also was to protect his right flank along the Loire River west of Angers, part of the southern flank of the OVERLORD lodgment area.45 Because this task was too great for the XV Corps alone, General Patton brought in the XX Corps to secure the Mayenne River south of Château-Gontier and to protect the Loire River flank. While the XV Corps was to drive about thirty miles southeast to the water line between Mayenne and Château-Gontier, the XX Corps was to move south toward the Loire. Although Patton assigned no further objectives, he was thinking of an eventual Third Army advance forty-five miles beyond Laval to le Mans--to the east. When, by which unit, and how this was to be done he did not say, but the obvious presumption that the XV Corps would continue eastward beyond the Mayenne River was not necessarily correct. "Don't be surprised," Patton told Haislip [XV Corps], if orders were issued for movement to the northeast or even to the north. -46- The implication was clear. Patton had sniffed the opportunity to encircle the Germans west of the Seine River, and he apparently liked what he smelled. 46. TUSA Ltr, Dir, 5 Aug (confirming fragmentary orders, 4 Aug); XV Corps Plng Paper, 2400, 4 Aug, XV Corps G-3 Jnl and File. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary sources cited in this section are from this file. As the XV Corps, on the right of the VII Corps, began to advance toward Laval and le Mans, General Hodges instructed General Collins to move to the south to cover the XV Corps north flank. In compliance, the 1st Division on 6 August displaced across the Sélune River south of Mortain to Gorron and Ambrières-le-Grand and, having met only slight interference, started to relieve the 90th Division at Mayenne.17 To replace the 1st Division at Mortain, Hodges shifted the 30th Division from Tessy and XIX Corps control. The 1st Division was then free to exploit eastward from Mayenne toward Alençon in a drive paralleling the XV Corps thrust to le Mans. 17. VII Corps Opns Memo 57, 4 Aug. During the first six days of August, General Collins had faced contrasting situations on his corps front. On his right, he had essentially the same opportunity for exploitation enjoyed by the Third Army's XV Corps, yet he had been bound to the First Army and its requirements and consequently was unable to capitalize on the fluid situation there. With the exception of the 1st Division, the VII Corps components had taken part in combat that resembled the earlier battle of the hedgerows. Stubborn resistance, skillful withdrawal, and effective delaying action in bocage terrain had resulted in a slow and hard advance. Whereas the 1st Division sustained less than 250 casualties between 2 and 7 August, the 3d Armored Division lost almost 300 men, the 4th Division 600, and the 9th Division nearly 850.29 Although the figures hardly approached the intensity of losses in July, they indicated clearly a major difference in the character of the opposition met on different sectors of the front. As early as 8 August, General Bradley was confident that the reinforced VII Corps would hold at Mortain. He felt that the Mortain counterattack had "apparently been contained." As he studied the situation, he came to the further conclusion that the Germans by attacking had "incurred the risk of encirclement from the South and North," and he acted at once to capitalize on the opportunity.46 In the presence of General Eisenhower who was visiting his headquarters on 8 August, General Bradley telephoned General Montgomery and secured approval for a bold course of action designed to encircle the German forces west of Argentan and Falaise. -47- What he proposed was a radical change--a 90-degree turn--in the 12th Army Group offensive axis. Instead of driving eastward toward the Seine, the First and Third Armies would wheel to the north and attack toward the army group boundary, specifically toward the towns of Flers and Argentan. 46. 12th AGp Ltr of Instrs 4, 8 Aug. 47. Bradley, Soldier's Story pp. 372, 374-75; Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 158; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 275; Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, p. 636. For an interesting speculative account of the command decisions at Mortain, see G. G. Haywood, Jr., "Military Decision and Game Theory," Journal of the Operations Research Society of America, II, No. 4 (November, 1954), 371-85.
on 7 october, montgomery informed eisenhower that 21 army group did not have the strength to carry out an eastward thrust towards the ruhr and had to devote what strength it possessed to a) clearing the scheldt estuary b) securing the nijmegen salient and clearing its flanks. In other words, montgomery more or less admitted that market-garden had failed to achieve its main objectives and a new plan would be required. It was back to the drawing board. touchdown!
Now I get it... It's a familiar US Army maneuver. The 1st Army pinned the Germans frontally with a holding attack, while 3rd Army executed the flanking attack. US commanders did that maneuver routinely, at all levels. Some might say it was Hitler holding the German units in front of the US First Army. Their precarious situation was not lost on the field commanders (or Hitler really).
Yes, I did have a look at a map. There are routes running NE from Mayenne but they don't look very accommodating and they run through wooded country as well. I don't wonder that VII Corps advanced so slowly. The 3rd Army and XV Corps, on the other hand, were in more open country and had broken free of the toughest German defenses. The road net is not so much the issue. The attached Michelin map of primary and secondary highways shows plenty. In fact, if you try to follow the route of Regiments and Combat Commands on this map, it is often impossible to find the towns they pass through. For tracked and all-wheel-drive vehicles, third and fourth class roads seem just fine. Of course bridges of sufficient capacity is another matter. http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=101639&stc=1&d=1363118712
Interesting about the roads. Still, I tend to think that Eisenhower and Bradley were right to go for a deeper envelopment with XV Corps. Whether that was done with sufficient speed and strength is the question, I suppose.
If a copy is not online, at least one can find the name on the Internet. First United States Army Report of Operations, 1 August 1944 to 22 February 1945. 4 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946. And a source: MilSpecManuals-Where Military History meets the Digital Age
