I was watching A Bridge To Far last night and they were talking about a raiding party that was set up intially to race for Arnhem bridge. Was this a spin off of the SAS jeep section? Also they said that the reason that 1st Division wasn't able to contact sub ordinate units was because they were given the wrong crystals. I didn't understand this. Iwatched it twice to try and figure out, but it never went into any explanation. Because of this movie I have become very interested in the action and I think I am going to make this my area of study. Jeremy
(Jeremy @ Nov 3 2005, 07:06 AM) [post=41010]I was watching A Bridge To Far last night and they were talking about a raiding party that was set up intially to race for Arnhem bridge. Was this a spin off of the SAS jeep section? Also they said that the reason that 1st Division wasn't able to contact sub ordinate units was because they were given the wrong crystals. I didn't understand this. Iwatched it twice to try and figure out, but it never went into any explanation. Jeremy [/b] British radios did not work because their long-range VHF sets were delivered with the wrong crystals, thus operating on a frequency no one was listening to . The shorter-range sets for use between the brigades did not work, and the various battalions were completely cut off from each other.
I found - as usual - that Martin Middlebrook's account of Arnhem was exceptional. Strongly suggest you get a copy. Browse for 'Middlebrook Arnhem' and that should provide you with a precis. Also believe it or not ... the 'Close Combat' game 'Bridge too Far' proved an excellent way to get a better understanding of the overall area. As history .. very far from perfect ... but nevertheless a good little sideline. Des
Jeremy The raiding party-the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron commanded by Major Freddie Gough with a troop of RE's were given the Coup de Main task to get to the bridge by the shortest route possible remove any demolition charges and hold the bridge until reinforced. Regards Doug.
WIth regards to the communications problem, no one really seemed to think of using, or asking about, one good system, the Dutch Telephone Network! This was mostly intact and hardly supervised by the Germans, sadly it wasn't really used until just before the surrender. Regards MG
I think that any study of Market Garden runs into problems if it only looks at Arnhem. Middelbrook's book does this and i would certainly recommend it, but there is much more to the whole operation. To me, although things at Arnhem did not go according to plan, I think the delays in taking the Nijmegen bridges were in the end crucial. I do not, though, go along with the line in "A Bridge Too Far" that the British tanks "stopped for tea" rather than press on after they were taken. To me, this covers up the failure of the 82nd Airborne's plan, which led to the failure to take the bridges on 17 September. I would suggest also reading the German side of the operation in "It Never Snows in September", Robert J Kershaw, Ian Allan 2004.
Thanks for the book suggestions angie. To risk a little intended humour, I take it these guys are real historians?! images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif regards MG
(angie999 @ Dec 4 2005, 05:33 AM) [post=42607]To me, although things at Arnhem did not go according to plan, I think the delays in taking the Nijmegen bridges were in the end crucial. I do not, though, go along with the line in "A Bridge Too Far" that the British tanks "stopped for tea" rather than press on after they were taken. To me, this covers up the failure of the 82nd Airborne’s plan, which led to the failure to take the bridges on 17 September. [/b] Angie, I you keep saying this but I have no idea where you get it. The 82nd was given the objective of key bridges at Grave and Nijmegen as well as some subsidiary bridges over a canal to the east of Grave. Despite the fact that the bomber groups called this "Flak Alley" and the fact that they were outnumbered by 4000 SS soldiers, they completed their first day objectives and held the bridges after only four hours from drop to completion. They held these bridges for two days despite intense resistance and counterattacks and the bridges were in Allied hands (except for rail bridges which they were not tasked with taking). After hold these bridges, they were then ordered to take the bridge at Nijmengen again in broad daylight but this time having to cross the river 400 yards wide against heavy 88mm and 20mm and machinegun fire. They did such an incredible job of this that not only did one soldier get the medal of honor but your own Miles Dempsey in watching the 82nd overcoming such heavy defense of the bridge remarked with a single word "unbelievable". How you can deduce that they "failed" other than they were given an impossible objectives in an infeasible plan and somehow still accomplished this in the daytime of all things in only three days, is beyond me. This sounds like a likely story of a British historian trying to cover for claims of armor "stopping for tea" that he is shocked at. I don't believe that but they did but I can envision someone defending them by attacking others. They fought well from the moment they hit the ground until they were withdrawn and relieved 56 days of combat later. All I have ever read about the 82nd was accolades for above and beyond. It is shocking to hear criticism of them especially from someone of your caliber. It was by someone bitter about the accusations I could understand them taking a cheap shot at the 82nd but that is not in your character.
Jimbo, I recently posted the piece below on another forum where Nijmegen was the subject. If it does not read 100% in context here, it is because it was a reply to an earlier post on that forum, rather than written for posting here.This is it: Three regiments from 82nd Airborne landed on 17 September. One of these captured the Maas bridge and two were deployed onto the heights to the south east of Nijmegen to deal with expected counter attacks from that direction. In fact, a fairly weak counter attack went in on 18 September in the form of the German 406th Division, a hastily assembled force which was a division in name only. Some troops were older depot personnel from Germany who had not seen action sine WWI! It was beaten off without too much trouble, although from German accounts some of the Americans were firing high. This is usually taken as an indication of nervous, inexperienced troops and indeed after Normandy 82nd Airborne contained many inexperienced replacements. At the time of the initial landings, there were effectively no German forces in Nijmegen and even a coup de main force of battalion strength could have taken the town and both the road and rail bridges over the Waal. However, when an attempt was made that evening, in a lot less than battalion strenght, sufficient forces from 10 SS Panzer and other hastily assembled units had arrived to form a defensive perimeter inside the town and secure the bridges. This German position in the town was then strengthened over the next day. The lead elements of XXX Corps arrived at Grave at about 0820 on 19 September, well within timetable to reach Arnhem had the road ahead been clear. Instead, they had to fight alongside 82nd Airborne to capture the town and the bridges, securing the road bridge at about 1830 on 20 September and the rail bridge shortly after that. In total, about five tanks were across, together with the remnants of the battalion which had carried out the river assault, it was nearly dark and they all needed resupply. The Germans by then had established a new, although weak, position at Ressen and were preparing another up the road at Elst, where later quite a sharp action was fought. The tanks could not operate off road in that particular terrain and the total forces available were insufficient to attack. Any advance that evening was frankly "not on". The real question is, why didn't 82nd Airborne take the town and bridges on 17 September? ......................................................................................... Back to current post - my position is that too large a proportion of the 82nd was posted to guard the Groesbeek Heights, for possibly two reasons: 1. An overestimate of the strength of any possible German counter-attack from the Reichwald. 2. Browning had decided to locate his corps headquarters there - totally unnecessary and he had no useful work to do in Holland anyway - and this put pressure on Gavin tpo provide protection. On the "tea" thing, which has been followed by some US historians, I think Cornelius Ryan shares a lot of the blame. Do not get me wrong. I am not criticising the performance of the soldiers of the 82nd and I think the assault river crossing by Maj. Julian Cook's battalion on 20 September was outstanding. I am criticising the plan they were following and I do not know whether Gavin had the freedom to devise his own plan, or whether it was imposed on him, in whole or in part.
(Colonel Gubbins @ Dec 4 2005, 07:55 PM) [post=42637]Thanks for the book suggestions angie. To risk a little intended humour, I take it these guys are real historians?! images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif regards MG [/b] I would say that they are both talented amateurs, but Middlebrook has a long and respected track record and Kershaw's book is very well researched.
Angie, Don’t know where you got the “history” but it looks more like someone desperately trying to cover up 30th Corps delay than someone objectively evaluating an operation retrospectively. It is wrought with errors. I have seen few “blameshifts” that are that transparent. Maybe if the person that wrote it had used a few less exaggerations, then they might at least mask their motivations. -First of all, the 82nd Airborne 504th took all of their first day objectives in “four hours” including the Graves Bridge. They took all bridges they were tasked with except one that was blown up before they got to it. That’s a mighty important fact to ignore when looking to blame them or their commander or their plan. -Second, just the use of the term a weak counterattack of depot workers who haven’t touched a gun since WWI is a tad “over the top”. There were over 4000 SS troops there that outnumbered them alone with a number of tanks to their “none”. Why would that person would consider that “light counterattack” unless he was being facetious? -Third, it was nicknamed “Flak alley” by bomber pilots that hated it for its intensity of flak concentration. Exactly how is an airborne division going to take out 20mms and 88s protected by SS infantry and armor? They were so afraid of these 88s that they dropped these guys well away from their objectives and not hta far from the British 1st Paras. It doesn’t make a whole lot of sense to expect Paras to capture all the objectives without infantry, or armor support. Is this guy trying to infer that was Monty's plan and they just did a poor job of executing it? -Fourth, the 508th was under intense fire by another paratrooper division, the 3rd Fallschirmjager Division. The hill they held throughout this encounter was nicknamed “Devil’s Hill”. It was constantly assaulted. -Fifth, they held their objectives and still executed aggressive combat and recon patrols until after these two days the Irish Guards finally arrive ahead of 30th Corps. -Sixth, from the beginning of the operation, 30th Corps only had to go 57 miles. That’s about two hours by Sherman. Why did it take three days? -Seventh, a German Panzer Grenadier division was dispatched as reinforcement at Nijmegen. The fighting was from house to house. -Eighth, the Waal River, as I mentioned before, had to be crossed which was 400 feet wide under the fire of 88s, 20mms, mortars, machine guns, and tanks. That was when Dempsey who witnessed the operation “unbelievable”. As far as your claims about Groesbeek Heights, the Browning and Gavin were under strict orders to not proceed towards Nijmegen until the heights had been secured. Nijmegen should have been a higher priority but you must obey your operations commanders. But all in all, I think you are straining at a gnat. If, my favorite, the “all-you-really-need” American and British fighter bombers could have been contacted, then the issue of any armor resistance is completely canceled along with flak guns in key positions. But since they could not contact them, the radio problem was more than a trivial or nuisance problem. Applying the “he who rules the sky, rules the war” principle that was so prevalent in WWII, if no one ruled the sky (as in this case) then it falls back to the “rock-paper-scissors” rule and whoever has the armor and fire power rules the battlefield. If it was indeed Monty’s plan that the 82nd do all the work and later 30th Corps can come waltzing in without having to fire a shot, then he severely misused his forces and exercised poor strategy. But, perhaps you can describe why it takes a little over two days for a tank group to go 57 miles unopposed. I don’t know who started the “stopped for tea” thing; I don’t doubt it was American historians. But, if it was done in response to attempts to blameshift by British historians as in your example, the failure of Market Garden being blamed on the 82nd, then all you could ever say in response to them is “touché”.
Angie and Jimbo. Forgive me if I get some details majorly wrong as I personally follow the RAF war, but I do have an interest in Operation Market Garden as my Great Uncle came down in the 2nd wave of paras. Not entirely sure what you are arguing about as I have not researched the battle, but I do know that it was truly a bridge too far. We didn't have the man power to take it, let alone the gliders. I think this was the first major problem to face takinhg Arnhem. There were not enough gliders or planes to bring all of the troops down in one wave, and so they had to be spread out over several days, giving the German forces a chance to get there and prepare a defence. Also, wasn't there a problem with the weather that prevented a drop for a day? Not sure about that one. Added to this was the ack-ack. I know as army followers you probably think the aircrews were a little bit wussy about this. But please remember a 27 or 33mm shot through a wing would blow a bird out of the sky. And when an attempt was made to resupply the troops by air, all of the planes were badly damaged or shot down, hence the memorial to the aircrews at Arnhem. This led to the troops running outof food and water. Whether it was British or American troops involved, you can't deny that Arnhem was a bit of a cock-up. How else could the Germans stand on the ground and shoot the crap oput of the second wave of troopers coming down? And air support from Bombers? I think they had other things to think about trying to take out the industrial cities of Germany to prevent resupply on the western and eastern fronts. This is not an excuse, it is just how it was. That was why Dresden was bombed. And besides, how could they have precison bombed the defensive positions? Only 617 were capable of such work, and they were busy on much more important sites. As to the Allied aircrews, they were good, but not good enough, and I'm sorry Jimbo, but the USAAF were a bit lax about accurate bombing. Within several hundred yards was good for them. And at Arnhem the positons were a bit too damn close to allow that. So the pair of you, stop arguing about whether the tanks stopped for tea, which I very much doubt they would have done wihtout orders from above, but look at the bigger picture of taking the bridges. Arnhem was a cock-up that need not have happened. There we are, I am sure you will rip me to shreds now as I have probably got the details wrong. But this is just my opinion, for what it is worth. Oh, and one more thing, my great uncle had half his face shot off before he had hit the gorund. And unusually the Germans repatriated him back to Allied lines. He died six weeks later in hospital two hundred yards from his childhood home in Staffordshire.
(jimbotosome @ Dec 5 2005, 07:24 PM) [post=42714]Don’t know where you got the “history” but it looks more like someone desperately trying to cover up 30th Corps delay [/b] There was little delay. They were tasked to reach Arnhem in two days and this was still possible when they arrived at the Grave bridge on 19th. If there was any delay, it was because of the blown bridge at Son. (jimbotosome @ Dec 5 2005, 07:24 PM) [post=42714]-First of all, the 82nd Airborne 504th took all of their first day objectives in “four hours” including the Graves Bridge. [/b] Yes they did, but they were not tasked to take Nijmegen, or the more important bridges over the Waal on the northern outskirts of Nijmegen at that point. My argument is that they should have been tasked to do so.The fatal delays occurred after Grave, because of the fact that it took until the evening of the 20th to get across the Waal (which is actually the southern branch of the Rhine). (jimbotosome @ Dec 5 2005, 07:24 PM) [post=42714]-Second, just the use of the term a weak counterattack of depot workers who haven’t touched a gun since WWI is a tad “over the top”. [/b] No it is not. It is based on German accounts of the composition and actions of 406th Division. There were no large concentrations of SS in a position to attack the Groesbeek Heights from the Reichwald on 17th or 18th. The battlegroups formed by 9 and 10 SS Panzer were north of Arnhem on 17th and it was the 10 SS Panzer battlegroup which blocked Nijmegen town, the Waal bridges and then the road north of Nijmegen. (jimbotosome @ Dec 5 2005, 07:24 PM) [post=42714]-Seventh, a German Panzer Grenadier division was dispatched as reinforcement at Nijmegen. The fighting was from house to house. [/b] Sorry, but the fighting was on a much smaller scale and confined to the German perimeter hastily established in the town on 17th. The Germans never had a divisional strength unit in Nijmegen. (jimbotosome @ Dec 5 2005, 07:24 PM) [post=42714]Eighth, the Waal River, as I mentioned before, had to be crossed which was 400 feet wide under the fire of 88s, 20mms, mortars, machine guns, and tanks. That was when Dempsey who witnessed the operation “unbelievable”. [/b] True, but it was totally undefended at the time of the original landings on 17th. An opportunity to cross it with minimal losses was missed. I think you have missed the point here, because this is my main point in the whole discussion. What proved very hard on 19/20 th could have been done cheaply by a coup de main operation on 17th. (jimbotosome @ Dec 5 2005, 07:24 PM) [post=42714]As far as your claims about Groesbeek Heights, the Browning and Gavin were under strict orders to not proceed towards Nijmegen until the heights had been secured. Nijmegen should have been a higher priority but you must obey your operations commanders. [/b] Hold on here - I don't know what Gavin's orders were, but Browning was the responsibile Corps commander, not some subaltern without a clue as to how to fight a battle. I think he may carry a lot of the responsibility. (jimbotosome @ Dec 5 2005, 07:24 PM) [post=42714]If it was indeed Monty’s plan that the 82nd do all the work and later 30th Corps can come waltzing in without having to fire a shot, then he severely misused his forces and exercised poor strategy. But, perhaps you can describe why it takes a little over two days for a tank group to go 57 miles unopposed. [/b] Do not be so incredibly naive. The whole idea was that the Airborne should do the work of taking the bridges. And 57 miles in two days is an incredible rate of advance in military terms. And I do not think Montgomery, an army group commander, played any part in drawing up the detailed operational plans of the airborne divisions. That task lay at a much lower level of command, corps and division. (jimbotosome @ Dec 5 2005, 07:24 PM) [post=42714]I don’t know who started the “stopped for tea” thing; I don’t doubt it was American historians. But, if it was done in response to attempts to blameshift by British historians as in your example, the failure of Market Garden being blamed on the 82nd, then all you could ever say in response to them is “touché”. [/b] It was probably Cornelius Ryan, but as I say, I do not blame the 82nd Airborne soldiers. I do blame the plan. (mosquito617 @ Dec 6 2005, 08:50 AM) [post=42739] Whether it was British or American troops involved, you can't deny that Arnhem was a bit of a cock-up. [/b] I think that my personal point is that by adopting a narrow focus on Arnhem, the conduct of the rest of market Garden is overlooked. For all the problems at Arnhem, I think the situation was acceptable as long as XXX Corps could get there on 19th. I think that the primary reason for not doing so was the battle for the Waal bridges at Nijmegen.
I read these pages sometimes almost in despair! To think that an armoured drive would stop for tea, is just about as absolutely stupid a thing to write, as it is possible to imagine, and shows quite clearly that the person that wrote that, knows about little or nothing about war, but lives in a little fantasy world of their own Stop and think for a moment! can you imagine the Guards stopping for tea, Some of the best and most disciplined troops in the world, stopping for tea......... Do these people that write such clap-trap have any idea of war. Use your imagination a huge column rolling Northwards, mostly under fire, when all of a sudden they all stop the war and make tea? all I can say to whoever wrote that is "for Gods sake grow up" Theses stories it seems to me are often produced to cover up for their own shortcomings. If like me you have had the honour of going into battle with the Guards armoured brigadesm then you would be only too aware of what complete and INSULTING rubbish that is. I am sorely tempted to relate the failure of our allies,But I will not...For one reason,that would defile the memory of those that fell in battle, and I will not do that...Unless I am pushed too damned far.... Sapper Sapper I would point out that I was Nijmegen bridge just after it was taken, I speak with first hand knowledge. Sapper
Yes, I cannot imagine the Guards - or any other British troops - stopping just to have tea. I can imagine British troops brewing up if they stopped and had a chance to, but not the same thing at all.
You would think that is what they would do Angie. Brew up, and that is also very wrong, I can never recall "Brewing up" We had our water bottles and that was about it. Certainly if we had time with nothing happening, we would try to get some food and drink..but this idea that British troop stopped and made tea at any opportunity, is just about as daft as it gets. In many cases we would be damned lucky to get one meal a day if we were heavily engaged, in what ever was taking place. Many times we have arrived back at the Harbour area, late, sometimes at night, utterly whacked, and have our first meal of the day, sometimes too damned tired to eat it. I know that I fallen asleep over my billy can, without finishing my soup and biscuits. many of these posting show an unreal and totally false idea of war, and what it is like in "Active areas" Brewing up, Yes, but only when you were blasted thirsty and hungry, after being with out food for some time Sapper
(angie999 @ Dec 6 2005, 05:09 AM) [post=42742]There was little delay. They were tasked to reach Arnhem in two days and this was still possible when they arrived at the Grave bridge on 19th. If there was any delay, it was because of the blown bridge at Son. [/b] And this would be the fault of the 82nd? (jimbotosome @ Dec 5 2005, 07:24 PM) [post=42714]Yes they did, but they were not tasked to take Nijmegen, or the more important bridges over the Waal on the northern outskirts of Nijmegen at that point. My argument is that they should have been tasked to do so.The fatal delays occurred after Grave, because of the fact that it took until the evening of the 20th to get across the Waal (which is actually the southern branch of the Rhine).[/b] So the blameshift is actually to be done from Monty to Browning. Ok, clears it up. To have taken Nijmegen and not Graves would mean that Monty would have donated the 82nd Airborne, the Polish Brigade as this would mean the SS Panzer groups in Nijmegan would have cut them off from 30th Corp. If you think Browning was not going to leave an escape route for his troops, you don’t understand about how a commander feels about getting his group slaughtered. If Groesbeek Heights had not been secured then the Panzer groups would have simply showed up while they were removing demo charges while they were rolling anti-tank guns across the bridge. If this is a what you call a “delay” then why the he-double-hockey-sticks weren’t the Tanks supposed to also be aggressive and go a mere 57 miles in less than two days? Is it that you can risk with hyper-aggressive action American soldiers but you don’t want to risk your precious Irish Guard or 30th Corps so they can take their sweet time and not rush the small resistance they are faced with? Face it Angie, there were no tanks there. The plan said there would be. That’s the GARDEN part of it Angie, remember? It was not operation MARKET, it was MARKET-GARDEN. Which one was missing? Perhaps Monty should have scheduled to drop the Paratroops in there a couple of days later in order to “coordinate” an attack of the two. You know what would have speed up the taking of Nijmegen Angie? Tanks. Any idea where the 82nd might have gotten any? Even if they had taken the bridge on the day of the jump, it would be two days before the armor would get there to cross it. Can you see why this becomes a transparent blameshift? If 1st couldn't hold Arnhem, why would you expect 82nd to do it without armor as well especially in the teeth of two SS Panzer divisions. (angie999 @ Dec 6 2005, 05:09 AM) [post=42742]No it is not. It is based on German accounts of the composition and actions of 406th Division. There were no large concentrations of SS in a position to attack the Groesbeek Heights from the Reichwald on 17th or 18th. The battlegroups formed by 9 and 10 SS Panzer were north of Arnhem on 17th and it was the 10 SS Panzer battlegroup which blocked Nijmegen town, the Waal bridges and then the road north of Nijmegen. [/b] Again, if the Monty had made Nijmegen bridge the first day objective, and the 82nd took it on the first day, 9th and 10th SS Panzer would still be blocking Nijmegen. Surely you don’t expect an unsupplied Airborne Division to assault two SS Panzer by itself do you? Again, that might be asking a little much out of an airborne division. (angie999 @ Dec 6 2005, 05:09 AM) [post=42742]Sorry, but the fighting was on a much smaller scale and confined to the German perimeter hastily established in the town on 17th. The Germans never had a divisional strength unit in Nijmegen. [/b] That’s not what I read on the WW2 airborne web site documenting the history of the 82nd and its regiments in MG. Also you just mentioned that 10th SS Panzer was at Nijmegen, but you failed to mention that 9th SS Panzer was there too. (angie999 @ Dec 6 2005, 05:09 AM) [post=42742]True, but it was totally undefended at the time of the original landings on 17th. An opportunity to cross it with minimal losses was missed. [/b] Why did they need to be across? They were across when the 30th got there. Again, your inference is that you expected an airborne division to assault BOTH 9th SS Panzer and 10th SS Panzer division. I am sure you know that these divisions were reinforced with Tiger tanks don’t you? Do you really believe what you are saying Angie? I don’t think you do, you have always impressed me as someone who understands warfare pretty good. (angie999 @ Dec 6 2005, 05:09 AM) [post=42742]Hold on here - I don't know what Gavin's orders were, but Browning was the responsibile Corps commander, not some subaltern without a clue as to how to fight a battle. I think he may carry a lot of the responsibility. [/b] Browning was responsible for the American paras. He was not responsible for 30th Armor nor the Irish Guards. I don’t think the plan was to leave the 82nd exposed for two days do you? (angie999 @ Dec 6 2005, 05:09 AM) [post=42742]Do not be so incredibly naive. The whole idea was that the Airborne should do the work of taking the bridges. And 57 miles in two days is an incredible rate of advance in military terms. And I do not think Montgomery, an army group commander, played any part in drawing up the detailed operational plans of the airborne divisions. That task lay at a much lower level of command, corps and division. [/b] I am naïve? Hmmm. Monty spent a lot of time on Market Garden, working out the details. The very premise of it, as I have stated, is that airborne was to be coordinated by Armor. Contrary to what you infer, there is a point to having armor there. So, if 57 miles is an incredible pace for an advance of armor against virtually no resistance (15th Army had fled) then it should have NEVER been planned as a part of the Market Garden. If the 82nd had taken Nijmegen bridge on D+0 then they would have had to have defended it until the armor had gotten there and the armor in Nijmegen would have taken it back since the 82nd would have had no armor support just as they did taking the Arnhem bridge and killing and capturing them. Surely if 28 miles per day on a piece of equipment that goes 29 miles per hour is a fast pace, then surely Monty of all people would have known how irrational the plan to use airborne and armor together was especially at a distance of Arnhem. The problem with saying that the 19th was ok, was the fact that 30th Corps didn’t get to Nijmegen until and at that point because of the heavy SS Armor that would have annihilated the Airborne troops and/or dropped the bridge with a few rounds, then they now have to wait for boats. The Germans attacked immediately through the east after they crossed the bridge yet you claim they didn’t need to take Groesbeek Heights, which is where they would have attacked if the bridge had been secured again cutting off the 82nd and getting “Horrocks” to stop at the least resistance. You do realize that the Germans attacked the heights right across the river from Groesbeek Heights don’t you? Any reason you think they would not have been just as willing to surround the 82nd if they held the Nijmegen bridge without armor and did not hold the heights? I would make the priority 1) Graves Bridge – I need an escape if Monty is wrong and those tanks at Arnhem were indeed operational. 2) Groesbeek Heights – I need to make sure I am not cut off by a flanking attack. 3) Nijmegen Bridge – Need to get across the river (angie999 @ Dec 6 2005, 05:09 AM) [post=42742]It was probably Cornelius Ryan, but as I say, I do not blame the 82nd Airborne soldiers. I do blame the plan. [/b] Perhaps he should have named his book “The Dutch Resistance Was Right” or “Monty’s Plan to Assault Armor with Paratroops”. (angie999 @ Dec 6 2005, 05:09 AM) [post=42742]For all the problems at Arnhem, I think the situation was acceptable as long as XXX Corps could get there on 19th. I think that the primary reason for not doing so was the battle for the Waal bridges at Nijmegen. [/b] Not if you ask the 82nd airborne, I hardly think they would agree with you there. The thing is that 30th Corps was supposed to be there the morning of the 18th not the 19th. When they got there the 82nd had been constantly under attack by a depot worker with a sledge hammer and it took both the 82nd Airborne and the 30th Armor Corps the rest of the day to over come him. I have heard the German depot workers can really swing those hammers. But because the 82nd took the bridge at Graves FIRST, they were not surrounded by that depot worker and Graves in his hands to hold back 30th Corps even further behind Graves bridge. Then Monty would have said, they should have taken Graves first! The next day, the 82nd had to wait for the boats to cross which didn’t come until afternoon, in which they decided to make a daylight assault which netted them the “unbelievable” by Dempsey (nothing by Monty who never praised the efforts of the American airborne troops which thoroughly disgusted Ike). So once they were across the “brave Guards Armored” stopped and refused to move any further (even though 1st Para was perishing at Arnhem) because their was another assault by depot workers at heights to the east. Of course this cost time because 82nd Airborne and Coldstream Guards took beat off these dock workers too, but Horrocks decided he was not going to take any risks here, that was for paratroops to do alone. I think it is Ironic that the “Guards Armored” got there one hour too late after sitting on their derriere when less than one hours worth of slow moving to reach the bridge at Arnhem. Say what you will but if 30th had at least gotten to Nijmegen an hour earlier rather than a day late and still sat on their behinds after crossing it, then they could have saved those men. Since there was another bridge just like Arnhem 25 km to the west (Rhenen) and completely undefended, why did Horrocks refuse to go that route? Why did he refuse to use the unprotected ferry crossing at Driel? Part of the delay was the fact that Horrocks refused not only to start ahead of time but also to wait until 2 pm when he got word that the paras were verified on the ground. Then and only then did he decide to risk his tanks to moving. That borders on cowardice especially in the face that 1st Airborne was guaranteed death or capture if everything in an extremely high risk mission did not go off perfectly. Seems like he could have put it on the line too. Maybe they should have brought up Patton and 3rd Army. Had that ever been proposed? I bet Patton wouldn’t have taken over 2 days to go 57 miles. He went over 100 miles in 2 days in a blinding snowstorm and attacked German panzer divisions in the middle of a major German offensive to save an airborne division at Bastone, you think he would have sat on his behind why brave soldiers were dying at Arnhem? Patton also would not have been trying to find some tactical reason why the operation was a total failure to scapegoat it. If the 82nd Airborne had been on the bridge on D+0 then the two SS Panzer groups would have dropped the bridge and captured them. Then the operation would have over before it started only instead of one destroyed Airborne division there would now have been two. Or maybe if Monty had not assumed that the tanks near Arnhem were “broken down”. I personally believe Market Garden was concocted by Monty because he was afraid that Patton would get to Berlin before him and need a plan and would be dismissive of any intelligence reports that the plan he had campaigned for could not be done. But there is even a more perplexing question. If it was a “bridge too far”, then why the “bloody heck” didn’t they simply blow the “bridge too far” and simply turn and begin to attack from Nijmegen to the east just like they would have if they had gotten Arnhem? They were past the Siegfried line. Why did the attack east into Germany “have” to start on at the town of Arnhem? Talk about throwing the baby out with the bath water. Secondly, why not just open a 10 mile corridor in the Siegfried Line by using heavy bombers to bomb along the line of it and annihilate it so the could simply walk into Germany? Drop your paras and move 30th through the destroyed static line. If Patton can do it with a bunch of M7s then why can’t you do it with heavy bombers too? Follow the bombing up by dropping the paras about 10 miles behind it and let them work their way back to it while 30th moves toward it and boom, you are not just in Holland but you are into Germany.
Who is looking to blame the 82nd for Son? It was in 101st sector and anyway was just the fortunes of war, but in spite of it XXX Corps lead elements were at Grave on the morning of 19th, under two days from the start of the operation. I am arguing that from the two PIRs deployed on the Groesbeek heights, at least a battalion could have been used for a coup de main operation to secure the Waal bridges. Both they and the units on the Groesbeek could, in my opinion, have held for 24 hours until reinforced by the second landing on 18th. I am not arguing for the Waal instead of the Maas, but for both. Otherwise, the probability of failure was always there. As for Browning, after Market-Garden he was shunted off into a command where he could do little harm operationally. He was considered a bit of a failure and I agree. XXX Corps did not take their "sweet time". Considering the obstacles and the restriction to a single road, they moved extremely quickly. It must be realised how many thousands of vehicles and how many miles of road were involved in the advance of a sinlge armoured division, let alone a corps? And any single mishap, such as one tank destroyed, blocked the road until cleared. (jimbotosome @ Dec 6 2005, 07:52 PM) [post=42781]You know what would have speed up the taking of Nijmegen Angie? Tanks. Any idea where the 82nd might have gotten any? [/b] No, there was simply no opposition to speak of until the evening of 17th and even that was limited. 82nd put in a company size move into Nijmegen late on 17th and the Germans just stopped it. They could not have stopped a battalion. And it is an entirely different matter defending a line against the small number of German tanks deployed compared to attacking against them. But just a part of 1st Airbourne, reinforced elements of one battalion, held out longer than two days at Arnhem. And what two aroured divisions? After Normandy, 9 and 10 SS Panzer were divisions only in name. The 9 SS Panzer battlegroup was deployed at Arnhem and the 10 SS Panzer battegroup, with such additional tanks as 9 SS still had, were sent towards Nijmegen. Maybe it would have meant the sacrifuce of troops from 82nd, but what was the assault river crossing on 20th if not a sacrifice? (jimbotosome @ Dec 6 2005, 07:52 PM) [post=42781]Surely you don’t expect an unsupplied Airborne Division to assault two SS Panzer by itself do you? Again, that might be asking a little much out of an airborne division. [/b] No, but have you never heard of "hold until relieved"? I think they could have held the bridges and then there would not have been the nearly two days of fighting before they were taken on 20th. (jimbotosome @ Dec 6 2005, 07:52 PM) [post=42781]but you failed to mention that 9th SS Panzer was there too. [/b] Such tanks as it had were attached to 10 SS. The bulk of the 9 SS Panzer battegroup operated against the British at Arnhem. (jimbotosome @ Dec 6 2005, 07:52 PM) [post=42781]Why did they need to be across? They were across when the 30th got there. [/b] No they were not. They had not even secured the town. That happened on 19th and 20th, once XXX Corps arrived. (jimbotosome @ Dec 6 2005, 07:52 PM) [post=42781]I don’t think the plan was to leave the 82nd exposed for two days do you? [/b] Why not? First, they were as expendable as British 1st Airborne and, second, 1st Airbourne was expected to do just that. (jimbotosome @ Dec 6 2005, 07:52 PM) [post=42781]Monty spent a lot of time on Market Garden, working out the details. [/b] Actually no. Army Group commanders do not work out details. And by all accounts, Monty was somewhat "psychologically absent" during Market-Garden. He did not apply his famous "grip" at all. There is a section here I am not responding to, because it just bears no relation to the realities of military operations in NW Europe. I would just ask one thing. Why "Horrocks" in quotes? Horrocks was his surname, not a nickname. (jimbotosome @ Dec 6 2005, 07:52 PM) [post=42781]When they got there the 82nd had been constantly under attack by a depot worker with a sledge hammer and it took both the 82nd Airborne and the 30th Armor Corps the rest of the day to over come him. I have heard the German depot workers can really swing those hammers. [/b] What is this rubbish? Don't you dare ever use sarcasm or misquote me. Go back and do some reading of German sources. I don't think you know what a military depot is. (jimbotosome @ Dec 6 2005, 07:52 PM) [post=42781]Maybe they should have brought up Patton and 3rd Army. [/b] What use would Patton have been? When did he ever advance quickly when there were Germans in the way? (jimbotosome @ Dec 6 2005, 07:52 PM) [post=42781]But there is even a more perplexing question. If it was a “bridge too far”, then why the “bloody heck” didn’t they simply blow the “bridge too far” and simply turn and begin to attack from Nijmegen to the east just like they would have if they had gotten Arnhem? [/b] It was never a bridge too far. As an operation, it was all or nothing as far as finishing the war by Christmas is concerned. Without the Neder Rijn as on objective, the operation would be a bit pointless, in my opinion. (jimbotosome @ Dec 6 2005, 07:52 PM) [post=42781]Secondly, why not just open a 10 mile corridor in the Siegfried Line by using heavy bombers to bomb along the line of it and annihilate it so the could simply walk into Germany? Drop your paras and move 30th through the destroyed static line. [/b] I disagree, because it would have not been so simple an operation but this was not in 21st Army Group's sector. I have long argued for the Aachen gap as an objective in place of Market-Garden, but it would have been US 1st Army. I back the "northern thrust" strategy, not Market-Garden as such. My view is that the airborne concept demonstrated in Market-Garden was flawed. There is no case in war for deep operations by parachute and I think that the bulk of the allied airborne forces would have been better used as light infantry in the line, but that is another story.
It is nice, as a participant of Market Garden to agree with what you say Angie, but I do most heartidly. There is far too much trying to apportion blame these days. What was taking place at that time was a desperate and valiant attempt to end the war, and subsequently to save many thousands of Allied Lives. Everyone knew that it was a long shot, all of us strove might and main to make it a success. My company trying to save time, tackled the assault crossing of the Escaut Canal at one in the morning, That assault made Dantes Inferno seem like a birthday party...Horrific! Market Garden was a success, it was only the final hurdle that failed. all the other objectives were realised. I often marvel at the accusations of failure levelled at the British. Was it a long shot? Too damned right it was! Was it worth it? again, too damned right it was. had we cpmpleted the whole of that thrust we would have been in Berlin first, there would have been no cold war as it turned out. Germany would have lain mainly in our hands.... Now with aftersight? market garden was a blasted master stroke. It failed on one element only, all the others were achieved. The Eastern thrust took all its objectives...100% When I read some of these postings, I am amazed that folk do not realize that the enemy was fighting for his very existance, Does anyone therefore wonder that the enemy put up a fierce resistance? Sometime the postings seem to forget there are two sides in a war, and both want to win. You win some, you lose some. I hesitate to retaliate when I read postings running down the British...But now and again I am sorely tempted to post a few home truthts. Sapper images/smilies/default/biggrin.gif
Thanks sapper. I agree with you about blame. If things did not go just right, always worth trying to work out why, but this is not the same as blame at all.
