My service in Royal Signals, 1939 to 1946.

I'm not sure how clear cut the distinction is Andy. The first 'DRs' during the First World War were Royal Engineers Signal Service so the Engineers would have a case for continuing use of the name, not for all motorcyclists but for any used for carrying despatches. The RAF and RN had their own as well.

The title of Raymond Mitchell's book 'Commando Despatch Rider' about his time with 41 Commando suggests that it was used outside of R.Sigs.

I have the impression that the title could be applied to any motorcyclist whose work was the delivery of messages and despatches and that any motorcyclist carrying a message was a 'despatch rider' at that moment.

I'm sure that the term is often misused and applied to all army motorcyclists but not even all Signalmen who rode motorcycles were despatch riders either.

 

My suspicions come from an official book about the Royal Signals in WW2 written in the fifties by a RCS officer. He says something along the lines that in the Army DR's were only in the RCS due to the trade pay etc.

I've read in quite a few war diaries outside the signals ie Infantry, their M/C messengers being refered to as DR's which I've thought to be wrong and slightly annoying. The Engineer connection makes sense as it was them that left the Engineers to form the Signals in 1920 something.

Its a bit like an old trade just before I joined 'Royal Signals Electrician' everyone thought you was an 'Electrician' and it couldn't have been further from the truth-I guess its a bit like calling a Guardsman a Private in my book! Anyway I'm going on

 

I'm not sure how clear cut the distinction is Andy. The first 'DRs' during the First World War were Royal Engineers Signal Service so the Engineers would have a case for continuing use of the name, not for all motorcyclists but for any used for carrying despatches. The RAF and RN had their own as well.

The title of Raymond Mitchell's book 'Commando Despatch Rider' about his time with 41 Commando suggests that it was used outside of R.Sigs.

I have the impression that the title could be applied to any motorcyclist whose work was the delivery of messages and despatches and that any motorcyclist carrying a message was a 'despatch rider' at that moment.

I'm sure that the term is often misused and applied to all army motorcyclists but not even all Signalmen who rode motorcycles were despatch riders either.

Andy's question did refer specifically to the army as did my answer. I really don't know the qualification process for the RAF or RN so I cannot be specific on that.

I think there is some confusion about "carrying messages." If someone on a motorcycle carries a message from point A to point B that does not make him a Despatch Rider. I am quite sure from an army standpoint that Andy is right about it being a trade only in Signals in WW2. Also, the carrying of "despatches" in Signals was a highly organised activity, run on a tight preplanned schedule between Signals Offices. So a message from say someone in 2 Corps HQ to someone in say 11 Armoured Div would go into the 2 Corps Signals Office and then be taken out in the next scheduled DR run....which would loop around a variety of different HQ on a schedule almost like a bus route. The difference of course is that on a normal bus route they rarely have people shelling them or dropping bombs on them and the road is rarely dug up so the bus has to go across the fields.

And yes, there were plenty of people riding bikes in Signals and other units who were no Despatch Riders....and some of them may have on occasions taken a message but that did not make them Despatch Riders either....not even temporarily!

My thoughts anyway! Nevil.

 

It is hard for me to know what is of interest and what is just ho-hum stuff already covered a zillion times!
and further on... I will try and put something together that won`t be too boring I hope!
Nevil,

What fabulous and priceless photos and reminiscences! I do not think that anything you can post, from putting your socks on to catching a bus, will be boring or lacking in interest. The photos alone are jaw-droppingly good.

Many many thanks!

Peter

 

Hello Nevil,

Firstly my thanks for your service Sir. Secondly, what a fascinating set of photographs! Brilliant stuff.

 

and further onNevil,

, from putting your socks on to catching a bus, will be boring or lacking in interest. Peter

Thanks, Peter......I shall try to keep the socks part brief!

Nevil.

 

Hello Nevil,

Firstly my thanks for your service Sir. Secondly, what a fascinating set of photographs! Brilliant stuff.

Thanks! But skip the 'Sir' stuff except when you're pulling my leg!

Nevil.

 

Just a couple of additional thoughts on the 'who was a Despatch Rider' theme:
The average DR route would probably be anywhere from 150 to 200 miles, sometimes much more. Because they were on tightly timed schedules, and operated 24/7 in all weathers and circumstances, they could be very exhausting, especially as we normally worked on shifts through the 24 hours.. For example, I recall one night trip I made in Derbyshire and Yorkshire in early 1940. There was heavy snow in the hills and ice on the roads everywhere else so I slid off the road so many times I was exhausted and could hardly lift the bike up again. Eventually I stopped an army truck and the bike was lifted inside and I got a restful trip to my next stop. After handing over the mail and collecting the new messages, I took a two-hour kip on a table in the mess hall then went on my way. After it was light it was much easier and I was able to complete the route.

Bear in mind that for night riding the only light we had on the bike came through a hole about the size of the end of a pencil in the mask that covered the headlight. That made it hard to see and hard to be seen...we lost several DRs because of the latter.

That was maybe not typical but in 1940 and 41 we ran DR routes right through central London whether or not there was an air raid in progress, making whatever detours were necessary due to damaged roads.

Of course there were occasions when we were given orders to take a single message from point A to Point B but that was not a typical circumstance.

The other major responsibility was convoy duty for movements of the Corps, Division or whatever . That was also done by motorcycle riders in other services and regiments of course and was completely separate from the normal Despatch Rider duty..........with some exceptions....but more of that later! Nevil.

 

Nevil, your recollections give me a whole new view on DR duties.
My impression of WW2 DR duties was of a Mcycilst rushing one message from a HQ to another unit and returning with reports. Never heard of the 'bus stop' method of passing messages before.
Was this a 'back up' to radio comms or the primary comms system in early years of WW2?
Sorry if this sounds a bit dumb but I am interested in early WW2 communications.

Andy - any comments?

 

My impression of WW2 DR duties was of a Mcycilst rushing one message from a HQ to another unit and returning with reports. Never heard of the 'bus stop' method of passing messages before.
Was this a 'back up' to radio comms or the primary comms system in early years of WW2?
Sorry if this sounds a bit dumb but I am interested in early WW2 communications.

Andy - any comments?

Well, wars are messy things, as you know, Mike, so what you thought happened did actually happen on occasions......and the nearer one got to the enemy, the more such occasions were likely to occur. However, it was a long way from being typical.......the vast majority of messages were moved around in the way I described. Of course most DRs would want to scalp me for comparing it to a bus route but I think you get the point!

It really was not a backup to anything. There were some communications that could go by radio and plenty that could not......e.g. maps, long reports, top secret (even enciphered was suspect ....we DRs took stuff from Bletchley Park up to the War Office and elsewhere because radio or phone was not trusted), Order of Battle diagrams, unit move orders, and so on. Of course later in the war, and in the higher levels such as Army, Corps, and later SHAEF, there were much more sophisticated means of securely transmitting such items.

Frequently typical duties and responsibilities were mixed. For example, 4 Corps and 2 Corps in which I served as a DR, both had mobile command columns comprising large vehicles built for the use of the Corps HQ staff, radio communuications and so on. From these vehicles they directed the movements etc of the Divisions below them. It was the absolute responsibility of the DR Sgt and his guys to get the column wherever it was it had to go and I can tell you it was one hell of a responsibility because if you got them on a wrong road there was not a cat in Hell's chance of turning the column around.

However, in addition to that, you had to carry out your primary responsibility as Despatch Riders. So for example, as the column was moving, the so-called duty DR could be flagged from a command vehicle, handed a package of documents and told to take them to some other formation and then somehow relocate the column when he had done that.....and assuming they had stayed on the original movement plan! I was picking up a package from a command vehicle on one occasion in 1941 and as I slowed down to get it I was hit in the back by an army vehicle going like hell to overtake the convoy........and spent the next three weeks in hospital with concussion and numerous bruises and abrasions! My spine was saved by a Rolls razor in the pack on my back....it was bent into a 'V' shape.

Sorry......I have rambled on! Nevil.

 

Sorry......I have rambled on!
Not a bit of it. More, more!

Peter

 

Talking of mixed duties for Despatch Riders, the one that most stays in my memory occurred on, I believe, September 7, 1940. I was Corporal in No7 Despatch Rider Section with 4 Corps Signals, our Sgt was Bill Bayley. We also had a second DR Section, No 8 . Corps HQ was at Chenies and Signals were at Chalfont St. Giles. The Corps role at that time was supposed to be the back-up Corps for any German invasion from Dover through to Southampton. About mid morning Bill told me that the Mobile 4 Corps HQ would be moving out later that day and he and I would be running the convoy with 7 DR and part of 8 DR, and that the rest would stay at the static HQ at Chenies. We assumed it was yet another of the exercises that occurred every few weeks.
The planned route ran north of London but quite close in, which was unusual for an 'exercise' which usually tried to avoid likely high traffic (and bombing) areas. It was also somewhat unusual that the exercise was planned to extend through the night. We sat down and hurriedly planned the route, marked up our maps and briefed as many DRs as were available. However this all became clearer shortly afterwards when we were summoned to the C.O.s office and briefed for the move. We were told that all details were to be regarded as Top Secret but that an invasion alert had been issued based on activity in the German occupied Channel ports. The plan was that 4 Corps, with all Divisions, would move towards the coast just north of the Thames Estuary, and that the Mobile HQ would be in position 20 miles back by two hours before dawn next day. That item put a knot in a few stomachs I'm sure as the logistics of turning and moving such a huge body of troops and equipment north of such a large city were mind boggling!
I'm sure most are familiar with how large convoys are run but in case a few are not: The idea is that a DR (or other on a M/C in the case of other services) takes over an intersection ahead of the convoy and keeps it open for his convoy until the last vehicles has passed. He then rides as fast as he can to overtake the convoy and take over another intersection. With a number of DRs and a very large convoy it is a constant shuttle of riders overtaking the convoy so no intersection ahead of the convoy is ever left uncovered for other crossing traffic to get through and thus cut your convoy in two or more pieces. Sounds hard and somewhat complicated and I guess it is but with enough DRs one can keep a very large convoy rolling along smoothely and with some of the vehicles packed with top brass that is how it has to be!
Anyway, all went well, although all the roads were packed with military vehicles of all descriptions, until we got north of London by which time it was dark. One could see the start of a huge air raid taking place, with what seemed to be thousands of incendiary bombs landing. The fires were so intense that even 20 miles north of the city, I could easily read my map in the reflected light from the sky. I heard later it was the first heavy incendiary raid on London.
Past London, it was almost equally stomach churning as many of the villages had somehow become aware of the invasion aspect and were ringing their church bells. It all had a definite Goetterdaemmerung (Twilight of the Gods......reportedly Hilter's favourite piece of music!) flavour. We reached our destination with about an hour to spare but any thought of a rest was dispelled when the orders for DRs to take messages came flooding to us from the command vehicles. We were kept busy with that until about an hour after dawn, when the 'Stand Down' was issued.
By that time the DR Section was down to about half-strength with the rest scattered all over the area on despatch runs. The return to Chalfont St Giles started later that morning and was uneventful but hectic with barely enough DRs to run the convoy. Mercifully we all had a restful next day.
Rumours as to what happened to the expected German invasion lingered for months but I am still not clear how near or how likely it had been on September 7, 1940. Anyway it had been damned good training and I think we all sharpened up quite a bit after it.
Nevil

 

4 Corps Signals that my brother and I joined at the start of the war was a TA unit from Glossop and Mansfield in Derbyshire. After about a week the unit moved to Bakewell, Derbyshire, into two old houses in large grounds, Haddon House and Burton Closes (made into nice flats last time I saw them about twenty years ago). However, for us the conditions were awful. The large lawns where the unit attempted to parade soon became a sea of mud. In spite of this, one was not allowed out of the camp without highly polished shoes (polish, spit, and the bone handle of a knife!), creased pants and freshly blancoed equipment.


There were I believe three toilets in Burton Closes for about one hundred men and they were usually plugged and overflowing. The unit followed the old army tradition of “gunfire,” a 6:00 a.m. compulsory parade for a mug of tea that was heavily laced with Epsom salts. The resultant agony of the long and frantic queue for the three toilets available, if they were available, haunted my dreams or rather nightmares for many years afterwards. The justification for this routine was said to be the old army dictum that one should keep one's mouth shut and one's bowels open! It was several weeks before we got the latest in military hygiene, the pole latrine, something with which I am sure most of you will be very familiar.


Most of us thought the food was awful although I admit some were so grateful for three square meals a day after the recession of the Dirty Thirties that whatever was served was welcomed. Breakfast would be some boiled bacon, with canned boiled tomatoes and some bread with white margarine that looked and tasted like axle grease. Perhaps a dab of jam if we were lucky. Lunch would be boiled meat of some sort, usually mutton, bones, gristle, fat, and occasionally some actual meat.....and again bread with axle grease. Supper would be similar. There really was no other option as the only cooking utensils in the cookhouse at that stage were several huge steel tubs that could be heated from below, so everything had to be boiled.......and everything tasted of old mutton, even the tea.


More of the training routine later, but one good part of camp life was freedom after Church Parade on Sunday. The only problem with that was that the ceremonial parade, then march down to the church followed by the High Anglican service and then the march back, took forever so it was often too late for my brother and me to ride to my parents' home in Sale, Cheshire, have a decent meal and still get back in time for lights out. We solved that when we noticed that at the start of the Church Parade, the RSM would call for the Wesleyans, the Baptists and what he called “the Plymouth Rocks” (I think he meant Plymouth Brethren because the former is a breed of chicken!) to take one pace forward and then march off to freedom. Alan and I decided to convert and joined them on the next Sunday and that went OK for quite a few weeks and we were able to ride home early. However, it had not gone unnoticed because when on one Sunday the Baptists etc.,suddenly increased from the original 20 to around 50, this was too much for the RSM and from then on they had to produce pay books showing religion before being allowed to leave the parade. By that time we had become sufficiently adept at arranging our duty schedules with the other DRs that we could usually manage a Sunday off without the RSM being any the wiser.

The training for Despatch Riders included basic electronics (although not by that name then), Morse Code, line laying (from motorized line layers to installing poles), Signals Office procedures, parade ground drill, wireless operation, rifle maintenance and handling. The problem with all this was that there was a drastic shortage of the necessary equipment so for many weeks the training was largely theoretical, read from books or related by an NCO who often did not know much about it himself. Rifle instruction was done by a regular army corporal from the British Army in India who used to tell us that we should treat our rifles (when we got some!) “just like you treat your girlfriend,” which comprised a highly sexist description, comprising mainly four-letter words, that I think must have pre-dated the Indian Mutiny.


Nothing was included for actual motorcycle training as it was assumed, correctly, that we would know this. However, as often as we could, we instituted our own which was to take off for a few hours onto the moors for some lengthy cross-country riding, much like the “trials” we had participated in on weekends before the war. There was nobody capable of supervising this so we had great freedom. There was just one TA Captain who insisted on accompanying us occasionally. He could not ride worth a damn but we liked him so we did not give him a hard time. He was very short and his initials were S.A, which we assumed stood for 'short arse,' and which was what we called him behind his back. He was also sometimes referred to as Isaiah because he had a slight facial deformity which meant “one eye's 'igher than the other.”


After about six weeks of this I was told that as I was in a “reserved occupation,”(Manchester College of Tech plus working in a Public Health Lab) I was free to go back to “civvy street.” However, they added that there was an army rule that if I elected to stay with my brother, that would override the release. So that is what I did.


Nevil.

 

Andy - any comments?

Ref WW2 comms I know very little and what I do know is 1940 BEF stuff. Wireless Radio wasn't used very much as far as I'm aware, it certainly doesn't get mentioned in war diaries very often - I can only think of the 12 Lancers using it really effectively from what I've read to date.

The main mode of comms apart from DR's seems to be the telephone which ment Royal Signals Line Men laying and in many cases burying the cables from one HQ to another. This worked OK from Sept 39 to May 9th 1940 when things were quite static, but things changed dramatically and then the DR's came into their own and saved many a unit in France.

Just as a side note there was a telephone cable under the English Channel from Sangate near Calais to Dover and a private one in De Panne belonging to the King of Belgium (In his Summer House) that also linked to a telephone in the UK.

Cheers
Andy

 

I'm thoroughly enjoying the recollections Nevil, even if I didn't need reminding of mutton. We're so spoiled these days.

 

Andy, thanks mate. I am re-reading Norman Gelb's 'Dunkirk, the incredible escape' and am staggered by the lack of radio comms between Tennent at Dunkirk and Ramsey in Dover. As late as day 4/5 the fastest way for them to communicate was by passing messages via Destroyers crossing the Channel. Little mention of cross-channel telephone lines.
Nevil, always a pleasure to read your recollections. I will try to find out a bit about the 'scare' of 7th Sept 1940 when I get a chance, in the meantime I look forward to more from you. Thanks.

Mike

 

Nevil - results of a quick Google search:

7th Sept. 1940 : Germany starts it's Blitz on London with 300 German bombers in the first of 57 consecutive nights of bombing. The Blitz caused the deaths of over 40,000 men women and children and left a million homes destroyed in the city.
wikipedia.org

July 1940
Britain Stands Alone.
The French Armistice with Germany came into force on 25th June, so Britain now stands alone, awaiting the seemingly inevitable German onslaught. There is an almost perceptible sense of relief in Britain that she no longer has to deal with difficult allies, expressed by the King in the words “Personally I feel happier now we have no allies to be polite to”. From Enigma Luftwaffe decrypts Britain learns on 28th June that most of the German bombers would have completed their refitting by 8th July, following their work in France in close support of their armies. But for the moment Hitler had no plans for his next move and it was not until 2nd July that he instructs his staff to prepare detailed plans for the invasion of Britain “provided air superiority can be attained”. The loss of so many of his destroyers in the Norwegian campaign means that he knows his invasion fleet will be subjected to intense attack from both the sea and air unless the RAF is first rendered ineffective. Early in July the Germans land in the Channel Islands unopposed, this occupation of British territory being hardly noticed in the UK.
The British Attacks on the French Fleet.
Determined to prevent the French fleet falling into German hands, Churchill orders the seizure or neutralisation of all French warships. The British ultimatum of 3rd July gives them the choice of joining the British, scuttling their ships, or sailing to the French West Indies to hand them over to the USA. When these alternatives are rejected, the British navy opens fire at Mers-el-Kebir, killing more than 1,250 French sailors. With a five-minute bombardment, two battleships and a battle cruiser are sunk, but several French ships, including an aircraft carrier, escape to Toulon. Churchill defends his action to Parliament with the words “I leave it to the nation, to the world and to history”. It would seem that it was this brutal action to a country which had been Britain’s ally only two weeks before that convinced Roosevelt that Britain would continue to fight on, alone. And it is now suggested that the action finally persuaded Hitler that he was wrong in his belief that Britain would make peace once isolated. It is now known that the Pétain government, in passing on the alternatives to the French navy, suppressed the proffered alternative of sailing to the neutral USA. From 1st July BP (Bletchley Park) is reading the French naval cyphers, with the help of the documents from the commander of a French submarine who had sided with the British in Malta. A decrypted message from the French Admiral shows that he has ignored the option to sail to the USA, but that decrypt reached the Admiralty from BP 15 minutes after the bombardment had started. BP continued to decypher French naval signals until the Allies landed in north-west Africa in November 1942, when the Germans occupied all France, changing the cyphers, though the French fleet at Toulon had scuttled.
Intelligence and the Invasion Threat.
The air campaign in France during June has cost Britain a quarter of her remaining fighter strength. Only 600 serviceable fighter aircraft are left to oppose the enemy air-raids, which start on 10th July with attacks on convoys in the Channel and raids on dockyards in South Wales. But at least the reading of the Enigma “Red” Luftwaffe messages enables Air Intelligence to reduce their estimate of the number of German bombers that now threaten the UK from 2,500 to 1,250. (The Air Ministry mounts a campaign to collect aluminium pots and pans, ostensibly to increase aircraft production). On 16th July Hitler issues to his staff the first plans for “Sea Lion”, the invasion of the UK, naming 5th August as the date for the commencement of the major air offensive to destroy the capability of the RAF to make any significant attack on the German invasion armada. But, unknown to the British, following the Russian annexation of the Baltic States on 21st July Hitler gives instructions for plans for an invasion of Russia to be prepared. At that staff meeting he spoke with a noticeable lack of enthusiasm about the plans for the invasion of the UK, warning that air superiority over the RAF must be obtained by the beginning of September if the landings in the UK are to be made before the weather worsens. He names 15th September for the invasion, provided a prior week-long bombing attack on southern England had done substantial damage to the Royal Navy and the RAF; otherwise the invasion would be postponed until May 1941. Air raids have already become a daily feature of life in the UK, and they steadily build up throughout July. Even before the battle is joined in earnest, Britain has lost 526 pilots during the air fighting in June and July.
UK Intelligence staffs had been very conscious of the possibility of an invasion for some months, and on 29th May they warned that an invasion could be expected at any moment. This alert state was cancelled a few days later when Enigma decrypts established that the German first priority was to knock out France. On 5th July the UK Intelligence authorities again warned, precipitated this time by the first indirect references to German invasion planning in the Enigma decrypts, that large-scale raids might be expected at any time, though not a full scale invasion before mid-July. The Official Historian of the Intelligence War (Harry Hinsley) dryly records: “We might wish to attribute the views of the Military Intelligence to the fact that, its staff being soldiers, they were ignorant of the difficulties involved in organising a seaborne expedition against powerful naval and sea defences. Unfortunately for this argument, the views of Military Intelligence were shared by Naval Intelligence”. It is nice to record that our senior leaders were wiser than their Intelligence Staff; for Churchill paid no attention to these warnings and the Chiefs of Staff refused to order an invasion alert on the grounds that they expected an invasion attempt to be preceded by a major air battle.

Hut 6 and the Coming Battle for Britain.
After the end of the fighting in France the number of Enigma messages falls off drastically as the Luftwaffe reverts to the use of landlines, but the remaining Red decrypts do give a clear warning of the approach of the Battle of Britain even if in very general terms. On 28th June Air Intelligence reported that the majority of German bombers would have completed refitting by 8th July; the Battle of Britain is normally considered to have started on 10th July. The massive amount of detailed information that has been gathered from the Enigma decrypts over the last two months now bears fruit in strategic terms from the knowledge gained about the organisation and equipment of the Luftwaffe. And Photo Recce, including before long from the ultra long-range Spitfire (Type D), is at last performing well as the virtue of using fast, high flying aircraft becomes accepted practise. After 5th July the Intelligence Staff issued no further invasion alert until 7th September when all home defences were brought to a state of “immediate action”.
From Bletchleypark.org.uk.

 

And another one, sorry for the long quotes!

The Invasion Date?
Unbeknown to British Intelligence, that Sunday 15th September had originally been set by the Germans for the invasion, “Sea-Lion”. This date seemed to both sides to be about the most suitable because of the tides and moon. From hints derived from the Enigma decrypts, as well as from photo-recce showing the build up of the invasion barges, on 7th September the Intelligence Services had initiated the warning (“Cromwell”) that the invasion was imminent and this was maintained until well into October. (Actually the Official History says that to learn the date the Intelligence Services “resorted to every conceivable source and to some devices that were barely conceivable…The Vice Chief of the Naval Staff was surely being sarcastic when he suggested on 1st October that Naval Intelligence should set up an astrological section”). Hitler, like his naval advisors, had never been keen on what would inevitably have to be a sea-borne invasion. He postponed the date first to 27th September, then to 12th October and finally, as the air war failed to produce evidence of the command of the air that victorious landings would demand, until May 1941. The German navy had suffered severely during the Norwegian campaign, and in mounting an invasion they knew what they would suffer against the British navy provided with good air cover. The German airforce continued to persuade themselves that their assault was bringing the RAF to its last gasp, but even they had lost their enthusiasm for the gamble in the face of their mounting losses of experienced pilots. And, in any case, Hitler’s attention was now focussed on the East; the attrition of night-time bombing might yet persuade the stubborn British that peace was desirable!

From Bletchleypark.org.uk.

 

................. Wireless Radio wasn't used very much as far as I'm aware, ................

The main mode of comms apart from DR's seems to be the telephone which ment Royal Signals Line Men laying and in many cases burying the cables from one HQ to another. This worked OK from Sept 39 to May 9th 1940 when things were quite static, but things changed dramatically and then the DR's came into their own and saved many a unit in France.

Cheers
Andy

Yes, you are right, Andy. At 4 Corps we practiced with radio (called wireless then) on all the exercises and there was even one big one where the Corps Commander specified that no DRs would accompany the mobile HQ and they would rely on the wireless sections as an alternative....with limitations at to what could be sent of course.. When I went to France with the advance party it mainly comprised a beefed-up wireless section. In the circumstances it did not get to do very much before we had to move back to the coast. However, wireless was somewhat limited and the only time I personally saw it used well was in 11 Armoured Div where I was very briefly. Of course what I saw there was short-range stuff....I don't recall seeing it in the Signals Office, which like most was telephone and DR at that time of the war.

The line laying we eventually trained in, as DRs but working as part of a real line section, was mainly the type where the line is sprayed out of a device that looks a bit like a machine gun, shooting the line over hedges etc. We would have to stop every now and again to lift the lines over road intersections and so on but otherwise one could lay miles of lines very quickly. We also did some training in installing telephone poles and heavy cables but I never saw that used in an active service situation.

Corps HQ did rely heavily on DRs and we had anywhere from 40 to 50 at any one time.

Nevil.

 

Great contribution (from the son of a Sig)