Narrators' notes: Summary of events 1940 May 10 - June 3, FRANCE & FLANDERS

Discussion in '1940' started by dbf, Dec 13, 2011.

  1. dbf

    dbf Moderatrix MOD

    May 15th

    Tanks were moved into cover during darkness and were to remain stationary during the day.

    Brigade given role of Counter Penetration and protection of 1 COPRS Right Flank against rumoured German Armoured Div. Due to reports of German threat, tanks of 7 R. TANKS were moved across to Right flank during the afternoon.

    German aircraft were active during the day, but no action against tanks was taken.
     
  2. dbf

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    Night May 15/16th

    Tanks were moved further forward into FORET DE SOIGNES - 7 R. TANKS did no complete move till after daylight; this led to a strong German bombing attack being put in on 16th May, but fortunately tanks had moved again about an hour previously.
     
  3. dbf

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    May 16th

    4 R. TANKS was given the role of assisting to hold the Div. reserve line along the road running North East and South West through the FORET DE SOIGNES, or of counter attacking in a Southerly direction.

    There were various rumours of German movements South of BRUSSELS in a Westerly direction.

    German aircraft were very active and numerous places were bombed.

    About midday at a CORPS Conference a general withdrawal was decided upon and the Brigade less 2 sec. Mk. II tanks, was ordered verbally to move to the area of TOURNAI as soon as possible - Tanks to entrain at ENGHIEN after dark - Bde. less tanks, to move by road - route ENGHIEN - ATH - TOURNAI. Road Party on 16th May to move to area 4 to 5 miles East of ATH, completing the move on 17th May.

    The two sec. of Mk. II tanks were ordered to remain in the area of ERMITE (8 miles South of BRUSSELS) to cover inf. withdrawal over CANAL DE SENNE, through HAL.

    These were detailed from 7 R. TANKS - Major PARKES was placed in command.

    Withdrawal of Bde. started during the afternoon. Wheeled vehicles moved first, followed by tank groups.

    During the withdrawal bombing contented and at about 1800 hours a report was received from Bn. recce parties that due to German bombing it was impossible to entrain tanks at ENGHIEN. Orders were issued for recce to be carried out further down the line and the tank columns of 4 and 7 R. TANKS were ordered to continue their march Westward. Bns. had one or two casualties from bombing.

    The wheeled vehicles of the Bde. completed the move as ordered by evening 16th.

    The Germans continued bombing the railway during the evening and ATH was severely damaged. At dark a Conference with C.O.s was held, and it was decided that entraining of tanks was impracticable, and that the move would be carried out by road. Incidentally by this time tank trains were unobtainable due to disappearance of engine drivers. Tank column continued their march and joined wheeled vehicle columns for the remainder of the night.
     
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    May 17th

    The withdrawal continued.

    Wheeled vehicles moved first, followed by light tanks and carriers.

    Mk. II tanks, Mk I tanks in that order. Some deviations from the main road were made due to bombing and blocking of ATH.

    At about 1100 hours the Brigadier and B.M.B entered ATH and found all tanks turning round - 4 and 7 R. TANKS had each received written orders direct from 1 CORPS that tanks would return immediately to HAL to cover the withdrawal of 1 CORPOS who were threatened with attack by a German Armoured Div. Brigade H.Q. were not informed by 1 CORPS.

    Tanks column turned around and reorganised into units and marched back to ENGHIEN (about 15 miles). On arrival recess were carried out and preparations to fight were made. Contact was made with 5 DIVISION near hall.

    The only reports of Germans were of infantry or motorised troops; there were no signs of German tanks.

    At about 1500 hours Brigadier POPE arrived from G.H.Q. with verbal orders for the Brigade to move immediately to the are of ORCHIES. 1 CORPS were informed by Brigadier POPE and the Brigade withdrawal started again.

    The Brigade marched a further 20 miles to between ATH and LEUZE.

    The Services did not counter march but remained as originally ordered in villages about 6 miles West of TOURNAI except for ammunition, petrol and supply lorries, A.D.S. and the Recovery Section which were required forward with Battalions.
     
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    May 18th

    The Bde. marched to an area North of ORCHIES via TOURNAI (about 30 miles) in the order: wheeled vehicles, light tanks and carriers, Mk. II, Mk. I tanks.

    Roads were very full of refugees, who made movement tiring and difficult.

    TOURNAI had been heavily bombed the night before and many roads were blocked and some bridges were damaged - considerable deviations were necessary.

    Units were halted under cover near the Belgian frontier with the object of moving into Assembly Areas under cover of darkness. Wheeled vehicles trickled forwards during the afternoon.

    The Bde. came under order of General MacFARLANE who commanded MACFORCE consisting of one Inf. Bde. holding against German attack from the South some 10 miles of River SCARPE assisted by the remains of HOPKINS MISSION. French were on the Left.

    As the tank column started to move into their Assembly Areas (about dark), orders were received from MACFORCE for the Bde. to occupy defensive positions South and East of ORCHIES with one Bn., the remainder to be reserve North of ORCHIES. 4 R. TANKS moved out immediately on this role. Crews were on duty all night.
     
  6. dbf

    dbf Moderatrix MOD

    May 19th

    The situation on the front was quite unknown and there were many rumours of a sudden German attack, so at dawn two light tank patrols, each of three light tanks, were sent out.

    4 R. TANKS to recce VALENCIENNES.
    7 R. TANKS to recce towards road DOUAI - DENAIN.

    During the morning 4 R. TANKS occupied defensive positions on roads and in answer to application for help from the French on the Right two sections of tanks from the Left Company were ordered by MACFORCE to move out to the river line.

    One Company of 7 R. TANKS was moved South West of ORCHIES to prevent enemy penetration in that area.

    Lt. tank patrols returned during the night and reported no sign of immediate enemy attack - Contact had been made with parties of French troops withdrawing towards R. SCARPE.

    There was considerable German air activity during the day, chiefly recce with some high altitude bombing.

    Tanks remained out in their defensive positions during the night May 19/20th. Certain minor alterations to better positions were made.
     
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    dbf Moderatrix MOD

    May 20th

    Lt. Tank Patrols moved out again at dawn and remained on line of R. SCARPE till recalled during the afternoon.

    There were several rumours of German mechanised units possibly with tanks moving South of R. SCARPE towards the Right flank of MACFORCE. To deal with a possible attack in this direction, recces were carried out by 7 R. TANKS to the South West of ORCHIES with a view of taking on counter penetration role. During the morning one company 4 R. TANKS was moved from East of ORCHIES to EVIN (6 miles West of ORCHIES) to support 138 Inf. Bde. who had recently taken up the line CARVIN - RACHES. The tank move was not completed.

    German air activity increased considerably - all movement on roads was bombed and machine-gunned, each village also being systematically bombed. 4 R. TANKS suffered some casualties.

    About midday Brigadier POPE arrived with verbal instructions from G.H.Q. to move the Bde. to VIMY.

    The move started during the afternoon. Route AUCHY - CARVIN - LENS - VIMY (distance 30 miles).

    Roads were very full of refugees which made movement slow and difficult. Wheeled vehicles reached VIMY in the evening and tank columns arrived during the night.

    Brigadier reported to General MARTEL commanding 50 DIVISION and was informed that General FRANKLIN commanding 5 DIVISION would be arriving shortly and would take over command at VIMY. In the meantime General MARTEL continued to make plans for an attack by the Bde. with 151 Inf. Bde. General MARTEL wanted a dawn attack on 21st May - No plans were sufficiently advanced to allow sufficient recce this day.
     
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    May 21st

    Tanks columns arriving during the night and early morning, the last Mk. I tanks reaching the VIMY area between 0600 and 0700 hours.

    General FRANKLIN held a Conference to decide plans for the attack, but only hurried plans were made, verbal orders being finally issued by 0900 hours. These were followed by a Bde. Conference which did not finish till after 1000 hours (See O.O., APPENDIX A)

    4 and 7 R. TANKS moved off about 1100 hours preceded by Bn. R. Groups who went down to the Start Line to gain contact with 151 Inf. Bde. for the first time. (For further details see Report by 4 R. TANKS, APPENDIX B).

    1400 hours Brigade H.Q. moved to ECURIE about 2 1/2 miles from the Start line where it remained throughout the day with General MARTEL and H.Q. 152 Inf. Bde.

    4 and 7 R. TANKS crossed the Start Line shortly after 1400 hours in spite of the fact that the infantry were one hour late reaching the Start Line.

    Wireless communication broke down, party due to the lack of time for netting very bad atmospherics, and casualties to commanders tanks. Reports were received from 4 R. TANKS through Liaison Officer and by sending each message with light tanks.

    About 1800 hours German aircraft became very active and bombing attacks were made on DAINVILLE and other villages which had been captured.

    Battalions were ordered to stand fast at 1830 hours.

    Orders were sent to Bns. to rally at ECURIE and were collected there during the night.

    Bn. 'B' Echelons were brought up about 2100 hours and told stand by till tanks railed.

    At about 2130 hours the Staff Captain was sent out with two light tanks to report on the situation.

    During the night tanks came in to ECURIE and the remains of 4 and 7 Bns. were collected. Great difficulty was experienced in finding the ay in the dark due to the very difficult country and grave shortage of large scale maps.

    The reports from units showed that the attack had been very successful in inflicting loss on the enemy - A large number of casualties had been inflicted, columns of enemy lorries had been destroyed, armoured cars burned and a large number of anti-tank guns put out of action. At one time the enemy were completely demoralised and were running away; if only reserves had been available far heavier losses could have been inflicted. At one time a large number of prisoners were taken - these were handed over to the infantry.

    NOTE: it was found that a percentage of tracer was most effective in setting fire to enemy vehicles.
     
  9. dbf

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    May 22nd

    Bde. H.Q. and 4 and 7 R. TANKS returned to VIMY area.

    The move being carried out with vehicles very widely space in small packets. German aircraft were very active, roads being continually machine-gunned and bombed. The move was completed during the afternoon.

    In the evening it became apparently that a German thread was developing on the Right flank in the direct[ion] of MONT-ST. ELOI.

    Bns. spent the rest of the day reorganising; maintaining and repairing tanks.


    Approximate tank states showed:-

    4 R. TANKS.
    Mk. I tanks: fit 12, unfit 4
    Lt. tanks: fit 4, unfit 1

    7 R. TANKS
    Mk. I tanks: fit 13
    Lt. tanks: fit 6


    Casualties, reports showed (including Killed, Wounded and Missing):-

    4 R. TANKS
    Officers: 6
    O.R.s: 170

    7 R. TANKS
    Officers: 8
    O.R.s: 4? [forty-something, second numeral illegible, possibly 8, so 48 ?]
     
  10. dbf

    dbf Moderatrix MOD

    May 23rd

    During the night 22/23rd May, Bde. took up the following dispositions:-

    4 R. TANKS (now approx. 14 Mk Is) were concealed in trees on VIMY RIDGE West side of road VIMY - ARRAS
    Role to c/a any enemy advance from direction ARRAS and West of it towards VIMY RIDGE.

    7. R. TANKS on high ground East of SOUCHEZ
    Role to protect Right flank of Div. reserve position and watch SOUCHEZ gap.

    Later 7 R. TANKS moved to high ground on West of SOUCHES towers NOTRE DAME de LORETTE. Strength now 7 Mk II and 13 Mk I tanks.

    During early morning 23/5 [sic] General FRANKLIN ordered Commandant Army Tank Bde. to co-ordinate the Allied Touch defence of the whole area, both French and British. Bde. Comd. visited General PRIOUX French Cavalry Corps Commander in PETIT VIMY and later visited General PICARD Commanding 1 D.L.M. From the latter Officer and from Comdt. PINION he gathered that in his area SOUCHEZ-NEUVILLE-MT. ST. ELOI there were some 30 SOMUA and 24 HOTCHKISS tanks. It was agreed that some 10 Somua tanks would support 17 Inf. Bde (Brigadier STAFFORD) and another 10 would watch MT. ST. ELOI both on counter penetration role; the remaining Somua would be in reserve. The bulk of the Hotchkiss tanks would be concentrated about SOUCHEZ. Later the majority of the Hotchkiss tanks moved North West through SOUCHEZ.

    About 1100 hours on 23/5 German attack on MT. ST. ELOI developed and the Right flank of 17 Inf. was turned.

    Bde. Comd. visited Major GARRETT Commanding 7 R. TANKS, ordered him to move South through SOUCHEZ leaving one company to face North and North West.

    Accompanied by Major GARRETT they reconnoitred a suitable post from which to deal with the German attack which oddly now be seen moving on an axis MT. ST. ELOI - GNENCHY [CARENCY ?].

    This position was South of CARENCY on a ridge flanking German advance.

    (For further details of 7 R. TANKS operations see APPENDIX C).


    4 R. TANKS were not engaged during the day.

    German aircraft were very active all day, starting at dawn with air recess followed by heavy bombing and machine gun attacks on all roads, villages and located troops. All units had casualties from these attacks.

    During the afternoon it was decided to move Units 'B' Echelon and all spare personnel to the North of LENS and orders were issued for moves to start at dusk.

    Also during the afternoon MACFORCE issued orders that al units would stand and fight on the ground then held.

    Towards evening the German attack on the Right met with considerable success and it seemed that if they continued their attack that LENS behind us would be captured. The main road bridge in LENS was destroyed by enemy air action.

    About 2300 hours MACFORCE issued orders - verbally to the Bde. - for an immediate withdrawal - each unit for itself as best it could. The Bde. was to move to an area North West of CARVIN. The route HENIN - LIETARD - CARVIN to be used as all other bridges North of us had been blown. Actually bridges in LENS were still intact as 'B' Echelon, which was already on the move, used these bridges.

    Orders were issued to the Bde. and a withdrawal in good order was made during the night. Fortunately as night came on German activity as usual ceased and no attempts were made to follow up their earlier successes.

    Extra lorries for the Bde. R.A.S.C. Coy. were used to carry crews of knocked out or broken down tanks and to replace unit transport which had been destroyed by enemy bombing.
     
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    May 24th

    The withdrawal continued throughout the night. Roads were in some places badly congested; HENIN LIETARD being particularly bad due to block[ed] roads and burning houses from German air action during the evening.

    In the morning the Bde. collected about 4 miles North West of CARVIN after moving about 20 miles.

    The remainder of the day was spent resting, refitting and reorganising.
     
  12. dbf

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    May 25th

    All available tanks were reorganised into a unit called 4/7 Bn under the command of Major PERKES. It consisted of 1 Tank Coy. of 16 I TANKS including 2 Mk. II tanks (one doubtful mechanically) and a light tank Coy. of II Lt. tanks.

    Brig. POPE arrived during the morning with verbal orders for all available tanks to move to ORCHIES area to come under command of III CORPS for a counter attack on 24th in a Southerly direction towards CAMBRAI. The Brigadier attended a Conference at III CORPS H.Q. and plans were made for counter attack with two Divs. of III CORPS and three French Divs. The tanks of 4/7 Div. were to be divided between the two Divs. of III CORPS, two Mk. I section as the spear-head of each Div.

    During the afternoon sounds of fighting, which had been heard all day in a West and Southerly direction, gradually came nearer, till eventually enemy artillery started ranging on villages occupied by the Bde. As most of the Bde. had no fighting value left having only revolvers (the sooner sub-machine guns are provided for R.T.R. personnel the better) it was decided to move the Bde., less 4/7 Bn., to the West of LILLE. The move was carried out after dark (distance about 20 miles).

    The 4/7 Bn. also moved to area South of ORCHIES after dark.
     
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    May 26th

    The 4/7 Bn. arrived in Assembly Area 4 miles South West of ORCHIES and attempts were made to gain contact with III CORPS, but no contact could be made. The Counter attack had been cancelled apparently on the afternoon of 25th, but no orders had been sent to Bde. H.Q. although its position was known to III CORPS and Bde H.Q. was not moved till after midnight. The 4/7 Bn. were attacked by German bombers and had considerable difficulty in withdrawing (For details see APPENDIX.).

    On arrival of the Bde. West of LILLE the Brigadier went to ORCHIES to report to III CORPS. The B.M. went to G.H.Q. command post at PREMESQUES. The B.M. on arrival was given orders by Brigadier POPE for the Bde. less 4/7 Bn to move to DUNKIRK immediately to embark for U.K. 4/7 Bn. to move to SECLIM and to report to III CORPS.

    The Bde. moved during the afternoon, less certain details of the Bde. R.A.S.C. Coy. and Fd. Amb. who came under the command of 4/7 Bn. The Bde. reached DUNKIRK during the evening in good order. If only some tanks had been available, it was fit and ready to fight.
     
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    May 27th

    The Bde. embarked and sailed to DOVER. A number of casualties occurred during this move due to German shelling from shore batteries and to attacks by enemy aircraft on the ships.

    All vehicles and unit equipment was left at DUNKIRK - most vehicles were damaged before leaving - no fires were allowed otherwise everything would have been burned.
     
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    1 ARMY TANK BRIGADE Operational Order No. 6
    Ref. Map 1/50,000 Sheets 85, 86.

    SECRET
    21 May 1940

    SITUATION

    Enemy.
    1. Enemy have light elements of Armoured cars and light tanks, possibly some infantry in Southern outskirts of ARRAS and in the South, with columns moving towards DOULLENS.

    Own Troops.
    2. Details of 48 DIVISION are holding ARRAS and water line to the West probably at ETRUN 4203 and ACQ 3907.

    5 DIVISION hold the line of the River SCARPE, East of ARRAS.

    151 INFANTRY BRIGADE supported by 1 ARMY TANK BRIGADE and Artillery 50 DIVISION attacking round West and South of ARRAS.

    13 INFANTRY BRIGADE are attacking over River SCARPE during PHASE III of the attack up to the line of road ARRAS - CAMBRAI and River SENSEE.


    Topographical.
    3. Stream West of ARRAS, GRINCHORN R and COJEUL R are reported light tank obstacles. Recce should be made to confirm this.

    All bridges except railway bridges in ARRAS are blown.


    INTENTION.
    4. 1 ARMY TANK BRIGADE will cover the attack of 151 INFANTRY BRIGADE round the West and South of ARRAS.


    METHOD
    5. The attack will be carried out in three phases: -

    PHASE I - Move Infantry to start line which is line of Railway running North East and South West through railway junction 436976.
    Timing Battalions cross VIMY RIDGE 1100 hours.

    PHASE II - Clearing area up to River COJEUL 5293.
    Timing Tanks cross Start Line 1400 hours

    PHASE III - Clearing area up to River SENSEE 5490.
    Start Line River COJEUL.
    Timing will be issued later.


    6. Forward Battalions.
    Right - 7 ROYAL TANKS in support 8 D.L.I.
    Left - 4 ROYAL TANKS in support 6 D.L.I.

    Battalion Centre Lines
    Right - Road and Rail crossings 412958 - VAILLY 4395 - MERCATEL 4793 - NEUVILLE - VITASSE 4994 - HENIN-SUR-COJEUL 5091 - CROISILLES 5388.
    Left - Road and Rail crossings 449982 - ACHICOURT 4597 - BAURAINS 4796 - TILLOY-LEZ-MOFFLAIMES 4997 - WANCOURT 5394 - CHERISY 5692.

    Boundaries
    Right - incl. BOISLEUX ST MARC 4890 incl. CROISILLES 5388.
    Left - incl. Road ARRAS - CAMBRAI.


    7. Allotment of tanks.
    Two sec Mark two from 7 ROYAL TANKS to come under command 4 ROYAL TANKS.


    8. Forming up 9 D.L.I. MAROEUIL 4203. 6 D.L.I. AHZIN - ST. OUBIN 4502.
    Infantry advancing behind tanks.

    Artillery.
    One battery Artillery, one Anti-Tank Battery in support each 9 & 6 D.L.I.
    Support by observation, F.O.O.s moving with forward Infantry Battalion.


    ???ical
    C.P. at PETIT VIMY and at MAROEUIL from 1500 hours.


    s.
    Will be delivered to units at 1600 hours.

    t.
    P.P. at East of GIVENCHY H 4911 (Map 1/250,000, Sheet 5). 5 Pet 3 Disoleum lorries, opens 1600 hours.

    Ammunition.
    Amm Pt same as P.P. Opens 1600 hours.

    Rec.
    A rec post will be established at PETIT VIMY at 1500 hours.


    COMN.
    Brigade H.Q.s remain present location till 1400 hours, then it opens at DAINVILLE 4398. Subsequent moves via left route.


    Wireless silence till 1330 hours when units net.

    Frequencies
    Brigade Comd frequency 4750
    4 ROYAL TANKS frequency 4490
    7 ROYAL TANKS frequency 5530
    B Echelon frequency 5030
    Brigade rear link frequency 3600.


    Liaison.
    Brigade L.O. to H.Q. 50 DIVISION.
    Battalion L.O.s to H.Q. 9 and 6 D.L.I.


    ACK.

    Signed at 1120 hours

    Issued by D.R.

    H.F.B. CRACROFT
    Captain
    B.M., 1 ARMY TANK BRIGADE.



    Distribution.
    4 R TANKS
    7 R TANKS
    1 Army Tk Bde R.A.S.C. Coy.
    1 Army Tk Bde Fd Amb.
    1 Army Tk Bde Workshops
    5 Div.
    50 Div.
    151 Inf Bde. incl copies for 6 & 8 D.L.I.
    Fr Cav Corps
    G.H.Q. (A.F.V.)
    Brig.
    File. War Diary.
     
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    4TH BATTALION ROYAL TANK REGIMENT.

    SECRET

    21st MAY, 1940 - BATTLE OF ARRAS


    AAt 0815 hours on 21 May 1940, a message was received for R and O Groups of the Bn to be at Bde H.Q. at 0830 hours.

    At this time the Bn was situated as follows:- The Fighting portion was in the BOIS DE LA FOLIE (the last tank having arrived about an hour previously), with the "B" Echelon in AVION some two miles due North. Advanced Bn H.Q. was established in PETIT VIMY some 300 yards from the Tank bivouac area.

    The R and O Groups reported to Bde H.Q., and the Brigadier issued his orders for the attack. These orders were briefly as follows:-
    The Brigade was to attack 2-up with the 7th Bn on the Right and the 4th Bn on the Left. The Start Line, which was to be crossed at 1400 hours was the railway 700 yards South and parallel of the ARRAS - DOULLENS road. The Bde was then to advance in a South East direction round the South of ARRAS to the 1st objective about 6 1/2 miles from the railway, with a final objective, the River SENSEE, some three miles further on. The Bn was to be supported in the advance by the 151st INFANTRY BRIGADE and by one Regiment of Artillery. Air support was also promised for the duration of the attack.

    Seven Mk. II "I" Tanks of the 7th Bn were to be attached for the attack.

    Immediately after the conference the C.O., Lt. Col. J.G. FITZMAURICE, M.C., at 1030 hours issued verbal orders to his Coy. Comdrs. and Major HEDDERWICK who was commanding the seven Mk. II Tanks. These orders briefly were that the Bn should be led to the start line some eight miles distant by the Second-in-Command, Major J.S. FERNIE. In the meantime, the C.O. would make touch with the infantry who were accompanying the tanks at ANZIN ST. AUBIN. The Bn was to attack 2-up with "C" Coy on the right, "B" Coy on the left and "A" Coy in reserve. The seven Mk. II Tanks were also to be in reserve.

    The Bn was lead to the start line by the Second-in-Command, leaving PETIT VIMY at 1100 hours and arrived without halting to position just short of the start line at approximately 1345 hours. The Bn formed up according to plan and as previously arranged advanced over the start line at 1400 hours without further orders from the C.O.

    Whilst the Bn was lead to the start line, the C.O., Adjutant and Bn R.O. in the Light Tanks went to ANZIN ST. AUBIN to contact the infantry. No trace of the infantry could be found and information was finally received that the infantry would be an hour late in crossing the start line. Verbal orders were also issued by the Brigadier at the same time that there would be no alteration in the timing of the Bde advance.

    On the advance to the start line and on reaching the cross roads in DAINVILLE, Captain D.W. HUNT and his Section were detailed at the request of a French cyclist detachment to deal with a German motorised column which was advancing on DAINVILLE from the West. He disposed his Section to the West of DAINVILLE, killed many of the enemy and destroyed their vehicles and thus broke up their advance.

    Opposition was met in the form of anti-tank guns and H.E. from Field Btys simultaneously with crossing the start line.

    Owing to the nature of the ground, i.e., railway cuttings etc. the advance of the Bn was more to its right than it should have been until the River CRINCHON was crossed. After crossing this river it started to get back on its correct line. In the meantime the seven Mk. II "I" Tanks were told by the C.O. to deal with strong enemy anti-tank gun positions North of ACHICOURT and shortly afterwards "A" Coy was told to go into the attack between "B" and "C" Coys who by this time had become separated. These orders were given verbally by the C.O.

    Very considerable anti-tank gun and Field Bty opposition was met until the advance of the tanks was held up on the ARRAS - BAPAUME road between BEAURAINS and MERCATEL. At this period most of the remnants of the three Coys were in this area and consisted of approximately 10 tanks widely separated.

    Shortly previously to this the C.O. was knocked out by a direct hit on his tank from the Field Bty situated East of MERCATEL. He was killed at a point 200 yards South of the road running South West from BEAURAINS at about 466954.

    It was at this time (i.e., at about 1600 hours) that our infantry were first seen advancing towards the road. The Adjutant went back and made touch with the Infantry Comdr and told him that there was no opposition on the ridge immediately in front of him. The infantry were at this time taking numerous prisoners who were putting up no opposition.

    Having seen the infantry on to the ridge, the Adjutant then advanced into a shallow valley 1,000 yards North West of MERCATEL where he found the remnants of the Bn. On this advance anti-tank guns, armoured cars and miscellaneous transport vehicles stationary were spotted on the road running West of MERCATEL. Some of these anti-tank guns were in position. He collected as many tanks as possible and led the attack on to this road.

    This attack was successful and very considerable damage was inflicted both in personnel and material, no further casualties being sustained by the tanks.

    As it now appeared that our infantry had withdrawn from the ridge 2,000 yards behind, the Adjutant led the tanks back to this ridge and took up a forward rally position immediately behind the infantry who were being subjected to heavy H.E. fire from a bty due East of MERCATEL.

    The Adjutant then spoke to the Company Commander of the infantry who beseeched him to withdraw his tank further in the rear as he thought the tanks were drawing the H.E. fire on to the infantry. The Infantry Commander was told that the tanks would go back another 400 yards and would rally there and be ready to assist in the event of a counter attack. This was done. It was at this time about 1930 hours. A message was then received from H.Q., Tank Bde. which ordered "Stand fast. Await further orders." Major J.S. FERNIE and the Adjutant then went back about 300 yards and met the Bn Commander of the 9th D.L.I. at cross roads 800 yards South East of ACHICOURT. Major C.I LEE and Bn L.O. was met here and said he would go back to Bde. H.Q. and ask for orders. Shortly after this a very heavy bombing raid took place and the forward company of the infantry (now reduced to about 30 men) withdrew from the ridge. The tanks were then withdrawn to a third forward rally 200 yards behind the forward line now held by the infantry. It was at this time just beginning to get dark.

    As soon as the tanks were in position the Adjutant went forward about 200 yards to the cross-roads where he found Major FERNIE in 2/Lieutnant VAUX's Light Tank. He asked Major FERNIE if he had made touch with the Infantry Comdr of the 6th D.L.I. who had just come up to relieve the 9th D.L.I. This had not been done so he offered to do so and walked forward another 50 yards where he met the Infantry Comdr. whilst he was talking to the Infantry Comdr, Tanks were heard approaching along the road from the front. As it had been previously reported that a Mk. II Tank had broken down on the ridge it was thought that it was this tank returning. At the request of the Infantry Comdr, the Adjutant went to investigate. It was by this time quite dark and there was a considerable amount of smoke from fires burning in the vicinity. The leading tank had approached almost up to the cross-roads. It was stopped by waving a bundle of maps in front of the driver's visor. Flaps were then opened and German heads appeared; there was some shouting in German. It was then realised that it was a German tank about the same sized or a little bigger than a Mk. II. The Adjutant shouted a warning and ran back to his tank a distance of about 250 yards. The German tanks started firing and took up a line along the road facing the Bn rally position about 250 yards away. It was at this time that Major FERNIE was seen moving round to the Right flank in is Light Tank. He was not seen again.

    All tanks on both sides opened heavy fire and this fire was maintained for about 8 minutes when it was realised that ammunition was being wasted as fire could only be directed at approximate whereabouts of enemy tanks. A few of the enemy tanks were firing guns about the size of 2-pounders. A smoke candle was then fired from a smoke projector to stop the firing. The was effective. After the smoke cleared firing broke out again and after a short while the enemy tanks withdrew.

    After this as there was then no trace of our infantry and in the absence of any other orders it was decided to withdrawn the remnants of the Bn and attempt to find the Bde Rally about which no information had been received. The Bn then moved off to ACHICOURT and struck North across country from the ARRAS - DAINVILLE road. About 0100 hours on 22nd May the Bn was greeted by a burst of M.G. fire from a tank in the Bde Rally near ECURIE. As far as the 4th Bn was concerned these were the most welcome shots fired during the Battle of ARRAS.

    The following points may be of interest:

    1. The large number of enemy anti-tank guns encountered.

    2. The vulnerability of the crews of these anti-tank guns.
    A bust of well directed .303 M.G. fire at the flash invariably silenced the guns even up to ranges of 800 yards.

    3. Anti-tank guns were always sited frontally. In no case was an anti-tank gun seen in a defiladed position. The guns were usually well concealed but were clearly indicated by the flash of firing.

    4. The poor fighting qualities of the German troops encountered. They were very young and large numbers were observed lying on the ground fact downwards feigning dead, others ran up to the tanks surrendering.

    5. The accuracy of the German field batteries and the efficient spotting of the German observation planes. Targets were rapidly and effectively engaged by them. These targets frequently being engaged within 5 minutes of being spotted, such targets being groups of three tanks etc.

    6. No artillery support from our own artillery of any description materialised during the attack.

    7. No air support or protection from enemy bombers or recce machines of any description was given.

    8. The tanks before the battle in the preceding ten days had marched about 300 miles and no time had been available for maintenance.

    9. A large percentage of losses of tanks was due to mechanical breakdown due to excessive mileage during the past ten days and lack of time for maintenance. Had the infantry been able to maintain the forward position to which they had advanced most of these tanks could have been received.

    10. The "I" Tank Mk. I was definitely proof against the German anti-tank gun. One tank showed as many as 14 direct hits and the only indication the crew had of being hit was a red glow for a few seconds on the inside of the armour plate.

    11. Although on frequent occasions tank passed through heavy enemy H.E. concentration nothing but a direct hit affected the tanks.

    12. The effectiveness of the tank advance was very noticeable. Had infantry been available in sufficient numbers and counter batter fire had been available the forward position could have been maintained.

    13. The great advantage of tracer ammunition. This was used in the proportion of 3 in 1 and proved invaluable.

    14. The difficulty of firing the .5 M.G. Stoppages were difficult to rectify. Personnel questioned in tanks equipped with .5 are unanimous that they would prefer .303.

    15. Wireless control collapsed early in the battle. This was probably due to lack of time for nothing. Rear link set shorted before the Start Line was crossed. Control was consequently extremely difficulty and communication with Bde H.Q. non-existent. These difficulties were increased by the size of the front and the depth of the advance.

    16. Although little infantry support was available and the Battalion was not used in the role of an "I" Tank Bn every that that happened confirmed the correctness of our previous training and doctrine in "I" Tank tactics.


    H.G. CRACROFT
    Captain
    4th Bn R. TANK Regiment.

    Tweseldown Camp
    9 June 1940
     
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    7th Battalion ROYAL TANK REGIMENT on 23rd May


    22nd May
    Bn withdrew to VIMY RIDGE under cod of Major H.F.B. GARRETT, M.C., at dawn.

    At 1100 hours the battalion took up positions on the GIVENCHY ridge covering the SOUCHEZ gap.


    23rd May
    The above fire positions were advanced to cover the NOULTETTE Cemetery ridge West of SOUCHEZ by 0930 hours. No sooner had these positions been taken up than orders were received to move to meet an enemy attack with tanks and infantry which was developing in the CARENCY - ALBAIN ST. NAZAIRE area. Major GARRETT led A & B Companies to the attack and ordered D Company to hold the SOUCHEZ position as far as it could.

    The enemy attack was taking place as the two companies arrived in the area. French SOMUAL tanks were assisting us on the Right flank. Enemy tanks appeared to be of the same size as the Mk II. These tanks made use of smoke but numbers were knocked out by our 2-pounder fire. They had advanced through an artillery barrage apparently without casualties. The action of A and B Companies and the French was successful and the enemy withdrew. At this time Major GARRETT was killed whilst directing operations outside a tank and the tanks proceeded to rally near the outskirts of SOUCHEZ - about 1400 hours. O.C. D Company observed this from the SOUCHEZ position and moved with his command tank and reserve section towards the rally. On ascertaining the position he took command of the battalion and moved the battalion back to the NOULETTE ridge, information having been received through the French of a threatened attack in that direction. From an O.P. near the Cemetery memorial a German motorised column was observed out of range in the direction of VILLERS AU BOIS - MONT ST. ELOI lined up in serried rows. This information was taken to Brigade H.Q. by the Liaison Officer at once, but before he returned the enemy column was observed to advance in the SOUCHEZ direction. The available tanks, then some 14 or 15 tanks of the battalion were disposed to meet this threat as follows: -

    Two sections left to hold the NOULETTE ridge -
    two sections to hold blocks on the outskirts of SOUCHEZ in collaboration with the French there, and
    one section under the Acting Battalion Commander advanced from SOUCHEZ towards CARINEL in the direction of the German advance.

    This latter section encountered German Anti-Tank guns covering a blazing barricade in CARINEL and German infantry which had apparently debased and were advancing towards an assembly area at the foot of the NOULETTE ridge. These were successfully engage and the assembly area sprayed with M.G. fire. Since the enemy position encountered was so small in comparison with that known to be in the vicinity the acting bn commander withdrew once more to the NOULETT ridge leaving one section only blocking SOUCHEZ. It was then approaching dusk and in accordance with the instructions as understood to have been given to Major GARRETT, arrangements were made to withdraw to the GIVENCHY ridge. Occasional parti?? of enemy infantry had been observed approaching the Cemetery ridge positions, but no great fire effect could be obtained against them owing to their skilful use of cover. The withdrawal was commenced and almost immediately an advance of German tanks and infantry developed against the ridge. This was engaged by two Mk II tanks, one forward of the GIVENCHY ridge and one at the foot of the GIVENCHY ridge to a flank - while the remainder of the battalion continued its withdrawal. Both these tanks had to be abandoned eventually due to serious mechanical trouble (gear box and rackhams) and consequent inability to get away but all ammunition was expended first. Enemy tanks were of light and medium type and four or five were knocked out. It was not easy to observe fire effect owing to the fading light and towards the end fire was confined to firing in the direction of enemy gun flashes.
     
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    Ref. Map 1/250,000, Sheets 2 & 5.


    PREAMBLE.

    23 DIVISION was despatched to FRANCE during April, 1940 for labour on aerodromes of the Air Component. The Division was to return to ENGLAND to complete its training after 3 months.

    Individual training had not been completed at the time of embarkation. Only a small proportion of the men had fired a rifle and none had been properly exercised in Bren Gun or A.T. Rifle.

    Since the Division was intended for labour and not for operations during this 3 months, it was sent overseas with only a small and modified scale of weapons, equipment and transport.

    Each infantry Battalion was allotted 8 Anti-Tank Rifles and 18 Bren Guns. Even this small scale was incomplete as some 25 Bren Guns were left in ENGLAND for the protection of Merchant shipping. There were no pistols available for issue.

    Battalions had only 12 vehicles each.

    23 DIVISIONAL Signals remained at home and the Division went overseas with only a modified D.R. Section under 2/Lieutenant D. BELL.

    The DIVISIONAL Artillery also was left behind and only one Field Ambulance accompanied the Division into the Field.

    On arrival in FRANCE toward the end of April the Division was immediately dispersed over a wide area to the aerodrome sites on which units were to work. Troops were accommodated in tented camps. Work was well under way by the end of April. The scheme was for each week to have four days' work, two days' training and one day's rest.

    On 10 May, the day of the invasion of HOLLAND and BELGIUM, units of 23 DIVISION were located as follows:-

    ROYAL ENGINEER Companies were distributed in sections throughout the Division except that 508 Fd Pk Company was at TINCQUES (H 20).

    At 0530 hours on 10 May the aerodromes at GREVILLERS and the Supply Echelon at BEAUDRICOURT suffered serious casualties as a result of enemy bombing. At both places, in addition to losses in the opening attack, further casualties were sustained by the explosion of delayed action bombs some hours later. Immediate steps were taken by the cutting of slit trenches and the dispersion and concealment of tentage in all units to minimise the risk of casualties in subsequent bombing raids. Work on aerodromes by day and repeated air raid alarms by night interfered with the rest and comfort of the troops, who indeed from 10 May were to know very few opportunities to sleep during the subsequent three weeks.

    On the night of 12/13 May 10 D.L.I. with one company 1 TYNESIDE SC. were sent to ABBEVILLE area for the defence of aerodromes North and South of the SOMME. This move was only possible by the pooling of transport of 70 BRIGADE, 9 R.N.F., 186 Field Ambulance and a Construction Company ROYAL ENGINEERS and for the time being these units were rendered immobile.

    On 14 May 23 DIVISION (with one Infantry Brigade, 46 DIVISION) was made responsible for the define of all aerodromes from the Belgian Frontier to the River SOMME.

    On 16 May 9 R.N.F. and 5 E.Y. were further dispersed in small detachments over enormous areas about LILLERS (H 23) and DOUAI (H 60) respectively to guard vulnerable points.

    These then were the conditions obtaining when at 0830 hours on 17 May G.H.Q. orders 23 DIVISION to hold a position on the CANAL du NORD between RUYALCOURT (N 67) and ARLIEUX (N 79) a front of 17 miles.

    At the same time this order was received the Division was dispersed over an area extending from LILIERS in the North to ALBERT in the South (70 miles) and from ABBEVILLE in the West to DOUAIS in the East (80 miles). Units had insufficient transport and practically no means of intercommunication. Its men were untrained and inadequately armed and equipped and there was no DIVISIONAL Artillery and in particular no Anti-Tank Regiment.

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    Last edited: Feb 7, 2022
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    NARRATIVE.

    17 May

    At 0930 hours a Conference was held at Divisional H.Q., MIRAUMONT at which Brigadiers and C.R.E. were present. The G.O.C. gave out preliminary orders from the map and these were confirmed later in Operation Order No. 1.

    In outline they were as follows:-

    The front was divided into two sectors with dividing line CAMBRAI - ARRAS Road inclusive to Left.

    70 BRIGADE, supported by 507 Fd Coy on Right;

    69 BRIGADE, supported by 233 Fd Coy on Left;

    8 R.N.F. (M.c.) and Provost Coy in Reserve at ST. LEGER (N 58)

    A.D.S.'s in each Brigade area to be established by 186 Fd Amb;

    186 Fd Amb and M.D.S. at MIRAUMONT (N 47);

    Infantry to put out bridgeheads to cover preparation of bridges for demolition;

    Troops to be in position by 1830 hours.

    Divisional H.Q. - CHERISY (N 59).

    A reconnaissance of the CANAL du NORD within the boundaries allotted to 23 DIVISION showed that there were some 17 bridges in all, many not marked on the map. The Canal was dry on most of the front of the Right brigade and there were many places where A.F.Vs could cross without hindrance. Immediately to the right of this sector the canal runs through a tunnel for three miles and is no obstacle whatever.

    By 1830 hours the forward troops were in position on the line of the canal. 10 D.L.I. (Res. bn 70 BRIGADE) did not arrive until midnight as it had to be collected from its scattered positions in the vicinity of ABBEVILLE.

    At about 1800 hours Major BURNS ROYAL ARTILLERY reported to Divisional H.Q. saying that he was bringing an improvised Fd. Regiment ROYAL ARTILLERY of 13 guns to support the position. The Right flank being most vulnerable he was instructed to site the major position of his guns in support of this. His guns, which did not arrive until the next afternoon (18 May), were a mixed lot of 8 - 18 pounders, 3 - 25 pounders and 2 - 4.5 howitzers.

    He had no signallers or signal equipment and no instruments. In some cases guns had to be laid for direct fire by locking up the muzzles. It was later discovered that 4 guns had no oil in the recoil action. Officers and men manning the guns had never been together before.

    Major BURNS worked enthusiastically through 17/18 May selecting gun positions from which direct fire could be brought to bear on likely avenues of approach for tanks. By the evening of 18 May all guns were in position.

    An extra issue of Anti-Tank Rifles and French Anti-Tank guns came to the Division on 17 May. The Anti-Tank rifles were issued to units but as they were in cases and the units in their battle position there was some delay in their distribution. The French Anti-Tank guns were new and not more than a dozen men in the division had seven seen one. It was at first intended to give these to the Provost Company who were entirely unarmed but as none of these men could operate the guns they were issued to the Infantry Bns.

    The Provost Company was sent to rejoin rear Divisional H.Q. at MIRAUMONT.

    Communication over this wide front was exceedingly difficult with no telephones or wireless and the only links with G.H.Q. at ARRAS were by D.R. or by civil telephone, the latter a precarious link necessitating speech in parables on account of secrecy.

    No touch was ever gained with Macfarlane force supposed to be operating on Left of 23 DIVISION nor with troops of 12 DIVISION and G.H.Q. R.E. who were said to be holding the line on the South. French Territorial troops supposed to be holding canal crossings on the divisional front were not there.

    Exact information as to the whereabouts of the enemy was not available but the situation was serious enough to lead G.H.Q. to issue at 1000 hours on 17 May an order for all G.H.Q. Troops to be prepared to move at a moment's notice.

    On this day (17 May) the division was warned that no further pack trains were to be expected for four days, rations were reduced to half scale (and these not available) and troops were "to live on the country.

    In fact no further normal issue of supplies ever reached the Division until its arrival in ENGLAND 15 days later.

    All was quiet on the night 17/18 May though there was much troop movement, chiefly French, through CHERISY and along the CAMBRAI - ARRAS Road.

    Superimposed over these streams of refugees going in all directions but mostly from CAMBRAI towards ARRAS and BAPAUME, blocked all roads. In the evening there was bombing and machine gunning of these roads by low flying aeroplanes and the village of BOURSIES suffered heavily and there were many casualties amongst refugees and troops.
     
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    NARRATIVE.

    18 May

    On the morning of 18 May a reconnaissance of the Right brigade sector and the land over the tunnel immediately South of it, by the G.O.C. led him to report that he was particularly anxious about this flank, At 1500 hours O.C. R.E. (G.H.Q.) called at Divisional H.Q. and reported that his sappers, preparing bridges for demolition, North of PERONNE, had been fired on by enemy tanks.

    This report was telephoned to G.H.Q. at ARRAS and the Division was ordered to refused its Right flank. This was done by withdrawing the 70 BRIGADE into villages between the CAMBRAI - ARRAS road and the railway running from MARQUOIN and BOYELLES (N 48).

    The Right brigade was ordered to make tank-proof localities in these villages.

    On the Left brigade front 69th BRIGADE were ordered to make similar dispositions in villages behind their front.
     

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