OMAHA BEACH.

Discussion in 'NW Europe' started by Trux, Apr 16, 2017.

  1. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Mike is resting again now. Partly because this is a good place to pause, partly because Windows 10 is messing around with my PC and making life difficult and I am having trouble accessing Fold3 in order to obtain war diaries.

    Mike
     
  2. Tricky Dicky

    Tricky Dicky Don'tre member

    Good for Mike - have a nice snooze :sleepy::moh:

    TD
     
  3. idler

    idler GeneralList

    Thank you for your efforts so far. Especially enjoyed the Gun Support Craft bit as that's rarely mentioned in any detail.
     
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  4. Aixman

    Aixman War Establishment addict Patron

    Mike
    My lifelong interest in WW II always tended to avoid navy things. As I was interested in landings, I soon had to make concessions regarding the vessels touching the beaches.. But that was a fixed limitation. Now you succeeded to "tear me into the deep water".

    Very interesting, as all of your threads! Thank you for posting and sharing.

    Aixman
     
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  5. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Thank you for kind comments and support.

    TD. A pause will allow your head to recover.
    Aixman. Deep water is dangerous. Best avoid it.
    Idler. I was pleased to show that small craft had their share of action and danger.

    Mike
     
  6. Tricky Dicky

    Tricky Dicky Don'tre member

    Mike - you are so kind thinking of others first :rolleyes::lol:

    TD
     
  7. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Double Yipee.

    I have managed to become a Premium member of Fold 3 and can now access all those interesting documents. Only took me seven weeks and several visits to the helpline. My fault of course, not theirs. They could not realise how technically inept I am. A simple instruction like empty your cache and clear your cookies had me puzzled for days. Not sure I understand it now.

    Mike
     
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  8. Tricky Dicky

    Tricky Dicky Don'tre member

    Dont you need medical training for that ?? :blush:o_O

    TD
     
  9. arnhem44mad

    arnhem44mad Member

    This Is brilliant mate!

    I'm working on a 1/30th diorama of Omaha Beach with some figures representing the 2nd Rangers, 5th Rangers and 1st Infantry Division. I Also have 2x DD wading stacks Sherman for the dip as well. This thread will really help me with keeping things accurate!

    Scott
     
  10. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Before moving on to describe the development of the beaches I will post some additional information on the ships and craft and their actions on D Day. This information comes from the War Diaries and after action reports of the ships and craft involved.

    1. The Transports.
    Transport War Diaries.

    For crossing the Channel the transports formed two parallel columns. As befitted the headquarters ship, Ancon led the way and acted as navigation guide. Her station was at the head of the right hand column.

    From the report of APA 28 Charles Carroll.
    Thomas Jefferson Ancon
    Empire Javelin and Anne Arundel
    Princess Maud and Dorothea L Dix
    Prince Charles and Thurston
    Ben My Chree and Samuel Chase
    Prince Baudouin and Empire Anvil
    Amsterdam and Henrico
    Charles Carroll
    An escort was provided by seven Livermore class destroyers.

    Before entering the Transport Area the transports formed a single line ahead and then ships made for their designated anchorage.

    The minesweepers had already swept the Transport Area and the danlayers had laid buoys to mark the anchorages. Ancon positioned itself on the eastern end of the line while the remainder of the transports formatted on her. According to some of the transports diaries the line was not as neat as it should have been but!!!.

    In logical order the transports of the two Assault Groups anchored next to Ancon and the smaller transports of Group O4 anchored to the west.

    Amsterdam.
    Ben My Chree
    Prince Baudouin
    Prince Leopold
    Prince Charles
    Princess Maud
    Empire Javelin
    Thomas Jefferson
    Charles Carroll
    Henrico
    Empire Anvil
    Samuel Chase
    Ancon

    Transdiv 1 had the advantage of anchoring almost opposite their beaches while Transdiv 3 was to the east of their beaches. Transports were some 700 yards apart.

    The transports carrying the follow up troops anchored in a second line, to seawards of the assault wave transports, and at the eastern end of the line. LSTs filled the rest of the second line.

    LST 216. Rhino 11.
    LST 317. Rhino 10.
    LST 313. Rhino 9.
    LST 310. Rhino 8.
    LST 316. Rhino 7.
    LST 6. Rhino 6.
    LST 378. Rhino 5.
    LST 374. Rhino 4.
    LST 376. Rhino 3.
    LST 357. Rhino 2.
    LST 314. Rhino 1.
    Thurston
    Dorothea L Dix
    Anne Arundel.

    There were five Rendezvous Areas. 1 was to the east, 5 was to the west and 2, 3 and 4 were to seaward of the second line. Each Rendezvous Area had a SC assigned to it as control craft. The various waves of craft, LCA, LCVP, LCM and later LCT, were formed up here and dispatched to the Line of Departure.


    Transdiv 1.
    Carrying 16 Regimental Combat Team.
    APA 26 Samuel Chase.
    APA 45 Henrico
    Empire Anvil.


    APA 26 Samuel Chase.

    0230. Passed Point K (end of swept channel).
    0315. Anchored in Transport Area.
    0325. Lowered LCS(S) to proceed to assigned duty.
    0530. Commenced embarking troops in rail boats. (Boats in davits).
    0536. Lowered first ships wave of boats.
    0601. Lowered last ships wave boats.
    0635. Hatches 1A, 2 and 4 open.
    0637. Boat wave sent to beach.
    0700. Boat wave sent to beach.
    0717 to 0750. Four LCTs came alongside and the work of unloading vehicles began. Vehicles in Hold 1A and 4. Three Cub planes in Hold 2.
    0730. Casualties began to come to ship in various craft and were taken on board.
    0847. Boats of the first wave returned to the ship. Six LCVP and one LCM sent to other transports.
    1100. All vehicles and planes unloaded and LCTs cast off to proceed to beach.
    1150. All hatches secured.
    1115. LCI 85 came alongside in sinking condition having been hit by shell fire on the beach.
    1200. All available LCVP, 15 in all, sent back to the beach to assist in unloading LCIs.
    1430. Began hoisting in boats as they returned. Six failed to return.
    1833. Underway to new anchorage.
    2006. Depart Transport Area.
    2028. Passed Point K.
    Sailed to Portland with 322 survivors, injured and dead on board.


    APA 45 Henrico.

    0327. Anchored in Transport Area in 17 fathoms. Port anchor.
    0331. Assault boats lowered.
    0411. First assault wave left for the Rendezvous Area.
    0500. Second assault wave left for the Rendezvous Area.
    0527. Third and Fourth assault waves left for the Rendezvous Area.
    0723. LCT 599 moored starboard side to embark Army personnel and equipment.
    0745. First LCVP returned from Easy Red beach.
    0748. LCT 306 moored port side to embark Army personnel and equipment.
    0750. LCVPs returned with casualties.
    0805. LCVP 3 and 20 returned in a sinking condition and hoisted aboard.
    0820. Crew of LCVP 21 reported aboard. Boat having sunk.
    0838. LCT 537 moored starboard side to embark Army personnel and equipment.
    0850. LCT 600 moored port side to embark Army personnel and equipment.
    0856. LCT 537 cast off.
    0907. LCT 559 cast off.
    0919. LCVP 4, 7, 9, 14, 22 and 32 left to report to Anne Arundel.
    0932. LCT 306 cast off.
    0937. LCT 600 cast off.
    All troops and equipment of 16 Infantry completely discharged.
    1000. Crews of LCVP 6 and 21 reported, having lost boats.
    1130. Hoisted all remaining craft.
    1207. Orders from Assault group Commander O1 to send all available LCVP to the Control Area to assist in the landing of troops from LCI(L)s and return with casualties.
    1530. LCT 544 moored starboard side to transfer survivors and casualties.
    1710. LCG(L) 449 moored starboard side to transfer survivors and casualties.
    1730. All remaining boats on board and secured.
    1825. Under way.
    1909. Anchored waiting for other transports to receive additional casualties.
    2006. Under way for UK.

    Losses and casualties.
    LCVP 2, 6, 11, 12, 21, 22, 27 and 31 were lost. Seven were lost during the assault on obstacles or by enemy action. Three were lost in the late afternoon when they were stranded on sand bars and could not be recovered.

    Army casualties received:
    52 stretcher cases.
    26 walking cases.
    16 survivors.
    7 dead.

    Navy casualties received:
    6 stretcher cases.
    14 walking cases.
    5 survivors.
    1 dead.



    Empire Anvil.

    Empire Anvil loaded her LCAs at the rail and then lowered them.

    Empire Anvil was scheduled to land 1 Wave carrying 3/16 Infantry at H+1 minute on Fox Green. Two divisions of six boats each were dispatched. 'A' Division drifted badly off course and approached the shore near Port en Bessin. It made its way back but was very late in landing. 'B' Division landed in the correct place slightly late at H+20 minutes. 'C' Division landed 5 Wave at H+35 minutes.

    19 LCVP and 1 LCM from Dorothea L Dix reported to Empire Anvil to carry troops from:
    Headquarters and Headquarters Company 3battalion, 16 Infantry.
    Weapons Company 16 Infantry.
    81 Chemical Weapons Battalion.
    37 Engineer Combat Battalion.
    20 Engineer Combat Battalion.
    61 Medical Battalion.

    These craft did not land until the afternoon and were then not available to unload Dorothea L Dix. Troops in these craft were loaded via nets and fixed steel ladders. This proved difficult in the heavy seas.

    Mike
     
    Last edited: Oct 10, 2017
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  11. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Transdiv 3.

    A veteran Atlantic Fleet unit which had taken part in landings in North Africa and the Mediterranean.

    APA 28 USS Charles Carroll.
    APA 30 Thomas Jefferson.
    SS Empire Javelin.


    APA 28. Charles Carroll.

    0242. Passed Point K.
    0332. Anchored in the Transport Area.
    0430. Commenced debarking troops.
    0540. Wave 6 departed from Rendezvous Area for the assault beaches. Waves 7 and 8 followed at designated times.
    0617. All combat troops loaded and clear of the ship.
    0705. Wave 6 left Line of Departure.
    0727. Wave 7 left Line of Departure.
    0735. Wave 8 left Line of Departure.
    0920. LCT 590 came alongside severely damaged and discharged 8 wounded and 3 dead.
    1332. Completely unloaded troops and equipment. Continued to receive casualties.
    1444. Completed hoisting boats.
    1951. Underway.

    Casualties received.
    86 wounded.
    5 dead.
    99 survivors.

    5 LCVP were lost by gunfire.
    1 LCVP lost by broaching.
    3 crew wounded and one killed on the beach.


    APA 30 Thomas Jefferson.

    0324. Anchored in the Transport Area.
    0335. Debarkation of troops commenced.
    0506. All boats loaded.

    Approximately 1200 troops were loaded. 28 boats were loaded at the rail including 25 LCVP, 2 LCP(L) and I LCS(S). 2 LCM and 7 LCVP were net loaded. Net loading was difficult because of the heavy seas and boats suffered minor damage.

    The following were loaded:
    To land at H+1 minute. 18 LCVP carrying 546 troops.
    To land at H+30 minutes. 13 LCVP carrying 384 troops.
    To land at H+40 minutes. 2 LCM carrying 233 troops.
    To land at H+60 minutes. 1 LCVP carrying 35 troops.
    LCT 535. 1045 hours. 8 Jeeps and 12 men.
    LCT 586. 1107 hours. 9 jeeps and 30 men.
    LCT 587. 1215 hours. 4 jeeps, 2 Cub planes and 7 men.

    Hereafter the report becomes more narrative and gives some good insights as to how the craft were organised and marshalled.

    First Wave.
    Three divisions each of six craft assembled 500 yards beachwards of the ship. They formed station on LCC 30 and each division formed a circle. Maintaining station was difficult because of the weather and sea conditions. The first wave left the Rendezvous Area 25 minutes before the scheduled time to allow for delays. The wave proceeded in echelon formation towards the Line of Departure, led by LCC 30. Speed varied between 5 and 7 knots and was adjusted to prevent early arrival. Navigation by LCC 30 was excellent.

    At the Line of Departure the primary control vessel PC 1225 was on station. It instructed the commander of each division as to their proper course to their beach and dispatched the wave of 18 boats on schedule. The wave followed LCT(A)s into the beach. Although they landed on the beach three minutes late at 0634 this wave still landed the scheduled one minute after the LCT(A)s.

    Upon arrival at the Line of Departure LCC 30 returned to the ship to meet and lead the next wave into the beach.

    Second Wave.
    The secondary control vessel SC1353 should have been stationed in the Rendezvous Area but arrived late. The assistant boat group commander was ordered to act as control vessel for the second wave. 13 LCVP from Thomas Jefferson and five from LST 408 assembled and were ready at 0515.This wave set off twenty minutes early to ensure arrival at the Line of Departure on time. The assistant boat group commander led the wave to the Line of Departure from where they were dispatched on schedule and beached at 0642, one minute behind schedule.

    LCVP 16, 19, 24 and 29 had to be abandoned on the beach. On the return journey to the ship several LCVP stopped to assist floundering DUKWs. Fifteen soldiers were rescued from the water and taken to the ship.

    Third Wave.
    Two LCM and one LCVP from Thomas Jefferson and one LCM from Charles Carroll embarked 233 troops. They beached without incident and rescued three men from an abandoned LCVP on the beach.

    Fourth wave.
    The one LCVP involved in the landing at H+60 minutes beached safely but collided with an LCT when retracting. It filled with water and sank.

    On returning to the ship 24 LCVP were dispatched to assist with debarking troops:
    8 to Dorothea L Dix.
    16 to Thurston.

    Boats were recovered and at 1952 sailed for UK. No more trips were made.

    Craft losses.
    LCVP 36. Collided with a LCT on retracting and sank.
    LCVP 29. Struck a sand bar and the coxswain lowered the ramp thinking it had beached. As troops debarked the boat slipped forward into deeper water and the boat filled with water. Surf and wash from other craft caused it to broach. The motor died and the craft was abandoned.
    LCVP 24. Troops were slow to clear the boat and sufficient water entered the boat to drown the engine. Boat abandoned.
    LCVP 16. Took in water due to heavy seas en route. Beached but when the ramp was lowered flooding was complete and the engine died. The craft was abandoned.
    LCVP 19. Troops were slow to exit and water flooded over the ramp and gunwales. Engine flooded and the boat was abandoned.
    LCVP 4. Developed engine trouble in the Rendezvous Area and was replaced by the stand by LCVP. The boat was hoisted aboard for repairs.
    LCVP 13 was hit by a shell which did not explode but damaged the ramp hoisting gear making the ramp inoperable.



    Empire Javelin.

    0330. Anchored in Transport Area.
    0420. First 14 LCAs loaded and lowered. 2 and 4 Waves for Dog green.

    6 LCA from Princess Maud and 4 from Empire Javelin made 5 Wave. Princess Maud’s LCAs were hoisted to the rail for loading. This was difficult in the choppy sea. One set of falls jammed and the boat was suspended, fully loaded for ten minutes.

    11 LCVP and 1 LCM from Thurston arrived to carry remaining troops. A helter skelter, or canvas chute, was used to load these craft since they could not be hoisted to the rail. It was thought quicker and safer than using nets or steel ladders. Three nets plus permanent steel ladders were available on each side of the ship.

    SC 1332, the secondary control vessel, reported ten minutes before reaching the Transport Area and came alongside for final instructions. It then marked the Rendezvous Area 700 yards from the ship with two green lights showing to seaward. A LCP(L) was lowered to assist the Secondary Control Vessel in dispatching waves.

    LCC 50, the Navigation Leader was given final instructions by loud hailer before guiding 2 Wave to shore. The Boat Group Commander in a LCP(L) went with the party until it was clear that they were on time and to the correct beach. It then turned back to lead in succeeding waves. One boat of 2 Wave hit a submerged obstacle off the beach and sank. Returning boats rescued all the crew and troops and returned them to the ship.

    Only four boats of 4 Wave reached the beach. One became stuck amongst the obstacles and was abandoned. One sank on the way back to the ship. The remaining two touched down 10 to 15 minutes late.

    In 5 Wave Princess Maud’s six boats became separated and are not included in this report. One LCA hit an obstacle which blew up killing half the troops on board. One became water logged before reaching the beach and the troops reembarked in another craft.

    Mike.
     
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  12. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Transdiv 97
    AP 76 USS Anne Arundel. Flagship Senior Officer Assault Group O3.
    AP 67 USS Dorothea L Dix.
    AP 77 USS Thurston.

    Transdiv 97 crossed the Channel with the other transports but the troops were not scheduled to land until later in the morning.

    AP 76 Anne Arundel.
    Carried 22 LCVP, six on davits, and 2 LCM.

    0229. Passed Point K.
    0305. Backed out starboard anchor 15 fathoms on deck.
    0317. Anchored in Transport Area with 60 fathoms of chain to starboard anchor. 730 yards on port beam of Ancon.
    0332. Commenced hoisting out all boats except davit boats which were to be rail loaded.
    0337. Despatched four LCVP to APA Samuel Chase.
    0358. All boats except davit boats in the water and secured along port side of ship.
    0645. Commenced disembarking troops. 702 Army personnel loaded into boats secured alongside and in the port and starboard davits. On account of the rough sea and high wind disembarkation of troops, except for three boats on starboard davits, was carried out on the port side only.
    0705. Hoisted barrage balloon.
    0745. Disembarkation of troops into 18 LCVP and 2 LCM completed and landing boats assembled in rendezvous area.
    0800. 20th wave of 18 LCVP and 2 LCM despatched from rendezvous area to Line of Departure. In view of the rough sea it was deemed advisable to advance the time of departure of this wave, carrying 2/18 Infantry, from 0818 to 0800.
    0930. Commenced disembarking Headquarters Company 18 Infantry and other regimental troops into LCI(L) 493 moored alongside to starboard.
    0958. Commenced unloading jeeps in No 2 Hold onto LCT(A) 2075 moored alongside to port.
    1005. Commenced unloading jeeps from No 4 Hold into LCVPs as available.
    1036. Finished disembarking troops into LCI(L) 493 and despatched it to Easy Red Beach.
    1058. Finished unloading 18 jeeps into LCT(A) 2075 and despatched it to Easy Red Beach. 36 personnel accompanied jeeps.
    1135. Finished loading 12 jeeps into LCVPs and the wave of LCVPs despatched to Easy Red at 1142. 24 army personnel accompanied jeeps. Ship completely unloaded.
    1735. Hauled down barrage balloon.
    1814. Underway out of Transport Area.
    1931. Anchored.
    2000. Underway to UK.
    2016. Passed Point K to port and entered Channel 4.

    Anne Arundel lost ten LCVP, all damaged on uncleared and unmarked beach obstacles.

    LCVP 1. Struck two submerged stakes while going in to land. Filled with water, propeller badly bent. Could not be retracted and left on beach.
    LCVP 7. Struck a submerged obstacle on the way into beach. Could not retract as LCVP 17 sunk under its stern. Left on beach.
    LCVP 9. Struck two submerged obstacles on way in to beach. Propeller badly bent and inoperative. Left on beach.
    LCVP 10. Struck stake while retracting. Boat flooded rapidly. Went alongside USS Harding where it sank as the crew left it.
    LCVP 14. Struck stake going into beach and then struck a submerged bulldozer. Flooded at once and motor failed. Abandoned.
    LCVP 15. Hit two stakes going into beach. Filled with water and could not be retracted.
    LCVP 17. Struck two stakes going into beach. Flooded rapidly and sank fifteen foot off the beach.
    LCVP 19. Struck a stake when retracting. Taken in tow by a LCM but sank halfway back to ship.
    LCVP 25. Struck a submerged obstacle and was holes. Coxswain went ahead to get as near beach as possible and hit a second obstacle. Left hanging and abandoned.
    LCVP 26. Struck a hedgehog. Could not retract and left beached.



    AP 67. Dorothea L Dix.
    24 LCVP.
    2 LCM.

    Dorothea L Dix arrived at the Transport Area with the other transports but would not disembark troops for some hours. In the meantime the ships landing craft were assigned to other ships, most to Empire Anvil. They should have returned in plenty of time to carry Dorothea L Dix own troops to shore. In the event things did not run smoothly.

    0318. Anchored in the Transport Area.
    Lowered all boats, 19 LCVP and 2 LCM. Boats dispatched as follows:
    19 LCVP and 1 LCM to Empire Anvil.
    3 LCVP to Henrico.
    1 LCM to Samuel Chase.
    1 spare LCVP and 1 LCVP for boat group commander were retained.
    0405. All boats had reported as assigned.
    Opened all hatches and hoisted the majority of the vehicles on deck to expedite later unloading. Inflated barrage balloon to be flown shortly before H Hour. Crew and troops breakfasted.
    0842. First Dix boat returned.
    0920. Only three of Dorothea L Dix LCVP had returned plus one LCVP from Thomas Jefferson and one LCM from Henrico.
    0923. As no LCT had yet reported a start was made in loading vehicles into LCVP.
    0938. The first LCT, LCT(A) 2425, reported. It was taken alongside forward and unloading vehicles into it commenced. Attempts to load vehicles into LCVPs continued but weather conditions made it slow and difficult.
    1045. LCT 199 arrived. Unloading into small craft was discontinued.

    At this stage the mean of debarking all 33 Jeeps and 1 Cub aircraft were in sight but there was doubt as to the availability of LCI(L) or other craft to disembark troops. A decision was made to land as many troops in LCTs alongside as capacity would permit. This was estimated as eight boat teams or 250 men.

    The shortage of boats was caused by the delay in landing waves 7 and 13 on Fox Green. 11 of the delayed boats were from Dorothea L Dix boating from Empire Anvil. Wave 7 did not land until 1535, 495 minutes late. Wave 13 landed earlier and out of sequence at 1315, 270 minutes late.

    The boats.
    1 LCVP got a line round its propeller off Empire Anvil.
    1 LCVP had its ramp dislodged while at Samuel Chase. It completed the trip but was not used again.

    LCVPs 4, 7, 10, 12, 18, 23 and 24 were holed, swamped and not recovered.
    LCVP 18 was later salvaged and used by Ancon.
    One man was still missing when the report was written on 14 June.

    Dorothea L Dix received the following casualties:
    Army. 24 stretcher cases. 24 walking wounded.
    Navy. 4 stretcher cases. 1 dead.
    USCG. 1 stretcher case. 2 dead.

    The otherwise complete and detailed report from the Commanding Officer has little to say regarding the remainder of the day.



    AP 77 Thurston.

    24 LCVP
    2 LCM
    1104 troops.

    0229. Passed Point K and changed course for entering the Transport Area.
    0333. Anchored in Transport Area.
    0404. All LCVP and LCM waterborne and dispatched to designated transports.
    22 LCVP and 2 LCM were furnished to transports of Assault Groups O1 and O2 for the initial assault.
    0615. All vehicles and troops equipment unloaded from the holds to main deck and all holds closed and battened down.
    0835. First landing craft returned to the ship.
    0850. First casualties received on board.
    0912. Commenced unloading vehicles, planes and troops equipment into LCVP as LCTs had not arrived.
    0940. LCT 2237 seen approaching and unloading stopped.
    1000. LCT 2237 moored alongside.
    1015. LCT 2067 moored alongside.

    The plan assigned Thurston sufficient craft to unload all her troops, vehicles and planes. The craft included:
    16 LCVP from APA 30 Thomas Jefferson.
    9 LCVP from Anne Arundel.
    7 LCA from Prince Baudouin.
    6 LCA from Amsterdam.
    1 LCM from APA 26 Samuel Chase.
    1 LCM from Anne Arundel.
    4 LCI(L) from Assault Group 03. LCI(L) 93, 487, 495, 497.
    3 LCT(A) from Assault Group 01. LCT 2037, 2287, 293.

    Losses of craft and the late landing of LCI(L) and LCT meant that few of these actually arrived. Only the following reported, and the LCI(L)s were very late.
    3 LCVP.
    1 LCA.
    2 LCT.
    2 LCI(L).

    The two LCTs were loaded with 2 Cub aircraft, 26 Jeeps, 1 trailer and 8 boat teams of troops for Wave 31. 8 boat teams equalled some 250 troops.
    The remaining boat teams of Wave 32 were loaded into LCMs and dispatched at 1145.
    The troops of Wave 33 were loaded into 7 LCVP and dispatched at 1235.
    LCI(L) 23 arrived at 1245 and was dispatched at 1345.
    LCI(L) 534 arrived at 1311 and was dispatched at 1400.
    1053. Commenced embarking troops.
    1205. All vehicles. Planes and troops equipment unloaded and dispatched to the beach.
    1400. All troops debarked and dispatched to the beach.
    1615. Boats hoisted aboard. Ready to leave the Transport Area.
    1820. Underway.

    Thurston’s boats.
    Of the 24 LCVP 22 were sent to Assault Groups O1 and O2 to carry initial assault troops. Two retained as spare and control craft.
    3 of these boats were left on the beach. Two boats were damaged and broached while one hit a submerged tank.
    9 boats which returned were damaged and were hoisted aboard for repairs.
    8 boats were sent to Anne Arundel at H+190. These should have been replaced by boats from Anne Arundel.
    Four boats were available to land Wave 33. Since these were landing on a falling tide they dried out and were ordered to be abandoned by the Beachmaster as demolitions were taking place.

    Two of the five abandoned boats were recovered and returned later.

    No radio messages were sent or received during the operation. Signals were by lamp. No ammunition was expended.


    When the transports sailed for the UK the smaller ships had already sailed and Ancon remained. Charles Carroll led as guide and command ship.
    Charles Carroll.
    Thomas Jefferson.
    Anne Arundel
    Dorothea L Dix.
    Thurston.
    Samuel Chase.
    Henrico.
    Empire Javelin.
    Empire Anvil.

    Mike.
     
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  13. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    LSTs.

    The first LSTs were arriving at the Transport Area at much the same time as the transports but using the slow channel. They sailed from Weymouth around 0300 and arrived off the coast of Normandy twenty four hours later. Each LST carried DUKWs on the tank deck, vehicles on the main deck and towed a Rhino plus tug. Unloading mostly proceeded according to plan, although the experience of the DUKWs and Rhinos did not.

    All LSTs except 725 left for the UK around 2110.


    LST 357.
    Omaha East.

    5 June.
    0245. Sailed from Weymouth towing Rhino 2.

    6 June.
    0316. Anchored in the Transport Area, formating on LST 314 (flagship).
    0327. All LCVP waterborne.
    0332. Rhino cast adrift.
    0343. Stern anchor out.
    0402. First DUKW waterborne. The rest of the DUKWs followed.
    0454. LCVPs loaded and dispatched to the Rendezvous Area.
    0502. Rhino standing in.
    0839. Rhino married with difficulty due to adverse wind and sea conditions.
    0908. Rhino loaded and cast off. Ship now unloaded of all vehicles and personnel.
    2210. Joined LST convoy for UK.

    Almost a text book operation. LSTs approached the Transport Area in single column and anchored in the second line. LST 314 was flagship and anchored to the west of AP 77 Thurston. The remainder of the LSTs anchored in line.

    LSTs had bow anchors and stern anchors. The bow anchor was used in normal everyday circumstances. The stern anchor was used with as powerful winch to retract the LST from a beach. The Normandy beaches had a much more gradual slope than most. Normally LSTs could approach a beach and lower its ramp to discharge vehicles while the LST remained afloat. The stern anchor and winch could assist in reversing off the beach if necessary, and prevent the stern swinging round due to the effects of wind and tide. On D Day the stern anchor rather than the bow anchor was used to anchor the LST to avoid the risk of the Rhino fouling the anchor chain when ‘marrying’.

    The DUKWs were launched from the tank deck. The launch was difficult because of the sea conditions. The Rhino and its tug had already been cast adrift. Both had crews on board and had the engines running. Once the DUKWs were launched and the LCVPs loaded and dispatched the Rhino could move to the bows of the LST and marry. This involved the Rhino reversing up to the LSTs ramp. Three cables were used to hold the Rhino in position as it manoeuvred. This was not easy in calm conditions and on D Day it took several attempts before the Rhino was correctly positioned and secured so that vehicles could drive straight off the LST and onto the Rhino.


    LST 316.
    Omaha West.

    June 6.
    0325. Anchored in the Transport Area with bow anchor. Lowered boats and commenced loading troops and equipment.
    0345. Dispatched boats to Rendezvous Area.
    0430. Shifted to stern anchor.
    0448. Commenced discharging DUKWs.
    0510. Rhino 7 married to bow.
    0714. Completed unloading.
    2120 Underway for the UK.

    One LCVP lost on the beach due to enemy fire. One man wounded.


    LST 375.
    5 June.
    0315. Sailed from Weymouth towing a Rhino and tug.
    0635. Line from Rhino to tug parted. Replaced.

    6 June.
    0300. Arrived in Transport Area. Cast off Rhino and anchored by the stern.
    0325. Stern anchor secured. Bow door opened, ramp lowered and DUKWs unloaded. Proceed to marry with Rhino. This proved difficult with the swell, strong tides and currents. The first attempt failed when the Rhino centring cable parted. Three of the LST wire ropes also parted at this time. The Rhino cast off and moored alongside while the cables were replaced.
    0625. The marrying was successful and loading of the Rhino commenced at once.
    0710. Loading complete. The Rhino cast off and headed for the beach carrying 56 vehicles.
    All vehicles were lowered from the main deck to the tank deck. Stood by to receive LCTs to complete unloading.
    1400. LCT 244 married and loading began.
    1425 Loading LCT 244 completed.
    1449. Attempted to marry to LCT 205 but the ramp chains parted and the marriage failed. Emergency ramp lifting gear was rigged and loading attempted. After 6 vehicles the sea became too rough to continue.
    2050. Moved to a point one mile off the beach to find smoother water. At this time no LCT were available.
    2340. Rhino 4, fully loaded, fouled the anchor chain. Chain cleared and Rhino moved alongside.

    7 June.
    0950. LCI 487 took Rhino 3 in tow to the beach.
    1413. Received survivors. 62 men and 8 officers from Susan B Anthony. 9 men and 2 officers from LCT 294.
    1645. Commenced marrying LCT 293 to complete unloading.
    1655. Commenced unloading into LCT 293.
    1720. Completed unloading 8 vehicles and 1 trailer into LCT 293.
    1758. Commenced marrying LCT 206.
    1820. Completed unloading.

    8 June. To UK.

    The LCVPs.
    0230. All small boats were lowered and stood off. The scout boat proceeded on assigned duty.
    0605. Boats 1 and 4 were loaded with troops and proceeded to the Rendezvous Area.
    0730. Boats 3 and 6 were loaded and proceeded as ordered.
    0745. Boat 5 attempted to rescue the crew of a sinking DUKW and suffered underwater damage. It was hoisted aboard.
    1135. Boat 1 returned and was hoisted on board.
    2010. Scout boat returned with engine trouble and was hoisted on board.
    2030. Boat 6 returned in a sinking condition having suffered under water damage. Crew were taken off and boat sank before it could be hoisted.



    LCS(S).
    The following is taken from the report of the four LCS(S) carried on LST 374.

    The four LCS(S) carried aboard LST 374 were put into the water in the Transport Area at about H-210 minutes. They proceeded to Rendezvous Point KL at about H-190 minutes. They were joined by eight other LCS(S), three from LST 6, three from LST 376, one from APA Henrico and one from APA Samuel Chase.

    At about H-160 the LCS(S)s received a verbal message that they should all assemble at the buoy at Point KL and leave from there to meet the LCT carrying DD tanks at the 6000 yard line. No order to proceed was received but at H-135 it was discovered that some boats had left, unnoticed in the poor visibility and heavy seas. The remaining eight started for the 6000 yard line.

    Arriving at the 6000 yard line at H-45 they found the LCTs in the process of launching their DD tanks. The LCS(S) took up station in front of their respective DD tanks and proceeded at reduced speed towards the beach. Those DD tanks that had survived the launching followed.

    At H-15 minutes the LCS(S) commenced firing HE rockets as follows.
    Boat 1 fired a ranging shot which fell on the beach 200 yards from the waters edge. 43 more rockets were fired, two at a time, while approaching the beach. All rockets hit well up the beach but the later ones could not be observed because of the smoke and dust. 44 rockets hit the beach. The remaining four misfired.
    Boat 2 fired 48 rockets all of which hit the beach.
    Boat 3 fired two ranging shots, the first having fallen short. 46 hit the beach and two misfired.
    Boat 4 fired 46 rockets which hit he beach, 2 misfired.

    After firing the craft withdrew. They picked up four survivors from the DD tanks on the way and hove to at the 2000 yard line where they remained until H+90. They then reported to the Deputy Senior Office Assault Group ‘O’ for duty as assistant control craft, liaison and despatch craft under the Primary Control PCs.

    When the duties off the beaches were completed they operated as liaison and despatch craft for Shuttle Control based on HMS Ceres. They then remained in the area except for one returning to Portland on LST 375 for repairs and two returning to Southampton on LST 374 for repairs. On D+16 and D+17 all four of the craft were lost in the storm. The crews returned to the UK soon afterwards.

    Mike.
     
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  14. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    The LCI(L)s.

    In praise of the LCI(L).
    The original British requirement was for a craft which could carry 200 troops across the Channel in reasonable comfort below decks, and provide meals. Following from this was a requirement for a reasonable speed so that troops would not remain on board for too long and the ability to beach in water shallow enough to allow troops to wade ashore. Production was undertaken by the USA and their attitudes of can do, no frills, mass production using existing methods and available components led to the LCI(L).

    Shallow draft dictated a welded steel hull. Troop carrying dictated large open space below decks. Great demand for large marine diesel engines led to eight diesel truck engines being used. The transmission was simply a shaft serving each set of four engines, each engine transferring power to the shaft by means of a rubber roller.

    The US had the advantage of plenty of waterways with open spaces suitable for ship building, and freedom from the air raids which threatened all British industry. Production lines almost identical to that used in the motor industry were set up. Prefabricated sections were assembled away from the assembly slipways. They were then moved on specially designed trolleys and cradles, carefully aligned and then welded together at Position 1. The entire hull then moved to Position 2 where the deckhouse was fitted and welded. At Position 3 the pilot house and conning tower were fitted to the deck house. At Position 4 electrical and other installations were fitted. At Position 5 all the minor furnishings were fitted. Finally the hull was hauled into a mobile floating dock which carried it into the river and it floated off.

    This basic mass produced craft proved to be very versatile. Its engines gave it a speed of 16 knots. The twin shafts gave it great manoeuvrability. The open space could be used for a variety of uses apart from troop carrying.

    Some uses in Operation Overlord/Neptune.
    Carrying troops across the Channel.
    Unloading troop transports and ferrying troops to the beach.
    Headquarters and control craft.
    Tugs for rescue and recovery work.
    Tugs for towing and positioning Rhinos, NL pontoon piers etc.
    Accommodation craft off the beaches.
    Mother ships for small craft.
    Escorts for LCT convoys.


    On D Day the LCI(L)s used the fast swept channel until they passed Point K when they headed for their assigned Rendezvous Area. They circled in the area until ordered into the Line of Departure. By the time the LCI(L)s landed the beach obstacles should have been sufficiently cleared to provide wide gaps. Ideally the troops should have moved far enough inland to prevent direct artillery, mortar and small arms fire being directed at the vessels as they approached and beached. Of course the obstacles had not been cleared and the direct fire had not been supressed.

    LCI(L) were manned by personnel from the US Coast Guard, the commanding officer being a Lieutenant (Junior Grade) US Coast Guard Reserve.



    LCI(L) 85.
    This ship arrived with the other LCI(L) of Force ‘O’ and circled in the LCI Collecting Area until the time to make the run into the beach. Scheduled beaching time was 0830 on Easy Red. The Line of Departure was reached at 0820 and the Primary Control vessel called by loud hailer and ordered the ship to the beach. The control vessel had drifted to the east in the strong tide running along the beach and was almost past Easy Red and into Fox Green. LSI(L) 85 landed on the boundary between the two beaches instead of the opposite flank of Easy Red as intended.

    The ship grounded at 0830 and put out both ramps. The water was too deep for the troops to wade to the shore so the ramps were retracted and the ship began to back off the beach. The anchor winch was hit and stopped working. In common with other landing ships and craft the LCI(L) dropped a stern anchor on approaching the beach, paid out cable until it beached and then used the anchor and winch to retract from the beach. The anchor also prevented the vessels stern swinging round with the current and broaching too. There were no LCVP in sight to help unload so the vessel went 100 yards to the right and made another beaching.

    Since the winch was damaged the second beaching was made without an anchor. As the ship grounded a Teller mine exploded under the bow, splitting the void tank. The port ramp went down and troops began going ashore. After some fifty troops had gone down the ramp it was hit by a shell and blown over the side. The starboard ramp was not down and the deck was jammed with troops wounded by machine gun and shell fire so the vessel backed off again.

    A check revealed that there were fifteen dead and thirty wounded. The ship was hit by some twenty five shells. Fire started in troop compartments 1, 2 and 3. Water was coming in through shell holes below the water line and the hole made by the mine.

    The LCI(L) backed off and stood off about 200 yards from the shore. The damage control party began fighting the fires and had them out in thirty minutes. Fortunately the vessel was carrying several Army and Navy doctors plus the vessels own pharmacists mates so the wounded were attended to immediately.

    All but thirty of the troops were able to debark and were carried ashore by LCVP. There were not sufficient boats to complete unloading so the vessel went to APA26 Samuel Chase to unload casualties. It came alongside about 1200. By this time it had developed a bad list from the flooded compartment forward. The damage control party attempted to pump it out but the pump filters kept clogging with debris.

    By 1330 all the wounded were transferred to Samuel Chase. The vessel backed away and was taken in tow by AT 98. The list was now so bad that it was decided to have the tug pump it out rather than attempt to beach. This was unsuccessful and the LCI(L) capsized at 1430. All the crew boarded the tug and the LCI(L) was sunk by a demolition charge.



    LCI(L) 90.
    Arrived at the Rendezvous Area behind the Transport Area and circled. Left the Rendezvous Area with LCI(L) 91 and 94 and proceeded to the Line of Departure. It was scheduled to land at H+70 on Easy Green carrying troops from the beach battalion. Arriving at the Line of Departure ahead of time it was held for thirteen minutes by the Primary Control Craft.

    When ordered in there was no problem identifying the beach but there was no opening in the obstacles and the first attempt failed. The vessel backed out, made a tight circle and approached again and beached. The stern anchor had been dropped and the winch was used to help position the ship against a stake without a mine. This manoeuvre used the last length of anchor cable and it was released from the reel. Without the anchor cable the ship began to broach and the engines could not hold it. Troop unloading ceased, three quarters of the troops had already been unloaded, as the ramps had been twisted off their mountings and the water was too deep for the troops.

    The ship backed off the beach and a flag hoist was made for small boat assistance. It then lay to about a thousand yards from the beach. Eventually LCVPs unloaded the remaining troops. One army casualty was evacuated to an APA. Reported to APA 28 Charles Carroll for orders at about 1200. At 1300 took 68 officers and men of V Corps Headquarters from Charles Carroll. A used anchor cable and spare anchor was installed. On approaching the beach the control vessel gave information which led to the senior army officer ordering a delay in beaching.

    At 1700 the ship was ordered to land. At 1726 it beached on the right hand side of Easy Red in intense mortar fire and sniping. The troops disembarked and the craft withdrew. One ships officer and one army casualty were evacuated to a LST.

    Later an LCM loaded with fifty survivors from a sinking LCT were brought aboard. The survivors were provided with accommodation and breakfast before going to a LSD.

    On D+1 LCI(L) 90 was assigned duty as an accommodation ship for small boats crews and continued doing this for some days.



    The strange case of LCI(L) 554.
    Several writers, including the writers of official histories, have credited LCI(L) 554 with achieving a breakthrough on Omaha. At a time when things were not going well on or off the beach LCI(L) 554 is said to have crashed through the beach obstacles in order to land troops. Other craft seeing this daring feat followed. The official report submitted by the Commanding Officer of the craft makes no mention of this.

    The original document has a short statement followed by a brief log of events.

    LCI(L) sailed in a convoy of 35 LCI(L). It proceeded to the Transport Area from where the craft were to depart in groups to their respective beaches. The ship was in a group of eight LCI(L) to land on Easy Green and Dog red at 1015. They reported to the control vessel ay the Line of Departure and were ordered in to the beach. There were no cleared channels through the beach obstacles but those obstacles lower down the beach had sufficient water over them to allow the ship to clear them. The stakes nearer the shore were sufficiently visible to allow the ship to pass between them. There was some machine gun fire but it was not directed at the ship.

    0917. Left the Transport Area.
    1029. At the Line of Departure.
    1057. Dropped the stern anchor.
    1059. Beached between LCI(L) 412 and 411.
    1100. Ramps out and troops proceeding to land. Only the port ramp was used as it was in two feet of water and the starboard ramp had an obstruction in front of it.
    1115. Three survivors from a craft from APA 26 Samuel Chase came aboard for transportation back to the ship. Ramps retracted and ship off the beach.
    1120. Anchor secure and underway for the Transport Area.

    Was the commanding officer modest?
    Was the story embroidered for publicity and propaganda?
    Is it an error?

    The reports of the other craft mentioned, LCI(L) 411 and 412, are similar to the report of LCI(L) 554. They report having to approach the beach with care but experienced no great difficulty, landed the troops and retracted safely.

    The Commanding Officer LCI(L) Group 34 on LCI(L) 408 reported that all the craft of his group approached the beach at the same time, in line abreast. One LCI(L) had to back off and try again and LCI(L) 553 got stuck when retracting, was hit by gunfire and was abandoned.

    Perhaps the success of this group did encourage others to negotiate the obstacles and beach their craft but there does not seem to have been a deliberate decision to charge the obstacles, nor was it the action of an individual craft.

    Lessons.
    Question everything.
    Check the original sources.

    Mike
     
    Last edited: Oct 14, 2017
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  15. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    We are now going ashore to see how the beach organisation is developing.

    DEVELOPING the BEACH.

    The Beach and Beach Maintenance Area.

    The usable beach at Omaha was some 7,900 yards long. At either end of the beach there were steep rocky cliffs rising from the waters edge and this was not usable for beaching etc.

    The beach had a great tidal range which gave a large tidal flat area. The flat was 300 yards between low water and high water marks and was of hard, well compacted sand which would bear the weight of vehicles and provide good landing places for craft. There were no areas of underlying peat or clay such as caused problems on other beaches but towards the edges of the beach there were outcrops of shale. Possibly the only problem was that in places the beach had a series of runnels which were some fifty to a hundred yards from the high water mark and were from two foot to four foot deep. These runnels caused problems for landing craft of the early waves since they grounded in shallow water and troops and vehicles then found an area of deep water between themselves and the beach proper.

    At the top of the beach on the eastern half (Easy Red and Fox), above the high tide mark, waves had thrown up piles of shingle consisting of small rounded stones This area shelved steeply to a height of 25 feet. On the western half of the beach there was a sea wall six to twelve feet high.

    Inland of the shingle and sea wall there was an area of varying depth on which there had been houses and holiday villas most of which had been demolished. This area would provide useful space for the many units which needed to bivouac or establish dumps near the beach. Inland of this area were bluffs which sloped up to heights of eighty to a hundred and twenty feet. There was a good road along the shore at the western end of the beach but this degenerated and disappeared at the eastern end.

    Five gullies or draws provided exits from the beaches. These were identified by the US by the beach initial and a number.
    Exit D1 had a good road running from the beach to Vierville sur Mer about 600 yards inland. This road had provided access to the beach villas.
    Exit D3 also had a good road leading to Saint Laurent sur Mer about a mile inland.
    Exit E1 had a narrow cart track leading up a steep hill to Saint Laurent sur Mer.
    Exit E3 had a dirt road winding up to Colleville.
    Exit F1 had only a poor cart track which was not suitable for motor vehicles.

    Inland there was a rolling plateau which extended two to four miles inland before reaching the low, swampy valley of the River Aure. There were two main roads. Route B was less than a mile from, and parallel to the beach and ran through the three principal villages of Vierville sur Mer, Saint Laurent sur Mer and Collevlle. The Isigny to Bayeaux road was further inland and roughly parallel to Route B. This provided a near text book road layout with a lateral road along the shore, one just inland and one near the edge of what would be the Beach Maintenance Area. These were linked by and to the routes from the beach.

    All the area between the beach and the River Aure would become the Beach Maintenance Area which together with the beaches was the responsibility of the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group.

    Ideally reconnaissance parties and advanced parties should have reached the areas allotted to dumps, assembly area and transit areas on D Day, examined the sites and assessed their suitability and made a start in laying out the sites. MPs should have signed the routes and dumps should have been open for receipts on D+1 and for issuing on D+2. Of course hardly any of the proposed Beach Maintenance Area had been reached by US forces on D Day and the programme was far behind schedule.


    Gapping Teams.
    It was a priority to clear gaps through the beach obstacles. The assault wave was carried in LCAs and LCVPs which were planned to beach on the seaward side of the obstacles. Later waves would arrive when the seaward rows of obstacles were under water and invisible to the crafts crews. Soon larger craft, LCTs and LCIs, would be landing. It was planned that 50 yard wide gaps would be cleared and marked so that craft could beach safely and vehicles make their way from the craft to the top of the beach. The plan was for gaps to be made in the obstacles by H+60 minutes and that vehicles should be landing.

    There were eight Gapping Teams landing on Omaha West, numbered 1 to 8. These were assisted by one Sherman tankdozer per team. Naval Combat Demolition Units were to clear the most seaward line of obstacles while army engineers cleared those further up the beach. When the initial fifty yard wide gap was complete the Gapping Teams would progressively widen the gap until the entire beach frontage was cleared. As the gaps were cleared they were to be marked with small buoys Any uncleared obstacles, plus any wrecked craft or drowned vehicles, were to be marked by buoys also. For a variety of reasons they were not successful in clearing gaps before the rising tide prevented further work. Of the eight Gapping Teams only two can be considered successful, and of the two gaps only one was used on D Day.

    Team 1 landed in the wrong place. It should have landed on the extreme right of the assault near the boundary between Dog Green and Charlie. It was carried by the current and landed on Dog White, well to the east. They set to work and laid all their charges in some 15 minutes and blew an initial 50 yard gap through the defences. In the afternoon they worked to widen the gap to 150 yards. However no craft landed here on D Day and the gap was not used. Team 4 suffered so many casualties that it was unable to lay sufficient charges to clear a complete gap. Thus this was only partially successful and the gap was not cleared until the tide went out. Team 5 could not set the charges off because of the numbers of infantry which were landing and taking cover behind them. By the time the area was cleared of infantry the tide had risen and only a partial detonation was achieved. The gap was not sufficiently cleared to be used. Team 6 found that there were relatively few obstacles, all sparsely distributed. They successfully cleared a 50 yard gap. Later as the tide rose two LCTs heading for the gap missed the markers and struck a mined obstacle thus obstructing much of the gap. Team 8 was on time and in the correct place on Easy Green. It suffered heavy casualties but succeeded in clearing a 50 yard gap. The remnants of the various teams were set to various tasks further up the beaches until the tide receded sufficiently for clearance work to resume.

    Thus only one operational gap was made, and that was inadequately marked.

    On Omaha East the eight Gapping Teams did a little better. Team 9 set their charges and after two attempts set them off. A partial gap was cleared. Team 10 cleared a gap almost 100 yards wide before work was slowed by casualties and the arrival of more landing craft and troops. Team 12 wired a sector and placed charges but found they could not set it off because of the infantry sheltering behind the obstacles. As they retired up the shore a shell set off the charges killing ten men and wounding nine, as well as many infantrymen. A gap was made however.

    No gaps were made on Fox Green until after 0900. On Dog Red a wide gap was made and this was built upon later but that the boundaries were not adequately marked. Some areas of obstacles remained and these were not marked either. Because the only gaps through the beach obstacles were near beach exits D3 and E1 this was where most of the landings were made. However the beach exits were not clear and troops and vehicles were pinned down on the beach. By H+120 minutes the beaches were so congested that the beachmasters halted all landing of vehicles.

    All development of the beach above the high water mark was the responsibility of the beach units. In this case the Provisional Engineer Brigade Group, whose story follows below.

    USA-E-Logistics1-12.jpg

    Mike
     
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  16. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    The Provisional Engineer Brigade Group.

    When the Beach Maintenance Area was fully established the Provisional Engineer Brigade Group would control a total of nearly 20,000 personnel.

    The Provisional Engineer Brigade Group consisted of 5 Engineer Special Brigade, 6 Engineer Special Brigade and the additional units shown below.

    Provisional Brigade Group Headquarters.
    Advance Section, Port Headquarters.
    2 X Transportation Corps Port Battalion.
    Engineer General Service Battalion.
    Three Signal Teams.
    Quartermaster Service Battalion.
    Quartermaster Truck Battalion.
    Transportation Corps Amphibious Truck Battalion.
    3 X Quartermaster Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments
    2 X Military Police Company.
    Ordnance Medium Automobile Maintenance Company.
    Total 847 vehicles. 3486 personnel.

    5 Engineer Special Brigade.
    5 Engineer Special Brigade Headquarters.
    37 Engineer Combat Battalion.
    336 Engineer Combat Battalion.
    348 Engineer Combat Battalion.
    61 Medical Battalion.
    210 Military Police Company.
    30 Chemical Decontamination Company.
    294 Joint Assault Signal Company, Special.
    251 Ordnance Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.
    616 ordnance Ammunition Company.
    3466 Ordnance Medium Automobile Maintenance Company.
    533 Quartermaster Service Battalion.
    619 Quartermaster Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.
    131 Quartermaster Mobile Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.
    453 Transportation Corps Amphibious Truck Company.
    458 Transportation Corps Amphibious Truck Company.
    459 Transportation Corps Amphibious Truck Company.
    97 Quartermaster Railhead Company.
    559 Quartermaster Railhead Company
    Company ‘A’, 203 Gas Supply Battalion.

    Naval Beach Battalion. (Army units only).
    Platoon, 465 Engineer Depot Company.
    Platoon, 608 Engineer Maintenance Company.
    Detachment 1602 Map Depot.
    S and I Section 218 Signal Depot Company.
    Section 1 Medical Depot Company.
    Platoon Graves Registration Company.
    4042 Quartermaster Truck Company.
    1212 Engineer Fire Fighting Section.
    ? Bomb Disposal Squad.
    ? Transportation Corps Port Battalion.
    ? Transportation Corps Port Battalion.


    6 Engineer Special Brigade.
    6 Engineer Special Brigade Headquarters.
    147 Engineer Combat Battalion.
    149 Engineer Combat Battalion.
    203 Engineer Combat Battalion.
    60 Medical Battalion.
    214 Military Police Company.
    31 Chemical Decontamination Company.
    293 Joint Assault Signal Company, Special.
    ? Ordnance Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.
    618 ordnance Ammunition Company.
    3504 Ordnance Medium Automobile Maintenance Company.
    ? Quartermaster Service Battalion.
    538 Quartermaster Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.
    95 Quartermaster Mobile Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.
    460 Transportation Corps Amphibious Truck Company.
    461 Transportation Corps Amphibious Truck Company.
    ? Transportation Corps Amphibious Truck Company.
    88 Quartermaster Railhead Company.
    555 Quartermaster Railhead Company.
    3820 Gas Supply Battalion.

    Naval Beach Battalion. (Army units only).
    Platoon, 465 Engineer Depot Company.
    Platoon, 608 Engineer Maintenance Company.
    9 Air Force Beach Party.
    S and I Section 218 Signal Depot Company.
    Section 1 Medical Depot Company.
    Platoon Graves Registration Company.
    4043 Quartermaster Truck Company.
    1212 Engineer Fire Fighting Section.
    ? Bomb Disposal Squad.
    ? Transportation Corps Port Battalion.
    ? Transportation Corps Port Battalion.


    The Beach Maintenance Area included the beach, the dumps inland and the road network connecting beach and dumps. Normally a Beach Maintenance Area will be established by each Engineer Special Brigade but on Omaha 5 Engineer Special Brigade landed first, reinforced by some units of 6 Engineer Special Brigade and the two Beach Maintenance Areas were consolidated into a single shore establishment under the command of the Provisional Brigade Group.

    The Engineer Special Brigade was equivalent to the British Beach Group.
    The Provisional Brigade Group was equivalent to the British Beach Sub Area.

    An Engineer Special Brigade was capable of moving 3,300 tons of supplies a day from ships to the dumps and providing the labour and technical personnel to operate the dumps. As the size of the army ashore grows and the required daily tonnage increases the Engineer Special Brigade can be augmented by the attachment of service troops from the Communications Zone (Line of Communication).

    Mike.
     
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  17. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Provisional Engineer Brigade Group on D Day. An overview.

    The first troops of the Provisional Engineer Brigade Group to actually land were a reconnaissance party from 37 Engineer Combat Battalion. They landed at 0700 (H+30 minutes). In the first hour of the assault other groups from the engineer brigades landed but it was immediately obvious that they could not carry out their planned work of developing gaps across the beach and exits from it. Engineer brigade personnel were pinned down by enemy fire just as the infantry were. Instead they remained under what cover there was, helped the wounded or added their fire to that of the infantry in the hope of reducing the volume of enemy fire.

    In the second hour after the assault began the engineers continued to land, often on the wrong beaches. There was little prospect at the time of working along the beach to join their units. Some engineer teams helped by blowing gaps in the barbed wire entanglements but many had lost their equipment in the landing.

    Because the only gaps through the beach obstacles were near beach exits D3 and E1 this was where most of the landings were made. Elsewhere craft were unable to find a place to beach and some made their way to the exits which were open. This led to congestion and the enemy was not slow to fire on this tempting target. As the beach became littered with vehicles and craft and the tide rose such beach clearance work as had been possible had to be abandoned. At this point beach masters ordered that no more craft carrying vehicles should be sent in. Some beach units had already ordered craft carrying their vehicles and personnel to stand off.

    One mine detector team from 37 Engineer Combat Battalion cleared a path up a defile between exits E1 and E3. Infantry then advanced along the trail and by 1030 (H+4 hours) had cleared enough of the area around exit E1 to allow engineers of 37 and 149 Engineer Combat Battalions to begin opening the exit. A company from 37 Engineer Combat Battalion made one road from the beach east of the exit and a company from 149 Engineer Combat Battalion used bulldozers to clear a road to the west. Personnel from both battalions helped to fill in the anti tank ditch which blocked the exit and cleared mines from the road and from a field to the west.

    Near exit D3 troops from 147 Engineer Combat Battalion cut wire entanglements, blew gaps in the sea wall and used dozers to clear the beach.

    By 1030 there was still very little beach organisation, little beach clearance and landings had almost ceased. By 1230 (H+6 hours) however more troops had penetrated inland and order was being imposed on the chaos. The Engineer Special Brigades were able to start work, although not according to the plan. Beach clearance was still not possible but it was possible to clear damaged or stalled vehicles from the ramps of LCTs and allow the remaining vehicles to land, to remove damaged vehicles from the beach exits and make a start on clearing the beach road.

    An attempt was made to cut a new road directly inland from exit E1 to the road (Route B). This could not be completed since the enemy still held positions between the beach and the road. Vehicles were however able to move off the beach and into fields at the top of the slope.

    By 1400 tanks began to use exit D1 which had by then been cleared. It was however unsuitable for other vehicles.

    By late afternoon the gap assault teams were able to resume work on beach obstacle clearance. It was necessary to gather explosives and ‘borrow’ bulldozers from other units. Work was hampered by enemy shelling the beaches and exits, and by fresh waves of troops landing. Five large gaps and six smaller gaps were cleared and marked.

    Exit E1 remained the focus of operations. 1 Division engineers pushed a road through from the exit to the highway and vehicles could then be driven off the beach and into the fields on top of the cliffs. The exit road was improved and some congestion relieved. Engineer Special brigade personnel cleared minefields and opened up transit areas and bivouac areas where troops could pause and reorganise before moving inland.

    The Engineer Combat Battalions continued throughout with the work of clearing wreckage from the beach and giving aid to the wounded.

    Organisation of the eastern end of the beach began in the late afternoon. Advance units of 5 Engineer Special Brigade landed between exits D1 and D3, some 4000 yards from their intended landing place. They made their way eastwards. The first men from 336 Engineer Combat Battalion reached exit F1 at 1700 and found that good progress had been made in clearing obstacles but the exit road was in poor condition. Some alterations to plans had to be made and mine clearance teams and bulldozers started work on an alternative road through to Route B. Anti tank ditches were filled in and fields were cleared of mines. LCTs and other craft were ordered to land opposite exit F1 and the exit was opened at 2000. Two tanks successfully passed through the exit and up the road but those following hit mines and a new path was made round them. Tanks were able to pass through by 2230. Fields at the top of the cliff were cleared and dumps established.

    Towards evening the situation at exit D3 improved. Enemy small arms fire ceased and engineers of 348 Engineer Combat cleared mines from the beach lateral road by 1700. Artillery fire still prevented work on the beach exit but by 2000 it had slackened enough to allow work to begin. A road was cleared up to the top of the cliffs before sniper fire stopped work again. Tanks were using the exit by 0100 of D+1.

    By the end of D Day work was a long way behind schedule but a start had been made on organising and operating the beach. Enough beach exits were open to allow those vehicles which were landing to clear the beach area and avoid congestion. A start had been made on clearing the beach of obstacles. Three exits were open at D1, E1 and F1. Some improvised dumps had been created but only small amounts of petrol and ammunition had been landed by DUKW so supplies were being issued from the reserves in beached LCTs and rafts. Of the approximately 55,000 personnel scheduled to land some 24,000 had actually done so.

    All the beach operations on D Day had been under the control of the commanding officer 5 Engineer Special Brigade regardless of which brigade units belonged to. In mid afternoon the command party of the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group landed and established a command post in a pillbox at exit E1. The commanding officer of the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group landed and was ready to assume command of all beach units at midnight. 6 Engineer Special Brigade units then reverted to their own command instead of that of 5 Engineer Special Brigade.

    Mike
     
  18. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    1121 Engineer Combat Group.

    The engineer units of 1 Division and 29 Division were to start the work of opening up the beaches. Their brief was to assist the assault units of the divisions by clearing obstacles and mines, opening gaps in the sea wall and making roads to enable tactical vehicles to move inland. They were also to establish assembly areas and other facilities to assist their formations. Gradually as the assault divisions moved inland the Engineer Special Brigades took over the tasks that should have been started and began to develop the Beach Maintenance Area.

    1121 Engineer Combat Group was responsible for the opening of beach exits. It contained two battalions, 121 Engineer Combat Battalion from 29 Division and 112 Engineer Combat Battalion from V Corps Engineer Troops. All combat battalions were similar in organisation and equipment but these two battalions had additional plant in order to carry out their assigned tasks.

    112 Combat Engineer Battalion was to open Exit D-3 at Les Moulins, at the junction of Dog Red and Easy Green beaches. This proved a difficult task and was not completed until 2000 hours on D Day. The battalion spent much of the day pinned down on the beach. It was joined by a platoon from 147 Engineer Combat Battalion from 6 Engineer Special Brigade.

    121 Combat Engineer Battalion was to open Exit D-1 at the western end of the assault area on Dog Green. Two platoons from Company ‘B’ plus the company commander and company advanced staff landed from two LCM at 0710 (H+40). The remaining platoon of Company ‘B’ and one platoon from Company ‘C’ landed at 0720 (H+50). The commander of Company ‘C’ was killed on leaving the craft. Advanced elements of Battalion HQ landed from an LCI(L) at 0730 (H+60). The LCI(L) was hit on the bow by a shell which started a fire. There were heavy casualties and much equipment was lost. The craft burned for the rest of the day.

    The personnel who survived and reached the sea wall were scattered but officers managed to collect them together and recovered as much equipment as possible. About 1000 hours some of the personnel including the executive officer and adjutant advanced up the bluffs with the parties of infantry gathered by Brigadier General Cota and reached Vierville sur Mer.

    The remaining two platoons from Company ‘C’ landed on Easy Green at 1030 (H+4hours). They landed from LCTs together with bulldozers and one ton of explosives per platoon. The remnants of Companies ‘A’ and ‘B’ which were sheltering on the beach and the two new platoons, plus bulldozers, were ordered to move to Exit D1 and open it for traffic. Most of the defenders had been cleared but some snipers remained and these had to be cleared before work could begin.

    About 1200 hours the officers who had accompanied Brigadier General Cota to Vierville sur Mer now accompanied him down the D1 draw and rejoined the elements of the battalion working on the beach and beach exit. The anti tank wall blocking the approach to Exit D1 was breached by the crude but effective means of detonating 1,100 lbs of TNT against it. Company ‘B’ remained on the beach to complete the opening of Exit D1 and to clear the road to Vierville. This work was accomplished by 2100 hours.

    Company ‘C’ was ordered to clear Transit Area 1, west of Vierville sur Mer. This work was 50% completed that night and the company bivouacked on it. Headquarters and ‘B’ Company bivouacked to the south of Vierville sur Mer.

    At 0530 on D+1 the enemy attacked from the south and the battalion held them off until Rangers supported by tanks arrived at about 1030. The battalion then set up a defensive line along the east/west road to protect the Division command post. At 1600 they were able to continue clearing Transit Area 1, which was complete by 1900.

    Company ‘A’ landed with 115 Regimental Combat Team, the leading platoon landing at 2300 hours on D day. The company supported 115 RCT forward movement by clearing the route and opening the lines of communication behind the leading troops. Company ‘A’ rejoined the battalion on the evening of D+1.

    Moving inland in support of its parent 29 Division 121 Engineer Combat Battalion carried out the usual combat engineer tasks including:
    Company ‘C’ cleared Vierville of rubble.
    Company ‘A’ cleared the road to Grandcamp
    Company ‘C’ cleared the road through Isigny.
    Company ‘A’ Built ten improvised foot bridges using assault raft equipment, pneumatic floats and bridge timbers.
    Established a water point at reference 610907. This opened on D+4.

    Mike
     
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  19. Bin There

    Bin There Active Member

    This entire thread is an excellent detailed summary (if you'll excuse the contradiction).

    I note however this in this post you left out some key details on the reduction of WN64 on the eastern shoulder of the E-1 draw. You mention the one platoon (boat section) of Co. E, 16RCT that climbed the bluffs between E-1 and E-3 draws and headed inland, but neglected to mention that at the top of the bluffs it first turned west and attacked WN64 from the flank/rear. Co. A, 16RCT landed in front of WN 64 at 0740 hours, shortly before the Co. E platoon attacked it from the flank/rear. Co. A proceeded to mount a frontal attack on the resistance nest. It lost 45 men just trying to cross the anti-tank ditch, but various elements continued the attack. While WN64 was engaging Co. A's frontal attack, the boat section from Co. E hit it from the flank. In the ensuing 2 hour fight, this boat section took 21 prisoners and killed 'several' enemy soldiers. Between the Co E boat section and Co. A's attack, WN64 was effectively neutralized (but not completely cleared) by about 1000 hours. Both the platoon leader and platoon sergeant of this Co. E boat section received DSCs for their feats that day.

    The fall of WN64 was also a big factor in the reduction of WN65. A machine gun crew (I think from the support BLT of the 16th RCT) arrived about 0930 hours and set up just to the rear of WN64. It proceeded to suppress WN65 across the draw and, more importantly interdicted the flow of ammunition resupply to the enemy position.

    Again, this is an excellent thread. Thanks much.
     
  20. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Bin There,

    Thank you for your kind comments and for your contribution. Your previous post about LCVP 26-26 encouraged me to look up the War Diaries for the transports involved.

    Mike.
     

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