Hi all, I was pondering on the problems faced, using artillery in the jungles of South East Asia during WW2, and have a number of questions. Firstly, are you defending or attacking that airfield, railway or road, or sea port, this has a major factor on your options. In defence, you may have had time to prepare, so guns and mortars can be positioned and potential targets registered, ammunition stockpiled, lines of communications laid down and improved, and crews given a modicum of creature comforts. In attack, everything has to be carried with you, and orientation can be very difficult the further into the jungle you venture. Mobility; Moving your piece of artillery into position, and maybe late repositioning it. Firstly, use any river, rail line, road, or track, as far as you can, then what trails are available to move onto. Of course, as you get closer to your enemy’s defensive position, these lines of advance are going to quickly become heavily defended. So now its flanking movements, hacking through jungle. Can your artillery, positioned just off the river, rail, road or track reach the defensive positions or have they got to come as well, is so, your going to need pack mules. So, at this point, what guns/mortars do you need, weight is a big factor, does the gun break down into pack loads? Supplies; Defence starts with an advantage, but even it will need resupply at some stage. Again, get back to those good avenues of movement as quickly as possible, the river, rail etc. but now its about how quickly supplies are consumed, so number of men to feed, how many rounds for the gun/mortar are being expended. Also, how heavy is each round, everything has to be carried. Which brings me to think of the next bit Effectiveness of gun; A 2-inch mortar, is really light, use small rounds, easy to move, but not going to do much. However, what is? A 6-inch round will be more effective but the real measure is by weight, because everything has to be carried, so you get a lot of 2-inch rounds for one 6-inch round, you can be less accurate but still do better. Accuracy relies on observation, and in the jungle, the best observation has to be from the air, so how’s that air superiority coming along, are we a contested air space or worse still, operating under an enemy sky. Failing air observation, the defence would probably have the advantage here, using predicted fire and would be sitting on the higher ground, so may have some areas under observation. So, what guns and mortars were successful, and why? Did any army have an advantage due to their operational use of their artillery? Were mortars more useful than gun/howitzers? How critical was the pack animal to sustained operations? Regards Fatboy Coxy
Lots of issues to discuss there. I know there are some official analysis which would be worth finding. My twopenny-worth is that accounts of fighting in Northern Burma talk of major difficulties dealing with indirect targets in hilly/mountainous jungle terrain - observation, accuracy of maps, firing off reverse slopes, getting into position and such. Any artillery could be a game changer and counter battery fire crucial. There are accounts of batteries and troops struggling to get into place to silence dominant enemy positions.
Plus throw in weather/climate, problems of all communications, problems of geography as mentioned - rivers being a major problem I'm sure Coxy is going to be doing a lot of reading during this lockdown Good luck TD
I can't supply anything useful within the '39-'45 frame, but in the early 50s in Malaya the artillery (25pdrs) were employed primarily to stimulate movement from enemy forces. This could either be firing on identified camps, or more speculative 'fishing' along known trails. In either case, a moving barrage would be employed to 'flush' enemy troops into waiting ambushes (or even to simply identify their general positions from the air). Very few direct kills and injuries were ever recorded, although this may partially be down to the small-unit tactics of insurgents as opposed to the large concentrations of men in the field during major wars. One study I have read suggests that there was little psychological effect even with bombardments that lasted for a fairly long period of time. This suggests that they weren't viewed as much as a threat as a nuisance. They enemy knew they'd have to move on or take cover for the duration, and this they dutifully did.
Do you have a copy of this? I haven't read it all in a while, but I recall that there was some material on the importance of mortars.
I think the OP argument about mortars is somewhat simplistic. For example Weapons Effectiveness studies in WW2 showed the difference between say the 2 inch and the 3 inch was much more complex than simply accuracy. For example the area of effectiveness for a 3 inch mortar bomb was over four times greater than that of a 2 inch mortar. WO 291/579 Comparison of mortar bombs. The fragment velocity of the American 60mm mortar bomb is estimated at 4000 feet per second, as against 3000 for the British 3-in mortar and 4500 for the 2-in mortar. Vulnerable areas for each, allowing for a ground cover factor of 1.5, are given as: Bomb Vulnerable area (sq ft) British 2" 1200 American 60mm 2500 British 3" steel 5000 British 3" cast iron 6500But whilst the area of the 3 inch cast iron round's effect was about 33% greater that the 3 inch steel one its lethality was 70% greater (see WO 291/129). However increasing the weight of the 3 inch mortar round from 71/2 lbs to 10 lbs significantly reduced its lethality and no explanation could be found (see WO 291/107) The type of fuze used could also have a significant effect depending on the environment and could add up to 65% further to lethality in the appropriate circumstances (see WO 291/129)
You might be interested in this document - it is a copy of a report saved in an appendix of the 1945 war diary of HQRA 36th British Infantry Division. It summarises the divisional arty's role in the mainly US/Chinese Northern Combat Area Command operation in North Burma, which involved assaulting Japanese fortifications in some exceptionally thick jungle. Section 6 makes particular mention of the methods used and the importance of Air OPs.
Been doing quite a bit of gardening too, trying hard to avoid decorating, lack of supplies best defence
Been doing quite a bit of gardening too, trying hard to avoid decorating, lack of supplies best defence
Really interesting. Did you serve in Malaya at any time, would have a ton of questions for you if you did
I just finished reading Unarmed Into Battle about the air OPs which has some coverage of the campaign (about 36 pages). It mentions some of the difficulty in their work including the good camouflage work by the Japanese to prevent their artillery from being spotted from the air and bombarded. But the OPs clearly contributed to the effectiveness of Allied artillery.
Message me an email address if you'd like the whole pamplet No, my grandfather was there with 54-bty, 25 Field Regt. I do have some paperwork relating to artillery in jungles. As above if interested.
Another document here from 36th Infantry Division's artillery, which was involved in some tough jungle fighting during the Second Arakan Campaign and later in North Burma. This one is from 36 Div HQRA's war diary and relates to an experiment in using arty against concealed Japanese fortifications, which took place in late December 1943 at Aundh Ranges. 36 Div was at this time training in Combined Operations for a planned amphibious landing at Akyab in the Arakan (which never took place due to the enemy Ha-Go counter-offensive). At this point, 36 Div's arty was 130 and 178 Assault Field Regiments (each recently reorganised from being standard all 25-pounder regiments to an experimental 'assault' role with one field battery of 25-pounders, one self-propelled battery of Priests, and one light battery of 3.7-inch howitzers) and 122 Anti-Tank Regiment with 6-pounder AT guns. Entries from the war diaries relating to the test: HQRA 36 Division, Aundh, 19th December 1943 Practice Camp. "Debunking the Bunker" - arty experiments in destruction of a bunker. 130 (Assault) Field Regiment, Aundh, 19th December 1943 Bunker Firing Trial. This was to test the powers of a Japanese type of bunker position in withstanding the fire of various types of Artillery Equipment. After pounding from observed fire and open sights engagement, the bunker was demolished. 130 Field Regiment in particular had tragic previous experience with Japanese bunkers. While serving with 14 Indian Division in the First Arakan Campaign in early 1943, it had spent several months desperately trying to knock out fanatically held strong-points on the main Japanese line at Donbaik. It was discovered that its 25-pounders simply could not penetrate the heavier earth-and-timber bunkers, and even direct hits had no apparent effect at all on the infamous 'Sugar 5' (a small hillock which had been burrowed into and reinforced); the regiment even dragged a 25-pounder to a gun pit dug within a hundred yards of Sugar 5 and fired at it point-blank over open sights with no appreciable result. The fortifications were so strong that the Japanese could drop their own supporting fire directly on top of their own bunkers during an infantry attack, and consequently the line held against several brigade-scale British assaults (ordered to be carried out, to the despair of junior commanders, WW1-style, with a massive creeping bombardment followed by a charge across open ground directly at the bunker line).
Here's another bit of lockdown reading for the terminally bored: a report called 'Japanese Tactics in the Withdrawal' (from the March 1945 war diary of 'G' Branch, 36 Division HQ) which talks a little about 36 Div's experience of Japanese artillery. Enemy arty tactics on the third page, a quick mention of mortars the next, and the page after that talks about dealing with the strongpoints encountered in North Burma.
And having exhausted all the quarantine DIY and gardening jobs, some ideas on Coxy's specific questions. This is just based on my (amateur) research of 36 Division's artillery units and their specific challenges in the North Burma operation in 1944-45, so it's only a very limited slice of the overall story of arty in SE Asia. Firstly, are you defending or attacking: 36 Div was on the offensive for over eight months, pushing south from Myitkyina towards Mandalay, initially along the 'Railway Corridor'. The Japanese reaguard was generally kept on the run, but intermittently stood to fight hard delaying actions using fortfications (built with the help of impressed local labour) that were held for days or weeks. After a major battle at Pinwe the Japanese fell back fast for the Irrawaddy, and 36 Div's patrolling became longer range and more aggressive to cover ground quickly. This December 1944 operation instruction for 130 Fd Rgt describes joint infantry/arty jungle patrols, with the Air OP ready to scramble to act as monitor for the patrol should things go wrong (2" mortar smoke or flares as SOS signals): Mobility: A major problem for 36 Division, especially in the early months of the campaign (which began at the height of the monsoon in August 1944). By this point, the divisional arty had ditched its Priests and reverted the SP batteries back to towed 25-pounders, and the anti-tank regiment was in the process of re-equipping with 3" mortars. The division's infantry was airlifted into Burma, but as the Ledo (Stilwell) Road had not yet been completed most of the vehicles had to be left behind in Assam. The 25-pounder batteries were also stuck there - only the 3.7-inch howitzer batteries and a couple of 6-pounder AT guns could be flown in. Once in theatre, 494 Light Battery (of 130 Field Regiment) had a grand total of eight jeeps and trailers to handle all of its transport needs when on trails away from the railway line and the 'jeep train' service, including towing the guns and collecting supplies. Reliability issues due to monsoon conditions meant not all of them were available at any time, but the battery did somehow acquire a repaired Japanese 30-cwt truck which proved invaluable until it broke down while crossing a jungle stream. The division had a mule company available and the howitzers could technically be dismantled and carried by them, but 494 Bty doesn't appear to have used them at all. Div HQ arranged and assigned a number of bullock cart teams to help shift the guns, however, which helped for several weeks until the battery's gun tractors and other transport was able to get down the Ledo Road. Supplies: The railway line from Myitkyina and air-drops by transport planes of the 10th USAAF meant that supply was reasonably consistent. While Dakotas dropped ammo directly to DZs near gun positions, fragile and urgently needed spare parts for the guns would be flown in by a 'courier' service of Stinson L5 light planes landing at rough liason stips; they would also evacuate serious casualties on the return journey. The only occasion that ammo became a serious concern was during a Japanese counter-attack on 29 Brigade south of Mawlu on 12th November, during which 494's Battery Commander was wounded: only 46 rounds HE and 12 rounds smoke were available on the morning of the battle. Effectiveness of Gun & Observation: A major advantage for 36 Div was that 10th USAAF had air superiority over the area of operations and Japanese AA capability was limited, which allowed Air OPs free range. 36 Div had tight integration with 10th USAAF for both supply and close air support, and its brigade groups were accompanied by American air support control teams. As the documents I posted earlier mention, one of the biggest challenges was accurately locating bunkers that were camouflaged in thick jungle so that they could be dealt with. This was overcome by using a combination of successive arty barrages and airstrikes to blast away cover and reveal the target more clearly, allowing the Air OP to evaluate the position and range in the guns. At Pinwe, where the Japanese made a determined stand in late November 1944, fortifications were hidden amidst some of the thickest jungle to be found in Burma. The full weight of the divisional arty (at this time 4 x 25-pounder batteries, 2 x 3.7-inch howitzer batteries, plus a battery of Chinese 105mm howitzers) along with all of 72 Infantry Brigade's 3" mortars plastered the area. The sheer density of the jungle meant most shells detonated as treebursts - the only solution was to pour on thousands of shells and call in scores of B25 sorties to clearcut the place, the jungle itself being the target. This picture captures a glimpse of the result: Caption: 17 - A Bren gunner of 36th Infantry Division guards a jungle path in an area recently cleared by artillery near Pinwe, November 1944 [IWM SE 778] From the Div HQ war diary: A few months later, napalm started to become available to torch jungle cover. 130 Field's diary records an early improvised British attempt at jungle clearance by air-delivered fire in March 1943 while it was involved in Operation Cannibal: 130 (Lowland) Field Regiment, In The Field, 11th March 1943 1255hrs: 3 Bisley bombers escorted by fighters endeavoured unsuccessfully to set alight the jungle SOUTH S.W. of TWIN KNOBS with oil bombs and incendiaries. Small fires burned until 1630 hrs but the net effect was negligible. Later in the day 6 bombers attacked DONBAIK and the nala area to the east. This air strike request from 130 Field's January 1945 war diary, however, shows the real thing being called in from American B25s to support 29 Brigade's push east of Twinnge: So, what guns and mortars were successful, and why? The 3.7-inch howitzer seems to have been an especially important weapon as it could reach parts inaccessible to others. It could be pulled by a jeep or carrier (or bullock cart), air-dropped or broken into several mule loads. In the Arakan in March 1944, 494 Battery broke one down and, using manpower alone, lugged it up to a summit to engage another hill: 130 (Lowland) Field Regiment, In The Field, 16th March 1944 494 Bty took a 3.7 how up to pt 1619 in order to engage pt 1301 over open sights. The JEEP TRACK was then completed up to within 500 yards of pt 1619 and thence the gun had to be manhandled in pieces. Some difficulty was found in getting the gun on a firm platform at first which caused some erratic shooting, but when this difficulty was overcome satisfactory results were obtained.
82nd West African Division's (82 WA Div) views (partial transcription): » Topic: Jungle Gunners — 82(West African) Div arty in the Arakan
