I have only been part of this forum for 6 weeks and never been a member of another. In my intro I did mention that my father was the victim of a mortar in the attack on Tobruk January 21st & 22nd 1941. (Lived to sire 4 sons though) He was a Bren gunner in the Australian 2/8th 6th Div and had come through Mersa Matruh, Sidi Barrani & Bardia. Many of my father’s mates were “Rats of Tobruk” and after the war, many moved to the same “new” suburban housing area. They did not talk too much about their war years and I had to search books to satisfy my youthful interest. There has been much written and spoken about Tobruk and its significance, or not, to not only the North African & Mediterranean theatres but that without this resistance, the inability to invade Sicily in 1943 etc etc. I would be grateful if there could be an in depth discussion from the more “learned historians”, possible veterans of Tobruk on this site or others who were actually involved. Hopefully you would omit as is possible the usual personalities of Montgomery versus Rommel, which seems to have clouded many previous discussions. Agreed much would be theoretical, as German intention in North Africa has always been a bone of contention. I of course have formed many opinions of my own over the years that may need to be reviewed after this topic is discussed. Look forward to some good posts and some energetic opinions supported by some relevant statistical reasoning. Regards Geoff View attachment 861
I agree that the Monty v Rommel stuff should be excluded, if for no other reason than that both sieges of Tobruk were well and truly over before he was appointed to command 8th Army. The German logistics were a nightmare. Bringing fuel up by road when they were east of Tobruk meant that a good deal of the fuel was used up on the journey, for instance. The significance of defending Tobruk is that it denied the harbour and base facilities there to the Germans. The forces required for a satisfactory investment were also a major subtraction from the Axis strength.
The significance of defending Tobruk is that it denied the harbour and base facilities there to the Germans. And when it indeed fell to the Germans, they were so slow and incompetent at re-fitting it that could never be used to fully replace Tripoli and Benghazi to land supplies and reinforcements for the Axis.
Interesting also that there was some talk (gossip?) of the South Africans' commanding officer - Pienaar - and/or some of his staff collaborating with the Germans and thus allowing it to fall to them. Complete balls, AFAIK. I believe around 1/3 of all South African troops then serving in N Africa were taken POW when it fell; it had quite an impact of later campaigns in Italy and led to the wider employment of non-whites in the UDF. Richard
The siege of Tobruk was important in that it was the first place the Germans were stopped in a land battle, so it had a major impact on morale. And Rommel's failure to take the port and its supplies hobbled his logistic chain, which made Crusader possible, which nearlhy wrote off the Afrika Korps. I think the major impact was on Allied morale...it showed the Germans could be stopped by determined sons of democracy, which made the later fall of Tobruk to disastrous. The place that had been held so well fell so quickly.
The siege of Tobruk was important in that it was the first place the Germans were stopped in a land battle, so it had a major impact on morale. The Empire troops took over the very good italian defenses at Trobruck. Rommel commented on how well the Italians had laid out the defence. The lack of german intelligence about the actuall defenses was crucial to their failure to capture the port in the first instance. !
Originally posted by morse1001@Jul 13 2005, 08:26 PM The siege of Tobruk was important in that it was the first place the Germans were stopped in a land battle, so it had a major impact on morale. The Empire troops took over the very good italian defenses at Trobruck. Rommel commented on how well the Italians had laid out the defence. The lack of german intelligence about the actuall defenses was crucial to their failure to capture the port in the first instance. ! [post=36431]Quoted post[/post] I think this is true of the first siege, but apparently by the time of the second siege the defences had been somewhat neglected.
Originally posted by angie999+Jul 14 2005, 04:46 AM-->(angie999 @ Jul 14 2005, 04:46 AM)</div><div class='quotemain'><!--QuoteBegin-morse1001@Jul 13 2005, 08:26 PM The siege of Tobruk was important in that it was the first place the Germans were stopped in a land battle, so it had a major impact on morale. The Empire troops took over the very good italian defenses at Trobruck. Rommel commented on how well the Italians had laid out the defence. The lack of german intelligence about the actuall defenses was crucial to their failure to capture the port in the first instance. ! [post=36431]Quoted post[/post] I think this is true of the first siege, but apparently by the time of the second siege the defences had been somewhat neglected. [post=36444]Quoted post[/post] [/b]Absolutely right. The Tobruk defenses were neglected between siege and Gazala, and most of them were in disrepair, abandoned, or looted, when the Germans hit the town the second time. They came in the same direction O'Connor did in 1941, the southeast corner.
I would like to expand this thread by introducing the following. We know what did happen at Tobruk April to November 1941 as history in this case is fairly clear. It is recognised that this was a decisive siege and led to a stalemate so to speak. The allies were there, the Axis wasn't. .............This was the position when the Germans launched their ill-fated attack on April 13th, 1941. Known as the "Easter Battle", the Germans had confidently expected a walk-over - instead it had ended in their being completely routed. The spirit of co-operation, trust and comradeship between the men of the garrison, consisting of two thirds Australian and one third British, was the real strength of Tobruk. No other Middle East front saw understanding between the men of these countries so complete. On Easter Sunday the enemy made his attack with infantry action against the perimeter. The vigorousness of his attack was matched however by the vigour of the defence, and his success in this phase was very limited. On the morning of Easter Monday the Germans launched their attack by tanks. The familiar pattern employed by these "Blitzkrieg" experts was to have the tanks break through the defences - a deep armoured thrust - and through the gap would pour the infantry. In Poland, France and Belgium these tactics had never failed. Once the tanks had broken through it had always been the beginning of the end and the rolling up of the defences had been a matter of course - until Tobruk. Here the enemy's tanks did not so much break through as they were let through. The garrison lay low until the German infantry appeared in the wake of the tanks. These were engaged by our fire with the result the tanks were left to advance without the support they had expected, and the further they advanced the more intense became the fire they encountered. For there was the secret of the defence - a defence in depth. The combined force of the artillery and tanks lay waiting for them. They were hit with every calibre weapon that they could command capable of damaging them. The fire of the 25-pounders at point-blank range was particularly devastating. As the enemy armour in retreat poured through the gap they had made in our lines, they came under the fire of Brens, mortars, rifles and shells and terrible confusion resulted. Thus ended the Afrika Corps' first attempt to capture the garrison. Tobruk was a nut they could not crack and further attempts such as the Battle of the Salient in April-May had little more success. While Rommel gained a small amount of territory with his far superior forces, the men of the Fortress inflicted such heavy casualties he did not seriously attack Tobruk again in 1941. Under the inspired leadership of General Morshead the actual defensive task of holding Tobruk was, in reality, held by offensive tactics. This then was the pattern of Tobruk. A thorn in the side of the German army, upsetting his plans for an attack on Egypt, and giving the allies time to build up their forces for a counter offensive. THE SCENARIO I WOULD LIKE TO FOLLOW IS THE LOSS OF TOBRUK TO THE AXIS ON APRIL 15TH 1941. HERE I FEEL THERE IS SCOPE FOR A GOOD DEBATE ON WHAT THE RAMIFICATIONS OF SUCH A LOSS AT SUCH A CRUCIAL TIME WOULD HAVE MEANT TO THE ALLIES DESERT CAMPAIGN INITIALLY AND TO FUTURE MEDITERRANIAN ACTIVITY MOVING FORWARD. View attachment 868
The loss of Tobruk in April 1941 could have had VERY serious strategic consequences. Because of the Commonwealth forces sent from North Africa to aid the Greeks, Egypt was probably as vulnerable as it would ever be during the war. Tobruk would have given the Afrika Corps a harbour much closer to the Egytian frontier and eased supply problems greatly. It is quite possible that Egypt would have been overrun, with the loss of the Suez Canal, severing the quickest route from Britian to the Far East. This would have made the Iraqi oil fields vulnerable, and could have forced Britian to become dependant on the U.S. for all its oil, shipped across a dangerous Atlantic. I don't know enough about Australian history to say that the first Seige of Tobruk was Australias' "Finest Hour" in WW II, but it must rank up there.
