Book Review Slog or Swan: British Army Effectiveness in Operation Veritable – February – March 1945

Slog or Swan: British Army Effectiveness in Operation Veritable – February – March 1945

Dermot Rooney (Helion & Company, Warwick, 2025)

I found this a truly fascinating assessment of 21st Army Group’s month-long battle to clear the northern corner of the Rhineland in early 1945. It essentially comprises the detailed analysis of a series of engagements that are used to inform 8 chapters which each cover some of the factors that contribute to the effectiveness (or otherwise) of the British forces.

By concentrating on ‘Veritable’, the book is a first-step in the undoubted need for the historical record to be re-balanced away from the obsession on “just” Normandy and Arnhem. In addition, by using what the author calls a “nearly-bottom-up” approach he provides a genuinely new account which allows him to strip away many of the myths and inconsistencies which make up the standard narrative of ‘Veritable’. The use of an enormous range of primary sources has also highlighted cases where the undoubted chaos of the battlefield has been made more “foggy” rather than clarified by the secondary sources.

What emerges, then, is a campaign that was much more “messy”, improvised and complicated, and which definitely didn’t steadily progress as (“master”-) planned. Time and time again, plans (and re-plans) are foiled by a vast range of “frictions” which would have even astonished Clausewitz. Some were, probably, beyond the control of 21 Army Group, but the author makes a strong case that many others were created, or at least reinforced, by factors that were within the control of the British Army.

Intriguingly, the author makes a strong case that the evidence he has produced through his case-studies suggest that 21st Army Group was essentially limited to either a fire-power heavy ‘Slog’ or an opposition-light ‘Swan’. Exacerbating the limitations on British operations caused by this constraint, were the struggles which resulted from any attempt to transition from one tempo to the other. Overall, this meant that British set-piece attacks were often too slow while the forces committed to fluid advance-to-contact operations were too weak.

There are a couple of minor points where I do think the author has been misled by secondary sources. One being a suggestion by C.J. Dick that Montgomery had ‘refused to form a ‘corps de chasse’ in Normandy due to its perceived risk (a suggestion repeated by this author on p.185). This conflicts with my understanding of 8th Armoured Brigade’s role and organisation for the first days after D-day and also of the organisation of 30 Corps for Operation Sabot (i.e. “the Great Swan”!).

In summary, therefore, I would highly recommend this book to a reader who is looking for a study of a relatively over-looked campaign which asks serious questions of the effectiveness of 21st Army Group. It’s not a light read, containing as it does a large amount of operational detail but the exemplary map coverage and the clarity of the writing makes it definitely worth the effort. It’s also an uncomfortable read because it asks tough questions about the performance of the British Army in the closing stages of the war and challenges some elements of the recent more positive accounts.

I am left hoping for more similar studies that provide a comparative body of evidence: other theatres (Gothic Line – autumn 1944?) and other nationalities (9th US Army during ‘Grenade’ or one of the German armies during the ‘Bulge’ perhaps). That would provide a better answer to a question that hovered in the back of my (admittedly small) mind whilst I read – was the extent of the 'friction' suffered during ‘Veritable’ evidence of a “British-disease” or of the challenge of the 1944-45 battlefield (a challenge which surely is increasing in difficulty on today’s contemporary battlefield).

Highly Recommended.

 

Yes, it's a great book - it gave me a lot of new perspectives on what influences operations, and how primary sources can often be deceptive.

 

It's a very interesting observation that certainly does apply to CRUSADER as well. The inability to concentrate is often blamed on supply issues in the forward area, but as my little case study of the events at Beda Fomm on 23 Dec 41 has shown me (Article for purchase here: New Article – Failure at Beda Fomm, 23 Dec 1941), this was a command choice, rather than a supply-necessity. The ability to concentrate combat-capable mobile forces for the offensive seems to have been beyond commanders in late 1941. It sounds as if this was still an issue in 1945.

All the best

Andreas

 

It also reminded me of the Monty article on "the Encounter Battle" which was discussed here:

The Problems of the encounter battle etc RE Journal and subsequent discussion in Army Quarterly

Regards

Tom

 

Hate it when books aren't available as e-books.

All the best

Andreas

 

As this sounds such an interesting book I have immediately ordered it as an early Christmas present to myself! I particularly look forward to seeing how the Veritable operations and his analyses key into the operations of April 45, which I describe in TTS.

 

I don't get it. To me Veritable is clearly a slog, followed by (well after Plunder) a swan. Just as the slog at Alamein and Normandy was followed by a swan.

For inbetween type operations what's wrong with Operation Pheasant to clear North Brabant, Operation Nutcracker to Venlo or Operation Blackcock to clear the Roer triangle?

 

Hi JohnB,

For the full answer to that question, you obviously need to read the book but I think it does a pretty good job of showing that 'Veritable' was not planned as a "Slog" even though it ended up as one! The normal answer ("mud and mines"), while obviously true to some extent, has, in the author's opinion, concealed the extent to which the "Slog" it became was enforced at least in part by systemic issues within the British and Canadian forces.

Regards

Tom

 

Hi Tom, I probably will get the book in time but its been a good while since a single book has caused me to radically change my opinion on anything WW2. Certainly possible to add to my bank of knowledge and shift it a bit though.
Maybe 1st Canadian Army did get overconfident with regard timings - of course very interested in what 21st AG CinC was saying - but always had the extended slog being chiefly down to the 12 day delay in the launching of Grenade, the other punch in the two-hander. Put into context though, Veritable was the first act of the 21st Army Group plan to clear German forces west of the Rhine, a task 12th Army Group had been trying to achieve since September, and it did so in a timely manner whilst inflicting much heavier casualties than incurring.

 

It's not exactly that simple. Dermot did a presentation on WW2talk (it's on youtube, search for his name I think, or the title of the book) about how 1st Canadian Army had a pessimistic outlook but 30th Corps - who were executing all the initial moves - still had a plan based on fast movement which was overly optimistic. About how (now I don't remember if this is in the presentation) even though they knew the likelihood of a thaw, there was no backup plan to use fewer forces so as not to overwhelm the sodden terrain and roads. But even within the operation, how e.g. a small set piece attack which was supposed to create an opportunity for exploitation would fail to do so, because the army was too slow to switch from one to the other.

I came away from the presentation skeptical, still feeling "Well, what does it matter? Higher command expected it to be a slog, and it was one". But by the end of the book I couldn't help but see that the machinery of the army was not actually functioning all that well. As Tom put it, systemic issues.

 

I agree with Chris C. The plan was indeed two-sided. First Canadian Army had a more realistic outlook ('pesimistic' if you wish), whereas 30 Corps hoped for a quick break-through (optimistic). Although all this seems like a oversimplification to me: both headquarters probably will have considered various scenarios, among which one of a quick breakthrough.

The 'optimistic' scenario IMO might have worked if Op Grenade could have been launched in time. The postponement of Op Grenade really affected operations of First Canadian Army in the north. There were certainly flaws in the execution, not all of which can be attributed to an over-concentration of highly mechanized troops in a poorly accessible, half-flooded border region with a limited road network. There were certainly missed opportunities, some of which I also pointed out in my Op Veritable threads on here. But it must be remembered that despite all this 30 Corps nearly broke through the German lines at Cleve, when it seized the Materborn Ridge and gazed down on the battered town of Cleve in the evening of Feb 9th, the second day (!) of the operation. German reinforcements arrived in Cleve at the very last minute to prevent this (elements of 6. Fallschirmjäger Division & s.Pz.Jäger Abteilung 655 - heavy tankdestroyer Battalion).

See "On to the Materborn feature - 9 February 45" VERITABLE 1945: 15th Scottish & 43rd Wessex Divisions in the Reichswald battle "Breakthrough at Cleve?": VERITABLE 1945: 15th Scottish & 43rd Wessex Divisions in the Reichswald battle and "The dying Swan": VERITABLE 1945: 15th Scottish & 43rd Wessex Divisions in the Reichswald battle.

By the time the enemy resistance at Cleve had been overcome, two days later, on Feb 12th, the 47.Pz Korps had arrived to stiffen the German defense to the east of the town. This move had been facilitated by the postponement of Op Grenade, but not after much hesitation from the German high command. A quick breakthrough at Cleve on Feb 9/10th, could have seriously disrupted the build-up of a new defence by the 47th Pz Corps to the east of that town and may have had far-reaching consequences for the course of the operation. See "Veritable the German response" : VERITABLE 1945: 15th Scottish & 43rd Wessex Divisions in the Reichswald battle

But as we say: 'bijna is niet helemaal', meaning that something is not quite complete, accomplished, or successful, even though it comes very close. From that moment on it was over for the 'Swan'. Or as one veteran told me: "it was Normandy all over again"; how right he was. The First Canadian Army's 'Slog' had drawn all enemy reinforcements to the north at the expense of the front in the southern part of the Rhineland. As a result Op Grenade quickly turned into a 'Swan', once Ninth US Army, as part of 21st Army Group (!), crossed the Rur. My conclusion is that despite all set-backs 21st Army Group's plan worked, though it took considerable more time than the optimistic scenarios. In the end the 21st Army's Rhineland Campaign resulted in a thorough defeat of the German forces west of the Rhine. Instead of retreating behind the river the German Army completely wasted their last strength in a useless battle. The more troops the enemy lost on the west bank, the less they could deploy on the other bank to oppose a river crossing. In this respect 21st Army Groups Rhineland Campaign was a complete success.

Dermot has done a great job. I am very glad to have been able to make a modest contribution to his work. His book is a cherised part of my collection.

 

To be fair, that should be as Tom "quoted Dermot"!

Hi Stolpi,

Are there good sources for the German "side of the hill" for Veritable?

Regards

Tom

 

There certainly are, but most of them are in German language.

Re primary sources: There are hardly any War Diaries (KTB) of the German units involved, but there is a range of Foreign Military Studies written after the war by the German commanders. These are very informative, though they differ in quality. Most of them are in German language. I quoted some in my Op Vertitable threads. Unique are the OBWest orders that were preserved thanks to the interception by ULTRA.

Re secondary sources: I would certainly go for the book of Heinz Gunther Guderian, "From Normandy to the Ruhr: with the 116th Panzer Division in World War II", published in 2001. I hold the original German version, but the book has been translated into English. It is very well written and gives a detailed description of the Rhineland operations.

 

General Crerar on 4th February at the CinCs conference when outlining the plan said
"As, I intimated, I cannot forecast, with any degree of reliability, the time which will be taken to complete "Veritable", after it is launched. If everything broke in our favour, weather, ground, air support, enemy dispositions and reactions - I would not be surprised if armour of 30 Corps reached the Geldern-Xanten line in a few days. On the other hand, if conditions are against us, I see three "set-piece operations, one for each Phase, and the battle may well last three weeks.."

 

Yes, I'm aware of that.