The sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse

Discussion in 'The War at Sea' started by Warlord, Feb 26, 2008.

  1. Warlord

    Warlord Veteran wannabe

    Did Force Z really stand a chance against the Jap in 41?

    Was its demise caused by the lack of an acompanying carrier/s (in fact, air cover of any kind), wrong tactics, another appreciation mistake by Churchill, or was the Rising Sun just too much of an steamroller, not only for the Royal Navy, but for all allied forces in the Pacific and CBI?
     
  2. kfz

    kfz Very Senior Member

    Warlord,

    Dont realy understasnd the question. Quite lot of factors and tactiical errors conspired, not sure this was a big strategic error

    The Japanese pilots where well trained for this type of attack and brave

    They had good equipment, the best probably at that stage in the war, not only in aircraft but torpedoes, where superb.

    The British underestimated the performance of the aircraft, they thought they where out of range

    The British had lack of any effective AA defence, Lack of training maybe in not taking the Aircraft threat seriously, was a major factor.

    Modern thinking often blames Churchill's interference in Naval matters in getting force Z into a bad position. Not convinved, the threat from land based aircraft was to remain for the whole war.
     
  3. Warlord

    Warlord Veteran wannabe

    I meant to ask which one of the factors I pointed out, plus the lot all of you readers could suggest was the cause (by itself or together with others) for the sinking in such a tragic manner of two of the Royal Navy´s premier battlewagons.

    You kind of gave me the answers I was looking for, but the goal of the thread is for its readers to analize them deeper, maybe one by one, so in the end we can define some sort of a reason why the whole affair happened.
     
  4. freebird

    freebird Senior Member

    Did Force Z really stand a chance against the Jap in 41?

    Was its demise caused by the lack of an acompanying carrier/s yes

    (in fact, air cover of any kind), yes

    wrong tactics, yes

    another foolish mistake by Churchill, yes

    or was the Rising Sun just too much of an steamroller, no {IMO}

    not only for the Royal Navy, but for all allied forces in the Pacific and CBI?

    The Royal Navy {Adm. Pound} had a sound plan to deal with Japan, but Churchill thought he knew better, he would "Send a ship" {the Prince of Wales} and that would scare away the Japanese.

    Originally it was intended to sens the carrier HMS Indomitable with force Z, but it was damaged in the Caribbean. They should have at least sent HMS Hermes, but didn't.

    I have quite a bit of info on this debacle, I can explain later. {busy today, sorry}
     
  5. Warlord

    Warlord Veteran wannabe

    Please do, old chap (always wanted to use that phrase! :D). That thing about the plan the Admiralty had to deal with them Sons of Nippon sounds utterly interesting...

    Now, I knew about the mishap the Indomitable had just around the corner from my good ol´ country, but why didn´t they send another carrier instead? It´s true that there weren´t many around, but a little bit of air cover would have done a lot for Sir Tom and company.
     
  6. freebird

    freebird Senior Member

    Please do, old chap (always wanted to use that phrase! :D). That thing about the plan the Admiralty had to deal with them Sons of Nippon sounds utterly interesting...

    Now, I knew about the mishap the Indomitable had just around the corner from my good ol´ country, but why didn´t they send another carrier instead? It´s true that there weren´t many around, but a little bit of air cover would have done a lot for Sir Tom and company.

    The strange thing is Warlock, I was thinking about what I personally would have planned, and it's almost the same as what the Admiralty wanted. What I do know is that 2 ships were hardly going to scare off the Japanese, and the 2 ships that Churchill sent are about the worst pick that he could have made. The Battlecruiser Repulse was quite useful in the Atlantic, where her high speed would be useful in chasing down German raiders like the Admiral Scheer or Prince Eugen, something that the slower battleships couldn't do. However the ship was a poor candidate to send to the Far East, where her lighter armour and very light AA would make a vulnerable target for the Japanese. The Admiralty also didn't want to send the less experienced crew of the Prince of Wales, and they didn't want to send that ship too far away, as they were still not confident that the 14" guns had been finally fixed.

    What the Admiralty proposed was to send the Battleships King George V, Rodney, + 3 of the older "R" types {Resolution, Revenge etc} along with the carriers Indomitable & Ark Royal. This would have provided a solid force, with enough air cover to protect the heavy ships. Churchill's loony idea to send the Prince of Wales, which he bragged could "catch & kill" any Japanese ship was wrong to begin with, as a deterrent was misguided, but at least they could have sent the small carrier "Hermes" as a substitute for the Indomitable. In any event, once the Japanese had declared war, the "deterrent" idea was gone, and he should have recalled the 2 ships right away so that they could be used in a proper counter-attack, not just sacrificed.
     
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  7. Warlord

    Warlord Veteran wannabe

    Looks to me then that all the casualties in this affair were, among other things, some more victims of the misconceptions the Allies had about the Japs; those little fellows weren´t about to run in the face of anything, and two lonely ships, no matter the size, were nothing more than a threat that had to be dealt with ASAP.

    Now, I wonder if the task at hand wouldn´t have been performed better by a more balanced and flexible force, incorporating cruisers and destroyers as the strike component and leaving the big ships as the covering one, with more maneuvering room to take evasive action in the face of air attack and with the carriers out of the battle line doing their trade for the entire fleet, with even more room. Let´s remember that the seas around the Malayan Barrier are narrow and restrictive, no place for battle-line behemoths, and since ships commited to attacking an invasion force, because of the urgency of their task, are usually target-fixed and in consecuence vulnerable to all kinds of counterattack, I think the need was for fast, nimble but hi-powered ones.

    The battlewagons, if involved at all, should have been there mostly to support and show the flag, leaving the smaller ships the actual search and destroy, Balikpapan style.

    Opinions, anyone?
     
  8. freebird

    freebird Senior Member

    Looks to me then that all the casualties in this affair were, among other things, some more victims of the misconceptions the Allies had about the Japs; those little fellows weren´t about to run in the face of anything, and two lonely ships, no matter the size, were nothing more than a threat that had to be dealt with ASAP.

    Now, I wonder if the task at hand wouldn´t have been performed better by a more balanced and flexible force, incorporating cruisers and destroyers as the strike component and leaving the big ships as the covering one, with more maneuvering room to take evasive action in the face of air attack and with the carriers out of the battle line doing their trade for the entire fleet, with even more room. Let´s remember that the seas around the Malayan Barrier are narrow and restrictive, no place for battle-line behemoths, and since ships commited to attacking an invasion force, because of the urgency of their task, are usually target-fixed and in consecuence vulnerable to all kinds of counterattack, I think the need was for fast, nimble but hi-powered ones.

    The battlewagons, if involved at all, should have been there mostly to support and show the flag, leaving the smaller ships the actual search and destroy, Balikpapan style.

    Opinions, anyone?

    Battleships would have done fine too, as long as they had a solid fighter, CAP 120 SeaHurri's/Martlets on 2 carriers would have been more than enough, as the Japanese were operating from Indo-China, they didn't have alot of fighter support nearby.
     

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  9. Warlord

    Warlord Veteran wannabe

    Just to hammer a bit my point, I use this, from The Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse:

    "By now the main battle was about to commence but the Destroyer 'Tenedos', had already been discovered by Japanese bombers though after skilful maneuvering by its skipper, she was able to head safely back to Singapore a very different fate to that awaiting Repulse and Prince of Wales".

    The little ship - which together with others like it and a bit of heavy cover would have been able to wreak the same havoc at the beaches that its bigger counterparts were supposed to - was able to get away under an air attack from the same force which later destroyed the big ones.

    Now, about that nice propaganda piece... Wonder what the genius who had the idea behind it thought of it by June 42... They oughta had sent him to Clark Field, or Raffles Square!

    And about the said fighters: Would that kind of air complement had given enough support for a couple of whales in a barrel, taking into consideration that Wildcats (Martlets) were until the invention of the "Scissors" and related maneuvers by Thach, O´Hare and company, just a little more than target practice for the Rising Sun? And that no to mention Hurricanes in Java a little bit afterwards. (I see a new thread looming in the horizon here...)
     
  10. freebird

    freebird Senior Member

    And about the said fighters: Would that kind of air complement had given enough support for a couple of whales in a barrel, taking into consideration that Wildcats (Martlets) were until the invention of the "Scissors" and related maneuvers by Thach, O´Hare and company, just a little more than target practice for the Rising Sun? And that no to mention Hurricanes in Java a little bit afterwards. (I see a new thread looming in the horizon here...)

    The Zero's were out of range on the attack on the PoW & Repulse, it was only "Nell" & "Betty" bombers, they probably could have been thwarted even by Gladiators!
     
  11. Warlord

    Warlord Veteran wannabe

    But what about subsecuent operations, specially with captured airfields in Thailand and Northeast Malaya (progressively the rest of the peninsula) becoming operational everyday? Churchill sent the big ships in to stay, not to run after a couple of rounds, specially with the Gibraltar of the Orient at stake.

    It´s true that on that fateful day, Nells and Bettys did their homework all by themselves (by the way, very interesting thing that of the mediums making torpedo runs), but as time went by, another encounter was sure to come, and within those narrow confines, it was just a matter of time before Zekes showed up flying top cover for Mitsubishis on another search and destroy mission.
     
  12. spidge

    spidge RAAF RESEARCHER

    This thread is a few years old but feel this is the place for this info:

    I came across this snippet of information while researching a 1946 death in 453 squadron.

    The whole report to the Air Ministry by the Squadron Leader W.J. Harper seems quite damning however the report from the acting CO of 453 sq is very interesting.

    Asisbiz Spitfire MkIXc RAAF 453Sqn FU-N MH454 Coltishall 2TAF June 1944

    The squadron was to provide air cover for Admiral Phillip's Force Z (see Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse), but a radio message giving the location of the Fleet was only sent out by the Repulse an hour after the first Japanese attack. Flt Lt Vigors from 243 Squadron was acting CO of 453 Squadron while Sqn Ldr W. J. Harper was in Australia. He wrote about the loss of the two ships:.
    'I reckon this must have been the last battle in which the Navy reckoned they could get along without the RAF. A pretty damned costly way of learning. I had worked out a plan with the liaison officer on the Prince of Wales, by which I could keep six aircraft over him all daylight hours within 60 miles of the east coast to a point north of Kota Bharu. This plan was turned down by Admiral Phillips. Had I been allowed to put it into effect, I am sure the ships would not have been sunk. Six fighters could have made one hell of a mess of even 50 or 60 slow and unescorted torpedo-bombers.
    As we could do nothing else, we kept virtually the whole squadron at readiness at Sembawang while the Fleet was out. I was actually sitting in my cockpit when the signal eventually reached us that the Fleet was being attacked. Phillips had known that he was being shadowed the night before, and also at dawn that day. He did not call for air support. He was attacked and still did not call for help. Eventually it was the captain of Repulse who called for air support just before his ship sunk'.
     
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  13. Warlord

    Warlord Veteran wannabe

    This thread is a few years old but feel this is the place for this info:

    I came across this snippet of information while researching a 1946 death in 453 squadron.

    The whole report to the Air Ministry by the Squadron Leader W.J. Harper seems quite damning however the report from the acting CO of 453 sq is very interesting.

    Asisbiz Spitfire MkIXc RAAF 453Sqn FU-N MH454 Coltishall 2TAF June 1944

    I'm with you regarding the self-sufficient approach by the RN, but, to try to give Phillips a little credit among so much condemnation, wasn't he that focused on the success of his mission, so as to priorize radio silence above everything else, including the safety of his force?

    This would turn the incident into something like a naval Balaklava, at least shrouded in bravery, instead of a disaster born out of snobbery.
     
  14. spidge

    spidge RAAF RESEARCHER

    I only brought the nails - I will leave the hammering to someone else!
     
  15. marktwain

    marktwain Member

    by
    dec 1941 the royal navy had Lost Courageous, Glorious , Audacity,& Ark royal - formitable & illistrious were in repair- leaving argus, eagle, And Hermes.

    Remaining under shore air CAP should have been a pre requisite- but the problem went deeper- the cancelling of the Empire fighter projects, originally to be built in Canada & Australia, came back to haunt...
     
  16. Wills

    Wills Very Senior Member

  17. Peccavi

    Peccavi Senior Member

    I seem to remember reading that Phillips was of the old school of navy men that thought a well armed battleship would have little problem warding off air attack.

    Also he had little actual combat experience.
     
  18. spidge

    spidge RAAF RESEARCHER

    by
    dec 1941 the royal navy had Lost Courageous, Glorious , Audacity,& Ark royal - formitable & illistrious were in repair- leaving argus, eagle, And Hermes.

    Remaining under shore air CAP should have been a pre requisite- but the problem went deeper- the cancelling of the Empire fighter projects, originally to be built in Canada & Australia, came back to haunt...

    The US went through a similar diminished capacity in Carriers after initial battles, with October 1942 seeing "Hornet" as the only battle ready Carrier in the Pacific. All others were undergoing repairs or being upgraded. This did not last long however it was a dangerous period for Guadalcanal.
     
  19. cally

    cally Picture Prince.

    Just to illustrate the thread I enclose the classic famous shot of the POW sinking.
     

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  20. Dave55

    Dave55 Atlanta, USA

    A lot of knowledgeable people on this tread!

    I read somewhere along the years that there was some problem with the 5.25 AA battery on Prince of Wales during the battle. Per usual, I can't remember the details, but I believe the author indicated that the problem was either with the training of the crews or in the way in which they were used that day. He said that it was an excellent weapon system with very good fire control and had it been used optimally may have affected greatly affected the battle.

    Any thoughts on that?
     

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