The Soviets Fought The Japanese Twice

(Gotthard Heinrici @ Oct 24 2005, 03:23 AM) [post=40548]Incidentally I amn't glorifying Russia's actions here. I am however saying that not everything is as black and white as it should be. [/b]
My objection was that Russia attacked Poland too and war declared on Germany because of it. But Chech. was not a part of the pact so I don't consider the two coequal.

(Gotthard Heinrici @ Oct 24 2005, 03:23 AM) [post=40548]I dont agree with your assertion that Blitzkrieg is all about aircraft. Yes it is a very important element but the Tank is an important element too. This is an article explaining the concept:


The Concept of Blitzkrieg.
Airforce attacks enemy front-line and rear positions, main roads, airfields and communication centers. At the same time infantry attacks on the entire frontline (or at least at main places) and engages enemy. This restrains the enemy from knowing where the main force will attack and makes it impossible to prepare any defenses.

Concentrated tank units breakthrough main lines of defense and advance deeper into enemy territory, while following mechanized units pursuit and engage defenders preventing them from establishing defensive postions. Infantry continues to engage enemy to misinform and keep enemy forces from withdrawing and establishing effective defense.

Infantry and other support units attack enemy flanks in order to link up with other groups to complete the attack and eventually encircle the enemy and/or capture strategic position.

Mechanized groups spearhead deeper into the enemy territory outflanking the enemy positions and paralyzing the rear preventing withdrawing troops and defenders from establishing effective defensive positions.

Main force links up with other units encircling and cutting off the enemy.

As you can see, there is more to it than just Stukas diving out of the sky. Indeed the origins of Blitzkrieg dates back to the Stormtuppen tactics originally devised for the German Offensives of 1918. Aircraft had no real presence back then ,especially in a ground attack role. [/b]
Well, the whole term of Blitzkrieg has become used as a term of hyperbole. Looking at the word "Lightening war" implies that it is something different from a standard offensive. What would that offensive be? Every major offensive had tanks and infantry as the lead elements. According to the definition you gave, if you remove aircraft you have just described about 99% of all attacks even those not considered Blitzkrieg.

The point that gets lost here is a critical one because it completely hides why a Blitzkrieg was even remembered as anything other than another simple ground assault. Moving tanks at high speed just because you want to boast that you “blitzkrieged” the enemy is unquestionable suicide. Blitzkrieg is not intended to be suicide and certainly wasn't therefore the definition does not meet the reality. The thing that differentiated Blitzkrieg as a "new type of war" was aircraft and aircraft alone. This is because under normal attacks, the enemies front lines were in tact and you could not "lightening" anything. If you moved at lightening speed toward a front of dug in tanks and anti-tank guns the only lightening you would see is your own armor exploding in a suicide disaster. Hardly anything to create a term Blitzkrieg for.

Blitzkrieg, regardless of how people want to describe it is really better described as mercilessly destroying the enemy’s ground strength with air and then mopping up with ground forces. This is what a Blitzkrieg did. It was not a mighty tank battle. No Blitzkrieg was ever as dominant as deadly and as “lightening” rapid as Patton's Shermans ("Tommy cookers" or “Ronson lighters” to most) moved against the massive German armor including Tigers and Panthers which were often abandoned running from the awesome unstoppable massive "M4"s. My point there is that people that love history and reality at the same time, you have tremendous objection to very idea that a Sherman was dominating Tigers or Panthers to the point they run like scared rabbits and have to abandon these weapons in tact just to escape with their lives. This should have been a red flag but most are willing to accept it because Patton did move in a hurry.

There are stories of Panther tanks sitting in one position and destroying 27 Shermans like a shooting gallery. If then a Sherman is so vulnerable, then how the heck did Patton move so fast and why would you abandon stronger tanks? This should be an outrage to those that are interested in knowing the truth about what happened. I can tell you exactly what happened. It's very clear if you read Rommels writings. It was the devastating tactical air. There were no Shermans “hammering” Tigers, Panzer IVs and Panthers. Where is the reality here? So how did Patton “outdo” blitzkriegs for speed and destruction? It’s simple, massive tactical air. This is the gist of why the term Blitzkrieg is even known today as an impressive show, rather than a byword that illustrates too much faith in fast armor attacks.

This is where I say that historians (and those that try to make Blitzkrieg out to be something it wasn’t) and tank-o-files who romanticize the role of a tank need to be called out on the carpet because they have been pissing down our leg and telling us it is raining for 60 years now. WWII was TAC, TAC, TAC and then mop up with your tanks when the enemy tanks and artillery were destroyed. The only thing a tank had to be careful about is AT guns. This is more than some kind of obsession on aircraft. It was what dominated the war and what decided if you would win or lose. Nothing else.

(Gotthard Heinrici @ Oct 24 2005, 03:23 AM) [post=40548]And as for your assertion that Russia was literally back in the 1800's as a nation, well you do a grave dishonor to the nation that built the T-34, which essentially was the first Main Battle Tank at a time when the US could only design tanks like the Sherman, Stuart or the Grant. and its Attack aircraft the IL-2 was an ingenious piece of engineering ensuring excellent attack capabilities whilst wielding armor around the cockpit to help increase pilot protection, and it was an inspiration for the A-10 by the US.
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Russia has no innovations they didn’t steal. It was a country of darkness and cruelty for decades. The people lived primitive. Just like in the 1800s. There were no vehicles, no farm equipment, electricity, radio, no nothing. It was out of the past. In Russia, they had no reason to overblow the role of tanks so this is why you think the IL-2 was "all that and a bag of chips". But with the Allies, Patton and Monty dictated what would be written down in history and why the P-47 was so overlooked by most and the Sherman vs German tank fiasco was swallowed hook, line, and sinker. Tank commanders giving history have swept the fact that the TAC air did all the fighting of tanks, under the carpet.

Your bit about the IL-2 is a little strange. The IL-2 was not as heavily armored or rugged as a Jug. It didn’t have as good of rear armor and did not have bulletproof glass. It could not perform like a Jug either. The Jug was used as a fighter for the first part of the war until it had pretty much eradicated the Luftwaffe, then it was switched from a role as a deep escort fighter to a tactical air role because it was one of the most prolific tank buster. The Mustang had a longer range than most versions of the Jug so it made a better long range escort. The Jug was the first piston fighter to top 500 mph and could carry 3000lbs. The IL-2 was liquid cooled and could be knocked out if the cooling system was compromised. It also lacked rear armor made it vulnerable. It required two men instead of one. It could only carry a total of 2200 lbs of ordinance and that included the machine gun and cannon rounds. Its ceiling was only about 15000 feet, almost a third of a Jug’s. It was very vulnerable to enemy fighters whereas enemy fighters were very vulnerable to the Jug. Not the same planes at all.

Here is a link that describes were the A-10 gets its name. Both planes were made by Republic http://www.strategic-air-command.com/aircr...thunderbolt.htm it was NOT designed after the IL-2. It was not called the IL2-II, rather it was called the Thunerbolt II. The IL-2 was a knock-off of a Stuka and was not quite in the category of a Jug. I think you must be getting these ideas from the IL-2 game. The IL-2 would also take a back seat to the Tempest which was quite an impressive ground attack airplane and gives the Jug a run for its money.

Your bit about the Shermans is a little misleading. The T-34 was a good tank and cheap to make. The Sherman was too. But the Sherman was designed for offense. The US didn’t believe in tanks as much as they believed in air power. The emphasis was that air could do it and Shermans would be much easier to ship across the Atlantic. The T-34 was not produced and shipped across the ocean. The American tank of note in WWII would have been the Pershing. But it was too heavy to ship all over the world, and it was not needed as critically because US doctrine was not to take a tank against another tank. The Sherman was a better value. Shermans were used for killing light armor and infantry and for this role it excelled.

 

Jimbo I want to make one thing clear: I AM NOT A TANKOPHILE!!!! The fact that I feel that they were a factor in Blitzkrieg does not make me a person who believes that fleets of tanks would have won WWII all by themselves. I believe that Blitzkrieg was a combined arms operations and that was the reason that it was so revolutionary. Yes aircraft were very important in it and yes you are reading right, I have always believed that. AIRCRAFT ARE IMPORTANT!! Where we disagree is that you believe that the only factor in Blitzkrieg was the use of aircraft and I say that wasnt the only factor.

Right Jimbo please give me a list of historians you agree with so I can find out were the truth is about tanks. I dont actually believe you can back up your claims other than references to Rommel and Patton. Rommel, a wonderful Tactician but an absolute disaster as a Strategic Commander. You disagree? Well lets compare Rommel as a Strategic Commander with Eisenhower because there is a direct comparison - Eisenhower had to work with Allies, so did Rommel. Eisenhower had to get on, not only with the English, the French, canadians and Poles to name but a few. The fact that he was able to help forge a grand alliance which worked stands as a testament to his name. Rommel? Rommel could never hide his disdain for the Italians and because he felt they were inadequate he essentially ignored them, not a good way for a strategic Commander to behave. Rommel took risks, something a Strategic Commander should never do, by leading from the front. Literally. To the point that his headquarters sometimes didnt know where he was. Von Mellenthins book describes how a lot of decisions fell to his Chief of Staff because Rommel was absent and couldnt be contacted. Some Leader. He did recognise the value of airpower and true enough the Desert Air Forces harried the Afrika Corps all the way back to Tunisia after El Alamein. To me Rommel is and always has been overrated as a Commander and I await your efforts to "re-educate" me with great interest.


As I say I dont think you know very much about Blitzkrieg and I want you to show me a definition of Blitzkrieg that shows it was to do with only aircraft as opposed to a combined arms approach. Blitzkrieg was perfected by Guderian working off the theories of De Gaulle and Fuller and he credits them in his memoirs and as you are a great fan of those you will have no trouble accepting this. Next thing you'll probably try to say that it was Goering who invented Blitzkrieg and if so I'm sure you'll also back up this with a reference.

 

(Gotthard Heinrici @ Dec 16 2005, 08:48 PM) [post=43251]Jimbo I want to make one thing clear: I AM NOT A TANKOPHILE!!!! The fact that I feel that they were a factor in Blitzkrieg does not make me a person who believes that fleets of tanks would have won WWII all by themselves. I believe that Blitzkrieg was a combined arms operations and that was the reason that it was so revolutionary. Yes aircraft were very important in it and yes you are reading right, I have always believed that. AIRCRAFT ARE IMPORTANT!! Where we disagree is that you believe that the only factor in Blitzkrieg was the use of aircraft and I say that wasnt the only factor. [/b]
Gotthard, I don’t believe you can find a place where I called you a tankophile. I have made references to the euphemism because it represents where WWII history is all screwed up. The term Blitzkrieg was used by everybody. Guderian was a tankofphile and that may be why Blitzkrieg is such a confused term. In WWII there was a residual reliance on armor and infantry to get the job done. The importance of air power is “realized” retrospectively even more than it was contemporaneously. This means that though they were progressively starting to rely more and more on air power they didn’t realize how much the did, and even tempered the rate of its usage, because of how radical it was to conventional wisdom of warfare at the time. But let’s table the word Blitzkrieg for now because it has more of a religious meaning than a useful or descriptive one.

Myths and how they come about
I never knew how pervasive the "armor was the major factor" mentality was in the historians but they have been very effective at communicating their spin on the war. I have not read enough historians to make true blanket statements but I can make generalizations of the ones I have read. I sincerely believe it comes from where they got their recount of history, from the Monty’s and the Patton’s who would never want to say “well our armor strategy was somewhat negligible because air covered what would have been mistakes”. They would probably not communicate this if they were humans much less being someone egotistical. Therein lays the problem. More on historians later.

Tanks are needed?...Uh…ok.
Your statement that tanks were a factor, to me is like saying the fuel trucks were a factor and aircraft can’t win the war without them. I am not sure if it sounds sophistic to me or simply pointless, but it communicates nothing about what it took to win the war. Without fuel, the Allies would not have won the war, that’s axiomatic. But, I don’t consider fuel a factor in winning the war because it was a given on both sides. Without it neither could have ever won a single battle. It's quality and quantity does not affect who wins the war if a critical level is maintained and it is therefore logically negligible or a non-factor in the outcome of the war. The same is true of tanks if air supremacy is held. If you disagree with this then you have the monumental task of explaining why Shermans dominated Panzer IVs, Tigers and Panthers.

Houston, we have a problem.
That’s a lot like watching a cat chase a dog up a tree. You can’t simply ignore that elephant in the living room and move on as thought history has no major problems. If you do then, are telling me that Patton was so good that his Shermans, which were reputed to have their rounds bounce off German armor like rubber ball off a concrete wall, beats these legendary and awesome German tanks like “a red-headed retarded step-child”. And this merciless beating is such that he can move across France, almost wide open capturing abandoned ones along the way? This is the history by the great historians? This is all I get for my money?

(Gotthard Heinrici @ Dec 16 2005, 08:48 PM) [post=43251]Right Jimbo please give me a list of historians you agree with so I can find out were the truth is about tanks. I dont actually believe you can back up your claims other than references to Rommel and Patton. Rommel, a wonderful Tactician but an absolute disaster as a Strategic Commander. You disagree? Well lets compare Rommel as a Strategic Commander with Eisenhower because there is a direct comparison - Eisenhower had to work with Allies, so did Rommel. Eisenhower had to get on, not only with the English, the French, canadians and Poles to name but a few. The fact that he was able to help forge a grand alliance which worked stands as a testament to his name. Rommel? Rommel could never hide his disdain for the Italians and because he felt they were inadequate he essentially ignored them, not a good way for a strategic Commander to behave. Rommel took risks, something a Strategic Commander should never do, by leading from the front. Literally. To the point that his headquarters sometimes didnt know where he was. Von Mellenthins book describes how a lot of decisions fell to his Chief of Staff because Rommel was absent and couldnt be contacted. Some Leader. He did recognise the value of airpower and true enough the Desert Air Forces harried the Afrika Corps all the way back to Tunisia after El Alamein. To me Rommel is and always has been overrated as a Commander and I await your efforts to "re-educate" me with great interest. [/b]

Ok, now let’s talk about historians.
Who am I to question historians? I get that one a lot here. How dare a nobody like me who has little background in specific WWII studies question historians? I mean, no way I know as much about WWII history as Angie, spidge, or kiwiwriter, and a few others here on the forum, so who am I to have contempt for historians? Well, I will show you were my contempt for historians begins (in general, not any specific one).

A historian walks up on a battlefield immediately after the victory and sees burning tanks. The tanks of his nation have gone by and moved on. He ponders, how were the enemy tanks destroyed? Well everyone knows that, they met tougher armor, better tactics and more sound strategy, "write it down folks, posterity needs to know what I have seen". The fact is he has seen nothing. He has concluded a lot. This becomes the "facts" for posterity and what they have to draw their understanding from. He wasn't there. He sees a ground general when everyone is patting him on his back and telling him how brilliant he was. He thinks, I did a pretty good job, no reason to describe what tactical air did before I got here. After all, I did call it in.

The fact is that air power covers a multitude of sins (incompetence, surprise, poor recon, poor execution, being over matched, being out numbered, etc). It is a “trump” card that fixes situations that were previously fatal. Several years ago I got into studying the P-47 from having seen one in person. I would say it is about #8 or #9 on the typical American’s “what’s the best WWII fighter” list. But, the sheer size of this airplane and having a decent understanding of aerodynamics and general aircraft principles it peaked my curiosity so I began to study the plane and found out about its performance.

What's tactical air?
In the US, the Mustang was everything in WWII lore; however, I noticed that the Jug had better performance stats at altitude. It had incredible numbers of kill ratio, was reputed to have broken the Luftwaffe’s back yet the Mustang had all the press and was the darling dear of the historians. But why? The Jug had a surreal reputation as being ridiculously survivable, a dominant fighter and dominant fighter/bomber. Pilots that flew them both usually preferred the Jugs. Why is it not the king of the USAAF charm list? I started posting the numbers here and people started posting back that I was out of my mind. Why didn’t they know? What else didn’t they know? If they could be ignorant (relatively speaking) of the prowess of that plane, how could that possibly happen? They were not dummies. They were usually well read. They don’t want to believe in crap anymore than I would. Do they not like the plane because it was not pretty, not British or what? Why are people who care about WWII history so oblivious to the dominance of air power, to the efficacy of the Jug, the understated role of tactical air, to the futility and obsolescence of armor in the reason the war was won or lost?

In the light of what I was seeing, why did anyone even know what a Mustang was? It should have been a relatively obscure plane, like the Jug turned out to be, and known simply as the plane that got good gas mileage but was not as good as what it replaced but served well on long range bombing escort. Also, why had the Jug been replaced in the Eighth Air Force (except for the ace squadron 56th that refused to give them up) and relegated to a Fighter/Bomber role in the Ninth? What had it done to be punished?

The fact is it didn't nothing to get this role. What I found out is that the Jug was an even more dominant fighter/bomber than it was a fighter and it was definitely dominant in that role. When I posted the fact that only 1 in 11 had been “shot down” by enemy aircraft (that doesn't include flak figures), it raised the hackles of some that said that was unfounded and ridiculous. When I posted the tank kills one said there barely that many tanks in the Western front and to think they would have been destroyed by tactical air? Was there a different WWII? Does the history of WWII have anything to do with what happened? Then I started getting the "historians didn't say this so you can't rely on such dubious stats". Is it possible that most historians didn't know what they were talking about?

Ninth Air Force Retrospective
I bought a Ninth Air Force Retrospective book and began to read the progress and tactics developed during the war. They were not commenting on themselves, great leaders, favorite planes, or anything else but were logically analysing the factual data recorded by their branch of the Army. They told stories that looked as if they were talking about another war completely. This really began to bother me. The guys analyzing this were doing it from records of missions and reports from pilots and ground commanders on the interaction of tactical air. It purpose was to analyze what worked and improve it, find out what didn't work and eliminate it. The writers (unlike historians) had nothing to gain. Their country's future depended on them analyzing it. I knew what I was reading was objective. The problem was it was contradicting the gist of the historians.

I Like Ike...sort of
As far as Ike, the more I find out about Ike, the less I am impressed. Ike lacked a spine. He compromised the American position in the war and his refusal to move Patton to Italy cost a lot of men their lives. To his credit he did make it work, but I believe it could have worked much better. But, Ike was Ike.

Enter Rommel
What you seem to think is a good general and what I think is a good general are two different things. That’s for sure. To me it seems you rank a general by his degree of perfection. I don’t, I rate them by their knowledge of tactics, their ability to motivate their men, how good they think on their feet, how much they care about their men, how aggressive they are, and how well they react to the dynamics of a battlefield. As far as strategy, it is of a low rank of importance since rarely does it come into play and rarely would it ever play out like you planned it. Rommel not only epitomized those virtues, but was very astute. He was faced with a losing proposition. He dominated the British when the air was even. He lost when the RAF started cutting his supplies off. He "got" what won and lost battles. He understood that the air that was against him meant not only that he would lose in North Africa but that the war was actually over and had the guts to tell Hitler that very thing, thinking he would be relieved at best, possibly shot. He was not political cared nothing about Hitler’s empire but was simply a German general trying to defend his homeland. His honesty cost him his life in that Hitler believed he took part in the assassination attempt having expressed a fatalistic outlook for Germany in 1943. His "harried" retreat in North Africa was not a choice. He knew he had only one month to defeat the Brits in Egypt because of the equipment that was on the way from the US and the US troops and air force themselves. He had to capture the Suez in this time or as he put it, it was over (boy was he right). In Eygpt, the Aussies and the Brits laid some killer mine fields. The delay and exposure these caused along with the tremendous coverage of it by the British artillery combined with the continual bombing of his supplies and tanks by increasing air attacks, and the fact that the Italians were not delivering the fuel and ammo they continually promised, spelled the doom of Afrika Corps. His goal became to minimize the casualties to his own men and not get trapped. Before the end, he left the field for illnesses caused by prolonged and extreme fatigue where he worked so hard in such extreme conditions that his doctors talked Hitler into pulling him from the field to save his life. He was genuinely sick. It was not a ruse or a bow out. His letters to his wife made that clear.

The Society of Historians
Most historians don't like to rock the boat. If the emperor is clothed then he is closed, no matter what part of his anatomy is exposed, They will not risk being a pariah by postulating something that indicts other historians and calls into question their analysis of what really happened. None of them want to go against the flow so the myths are propagated from generation to generation. Someone comes out with an alternative idea and he is instantly labeled a "crackpot" and treated like he is insane.


(Gotthard Heinrici @ Dec 16 2005, 08:48 PM) [post=43251]As I say I dont think you know very much about Blitzkrieg and I want you to show me a definition of Blitzkrieg that shows it was to do with only aircraft as opposed to a combined arms approach. Blitzkrieg was perfected by Guderian working off the theories of De Gaulle and Fuller and he credits them in his memoirs and as you are a great fan of those you will have no trouble accepting this. Next thing you'll probably try to say that it was Goering who invented Blitzkrieg and if so I'm sure you'll also back up this with a reference.
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Thanks for the complement. The term Blitzkrieg is of no consequence in the context of how you and others define it. I don’t think the term was Goering’s but I think he did facilitate the possibility of a blitzkrieg, more accurately I would say Udet was the real father of the Blitzkrieg. Guderian was merely along for the ride.

Set down the stick you want to beat me over the head with and consider the case I have made here. Then give me an honest opinion, not wrapped in pride, insults or condescension. I have seen you post quite a bit here. I know you are a pretty sharp cookie. Maybe we won’t agree but I would like reasons you believe contrary besides merely stating something a historian said. You can look at a situation just as well as I can and determine if someone has been “putting on the dog” or if what they say really does fit the big picture.

 

</div><div class='quotemain'>What you seem to think is a good general and what I think is a good general are two different things. That’s for sure. To me it seems you rank a general by his degree of perfection. I don’t, I rate them by their knowledge of tactics, their ability to motivate their men, how good they think on their feet, how much they care about their men, how aggressive they are, and how well they react to the dynamics of a battlefield. As far as strategy, it is of a low rank of importance since rarely does it come into play and rarely would it ever play out like you planned it.[/b]

Fortunately for the Allies and millions of people in the World, Ike, Marshall, Nimitz, even Monty (just to name some of the best Allied commanders) did have a good grasp at strategy.

</div><div class='quotemain'>and the fact that the Italians were not delivering the fuel and ammo they continually promised, spelled the doom of Afrika Corps.[/b]

And of course Good ole Erwin doesnt mention the fact that the Italians were having some trouble with the British Units in Malta, losing many of their convoys during the trip to North Africa.
The reason of this being really simple: he was the one that very strongly favoured going on the offensive into Egypt in the spring of 1942, rather than allow limited Axis resources to be used to seize Malta. He persuaded first Kesselring and then Hitler, and finally Hitler persuaded Mussolini to give Rommel the go-ahead, rather than taking Malta - an island whose importance to the safety of those same Italian supply convoys he so much needed was obvious, except to Rommel.


</div><div class='quotemain'>None of them want to go against the flow so the myths are propagated from generation to generation.[/b]

Just like the absurd myth for instance that winter was alone responsible for the failure of Barbarossa.

 

(Exxley @ Dec 17 2005, 11:27 AM) [post=43267]Fortunately for the Allies and millions of people in the World, Ike, Marshall, Nimitz, even Monty (just to name some of the best Allied commanders) did have a good grasp at strategy. [/b]
Ike was hardly a strategist neither was Marshall. I don't know about Nimitz. But most strategies that even the "brilliant" strategists (seemingly the sole qualifier of a good general to you) came up with, never plays out. Everything changes when the fighting begins. With the Germans, generals didn't make the strategy, Schicklegrubber did.

(Exxley @ Dec 17 2005, 11:27 AM) [post=43267]And of course Good ole Erwin doesnt mention the fact that the Italians were having some trouble with the British Units in Malta, losing many of their convoys during the trip to North Africa.
The reason of this being really simple: he was the one that very strongly favoured going on the offensive into Egypt in the spring of 1942, rather than allow limited Axis resources to be used to seize Malta. He persuaded first Kesselring and then Hitler, and finally Hitler persuaded Mussolini to give Rommel the go-ahead, rather than taking Malta - an island whose importance to the safety of those same Italian supply convoys he so much needed was obvious, except to Rommel. [/b]
The Italians were getting fuel ashore they were just sending it to their own forces. They wouldn't open another port so they could only off load 600 tons a day. Don't know what you bone is with Rommel, but I think you are letting it skew your reality.


(Exxley @ Dec 17 2005, 11:27 AM) [post=43267]Just like the absurd myth for instance that winter was alone responsible for the failure of Barbarossa.
[/b]
Maybe that is a myth but it was the testimony of many who fought there. Tank and artillery barrels cracking, equipment not functional engines that wont start and men disabled and dying from frostbite, lack of proper clothing and exposure tend to curb your effectiveness. Some myths are true.

 

</div><div class='quotemain'>Ike was hardly a strategist neither was Marshall.[/b]

oh really ?

</div><div class='quotemain'>But most strategies that even the "brilliant" strategists (seemingly the sole qualifier of a good general to you) came up with, never plays out[/b]

Seems to me that the "Germany first" strategy was indeed succesful since the Germans were defeated first. And a good general, especially one that is to command an entire Army, just like Rommel in North Africa, is one with a clear operational and strategical view.

</div><div class='quotemain'>The Italians were getting fuel ashore they were just sending it to their own forces. They wouldn't open another port so they could only off load 600 tons a day. [/b]

Says Rommel of course. Now how about a little more hindsight from other sources ? How about the fact that Tobruk and Benghazi were low capacity ports and both were within range of Allied Bombers ?

</div><div class='quotemain'>Don't know what you bone is with Rommel, but I think you are letting it skew your reality. [/b]

The man is just plain overrated. An inspirational commander certainly. One of the best tactical/operational commander of the war, certainly. One of the poorest logistician of the war: definitively.

</div><div class='quotemain'>Maybe that is a myth but it was the testimony of many who fought there. Tank and artillery barrels cracking, equipment not functional engines that wont start and men disabled and dying from frostbite, lack of proper clothing and exposure tend to curb your effectiveness. Some myths are true.[/b]

See Halder's figures on German losses. THe claim that Barbarossa failed because of the winter is just an idiot myth.

 

as a fellow russian, i would have to say that we raped and ahniliated everything in our path, and this is a post about how we fought the japs, not about how we can critisize russia, we did make some mistakes but we did have great generalds zhukov, rokososky ect... we had the best medium tank during world war two the type-34/85. so stop talking crap about us

sorry if i offended some one

 

Both Kursk and Operation Bagration took place in the summer months, and the Soviets won both - the latter was described as the biggest single German defeat of the war (in the title of a book by Paul Adair).

Although both Liddell-Hart and De Gaulle both independently came up with the idea of collecting tanks into armoured formations, rather than using them as infantry support weapons, Guderian had the idea of putting radios in tanks to improve command and control. This enabled infantry, tanks and airpower to work in concert, and that's my understanding of blitzkrieg - a combined arms operation.

On the subject of airpower vs. tanks, I have some figures collected by 21st Army Group's no. 2 ORU. At Falaise, a sample of 56 tanks lost to the Germans (in a limited area) were checked. These were 9 Tiger Is, 3 Tiger IIs, 22 Panthers, and 22 Pz. Ivs . Of these, 3 Panthers and 2 Pz. IVs were destroyed by groundfire, 2 Pz. IVs were destroyed by aircraft, and the rest were abandoned by their crews.

At Mortain, 44 tank 'casualties' (34 Panthers and 10 Pz. IVs) broke down as follows : 20 were destroyed by groundfire, 7 by rockets and two by bombs from aircraft, four by other means (unspecified in the article I have) and 11 were abandoned.

Referring specifically to Tigers, 44% of losses were put down to Ground fire, 46% to abandonment/self-destruction, 4% to tactical aircraft (bombs/rockets) and 6% to strategic bombing (specifically by Lancasters on 18/7/44, on the first day of Operation Goodwood - all these came from sPz Abt. 503). Although the period this covers is unclear in the article, I infer it covers the period from D-Day to when the allies moved out of France and into Belgium/Holland.

The reason for the high degree of abandonment is put down to the notoriously unreliable Maybach engines.

Hope that may prove interesting ...

 

I read a book, well not all of it I lost it, about the eastern front. It made a good point. It took the Gremans 6 months to get to Moscow. It took the Russians several years to get to Berlin.