The Battle of the Scheldt October 2 to November 8, 1944 Fought by Canadian, British and Polish formations to open up the port of Antwerp so that it could be used to supply the Allies in north-west Europe. Led by Lt-Gen Guy Simonds, the battle took place in northern Belgium and southwestern Netherlands. After five weeks of difficult fighting, the Canadian First Army at a cost of 12,873 Allied casualties (half of them Canadian) were successful in clearing the Scheldt estuary. It was a further three weeks before the first convoy carrying Allied supplies was able to unload in Antwerp (on November 29, 1944). Clearing the Scheldt estuary and opening the port of Antwerp had been delayed for the sake of the Arnhem thrust. Arguably one of the greatest tactical mistakes of the war.
To add the 11th Armoured Division was in Antwerp by Sept 4th with enough fuel to advance to south Beveland and cut off the 10th German army in Breskins Pocket. However without orders the Roberts halted the advance before crossing the canal. Setting up the siege that followed the charge to Arnhem. the 10th Army (edit: it was in fact the 15th army) lived to fight another 9 (7 months edit) months.
Halting to invest and take Antwerp was the 'slow plodding safe way' to do things. Arnhem was a bold dashing attempt to make a deep intrusion into the enemy rear. The main criticism of Monty is that he was too cautious and never took risks that could lead to great rewards. Damned if he does, damned if he don't. Eisenhower in Command by this time and it was his decision to put Antwerp on the back burner
Always think it's worth quoting Brian Horrocks in Corps Commander in any discussion around Antwerp. "My excuse is that my eyes were fixed entirely on the Rhine and everything else seemed of subsidiary importance. It never entered my head that the Scheldt would be mined and that we would not be able to use Antwerp until the channel had been swept and the Germans cleared from the coastlines on either side... Napoleon would no doubt have realized these things but Horrocks didn't" A rather elegant way of stating that the benefit of hindsight is a wonderful thing me thinks?
I will leave it to historians to attach blame. Be it Horrocks, Monty, Eisenhower, Roberts (11th Armoured) or a combination of that group. It may even have been general failure in Intelligence but the facts remain. It was a blunder which prolonged the war. As important as the failure to seize Antwerp was the inexcusable escape of the 15th German Army under Von Zangen with about 120,000 men with all their equipment, vehicles and artillery. I tend to think it was strategic vs tactical. In advance of September, diverting Canadian forces to the channel ports also seemed ill-advised.
Canuck, "Clearing the Scheldt estuary and opening the port of Antwerp had been delayed for the sake of the Arnhem thrust. Arguably one of the greatest tactical mistakes of the war." I'd be interested in seeing your list of other "great tactical mistakes" - to see what metric you are using to compare thier "greatness"! "It was a blunder which prolonged the war." Really, by how much and how? Nine minutes, nine days, nine months? "diverting Canadian forces to the channel ports also seemed ill-advised." Really? Have a look at the map you provided in post 1 - so you think it would have been a good idea for the Allies to rely on a single port, at the end of a long, easily mined estuary and not that far from the Dutch V-1 and V rocket sites. Regards Tom
The War "Was Hell" for anybody that was there......but The Canadians...!! I just finished watching a multi-part video about the different battles The Canadians were in...including The Scheldt. It seems like those guy got A Lot of hard jobs, wherever they went. They sure accounted for a lot of Effort and Bravery.
Since you asked. I'd put the Antwerp error up there ahead of Hong Kong, Anzio, Dieppe and Arnhem. For two reasons. The escape of the 15th Army and the huge loss of re-supply capacity which would have allowed continued pressure by far more British and American units. If you want a precise guess I'll give you 3 months, 4 days and 12 hours. Who the hell knows. Several historians have pegged it at 3-4 months, give or take. The ports were an easier issue. Once the prospect of capturing Antwerp intact and trapping the 15th Army was presented, the channel ports, mostly useless anyway, should have fallen quickly to a secondary objective. They were each smaller than Antwerp and several were unusable until the end of the war. Canadian formations then could have avoided the Scheldt distraction and joined the critical pursuit. Putting your sarcasm aside, the Antwerp sequence of mistakes had profound impacts far more significant than almost any other in NW Europe.
Canuck The byline on your post is very illuminating...`The Germans and our own Higher Command ` Just as the Black Watch experienced on October 13, 1944.
The campaign was expected to take some 10 months to reach Antwerp. They were greatly in excess of timetable and then the war ended one month short of the penciled-in date. Can you list the 'several' historians who say it prolonged the war? I would love to see what they say in general about NWE 1944-45 and how they believe capture of Antwerp would have produced a swift German surrender in Jan-Feb 1945.
Canuck, We can debate can't we? "If you want a precise guess I'll give you 3 months, 4 days and 12 hours. Who the hell knows. Several historians have pegged it at 3-4 months, give or take." How can you compare it then? As Michael asks, which historians? "I'd put the Antwerp error up there ahead of Hong Kong, Anzio, Dieppe and Arnhem." So you were only considering British and American tactical mistakes then? Surely to that you could add the escape of the German defenders from Sicily? No end of British moves in the desert, the fall of Tobruk and Singapore? I'm pretty sure the French decision to carry out the Breda variant in 1940 should be up there if we are considering Allied tactical mistakes though...or Stalin's decision to ignore warnings of German invasion in 1941. I would also suggest that your two reasons for thinking the Antwerp "error" is higher are mutually exclusive, I'll try to explain. If 11 Armoured Division had been successful when it tried to advance to cut off the Beveland peninsula in early September 1944 and had managed to hold on there thereby cutting off that route of escape for 15th Army then how would that have opened up the port of Antwerp? Wouldn't those elements of 15th Army who couldn't make their way across North Beveland to Schouwen island just have stayed in both the Breskens pocket, on Walcheren and on South Beveland itself? I just don't understand why you think that would have made the port capacity of Antwerp available very soon? There was also no freely available amphibious force ready and waiting to conduct the assault on Walcheren - the Commando brigade was exhausted and mainly consisted of replacements, the landing and support forces were scattered all over the place. Of course, that's not taking into account the chance that if 11 Armoured Division had by-passed Antwerp then elements of 15th Army might have moved in to it! In addition, the Scheldt estuary was already mined both inside and outside the mouth, it took around 3 weeks to clear the estuary once the land defences were clear. There were also minefields in both the Channel and the North Sea that needed clearing if Antwerp were to be used by ocean-going ships. These operations had to be repeated a number of times, when the Luftwaffe dropped mines into the estuary. Fortunately, the Allies were not reliant on Antwerp alone. "the channel ports, mostly useless anyway, should have fallen quickly to a secondary objective" - sorry, not sure I understand you here - are you saying the Canadians were a bit slow in taking those ports if they should have fallen quickly? Montgomery thought that the Canadians were being a bit ponderous in early September 1944, but I have not studied their operations in enough depth to be able to comment. I'm also not sure why you think the channel ports were "mostly useless" either, I thought that apart from Dunkirk they were all cleared and used. By the way, you also seem to have ignored my point about the bottleneck in onward clearance from Antwerp. Once the port was opened in late Nov 44, according to you it should have transformed the supplies available to the Allies, right? Well, unfortunately, despite the 3 months work on the port itself and its forward transport links "within two weeks of opening a backlog of 55,000 tons of supplies had accumulated" at the port, and from the second week of December American unloading actually declined. You should also note that in early 1945 there was so much concern that an ammunition ship or dump would be hit by a V2/V1, bomb or mine, that all American ammunition was diverted to other ports, and British ammunition clearance through Antwerp was reduced to a minimum by diversion to Ghent and Ostend. So, I disagree with your title for this topic - whatever 11 Armoured Division did, there would have been a battle for the Scheldt, and it was never possible for the Allies to have "avoided the Scheldt distraction". I tend to agree with the Canadian regimental historian who said that the clearance of the Scheldt was "a hard job [which] had been well and truly done". And done by a coalition of Canadians, British, Poles and Americans. Regards Tom
This is a tricky one for me as I can only go with what my granda said about the battle of the Walcheren Islands. He told me once that this was worse than D-Day in his opinion. He was with the 80 Assault Squadron landing on Juno D-Day and he says he was at Walcheren but I have not been able to find any information on that as the diaries don't mention him in the list who were reported for duty and service records don't help either. So I'll probably never know if he was or not but granda said he was. Mike.
Of course we can debate. If you meant to assign me a formal research project with a bibliography, I'll have to dig in and find the specific references. I just returned from travel in the U.S. so, in advance of more in-depth study, let's deal with a few points: Yes, I was obviously confining my list of tactical mistakes to a few obvious Allied errors. Certainly, I could have added to that list. Including Hitler's decision to start the war. It was meant to be illustrative not exhaustive. With respect to the channel ports, The 1st Canadian Army was severely depleted, particularly the infantry formations, after the Normandy battles and by all accounts, were seriously under resourced to effect the capture of the following ports simultaneously while capturing any V1 sites in their path. Moerbrugge Dunkirk Le Havre Boulogne Calais Moerkerke Wyneghem Antwerp-Turnhout "Although Dieppe came rapidly into use, it could supply only a quarter of the needs of the 21st Army Group. The capture of Le Havre, Boulogne, Calais and Ostend only eased the allies' supply problems after extensive clearance of debris and mines. Ostend remained restricted to personnel. Boulogne's role as a terminal for the oil pipeline (Dumbo) was of great benefit, however, becoming the Allies' "... main supplies of fuel during the winter and spring campaigns". In hindsight, it has been questioned whether the capture of the defended ports was worthwhile given the need for much effort to bring them into use and the greater potential benefit of Antwerp. The opening of Antwerp in November 1944 largely solved the allies' supply problems." A good summary of Canadian operations along the coast. HyperWar: The Victory Campaign [Chapter 14]
I intend a more 'broad-brush' approach. I will check their body of work and see if they have any history of blaming certain individuals for every mistake.
Canuck, Thanks for the link to the Canadian OH. Stacey is much more circumspect than the historians you previously refer to: "It would seem that on 4 September, when Antwerp fell to the Second Army, there were open to the Allied commanders two possible courses either of which, if at once adopted and ruthlessly persisted in, might possibly have led to the defeat of Germany before the winter. One was Field-Marshal Montgomery's plan for a concentrated drive into Germany on a relatively narrow front, supported by all the administrative resources then available to the Allies. This plan, as we have seen, was certainly risky, and the administrative calculations on which it was based, involving the use of at least "one good Pas de Calais port", proved to be optimistic (above, page 321). The other possible course was to disregard the Channel Ports, merely masking them with minimum forces as was finally done at Dunkirk, and to concentrate every available resource upon opening Antwerp and incidentally destroying the endangered Fifteenth Army. Could we have struck while the Germans were still off balance, immediately after 4 September, we might have opened the Scheldt much more rapidly and cheaply than we were able to do in October; and it is possible (though scarcely probable) that we could have got the great port working in time to support an autumn campaign into Germany." So, Stacey regarded it as "scarcely probable" that even by diverting every possible resource to the opening of Antwerp in September 1944, use of the port would have enabled an autumn campaign that could have taken the Allies into Germany. In hindsight, then, it was probably better to open at least some of the Channel Ports as reserve capacity - especially useful, given the problems experienced in using Antwerp which I referred to in my previous post. "If you meant to assign me a formal research project with a bibliography" - actually I was only really asking for some evidence to back up the title and opening remarks of a thread that you started. By the way, why did you start it? Regards Tom
Tom, With apologies for the tardy response , I haven't had much time to spend this past week on a more detailed answer but will tackle your final question first. I came across the book shown below several weeks ago and it triggered my long held belief that Antwerp was a missed opportunity. Clearly, I agree with the premise of the book. I don't know if you are counted among those in the U.K. who are sensitive to any criticism of Monty and rush to his defense in any controversial discussion. I can tell you that it is not motivated by any particular animosity toward Montgomery. I tend to think he was overrated and a chronic self promoter but at least as competent as his contemporaries. In any event, any critique of Monty must equally apply to Eisenhower. I will provide more detail in the coming week but as you can see, my viewpoint on Antwerp is far from being an isolated or minority perspective. The 'Great Mistake', then, was the failure by the Allies to send whatever force could be mustered to seize a crossing over the Albert Canal at Merxem (as the Belgian [Resistance] White Brigade encouraged and implored them to do), and send an armoured column with all possible speed to the isthmus 2 miles west of Woensdrecht. This column would have had to be reinforced promptly to put in place a block to prevent the escape of the 15th Army. But had this been done, and then followed up once again very promptly with more troops, there could have been an opportunity to sweep up the Beveland peninsula during the very short period that existed until the resilient Germans reorganised themselves. The Great Mistake was to lose this fleeting opportunity. Peter Beale An aide to Bradley during the war, wrote Top Secret in 1946. He was bitterly critical of Eisenhower’s performance as Supreme Allied Commander. Ingersoll believed that in August 1944 (Antwerp) the Allies missed a great opportunity for winning the war by Christmas. Ralph Ingersoll Montgomery ignored the port of Antwerp for over a month. ... The one chance the Allies had of ending the war in 1944 was simply thrown away. William Weidner McManus totally disapproves of the operation: “When Eisenhower gave Montgomery permission (and priority of supply) to launch Market Garden, he made his worst decision of the war. Market Garden was a bad idea because it took the Allied focus off Antwerp.” He continues, “In turning their attention from opening up this ideal supply port to unleashing the bold Market Garden, the commanders were basically pinning their hopes for success on the military equivalent of a Hail Mary pass.” John C. McManus As an army group commander Montgomery had to understand the operational situation and to make decisions which supported strategic needs. He had to synchronize and maintain symmetry between the two armies in his charge, to maintain tempo, provide clear priorities and appropriate resources to his subordinate units to achieve the tasks he assigned. Failure to immediately exploit the seizure of Antwerp’s ports intact was a mistake of unrivalled proportion. The escape of the German Fifteenth Army across the Scheldt in September 1944 resulted in unprecedented delay to Allied operations. This force both possessed viable combat power and was able to use that power to effectively deny the Allies the use of Antwerp as a seaport for over two months. Major Michael Paul Williams Canadian Army American historian Charles B. MacDonald later called the failure to immediately take the Scheldt "One of the greatest tactical mistakes of the war."
Those 2 books/authors are useless as history . Ingersoll wrote his screed just after the war and it is an insanely anti-Montgomery view of one of Bradley's admirers still trying to settle scores for Bradley's hurt pride when Monty was given command of one of his armies during The Bulge. Weidner is quite simply deranged. I have his book Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap: Amazon.co.uk: William Weidner: 9781441597977: Books and it basically says there was a conspiracy by the UK to prolong WW2 and Churchill sabotaged the NWE Campaign by letting the USA do all the fighting whilst hiding soldiers in the UK order to preserve her Army for use after the war ended. He also says that Monty was part of this plan and that he (Monty) deliberately let the Germans escape from Normandy. That Eisenhower discovered this plan and in order to preserve the Alliance Eisenhower persuaded Bradley to fake his famous halt order to Patton and backdate it so that Bradley could take the blame and prevent US public opinion being outraged and quitting WW2. They idea of Bradley doing such a thing given he hated Montgomery is absurd. I am not joking Weidner really does make those claims. You have to read the book to understand the mental issues of the average Monty-basher. His book is nothing but a vile attack on everything British and no chance is lost to disparage both the British Army and the entire establishment. Now that is just two books but those 2 are such well known turkeys that I can not understand why you would think they have any credibility. I think you just Googled the subject and posted clips from reviewers. Me? I read it all. I knew Weidner was delusional before I got his book but I needed to get inside his mindset. That way I can give a detailed rebuttal when his Anti-Monty bollocks pops up on Forums.
I will take that response as confirmation of you being part of "those in the U.K. who are sensitive to any criticism of Monty and rush to his defense in any controversial discussion". Alan Brooke was also clearly deranged and insanely anti-Montgomery when he wrote in his diary: "I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance to Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp". "In defeat, unbeatable; in victory, unbearable. Winston
