Not everyone who was critical of the mistakes at Antwerp is a Monty basher. Besides, being anti-Montgomery does not automatically render your opinion incorrect. Biased perhaps but not necessarily wrong. In any event, not all of those dissenting views can reasonably be classed as "rubbish". Cornelius Ryan, Liddell Hart, Milton Shulman, John Keegan, several German officers and the Belgian Resistance have all noted their criticism of the strategy. Even Pip Roberts, in retrospect, admitted to the mistake.
The problem I had was that you used 2 extreme examples of books that were 'rubbish' Anyone who has read them can see they were 'rubbish'. I defy anyone to defend them. Are you defending them? 'Dissent' is one thing. Deranged peddlers of conspiracy theories are something else. I would say Ryan. Hart & Keegan are firmly in the 'admirers of the German military' camp so hardly qualify as impartial observers. That does not negate their criticism but using only that 'type' of author certainly would give you a skewed view of the subject. I am not one of those who believe Allied Generals were bumbling fools who only won because of sheer numbers. If anyone is put-out by my tenor on this matter then I can only say you now know how the 'opposition' feel. I am mortally offended when anyone quotes third-rate Monty hatchet-jobs as a source. If you do not want to be offended then do not offend. Being unaware of the offensive nature of the works you referenced is no longer an excuse!
Offense is taken not given and simply because you are offended doesn't make you right. Carrying the flag for Monty in the face of any criticism equally disqualifies you as an impartial observer. Montgomery's full career isn't the subject being debated. It is purely the sequence of events and decisions related to Antwerp and the Scheldt and that discussion extends well beyond Montgomery. Specific examples or a logical rationale for the decisions made would be far more helpful. There is no question that he is a central figure but ignoring the broader context actually serves to highlight his role even more acutely. Like it or not, the historical record contains views from across the spectrum. To arbitrarily dismiss uncomplimentary opinions based on suspected motives is a degree of censorship which distorts the debate. Based on that approach, someone on the other side of the argument could justifiably toss out any pro-Monty commentators as being blindly loyal to a flawed officer.
Perhaps now might be the time to point out I have not made any positive reference to Monty in this thread? All I did was point out that 2 books/sources were not worth the paper they were printed on. As is the usual case this failure to fall in line with a detractors charges immediately transforms one into a 'flag carrier' for the man. No. It means I have read the two book and you have not. I say it again both those books are garbage. If you believe otherwise them post extracts that show they have merit. I suspect that will be difficult as neither appears to be on Google Books.
Canuck wrote: "Some have questioned whether Crerar would have done so given the relationship or that it would have had any effect on Montgomery. It seems to be an elusive piece of information." Sorry, not sure I understand you there! Whether Crerar would have done what? Who are the "some" - and what is "elusive"? "The under strength Canadian 1st Army was certainly denuded of resources, formations and supplies after September 3rd, in support of Market Garden, so, at the very least, Monty could not expect the advance to accelerate." Maybe after 10 September in support of Op Market Garden - but 1st Canadian Army were given plenty of arty support and the use of 79 Armoured Division to help clear Le Havre, Boulogne, Calais, the Breskens Pocket and Beveland, and RN support for Walcheren. "The Canadian 3rd Infantry Division alone required 1,000 replacements at the time and had to give up their bridging equipment to support MG. Simonds was purported to have requested an additional division to meet the tasks assigned." Their bridging equipment? Really? Actually, on 4 Sep 2 Cdn Div were deficient 1,960 infantry ORs, 3 Cdn Inf Div were deficient 736 infantry ORs, and 4 Cdn Armd Div were deficient 755 infantry ORs. (Terry Copp, Cinderella Army, Appx A] Do you know the replacement requirements of 2nd British Army's formations on 4 Sep? Have you read Graham's biography of Simonds in which the failure of the mechanised 1st Cdn Army to cut off the horse-drawn 15th Army south of the Scheldt is lamented? How about Terry Copp's article "No Lack of Rational Speed" for a vigorous defence of the Canadian performance during the first couple of weeks in Sept 44? Regards Tom
Michael, You've read Ingersoll? I got about half way through and then began to feel terribly paranoid! He was one strange dude! I have also read something about his left-leaning politics and suggestions that his attempts to drive a wedge between US and UK military leaders was encouraged by the Soviets - but looking at the quotes from that other book, perhaps it was a British double bluff plot. Almost as silly as the Rohmer book about Falaise - Patton's Gap I think that one was called. Highly entertaining, but very daft. Regards Tom
I managed to borrow a copy of Ingersoll years back and I could not believe what he was claiming. In short that Monty was running around like a headless chicken during the Bulge and was on the verge of a panic-stricken retreat and was only saved by the steadfast Bradley. It was 90% fiction. I have no problems with criticism of Monty but I have no time whatsoever for baseless stories about his 'failures' in Libya, Sicily, Caen. Falaise or Arnhem. I simply refuse to smile indulgently when I hear such calumny. If someone is going to make such vile despicable claims about his Generalship then I am going to treat them with the contempt they deserve. The two books I slate are garbage and the correct response would be to drop them as a source and move on. Ramsey seems to devote more words to his billeting problems and golf than to clearing Antwerp!
This might satisfy your questionnaire but warning you in advance that there are a few unflattering comments about Monty. The Rough Road to Antwerp: The First Canadian Army's Operations Along the Channel Coast
I have found this thread on which I know absolutely nothing a fascinating read. I particularly found The Rough Road to Antwerp well balanced and easy to follow with a good conclusion at the end. Tim
Not much new information here but a good summary. I expect that I will soon be informed that the young author is mentally defective or suffers from some form of anglophobic psychosis. Mistakes in the Battle for Antwerp: and the Impacts on Allied Operations in Northwest Europe Mistakes in the Battle for Antwerp: and the Impacts on Allied Operations in Northwest Europe.
I would run with the latter: 'Goddam you Britishers' should be the papers title. It seems Pattons disaster at Metz and The Battle Of The Bulge are to be added to Montgomery's long (and getting even longer) list of failures.
I'm not sure this question's been asked/answered: why is the thread titled "The Unnecessary Battle"? There might be an argument that it could or should have been fought sooner, but everything is based on Antwerp and its approaches being very necessary.
I like the bit on p4 where he implies 15th Army 'escaped' into the Scheldt area (edit as I didn't mean to suggest into the river itself)!
I think the point of the argument is that sealing the neck of the South Beveland peninsula, in early September 1944, when the opportunity presented itself, was the obvious and preferred course of action. That would have taken less resources, much less time, less costly and a far more decisive action than the subsequent Battle of the Scheldt turned out to be. It was there for the taking. In that scenario, the divisions of the 15th German Army would have been trapped, unsupplied and with very difficult escape options.
It doesn't seem to be a very logical argument, though. In reality, the German forces that were left in the pockets and on the islands still had to be beaten into submission. Wasn't the likely consequence of more trapped Germans more fighting, not less? The 'escape' of the bulk of 15th Army could be viewed as the removal of useless mouths from the defences to prolong their resistance. Trapping the entire force might have reduced its ability to withstand a siege and forced it to surrender sooner. However, if you're prioritising the Scheldt over the Rhine, you aren't allowing much time for that to happen.
Idler, Well said. That is an entirely reasonable argument. I suppose it comes down to German intentions of maintaining the 15th in defensive positions (Breskens, North and South Beveland, Walcheren) or attempting an evacuation. Without the ability to re-supply I suspect the former was a nonviable option as the combat readiness of the 15th would have quickly degraded in the face of a siege. German General Eugen-Felix Schwalbe, responsible for ferrying the 15th Army across the Scheldt, commented that he lived in fear of the Beveland Isthmus being severed. The peninsula narrows into an isthmus only 1.5 km wide just before the village of Woensdrecht. He had two fears. German troops were in the process of withdrawing through the area at that time (early September) and he saw limited prospects for a slow and dangerous alternative of evacuation through the Dutch islands to Dordrecht and Rotterdam. That being a 12 hour sea voyage and easily interdicted vs the 45 minute trip from Breskens to Flushing. From his comments, that was easily the worst case scenario for the Germans and carries the implication that evacuating the trapped army of 86,000 men was the first priority vs a stand and fight strategy. It is hard to believe that, at that point in the war, Germany could afford to have that many men encircled and captured, over whatever time frame. In the end, it is conjecture if the importance of Antwerp in Germans minds was worth the expenditure of the 15th Army to delay it's capture. 15th Army Order of battle (31 Aug 1944) LXXXIX. Armeekorps - 70. Infanterie-Division - 712. Infanterie-Division - 59. Infanterie-Division - 64. Infanterie-Division - 182. Reserve-Division LXVII. Armeekorps - 245. Infanterie-Division - 226. Infanterie-Division - 17. Feld-Division (L) Order of battle (16 Sep 1944) At the disposal of the 15. Armee - 226. Infanterie-Division - 59. Infanterie-Division (part) - 70. Infanterie-Division - 245. Infanterie-Division (part) LXXXIX. Armeekorps - 245. Infanterie-Division (most) - 64. Infanterie-Division LXXXVI. Armeekorps - 59. Infanterie-Division (most) - 712. Infanterie-Division LXVII. Armeekorps - 711. Infanterie-Division - Kampfgruppe 346. Infanterie-Division + 17. Feld-Division (L) (remnants) + 331. Infanterie-Division (remnants) + 344. Infanterie-Division (remnants)
An indication of German intentions: British Intelligence in the Second World War: Volume 3" Hindsight might suggest that if the Germans were clearing themselves from the Scheldt (less fortresses), our best option was to let them carry on. Although 11 Armd Div contributed this more by accident than design, perhaps Breskens was 'unnecessary' in the sense that the bulk of the pocket could have been allowed to have their Dunkirk? With all the other stuff going on it would have needed a very clear and hard head to choose to let them go when the natural instinct would be to divide and conquer. Of course, in the context of Market Garden, Fifteenth Army was better off isolated, not moving across the front or flanks of the advance. Letting them go wasn't an option unless opening Antwerp had been the priority.
Oh dear, taking a deep breath!! The pocket south of the Scheldt had to be cleared before the estuary could be cleared of the mines that were already in it. It took until late October to clear that pocket even after much of 15th Army had crossed northwards. It took about three weeks to clear the mines. What is so hard to understand? BTW it was Operation EPSOM not 'Epson'. Regards Tom
Don't panic, Tom, I'm with you. Just thinking aloud about what that elusive 'unnecessary' element might be in the mind of whoever coined the term. I'm still at a loss as to how 11 Armd Div putting the cork in the bottle would have made the Canadians' job easier.
