'Top Secret' till 1996: March 1946 Japanese surrender on Bali

Discussion in 'Postwar' started by davidbfpo, Mar 4, 2021.

  1. TijgerB

    TijgerB Member

    Well in these case the Dutch are kind people :DDutch re-occupation of Bali and Lombok View file
    And it come at the price we love :poppy:
    Generally this Dutch project hold many interesting files :cheers:
  2. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron


    Thanks for the file and as it the staff work done by the British Indian 5th Division it is all in English. It is not the planning document for the two navies, although it does make clear the RN would only act in 'support of a landing' which was unopposed. So which flags were flown on all the vessels involved remains unclear.

    The Dutch force, two battalions strong were in Bangkok and weak in many respects (armour, transport etc) with only two-inch mortars. Minus any training in an opposed landing. With half the force, one battalion, to go onto Lombok - which was likely to be a different operational environment.

    There is a reference to the small British recce party coming by air and landing a week beforehand.

    Note there is no reference to a previous surrender by the Japanese, i.e. in February nor to a planned surrender after the Dutch landing.
  3. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron

    Tim id'd the CO of LST3502 was Lt Cdr J C H Nelson, RN. Whose previous ship was HMS Prince of Wales, but was not a POW. See a mention of him in: BBC - WW2 People's War - East-End boy goes to Sea (3) - Jacko's sad demise.

    His typescript memoirs 1918-1950 are at Churchill College, Cambridge; at Royal Museums Greenwich: Commander J C H Nelson, RN. Memoirs of a life in the Royal Navy., 1918 - 1950 | ArchiveSearch and 'Memoirs of a life in the Royal Navy 1918-50' by Cdr J C H Nelson. - National Maritime Museum
  4. Ewen Scott

    Ewen Scott Well-Known Member

    These documents are all dated around the end of Jan 1946. The planning document sets out two possible dates for the Bali landing, the first of which, 15 Feb, it notes can’t be met due to need for training and shipping from Bangkok. See para 14 on page 11 of the linked documents.

    That then fixed the date of the landing of Dutch troops on 2 March 1946 due to tides etc. That meant the British Mission would need to land 7 days before ie 24th Feb and carry out the functions set out in para 18 see page 12. The landing by air was dependent on the state of the airfield which is noted as having a wet patch in the middle.

    So it seems entirely plausible, and was envisaged in the plan para 16ei on page 12, that the plan for the British Mission changed due to the state of the airfield. It was then brought in on HMS Loch Eck as noted in previous posts along with the press. The timescale pretty much matches the plan. OK the plan doesn’t use the word “surrender” but their function demands them taking control of Japanese forces and effectively amounts to such. And in each step Bali then Lombok, the British Mission must go first before handing over to the Dutch. Note also that at this time the Dutch weren’t being allowed to land in Java due to the political situation.
    Last edited: Mar 9, 2021
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  5. timuk

    timuk Well-Known Member

    In the original film clip of the landings it can be seen that the Landing Craft are flying White Ensigns (around 00.17). The Dutch Troops appear to be carrying the Dutch Flag.

  6. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron

    I plan one day to construct a timeline of what we have gathered. Still bemused and puzzled that there were two surrender acts.

    Curious to note, thanks to TijgerB, that the Dutch released a British document in 1972 (although it may have been digitised many years later) and British researchers had to wait till 1996.
  7. TijgerB

    TijgerB Member

    davidbfpo I feel confidend the Dutch did not make them public before the British :unsure: Also I think there were 6 files mentioning Bali or something like that just took the first one :D At the moment I am involved in what has become the "3rd battle of Pesing" in the other end of the country:box:
    By the way mates stand at attention for a moment all hands. Today the 9th March it is the 75th anniversary for the landing of Dutch forces on Java :cheers: And the 79th anniversary of the Dutch surrender to the Japanese in 1942 :poppy:
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  8. JimHerriot

    JimHerriot Ready for Anything

    Good evening all.

    I've had a day of digging out stuff, and in digging out stuff I've found other stuff which may hopefully be of use here.

    Images follow from "Report of Surrender and Occupation of Japan" from Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area, dated 11 February 1946.

    Fontispiece, followed by contents pages followed by pages 93 to 97 "The Formal Surrender of the Empire of Japan" which includes General Order No. 1 giving the geographical areas and who would be responsible for taking the surrenders within. This having been issued to the Japanese was thus the way it was going to be, and given we have the ceremony in Tokyo Bay during September 1945 I think that date of March 1946 for the surrender of Bali is indeed correct (General Order No. 1 was a bit of a "hoisted by our own petard" logistically and geographically).

    My blue box-outs for cut to the chase purposes.

    Hope this helps and doesn't muddy Pacific waters further.

    Kind regards, always,


    Report of surrender and occupation of Japan 1.jpg

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    Last edited: Mar 9, 2021
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  9. papiermache

    papiermache Well-Known Member

    The download from the Dutch Defence site and this link is useful, given the Google Translate tool.

    Bibliografie Indië

    For example: unedited Google transate rendering:

    from Bibliographie Indie
    page 10
    "The Netherlands and the Indonesian battle for decolonization" 1

    1 This article is adapted by: Jan Hoffenaar and Ben Schoenmaker, With a view to the East. The Royal Netherlands Army 1945-

    " In the last year of the Second World War, when the fall of Germany seemed imminent, the Dutch government assumed that its own armed forces would play a role in the recapture of the Indies from the Japanese and the enforcement of authority thereafter. Little of this came about through the course of the battle. Only one battalion of the Royal Dutch East Indies Army (KNIL) and two squadrons of the Military Aviation KNIL (ML-KNIL) fought on the Australian side in the recapture of Tarakan and Balikpapan on Borneo. The unexpectedly quick capitulation of Japan on August 15, 1945 made it necessary to adjust all plans.

    According to agreements made at the conference in Potsdam, the Dutch East Indies came that same day (15 August) to fall under the South East Asia Command, the command area of the British Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. Previously, with the exception of Sumatra, the archipelago fell within the South West Pacific Area, over which American General Douglas MacArthur held sway. The British did not immediately have troops available for their new command area, and neither did the Dutch. The Indonesian nationalists led by Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta were able to take advantage of this opportunity. The latter proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August under pressure from radical youth groups. For various reasons, both the Japanese and the Dutch were no longer accepted as rulers. The Indonesian nationalists wanted to determine the fate of Indonesia themselves.

    Under these circumstances, the British were very reticent. At the end of September the first troops arrived, mostly British Indians who, now that the war was over, wanted to return home quickly. They set up a number of bridgeheads for defense: Batavia-Bandung, Semarang and Soerabaja on Java and Medan, Padang and Palembang on Sumatra. Their main tasks were the disarmament and removal of the Japanese soldiers and the liberation of the Dutch internees and prisoners of war on Java and Sumatra. This turned out to be a very difficult task. The situation escalated very quickly from October onwards. In those months, also called the bersiap period, groups of young revolutionaries attacked the Dutch, British, Chinese, Moluccans and others. Several thousand civilian victims were killed inside and outside the internment camps. The British lost 655 men to the dead and 325 men to the missing, including deserters. These events partly determined the negative Dutch image of the Indonesian republic.

    The first troops to the Indies
    The unexpectedly rapid capitulation of Japan and the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia two days later put the Netherlands in a difficult position from a military point of view. A revolution had broken out in the Indies. It soon became apparent that a great many troops would be needed to restore Dutch authority. The KNIL was far from ready for this task. Only a start had been made on the formation of new KNIL units, mainly filled with ex-prisoners of war. Troops therefore had to be sent to the Indies at very short notice. During the Second World War, the Dutch government had already made preparations for the deployment of an expeditionary force and command battalions with a view to the liberation and re-occupation of the Indonesian archipelago. Although there are already thousands of war volunteers (OVWs) in the Netherlands
    and some of them had received military training, the Expeditionary Force was still in an embryonic stage, while the formation of battalions of command for the Indies had slowed down and the Australian government stopped its cooperation for economic and political (anti-colonial) reasons. . The Light Infantry Battalions (LIBs), also established during the war for occupation duties in Germany, were the only troops available. These units, mainly filled with OVWs, were therefore intended for deployment in the Indies. Allied High Command agreed, provided that the Expeditionary Force was made available to the British occupying army after it became operational. Many OVWs at the LIBs had not counted on this change of destination.

    The deployment of the LIBs still took some doing, because, just as with the volunteers for the Royal Navy (KM), the 'long-banders' (who had declared themselves prepared to be deployed overseas) of the 'short-banders' had to be separated. Ultimately, seventeen LIBs were shipped to the Dutch East Indies from September 1945 to January 1946. These OVW battalions went via Malacca, because they did not yet have permission from the British government to land in Java and Sumatra. From March 1946 these OVW infantry battalions were admitted to Java and Sumatra and followed by another seven LIBs from the Netherlands. Of the last seven battalions, five in the Dutch East Indies were divided between the first seventeen battalions and the KNIL battalions that had meanwhile been formed to bring them up to sufficient strength. After the first seventeen OVW infantry battalions were repatriated in 1948, these residues (detachments) were reunited and divided into three new battalions, the so-called "stayers". The formation of command battalions for the Dutch East Indies was stopped at the beginning of September 1945. A total of 1,473 men were deployed for these units, 566 of whom had already arrived in Australia before the Japanese surrender. A company for the KNIL has been formed from part of the latter group. The other OVWs deployed for the authorities have been deployed in other groups in the Dutch East Indies. This also applied to those who had not yet been deployed. They partly filled in the gaps in the LIBs that arose when these units were regrouped for deployment in the Indies.

    A special unit that had been sent to the Indies at the same time as the OVW battalions was the Marine Brigade, which was mainly filled with war volunteers, and consisted of three battalions. This brigade belonged administratively to the KM, but was under operational command of the (KNIL) army commander. Like the LIBs, this brigade was initially refused permission from Mountbatten to land in Java and Sumatra and was first sent to Malacca. The contribution of the KM to the armed forces in the Dutch East Indies consisted of more parts than the Marine Brigade. The Naval Aviation Service (MLD) had a squadron of Catalina's available as early as 1945. The navy, which had remained operational in these parts during the Second World War, was also able to deploy a number of ships and submarines. On September 15, 1945, the light cruiser Hr.Ms. Tromp was the first Dutch warship from Australia to Batavia. In the years 1945-1946, a total of 19 naval ships left for the Indies for short or longer periods, including the aircraft carrier Hr.Ms. Karel Doorman (with 860 Squadron attack aircraft) that remained in the archipelago until after the First Police Action. In order to be able to realize all these missions to the Dutch East Indies, the KM (like the KL) depended to a large extent on the recruitment of war volunteers. Ultimately, the KM managed to attract about 10,000 war volunteers from November 1944 to the spring of 1946. This was 30% for the fleet, 10% for the MLD and almost 60% for the Marine Brigade. With the exception of the latter brigade, all naval units in the East were from January 25, 1946 under the command of the Commandant Naval Force in the Dutch East Indies, Vice Admiral A.S. Pinke."
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  10. JimHerriot

    JimHerriot Ready for Anything

    For papiermache, timuk, david bfpo, TijgerB, and all other fine folks that may be interested (and David I hope this doesn't fall foul of heading "off topic", but in my defence I'll rope in papiermache's post above as being my "in" to post this!).

    A book I've had for a few years now (due to the 2nd SAS connection) and it may be of interest given immediate post war (and beyond content). And (guilty as charged!) I have mentioned said book on WW2 Talk before.

    Extracts from; "Gratitude Is My Last Word" by the late Arie Noot (which hopefully, given the Nederlander perspective, will not be too out of place here). Please excuse the quality of the first two images, as the only thing worse here this morning than my eyesight is the light (reverted to the scanner for the further images).

    Arie had, for the most, a wonderful charmed life and I hope his surviving family do not mind me sharing a little of his narrative here.

    Kind regards, always remember, never forget,


    ARIE NOOT cover.jpg

    ARIE NOOT contents.jpg

    ARIE NOOT Page 39.jpg

    ARIE NOOT Page 49.jpg

    ARIE NOOT Photo 1.jpg

    ARIE NOOT Photo 2.jpg
    Last edited: Mar 10, 2021
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  11. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron


    No problem here. It is fascinating after years of occupation, with military defeats at home and in the NEI, the Dutch decided to return to the NEI - even if it meant war. The author indicates not everyone agreed with this, staying at home would be difficult, unlike in the NEI where there was a war.
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  12. JimHerriot

    JimHerriot Ready for Anything

    For completeness, here's the thread I posted in previously:

    Dutch man who went to US for training during WW2

    Links within still work, and if you can spare twenty minutes please view the YouTube video (linked within the above) and listen to the late Arie Noot in person.

    Kind regards, always remember, never forget,

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  13. Ewen Scott

    Ewen Scott Well-Known Member

    A large part of the problems in SEA postwar can be traced back to US politics and their desire to see an end to colonialism. So at the earliest opportunity they were trying to divest themselves of responsibility for assisting Britain, France and the Netherlands regain their colonies. It manifests itself in many ways.

    In the CBI theatre, US interests lay in keeping China in the war and reopening the Burma Road. Once Rangoon was recaptured at the beginning of May it withdrew those air forces supporting the British advance by the end of that month. Transport units, which had formed a significant part of the logistical support of 14th Army, went immediately to support the Hump airlift and combat units began to re-equip before transfer to China starting in Aug 1945. It had no interest in assisting in the recapture of Malaya.

    On the other side of the DEI, by April 1945 US forces had reached the most westerly islands in the Philippines. The next step was into Borneo between May and July. While the US was willing to give air and naval support to these operations, ground troops were largely Australian with some Dutch. After that USAAF units began to move to Okinawa in preparation for the invasion of Japan.

    US support for the Borneo operations seems to have seen it as a forward air and naval base and as a source of oil, once the oil fields an refineries had been repaired, so reducing transport needs for shipping it from the USA. From April 1945 though they wanted to transfer responsibility for much of the SWPA (excluding the Philippines) to Britain & Australia.

    As noted above, on 20 July 1945 at Potsdam, the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued new instructions to Mountbatten about how he was to progress his bit of the war. That included the transfer of Borneo, Java, Celebes and the southern half of Indochina to SEAC and much of the rest of the DEI to Australian control. This was to occur “as soon as practicable after 15 August”. This was a problem for Mountbatten as, until then, he did not expect to have to take it over until after Singapore had been recaptured. That was scheduled for Dec 1945 in his plans. When he arrived in Potsdam on the 24th July he was immediately pressed by the Combined Chiefs as to how soon he could take it over.

    Mountbatten’s problems then got worse when the Australians indicated an unwillingness to take on their designated bit as they wanted to pull troops out to form their share of the Commonwealth Corps planned for Operation Coronet. At the same time, until the Malacca Strait could be reopened after capturing Singapore, Mountbatten couldn’t transfer troops to replace them even if he had any spare, which he didn’t due to the need to send so many British personnel home under the Python Scheme. A compromise of a phased takeover was then agreed about 9th Aug with the proviso that it should occur in the event of a sudden Japanese collapse which was by then looking very likely. But the US and Britain were still in discussions on the 13th Aug as to whether the date of surrender (US) or the date of the ceasefire (Britain) should be the relevant transfer point. As finally agreed the formal transfer took place at midnight on 1/2 Sept 1945.

    Because of US (MacArthur’s?) insistence that nothing could happen until he signed the surrender documents delay ensued. As I previously noted much of that delay was caused by the typhoon weather around Japan at the time. US carrier forces suffered some weather damage and that led to the, probably apocryphal but much reported even at the time, story about the Captain of HMS Indefatigable being asked how his ship was coping and replying “what typhoon”!

    SEAC then had to find the military assets to send to accept surrenders in Malaya/Singapore, Thailand, Indochina, Hong Kong (accepted by the BPF but with troops following from SEAC) and the DEI, all from its Indian sub-continent base. Fortunately as the invasion of Malaya, Operation Zipper, had already been planned for the beginning of Sept, many of the forces required had already been assembled in Indian ports and were in the process of boarding ships. Had that not been the case then further delays might have ensued.

    That gave the various independence movements that window of opportunity to fill a political gap.
  14. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron


    Thanks I was aware of the American stance on colonialism in 1945; it has appeared in another thread I started on an event in the French province of Algeria and one on the British Indian intervention in French Indo-China, albeit mainly around Saigon.

    The competing logistic demands and the desire to send soldiers home had an impact too. The occupation of Japan aside I expect the USA faced similar issues, possibly with greater resources. Not to overlook the USMC Corps that landed in China, to take control from the Japanese and return control of several north-eastern provinces to Nationalist China.
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  15. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron

    Professor Robinson has replied and his book does not contain the chapter on the delayed arrival of Allied troops on Bali. Alas there is no electronic version and the nearest library with a copy is at the University of Leiden, Netherlands. It could be a while before access can be gained to that resource, unless anyone lives nearby.:)
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  16. TijgerB

    TijgerB Member

    I might have missed something sorry but what is the title of Professor Robinsons book :unsure:
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  17. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron

    Post 5 refers to: 'The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali' by Geoffrey Robinson (Pub. 1995).
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  18. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron

    Thanks to a Canadian friend now at Leiden University I have a copy of Ch.5 of Geoffrey Robinson's thesis, which refers to the return of the Dutch with a landing on 2/3/1945. Below are my notes, which have been reinforced with references. I have also added them as an attachment.

    A SOE character appears, Peter Kemp, who was on Bali for three months beforehand (See Footnotes 20-21).

    The Occupation of Bali: August 1945 to March 1946

    Notes taken from Chapter Five of the PhD by Geoffrey Basil Robinson, ‘The Politics of Violence in Modern Bali 1882-1966, submitted in 1992 to Cornell University, USA, using photographs of twenty-eight pages (one was illegible) taken at the University of Leiden, Netherlands. This chapter was not included in his book 'The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali' published in 1995.


    I have started each passage with the photograph number e.g. Ph1, each photo is of two pages. To aid the reader I have added in brackets additional information, usually on dates, locations and those involved. Footnotes have been added, mainly from Wikipedia which provides a short explanation and pointers to other sources. I have not listed all the sources cited by the author.


    Ph1. On 2/3/1946 Dutch military forces (KNIL[1]) landed to restore Dutch political authority on the island of Bali[2], then part of the Dutch East Indies[3] (DEI. Indonesia declared independence on the 17th August 1945).

    There was an uneasy and unequal relationship between the British (UK) and Dutch (NL) in Indonesia (Japan’s formal, official surrender was announced by Emperor Hirohito on the 15th August 1945 and formally signed on the 2nd September 1945[4]) which left the UK more or less in control of the landing agenda (facing a mix of politics, logistics and military factors). It was only (agreed) in August 1945 that the DEI became the responsibility of South-East Asia Command[5] (SEAC) headed by Lord Mountbatten; it had been a US responsibility (via South-West Pacific Area[6], The handover was at midnight 1st-2nd September 1945[7]).

    The four allies UK, NL, USA[8], and Australia had different political-military priorities; inter-governmental UK-NL relations were particularly tense.

    Ph3. The Labour government in the UK (elected 26th July 1945[9]) was not keen on reasserting military control of colonies. Plus, the reliance on the use of Indian troops (twenty-six of thirty infantry battalions; two divisions and a brigade[10]), against opposition in India and the UK. The battle in Surabaya[11] (in East Java; took place between 27th October-20th November 1945) and Magalong (not identified) in October 1945 convinced UK military leaders of the need for presenting a more neutral front.

    There are numerous citations of an Official British History volume: ‘British Military Administration in the Far East 1943-1946’ by F.S.V. Denison[12], pub. By HMSO 1956.

    Ph4. Broad disagreements led to the delay.

    Ph5. Bali was seen as a focus of US attention, so there was a need to tread carefully – no shooting etc. After the landing questions were asked: was the US watching, or was the landing impressive, as there was not even a New York Times report.

    There was a long delay in re-occupation of Bali. A landing was first proposed by KNIL in November 1945, with a small force of 150 soldiers; then in April 1946 and then on 2/3/1946, with two fully equipped infantry battalions, formed from ex-POWs (held in Thailand) who were known to be “trigger happy”[13] when deployed in Java and two marine companies.

    Ph7. On 20/10/1945 there was unauthorised Dutch naval landing at Singaraja, north Bali observed by HMS Taff (a River class frigate[14]) and a British reconnaissance team ashore. The Dutch demanded that the local Japanese forces surrender, this was refused and at one point the Dutch Navy fired 20mm cannon causing civilian casualties. The Dutch ships left, then returned and raised the Dutch flag before leaving. The resulting Dutch reports were more positive than those by the British.

    Ph8. The delay in landing in late 1945 was due to UK concerns over Allied POWs being held in the Indonesian interior (on the larger islands i.e. Java and Sumatra), this reinforced the agreement that political realities should precede any further military initiatives, particularly by KNIL forces.

    Ph9. The KNIL started planning, without UK knowledge, including General Robert Mansergh[15], who commanded the 5th Indian Division[16], who had responsibility for any Bali landing. The KNIL forces were assembled in Bangkok, Thailand which was twelve days sailing from Bali via Singapore (I expect that UK shipping would move them; others note the Dutch Navy had sixteen ships in theatre).

    On 6/1/1946 there was a unilateral UK decision to postpone a Dutch landing; General Mansergh was not convinced a Dutch landing would be unopposed, unlike the assumption made by the KNLI planners. An assault landing was not an option – for many reasons. The KNIL did not accept criticism of their planning.

    Ph10. By the end of January 1946, the UK assessment had changed: a landing would be unopposed, so there was no need to mount an assault landing.

    Ph11. There was a Japanese military command agreement (Bali and other islands to the east were the responsibility of the Japanese Navy; not clear at what level, possibly local on Bali, although there was a Japanese 16th Army HQ involved[17]) to establish two beachheads, Alongside a change in the overall UK command when Lieutenant General Philip Christison[18] left SEAC for the UK; the Royal Navy local commander, Admiral Dempsey[19] was in favour now.

    Ph12. Political policy concern sin the UK were over the potential use of Indian troops and the need to demobilise them as early as March 1946, so a transfer to the KNIL was then seen as a necessity. There was a UK advance party, led by Lt. Col. Kemp[20], already on Bali, possibly since December[21] (KNIL planning papers refer to a small advance party being airlanded or by a RN vessel a week before the main landing[22]).

    UK political policy was changed to: ‘it would not help, by military means, to establish law and order outside the key areas (of the NEI), and that British forces would confine themselves to enforcing the Japanese surrender and to extricate internees (mainly Dutch and 100k[23]) and POW.’

    At SEAC HQ UK officers had to be willing to extricate themselves from this policy to accommodate Dutch objectives; this was essential to the final success of the Bali landing. The KNIL planned to move their forces from Thailand to Surabaya, then onto Sanur[24] and Benoa[25], Bali.

    Ph13. The RN commander (not named, presumably Admiral Dempsey) gave an instruction: ‘if resisted no naval support would be given; the KNIL would have to choose re-embark or stay.’

    Ph14. Only afterwards did the KNIL admit they had had little intelligence on the local situation in Bali.

    Finally, there were conflicts over priorities, a lack of coordination led to repeated delays, these affected the character of the operation and re-occupation once it took place in March 1946.

    [1] See: Royal Netherlands East Indies Army - Wikipedia

    [2] See: Bali - Wikipedia

    [3] See: Dutch East Indies - Wikipedia and Indonesian National Revolution - Wikipedia

    [4] See: Surrender of Japan - Wikipedia

    [5] For background: South East Asia Command - Wikipedia

    [6] See: South West Pacific theatre of World War II - Wikipedia

    [7] From Post 33: 'Top Secret' till 1996: March 1946 Japanese surrender on Bali

    [8] US representatives left SEAC in November 1945, from James Pollman’s thesis: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a242888.pdf

    [9] See: 1945 United Kingdom general election - Wikipedia

    [10] See short note on the formations: South East Asia Command - Wikipedia

    [11] See: Battle of Surabaya - Wikipedia

    [12] This book is still available online via Abe Books and a copy is in The National Archives. There are numerous copies in UK university libraries, including the University of Birmingham.

    [13] Mountbatten’s Political Adviser refers to them as ‘atrophied and dangerously neurotic and trigger happy’ in a cable. See pg. 61 in a 1992 masters dissertation by ‘Soldier as a Policeman: South East Asia 1946-1946’ by James Pollman: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a242888.pdf

    [14] Very short mention: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_River-class_frigates

    [15] See short bio: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Mansergh It indicates he became commander of land forces in the NEI, after General Christison’s departure in January 1946, His private papers are at the IWM: https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1030006548 He took the Japanese surrender on 7/3/1946. See: https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1060034983

    [16] See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5th_Infantry_Division_(India)

    [17] In a 1992 master’s dissertation by James Pollman refers to the South West Navy and also to the confused command relationship between the UK and NL. See: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a242888.pdf A RN veteran who landed a week before the Dutch landing refers to the Japanese 16th Army representative accompanying an advance party. See: https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/98/a4607598.shtml

    [18] See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_Christison It does not mention his departure from SEAC

    [19] Not identified, possibly an Acting rank

    [20] A partial biography – with an odd fictional passage on involvement in the ‘Winter War’ between Finland and the USSR – names him as Peter Kemp, who served in WW2 with SOE and he did write three books, one concerns Bali ‘Alms for Oblivion’, pub. 1961. See: http://www.alternativefinland.com/atholl-highlanders-finland-officers-ncos-men/ Also see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Kemp_(writer) The book is reviewed, with no mention of Bali on: https://thepillarist.com/review-alms-for-oblivion-peter-kemp-1961-mystery-grove-2020/

    [21] A Commando Veterans website refers to: In the New Year of 1946 a peace treaty was signed between Thailand and Britain. New employment was found for Peter as the commander of a small mission to the Dutch East Indian islands of Bali and Lombok. There the Japanese garrisons had not yet surrendered, and Peter’s team was tasked with discovering Japanese intentions. As the General despatching Peter said: “In other words, if they cut your throats we’ll know we’ll have to launch a full-scale invasion.” In the event the Japanese surrendered immediately, and the team spent four months on the islands conducting civil and military government affairs until Dutch troops arrived. From: http://www.commandoveterans.org/PeterKempSSRF by Harry Fecitt. There is a 1990 book about Kemp, see a review which barely mentions Bali: http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/27th-october-1990/34/wherever-the-cold-war-was-hottest-

    [22] From: https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/archief/2.22.21/invnr/179/file/NL-HaNA_2.22.21_179_0003 In English and comments in Post 21: http://ww2talk.com/index.php?thread...-1946-japanese-surrender-on-bali.89165/page-2

    [23] See pg. 64 in a 1992 dissertation by James Pollman: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a242888.pdf

    [24] See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanur,_Bali The location of Dutch and Japanese landing before

    [25] See a very short: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanjung_Benoa

    Attached Files:

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  19. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron

    I have assembled a chronology based on the posts and sources cited. As "cut & paste" removes the format it is on the attachment.
    It appears that the official surrender ceremony on 7/3/1946 could have been preceded by an informal surrender as early as December 1945, when an advance party / recce team, arrived led by Peter Kemp of SOE (who appears to have been given the military rank of Lt. Col. / Colonel in the Royal Hussars).
    I am now happy to have - with your help - found answers as to why the Japanese surrender was taken so late. Next I will add a thread on this character Peter Kemp; first though time to cook dinner.

    Note: this chronology has been superseded by another see Post 45 on 1st August 2021.

    Attached Files:

    Last edited: Aug 1, 2021
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  20. davidbfpo

    davidbfpo Patron Patron

    Yesterday I listened to a 1983 BBC interview of Kemp (for a programme on SOE broadcast in 1984) and he said (not an exact quote): "At the beginning of 1946, the SOE Mission in Siam was closed down. I then got the best job given by the Army - to liberate Bali".
    Link: Set Europe Ablaze

    From Kemp this will exclude an informal surrender in December 1945, as I suggested. He would only have arrived in January 1946.

    I have created a thread on Kemp: Major Peter Kemp, SOE: The man just liked fighting — a true war lover
    Last edited: Apr 13, 2021
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