1/5 Queens Royal West Surrey's Stretcher Bearers note book from Villers Bocage to 26 July

Clive Wiley · Nov 11, 2014

This is from my Dads note book Cpl Robert Wiley that he used to note down the men he picked up from the 13 June 1944 to the 26 July.
I have transcribed it as it is hard to read, i hope that it may help some readers finding out what happened to some one they knew , also if any one can add [SIZE=11pt] any information they may have, including if they have copies of the War Diaries, or information from the official histories. i would be [/SIZE]grateful[SIZE=11pt] .[/SIZE]
[SIZE=11pt]He [/SIZE]didn't[SIZE=11pt] say much about this time but he did say that they were burying men so fast they had to leave some of them with their boots still sticking out from the ground.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=11pt]The note book he used he took from a German Tank just a day or so before.[/SIZE]

Page 1
13 June 1944
6095665 Pte Alexander,“C” coy
G(un) S(hot) W(ound) R(ight) Shoulder

3390019 Pte Herefield“A”Coy
exhaustion

6092220 Pte May “H” coy
Malaria- Clinical

6103252 Pte Hunt ? 1/7 Q(ueen’s) R(oyal) R(egiment)
S.W. R(ight).scapula region FB present

6143639 Pte, Gray1/7 Q(ueen’s) R(oyal) R(egiment)
S.W. R. Scapula Region
? F.B. Present

5888398 PTE Mountord1/7 Q(ueen’s) R(oyal) R(egiment)
Head wound :- ???? with R Hemiplegia

From CWGC:
MOUNTFORD, LEONARD AINSE
Rank:
Private
Service No:
5888398
Date of Death:
28/06/1944
Age:
28
Regiment/Service:
The Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)

1/7th Bn.
Grave Reference:
Sec. L/19.Grave 18.
Cemetery:
NOTTINGHAM NORTHERN CEMETERY
Additional Information:
Husband of M. Mountford, of Old Basford, Nottingham.

From Ancestry:
UK, Army Roll of Honour, 1939-45
Name:
Leonard Mountford
Given Initials:
L A
Rank:
Private
Death Date:
26 Jun 1944
Number:
5868398
Birth Place:
Nottingham
Residence:
Nottingham
Branch at Enlistment:
Infantry
Theatre of War:
Western Europe Campaign, 1944/45
Regiment at Death:
Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)
Branch at Death:
Infantry

England & Wales, Birth Index, 1916-2005
Name:
Leonard A Mountford
Mother's Maiden Surname:
Hufton
Date of Registration:
Jul-Aug-Sep 1916
Registration district:
Nottingham
Inferred County:
Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire
Volume Number:
7b
Page Number:
785

This may or may not be Leonard, but the location matches:
England & Wales, Marriage Index, 1916-2005
Name:
Leonard A Mountford
Spouse Surname:
Brandham
Date of Registration:
Jan-Feb-Mar 1938
Registration district:
Nottingham
Inferred County:
Nottinghamshire
Volume Number:
7b
Page Number:
534

Name:
Millicent Brandham
Spouse Surname:
Mountford
Date of Registration:
Jan-Feb-Mar 1938
Registration district:
Nottingham
Inferred County:
Nottinghamshire
Volume Number:
7b
Page Number:
534

14 June 1944

6089790 Sgt Raeburn “D” coy
S.W. elbow-L & arm- L fracture

6086553 Pte Stapleton
G.S.W. arm L
Page 2
14 June 1944

5441518 L/Sgt Wright “D” coy
S.W. Leg & thigh L

14679203 Pte Seldon
S.W. perf(orated) abdomen & buttock

6093078 Pte Harrington W.
S.W. Thigh L Perf(orated)

1797570 Pte Bleemire J
S.W. thigh R Pen(enetrated)

5678893 Pte Buckton D
G.S.W. Legs

6106252 Pte Haydon A
S.W. Perf L thumb & R forefinger

5121097 Pte Wood
S.W. Scalp and shoulder L

Page 3
24-7-44

5624387 Pte EPPS G
Exhaustion

Pte Bone HQ
S.W. (GW)(Chin)
______________________________________________________
"25 July 1944
14 Cas ADS

6105105 Pte Foster ? B Coy
G.S.W. Forearm R. perf

985300 L/C Ayres B Coy
G.S.W. Foot-R-Perf

Pte Booebek C Coy
Exhaustion
_____________________________
93rd FDS

6460781 Pte Glover F. “HQ” Coy
Gastritis

975579 Gnr Barnes (15L A/A)15 Light Anti-Aircraft
S.W. Calf -L-Perf
From FindMyPast, Royal Artillery Attestations 1883-1942:
First name(s)
Stanley Thomas
Last name
Barnes
Age
-
Birth year
-
Birth place
-
Service number
975579
Former service number
-
Attestation year
1939
Image at http://search.findmypast.com.au/record?id=gbm%2froyalart%2f975000%2f00061&parentid=gbm%2froyalart%2f847072 shows he went to 91st AA on 16 May 1940. It also looks like on 19 April 1946 he was transferred to Z/T class (could be 2/T)

14442246 Pte. Murray S. J(?)
S.W. Thigh L – Pen

6390435 Pte.Skinner ?
Exhaustion

Pte.Barton D Coy

Page 4
5538646 Pte.Wisbey D Coy
N.Y.D. Diarrhoea

7887914 Sgt. Elvy A [1st
S.W. Ankle L Pen(etrating)

4673670 Pte Smith L C Coy

Pte. Luff H Coy
Exhaustion

14552931 Pte.Russer C Coy
S.W. Pen(etrating) L Arm

6095651 Pte. Haywood D Coy
S.W. Ankle L Pen(etrating)

6402950 Sgt Bowdery D. “B” Coy
S.W. Nose Pen(etrating) Minor

M106167 Pte.Keityel (S. SASK)
S.W. Back L Pen(etrating)

Pte. Simms “A” Coy
Both Legs blown off.
Died at Canvilier A.D.S.
From CWGC: http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead/casualty/2340213/SIMMS,%20ERIC
SIMMS, ERIC
Rank:
Private
Service No:
4921037
Date of Death:
25/07/1944
Age:
22
Regiment/Service:
The Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)

1/5th Bn.
Grave Reference:
III. D. 10.
Cemetery:
LA DELIVRANDE WAR CEMETERY, DOUVRES
Additional Information:
Son of George Frederick and Lily Simms, of Heanor, Nottinghamshire.
From Ancestry: UK, Army Roll of Honour, 1939-1945
Name:
Eric Simms
Given Initials:
E
Rank:
Private
Death Date:
25 Jul 1944
Number:
4921037
Birth Place:
Nottinghamshire
Residence:
Nottinghamshire
Branch at Enlistment:
Infantry
Theatre of War:
Western Europe Campaign, 1944/45
Regiment at Death:
Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)
Branch at Death:
Infantry

Page 5

13808227 Pte.Mence A Coy
Blast Eyes

18 July 44
6090582 Pte. Turner H Coy
Exhaustion

19 July 1944
14548824 Pte.Estabrook F H Coy
F.B. R Eye Multiple Phosphorus?

6105973 Pte. Parsons C Coy
W Thigh R – Perf
Neck Pen

Page 6
6101834 Pte Derrick
Pef S.W. R Foot

6098163 PteMuckrell B Coy
Com frac (compound fracture) femur L
has W(oun)d R Hand

6095671 Pte Archer B Coy
GSW Throat Large
Haematoma R ?

1471685 GNR Pipe E
65 A/T 260 Bty
GSW Shoulder R – Scap(ula)

From FindMyPast: Royal Artillery attestations 1883-1942
First name(s)
Albert Edwin
Last name
Pipe
Age
-
Birth year
-
Birth place
-
Service number
1471685
Former service number
-
Attestation year
1938

Discharged in 1954 due to the age limit.
England & Wales, FreeBMD Birth Index:
Name:
Albert E Pipe
Mother's Maiden Name:
Croucher
Registration Year:
1915
Registration Quarter:
Jul-Aug-Sep
Registration district:
Fulham

England & Wales, Death Index 1916-2007
Name:
Albert Edwin Pipe
Birth Date:
22 May 1915
Date of Registration:
Feb 1985
Age at Death:
69
Registration district:
Camden
Inferred County:
London
Volume:
14
Page:
2517

1115425 Gnr Byrne
65 A/t
S.W. Thigh – Pen –L

FindMyPast:Royal Artillery attestations 1883-1942
First name(s)
Robert
Last name
Byrne
Age
-
Birth year
-
Birth place
-
Service number
1115425
Former service number
-
Attestation year
1940
Shown as an Eire Recruit, discharged 13.11.46 transferred to Z Class

6090535 Pte Wallace B C
Pen S.W. Back & Spinal

6106612 Pte England B Coy
S.W. Arm L Shoul(der) L neck

Page 7

Tpr. Fenning (1 R.T.R)

Tpr Dibley (1 R.T.R.)

3910875 L/C Lewis (3rd MONS R.)

6095731 Pte. Dorman (A/T)

Capt Wells (RAME 1. R.T.R.)

Dairy A/T
S.W. Back Small

RFN (Rifleman) Miles 2Bn R.B. (Rifle Brigade)
S.W. Leg R

26th July
11425108 L/Bdr Henry
65 A/T R.A. S.W. Knee L Perf(orating)

6089216 Sgt Smallbones H.Q.
?Crush of chest

26th
6101874 Pte Godsmith H.Q.

Many thanks to Mark for all your help with this

nickgrace1 · Nov 11, 2014

I will try to send you the relevant war diary sections if I get a chance tomorrow. I should be able to get you the June/July 44 parts from the National Archive diary but I still need to read through the other bits for you.

Tom OBrien · Nov 12, 2014

Clive,

Thanks for posting these details, I have just transcribed the relevant war diary and will try to post here tomorrow. It is interesting that he seemed to deal with casualties from such a range of units rather than just those from 1/5 Queens. Even though it is just a simple list, I found it moving in its simplicity.

Thanks,

Tom

Clive Wiley · Nov 12, 2014

Hello Tom, Thanks i look forward to seeing what you have ,
Yes i too was surprised at just how many regiments he was involved in , one of the reasons i wanted to transcribe it for. and just another small part that every man had during these days, and why so may never spoke about it. They make the bigger picture and bring the reality of it all .

BFBSM · Nov 13, 2014

The 1st/5th Queens Royal Regiment were members of the 7TH Armoured Division, an order of Battle for said Division for June 1944 is shown below:

7TH ARMOURED DIVISION
ORDER OF BATTLE
JUNE 1944

22nd Armoured Brigade
1st Royal Tank Regiment
5th RTR
4th CLY
5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards

131st (Queens) Brigade
1st/5th Queens Royal Regiment
1st/6th Queens Royal Regiment
1st/7th Queens Royal Regiment
No. 3 Support Company, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers

Divisional Troops
8th Hussars
11th Hussars
Divisional Signals

Royal Artillery

3rd RHA
5th RHA
15th Light AA Regiment RA
65th Anti-Tank Regiment RA

Royal Engineers
4th Field Squadron
621st Field Squadron
143rd Field Park Squadron

RASC
No. 58 Company
No. 67 Company
No. 507 Company
No. 133 Company

RAMC
2nd Light Field Ambulance
131St Field Ambulance
29th Field Dressing Station
70th Field Hygiene Section
134th Mobile Dental Unit

RAOC
Divisional Ordance Field Park
22nd Armoured Brigade Ordnance Field Park
131st Brigade Ordnance Field Park

REME
7th Armoured Troops Workshop
22nd Armoured Brigade Workshop
131st Brigade Workshop
15th Light AA Workshop

Royal Armoured Corps
No. 263 Forward Delivery Squadron

(Source: From “The Desert Rats – 7th Armoured Division 1940 – 1945” Robin Neilands, George Weidenfield & Nicolson Ltd, 1991)

BFBSM · Nov 13, 2014

From ‘A Short History 7th Armoured Division June 1943-July 1945’

8th Hussars, who up till now had been watching the right flank of the Division, were to lead, followed by the 4th County of London Yeomanry, with "A" Company of the 1st Rifle Brigade. The remainder Of 22nd Armoured Brigade was made up as follows: a troop of the 4th Field Squadron, Royal Engineers, 5th Royal Horse Artillery, less a Battery, 1/7th Queen s Royal Regiment, 5th Royal Tanks, two Companies of the Rifle Brigade, and a battery of self-propelled antitank guns. Their objective was Villers Bocage and the high ground to the North-East on either side of the main Caen road. 131 Brigade, with the 1st Royal Tanks, were to step up behind the armour as required, and to be ready to do this by the morning of the 13th, by which time their remaining battalion, the 1/6th Queen's Royal Regiment, was due to arrive.

The route chosen was along steep and narrow country roads through typical Bocage country, through the villages of Trungy, St. Paul du Vernay, Ste Honorine de Duchy, La Mirerie, Livry and Briquessard, avoiding the two main roads running South from Bayeux to Villers Bocage, upon which, it was felt, enemy would certainly be met. By two o'clock in the afternoon 8th Hussars had got off to a good start, and it was evident that, in spite of the noise and the dust of the tanks, the enemy had been surprised. Livry, twelve miles on from Jerusalem, was the first village to be found held, with an anti-tank gun and some infantry, and it was not until eight o'clock, after "A" Company of the Rifle Brigade had put in a dismounted attack, that the village was captured. It was therefore decided not to push on farther and the column closed up and leaguered for the night. Meanwhile, contact had been made with 1st United States Infantry Division towards Caumont, and a Squadron of the 8th Hussars, protecting the left flank of the Division, had met enemy on the main road from Caumont to Caen.

At half-past five the next morning the advance continued through Briquessard and Amaye-sur-Seulles. Villers Bocage was entered without incident, although the 11th Hussars and the 8th Hussars had both contacted enemy on either side of the centre-line. "A" Squadron of the 4th County of London Yeomanry, and "A" Company of the 1st Rifle Brigade then pushed on according to plan towards the high ground to the North-East of the town. In order to clear the traffic on the roads behind, the column had to move out comparatively closed up, and it was this that gave a Mark VI tank, which suddenly appeared from a side road, its opportunity. Its first shot destroyed one of the Rifle Brigade half-tracks, thus blocking the road, and then at its own convenience, it destroyed the remainder of the half-tracks, some Honey tanks of the Reconnaissance Troop, four tanks of the Regimental Headquarters and the two OP tanks accompanying the squadron. Escape for the tanks, carriers and half-tracks was impossible, the road was embanked, obscured by flames and smoke from the burning vehicles whose crews could only seek what shelter they could from the machine gun fire, and our own tanks were powerless against the armour of the Tiger, with limitless cover at its disposal. Meanwhile "A" Squadron in the lead, with the Commanding Officer, were cut off. Their last wireless message, received at half past ten, reported that they were completely surrounded by tanks and infantry, that the position was untenable, and withdrawal impossible. Relief was equally impossible, as, in addition to the burning tanks and vehicles, the road was blocked by the same Mark VI which commanded all approaches.

What had happened was simple enough, namely, that the anticipated counter-attack by 2 Panzer Division, much delayed by our own and the United States Air Forces, was at last on its way. Both sides were using Villers Bocage as the most important road-centre South of Bayeux, and the Division, advancing from the North, had met the German armour coming up in the opposite direction. As a result, there followed the brilliant defensive battle of Villers Bocage which, although it obliged us to withdraw some seven miles, cost the enemy casualties quite disproportionate to this gain.

Meanwhile, with the forces available, a hasty defence of Villers Bocage was organised. "B" Squadron of the 4th County of London Yeomanry moved up to block the entrances to the village, and almost immediately found themselves engaged in a tank battle with Mark VIs and IVs. At the same time the 1/7th Queens had been ordered up from the high ground to the East. The anti-tank guns were hastily got into position, and as the leading company made contact with the reserve Squadron, "C", of the 4th County of London Yeomanry, a Tiger tank suddenly appeared from a side road and proceeded to blow down a corner house in the main square where the troops were assembled. The infantry dispersed into the houses with Piats, while the tanks and the' six-pounders of the infantry disposed themselves to block all the entrances to the main street. But superior fire-power told, and more tanks succeeded in getting through, only to be completely bottled up by particularly fine work on the part of a tank-hunting party of the Queens, the six-pounders and a troop of "B" Squadron. The fighting was at point-blank range, and at one time a Mark VI was being engaged through a shop-front by a Cromwell in a side-street. A Company of the Queens then attempted to work through to the railway station on the South-Western outskirts of the town, only to be met by more tanks, of which four Mark VIs were claimed as destroyed by their anti-tank guns. By four o'clock in the afternoon the village was still ours and the enemy had lost six Mark VIs and three Mark IVs. The tank attack having been smashed, a more serious threat, that of infantry infiltration, supported by heavy shell-fire, had developed, and this was a threat with which the slender forces available, the remains of two squadrons of tanks and the scattered men of a single infantry battalion, were unable to deal. Moreover, the enemy infantry were also pushing on towards the Eastern outskirts of the town. By this time the remainder of the Brigade, reinforced by the 1/5th Queens, had taken up a battle position on the high ground to the East of Tracy Bocage, with 131 Brigade, reduced to the 1/6th Queens and the 1st Royal Tanks, protecting the long open left flank to the East of Caumont. It was impossible to hold Villers Bocage with its present garrison, and to have reinforced the position with further infantry would have risked the entire force being cut off, as 50th Division had not succeeded in advancing beyond their positions of the previous morning.

Accordingly, the decision was taken to withdraw the garrison into the area already held by the rest of the Armoured Brigade. Covered by fire from the 5th Royal Horse Artillery, the infantry withdrew first, followed by the tanks, whose final withdrawal was screened by smoke from the gunners.

The plan was to hold on East of Amaye-sur-Seulles until the advance of 50th Division on our left relieved us, and the bulk of the Division formed a tight "box", some two thousand yards from East to West, and one thousand five hundred yards from North to South. To the East the 1/7th Queens occupied the line of a sunken track running across a knoll of rolling corn-land, with a narrow valley behind; to the North of the valley were the 1st Rifle Brigade on a wooded feature astride the main road to Villers Bocage, with a company closing the gap between 1/7th and 1/5th Queens; and to the West the 1/5th Queens with the 4th County of London Yeomanry held a reverse slope, amid orchards and farm-buildings. During the day the 5th Royal Tanks occupied battle positions towards Villers Bocage and on the flanks of the infantry, withdrawing at night behind them. In reserve were two Squadrons of the 8th Hussars. The guns of the 5th Royal Horse Artillery were in position roughly in the centre, while from outside magnificent support was given by the 3rd Royal Horse Artillery, 5th Army Group Royal Artillery, consisting of medium and heavy guns, and the 186th United States Field Artillery Battalion, whose co-operation during this difficult period will always be remembered. For the most part the "box", owing to its narrow perimeter, was overlooked from all sides, and crammed with vehicles, while the woods and broken ground of the surrounding country gave ample scope for enemy infantry and tanks to approach and form up unseen.

The evening and night of the 13th passed anxiously but without undue incident, the enemy contenting himself with active patrolling against the Southern flanks of the position, sniping, and a little shelling. On the morning of the 14th, the 5th Royal Tanks once more moved out, and the remainder of the Brigade set about improving their positions and patrolling. Enemy were found on both flanks and across the road leading back to Briquessard. As the day progressed the shelling increased; one or two vehicles inside the box were "brewed up"; and enemy activity in the woods and orchards became considerably more noticeable, giving good targets for the artillery. By eleven o'clock this patrolling materialised into an attack, delivered on the left-hand company of the 1/7th Queens. Once more great execution was done by mortars and artillery, but the enemy succeeded in penetrating the area of one platoon, being driven off in a spirited counter-attack with Sten guns and grenades by the rest of the Company, which successfully discouraged further attempts on this flank Thereafter he contented himself with accurate and heavy mortar fire on the exposed positions of the 1/7th Queens.

Meanwhile, 131 Brigade, on the morning of the 14th, set off to clear the road from Livry to the "island" as it came to be known. Briquessard was occupied successfully, and near Amaye the tanks of the 1st Royal Tanks made contact with, a patrol of the 11th Hussars coming up in the opposite direction. A Squadron of the 8th Hussars had by now worked down 'to a commanding feature two thousand yards South of the road to Villers Bocage, and Amaye and the area round it were occupied by a Squadron of the 1st Royal Tanks and a company of the 1/6th Queens. The enemy were still both North and South of them, shelling and making constant attempts to probe their defences with infantry through the thick set hedges and orchards bordering the stream running through Amaye, and further West up the river valley from Cahagnes. But, having been repulsed in his attempt to break through the "island" from the direction of Villers Bocage, he now turned his attention to cutting the road behind it, and at four o'clock the tanks and infantry guarding the Southern approaches to Amaye saw infantry approaching to within a few hundred yards of their position through the orchards. These were immediately engaged by Besas when the commander of the left-hand tank spotted the muzzle brake of a tank moving along a hedge behind the infantry. It was fired upon but continued across the line of fire of the remaining tanks of the troop. Three hits forced the turret crew to bale out, and the tank was finally destroyed as the driver attempted to move it back to cover. Meanwhile a second tank appeared making for the high ground around Point 198, from which the 8th Hussars had by now been withdrawn. After attempting to find cover behind a bush, it was stopped as it tried to withdraw. The accompanying infantry still persisted, however, and were finally halted by the Besa fire of the tanks.

By now it was clear that nothing was to be gained by remaining in our precarious position with enemy both North and South, and little hope of a speedy advance by 50th Division, who were having a difficult time with Panzer Lehr. At four o'clock in the afternoon the Divisional Commander ordered a withdrawal to the Briquessard area, where we would be in contact with the Americans on our right and would be able to cover, at least by patrolling, the lightly-held enemy salient between our left and the right hand troops of 50th Division. 131 Brigade were to hold the road open while 22nd Armoured Brigade withdrew through them, dropping off the two infantry Battalions on their arrival to take up defensive positions in Briquessard and the wooded ridge running to the North. The 5th Royal Tanks, with a company of the 1/7th Queens carried on the tanks, were to form the rearguard, and the withdrawal was planned to start immediately after last light, at half-past eleven.

However, before the withdrawal could be achieved, the enemy made one last attempt to eliminate the "island" position entirely, this time from the South. At about half-past six a considerable increase in enemy patrol activity became noticeable, and tanks, mostly Mark VIs, were seen to be forming up. Half an hour later came the attack itself, by two battalions of Panzer Grenadiers supported by tanks. This attack was destroyed mainly by the artillery and mortars, and the few troops that did succeed in penetrating the forward positions of the 1/5th Queens were quickly destroyed by small arms fire and by the guns of two troops of the 4th County of London Yeomanry who came, up to help. Owing to the country, it was a close range battle, and for a time "G" Battery, 5th Royal Horse Artillery, were engaging enemy infantry with air-burst and Bren guns at four hundred yards range. This attack cost the enemy some seven to eight hundred casualties, and, owing to the vigorous anti-tank defence of the close perimeter, eight Mark IV tanks were destroyed as they attempted to penetrate the position. By eight o'clock the enemy had recognised defeat, and at half-past midnight our own tired columns, without lights and in clouds of dust, set out. The noise of the tanks was for the most part drowned by artillery fire and the noise of a heavy bomber attack, and the 1st Royal Tanks, standing to all night inside their tanks waiting for 22nd Armoured Brigade to go through, were undisturbed by the enemy. He, did indeed shell the centre line, causing casualties and destroying some vehicles, but as the first light of dawn appeared the 1st Royal Tanks drove out unmolested.

The battle of the "island" was a defensive victory of great importance. As we learnt later, 2 Panzer Division's intention was to drive a wedge between the British and American armies through Balleroy and the Forêt de Cérisy beyond. In fact, to their great surprise they met the Division at Villers Bocage, and were forced to fight an offensive battle in close country which undoubtedly favoured anti-tank defence, particularly the six-pounder anti-tank gun with Sabot ammunition which, in view of the short ranges imposed by the country, was probably the most effective anti-tank weapon we possessed. In order to support the Panzer Grenadiers, their tanks were forced to close with our anti-tank guns, but even so were unable to prevent the annihilation of the infantry by our concentrated artillery fire. The result was that, temporarily, 2 Panzer Division, at a crucial stage in the landings, when the build-up was much delayed by the weather, was severely crippled for a time as an effective offensive force. Our own losses had not been light, but bore no comparison with the enemy's. Of the prisoners taken quite a few managed to escape back to our own lines, including one Sergeant of the 8th Hussars, who succeeded in strangling one of his guards and brought the other one back with him in an amphibious Volkswagen. For the next three weeks the Division settled down to the uneasy stalemate of Bocage fighting, with its patrolling, sniping, shelling and mortaring, and our infantry, weary though they were, never lost the ascendancy gained at Villers Bocage.
Click to expand...

BFBSM · Nov 13, 2014

From “The Desert Rats: The History of the 7th Armoured Division” Major-General G.L. Verney. Hutchinson, London. 1954

June 7th to 12th

The 5th Royal Tanks were the first Regiment to go into action. There was a fast tide racing in as they disembarked from their craft and they lost two tanks, but they hurried on to their assembly area stripping off the waterproofing material as they went. The next day "A" Squadron were sent to assist the 56th Brigade and they had their first experience of serious sniping and close-quarter attack by infantry — Lieutenant Garnett's tank was actually "boarded" and he and his operator had to drive the enemy off with their revolvers. "B" Squadron were engaged in supporting the Commandos. During the day the Regiment took six guns for the loss of two tanks and half a dozen casualties which included Captain Noble of the 5th R.H.A.

The 1st Royal Tanks supported the 69th Brigade, also on the 8th. The Rifle Brigade were much handicapped owing to the ship in which the crews of their Carriers were travelling being diverted to Cowes Roads where it spent five days. The absence of these platoons was a serious disadvantage to the Motor Companies.

On the 10th such of the 7th Armoured Division as were ashore were ordered to advance through the 50th Division on Tilly. At that time there were only the three Armoured Regiments, the 5th R.H.A., part of the 8th Hussars and two companies of the Motor Battalion; there was a general shortage of transport. The 56th Brigade came under command. During the next three days some progress was made, but the enemy were determined to fight strongly for this village and had enough tanks and infantry to do so. The 7th Armoured early felt the need for more infantry than were available.

The 4th County of London Yeomanry led off at 5.45a.m. on the 10th and they were soon involved in fighting. In the hamlet of Jerusalem they knocked out a German tank but they were unable to disperse small parties of infantry who kept up a continuous sniping until the place was swept by the South Wales Borderers who took a strange collection of prisoners, two Japs, one Turk, one Russian and some Germans. By dusk the C.L.Y. had cleared Bucéels, but the enemy came back there with infantry during the night.

The 5th Royal Tanks had come up on the right of the C.L.Y. and they, too, were soon in contact with the enemy at a number of road blocks. In the close country fast movement was impossible, but eventually outflanking manoeuvres by the squadrons in turn got them as far as some more open country and Major Macdonald's "A" Squadron made fair progress to Verrières. When they leaguered for the night they were joined by the 2nd Essex, while the 2nd Gloucesters held Jerusalem. The two companies of the Rifle Brigade were deployed with these two leading Armoured Regiments, but there were far too few infantry for the tasks in hand. The 5th Tanks had lost five tanks and an officer and fifteen men killed during the day.

On the 11th the Essex and Gloucesters carried out successful attacks and they were supported by the Armoured Regiments until the advance was stopped by a line of thick woods. On the 12th the Queens Brigade appeared, supported by the 1st Royal Tanks, and they made a limited advance in very thick country. There was no opportunity anywhere for a break-through by tanks.

THE BATTLE OF VILLERS BOCAGE
June 13th to 15th

On account of the opposition at Tilly the Corps Commander decided to move the 7th Armoured Division round the right flank, for the American 1st Division had reported only slight opposition in their advance on Caumont. About noon on the 12th General Erskine received his orders and was directed to advance on Villers Bocage. The route was by St Paul du Vernay, Livry and Briquessard. The 22nd Brigade were to lead, without the 1st Tanks but with the 7th Queens, and they also had the 5th R.H.A. and the 8th Hussars (less one squadron) for reconnaissance to their front and flanks. The rest of the Queens Brigade with the 1st Tanks were to follow as soon as they could disengage.

The move began at 4 p.m. and all went well as far as Livry where the advance guard bumped into an enemy force. The tank of the leading Troop leader of the 8th Hussars was knocked out, and the motor company of the Rifle Brigade that was moving with the C.L.Y. had to be called up to clear the village. There was no alternative route except through the American area and that was not possible, so there was some delay while this operation was taking place. By the time the village was cleared it was 8o'clock so orders were given for the column to leaguer; it was not till nearly midnight that the tail reached the leaguer area. The Queens Brigade were not able to disengage and get on the move until after dark, but they then moved throughout the night and when daylight came the head of their column was just past St Paul du Vernay.

By dusk the Americans were on the outskirts of Caumont and they occupied the town early next morning.

The orders for the 13th were for the 22nd Brigade to continue the advance and for the Queens Brigade group to occupy an area round Livry; one squadron of the 8th Hussars which was already out on the left flank was put under their command. At 5.30a.m. the Armoured Brigade group began to advance. The intention was that the C.L.Y. should occupy the high ground a mile or so northeast of Villers Bocage, the 7th Queens should hold the town and the 5th Tanks the high ground a mile to the south. A battery of the Norfolk Yeomanry, the Divisional Anti-tank Regiment, was to cover the area between the two Armoured Regiments.

Up to 9 o'clock there had been no contact with the enemy except by patrols of the 8th and 11th Hussars who had met nothing more than small parties, and as "A" Squadron of the C.L.Y. with "A" Company of the 1st Rifle Brigade drove into the little town they were greeted by a cheering populace. They had been moving fast along the good Caumont road and they galloped through and on to the high ground beyond, followed closely by the Riflemen. When the tanks turned off the road the latter halted and their officers went forward as usual to receive their orders from the tank squadron leader. The Commanding Officer of the 4th C.L.Y., Viscount Cranley, also went up to the front in his scout car. Suddenly several Tigers appeared just to the south of the Caen road and immediately opened fire. In a matter of moments the Company's vehicles and the two nearest tanks were blazing. Sergeant Bray of the Rifle Brigade got one 6-pounder gun into action and claimed three German vehicles before a direct hit destroyed his gun. Thus, in a few minutes, the leading Squadron and Company of the Brigade were cut off, the Riflemen dismounted and separated from their officers, and a very nasty situation looked like developing.

Then all hell seemed to break out in the east side of the little town — German spandaus opened fire from the upper windows of the houses, the streets became filled with smoke and there was the crash of breaking glass and falling slates. A Tiger that appeared through the smoke was impervious to the 75-mm. shot that Major Carr, the second-in-command of the C.L.Y., pumped into it, and a few seconds later he himself was badly wounded and most of his crew killed when his tank was set afire. This Tiger went on to destroy various Regimental Headquarter vehicles and two of the three remaining Headquarter tanks—the fourth one, under Captain Dyas, followed it in the hope of getting in a shot from behind, but unfortunately the Tiger rounded on him and destroyed his tank too. Captain Dyas himself baled out and, finding that the wireless of the Regimental Sergeant-Major's blazing tank was still working, managed to get onto Major I. B. Aird and told him what had been happening. Major Aird took command of what was left of the Regiment and disposed the squadrons in defensive positions in co-operation with the 7th Queens who arrived as the battle began.

Colonel Gordon's leading company of the 7th Queens, as they reached the town, encountered a German staff car and two motorcycle combinations which appeared suddenly from a side road. These they dispersed, but the crews ran into the fields and began sniping from the hedges. Then a Tiger came down the main street and blew down a house at the corner of the main square when some of the C.L.Y. tanks and the infantry companies were gathered. The infantry took to the houses and worked their way through them, stalking another half-dozen tanks that appeared suddenly from the south. Particularly good work was done by Major French and his men of "C" Company, and by Captain Beard and some of the Carrier Platoon. In the course of the next two hours they destroyed several tanks and damaged others. For a time the German advance was halted.

Meanwhile the Squadron and Company to the north-east remained firmly cut off, and early in the afternoon a fierce German attack was launched on them. Tigers attacked from behind, destroying the few remaining Cromwells, and large numbers of infantry attacked from the east. The wireless suddenly ceased and it was realized that the position was over-run.

Heartened by their success, the enemy again turned his attention to the town, infantry coming in from the east and tanks from the west and south. Confused fighting went on until nearly dark. Lieutenant Cotton and Sergeant Brammall of the C.L.Y. conducted some successful actions against the tanks, being greatly assisted by the anti-tank guns of the 7th Queens. Between them they claimed a bag of six Tigers. They also had to face an unexpected enemy in the shape of the Pompiers, the local fire brigade, who did their best to put out the flames of the burning enemy tanks.

Identification from prisoners showed that two Panzer Divisions were involved, the Panzer Lehr who had been expected, and the 2nd Panzer who had not. Early in the afternoon it appeared that there was no hope of holding on to Villers Bocage and the ground east and south of it as well as the lengthy lines of communication (the Division was a very long way from support by any other British troops), so it was decided to hold the town until dark and then to pull out to the area of Amaye, a couple of miles to the west. Here the Brigade could be concentrated and reasonably strong with two Armoured Regiments, the 5th R.H.A., the 7th Queens and the 5th Queens who had been sent up during the day. Even so, the centre line was a very insecure one, for it ran for the three miles back to Briquessard parallel to the front and it was also extremely narrow in parts. Fortunately the enemy made only slight efforts to cut it during the 13th, and these were held off.

Very considerable artillery support was available to the forward troops. In addition to the 5th R.H.A. Colonel G. P. Gregson, their Commanding Officer, could call on the 3rd R.H.A., an A.G.R.A. (Army Group Royal Artillery) which included the 53rd Heavy Regiment and the 7th and 64th Medium Regiments, and the artillery of the 1st United States Division. With the latter, Brigadier R. Mews, the C.R.A., had established very close liaison, sending a team to them from the Division and receiving one of their teams. "During the next thirty-six hours many calls were made on all artillery and were answered promptly and accurately." A warm tribute was paid by the troops to the artillery support they received, and in particular to the American artillery whose extra weight and magnificent accuracy was of the greatest assistance during a critical period.

The 5th Royal Tanks, with whom were "I" Company of the Rifle Brigade under Major W. J. Apsey, had taken up a position during the morning near Tracy Bocage where the 5th R.H.A. were also in position. About 5.30p.m. the 5th Queens began to arrive in the forward area and this coincided with a determined attack by the Germans. "CC" Battery were closely involved and at one time were firing at a range of no more than 600 yards. Soon after this the retirement from Villers Bocage began and it was carried through without difficulty, the 5th Queens holding the west half of the perimeter in the new position and the 7th Queens the east. "CC" Battery themselves had to pull back and did so under cov of their own smoke-screen.

Back at Livry, Colonel Carver was in charge of the operation was Brigadier M. S. Ekins, who commanded the Queens Brigade, was temporarily cut off with the forward troops. A firm base was formed in the area between Livry and Torteval with Colonel Carver 1st Tanks, the 6th Queens, two batteries of the Norfolk Yeomanry, a squadron of the 8th Hussars, the 3rd R.H.A. and most of the Northumberland Fusiliers Support Company. Like the C.R.A. Colonel Carver was quick to establish close contact with the Americans on the right. During the day "B" Squadron of the 8th Hussar had worked their way as far as Cahagnes where they were attacked by infantry and Tigers and lost three tanks. The 11th Hussars now commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. Wainman, had only two squadrons ashore, "C" under Major W. V. Burdon and "D under Major J. A. N. Crankshaw. They were operating under Corps but in close contact with the Division. Their tasks had been to cover the flanks of the 22nd Brigade and they had sent in much useful information.

The evening and night passed with only slight shelling an( little activity by enemy patrols. The losses of the 22nd Brigade had been heavy. In the C.L.Y. the whole of Regimental Headquarters and "A" Squadron were gone — Lord Cranley missing, Major Carr wounded, Major Scott the Squadron Leader killed, the Adjutant and eight other officers missing, three officers and many Other Ranks wounded, seventy-six N.C.O.s and men missing, Twenty-seven tanks had been lost and numerous other vehicles, The Rifle Brigade had lost the whole of their "A" Company and Major J. P. Wright, its commander, three officers had been killed and eighty men were casualties. Captain C. F. Milner and a few men had got back.

June 14th

When daylight came the 5th Tanks moved out again to their previous day's positions on the Tracy Bocage ridge while the rest of Brigadier Hinde's force held the Box just east of Amaye. The infantry patrolled outwards and found the enemy in Tracy Bocage itself and two other small villages, but Amaye was clear and was taken over.

It did not seem advisable to try to hold the Tracy Bocage feature unless there was some prospect of the 50th Division being able to come forward; this they were trying to do, but they were up against stiff opposition from the Panzer Lehr Division. The Corps Commander accordingly directed that the 7th Armoured were to adjust their dispositions so as to keep their right flank in the closest possible touch with the Americans, and this necessitated pulling back Brigadier Hinde's force — it was decided to do this during the coming night. It was a sad disappointment that the brilliant thrust conceived by General Bucknall which had carried the Division to Villers Bocage, far behind the enemy's lines to a deeper penetration than was to be made for many weeks to come, could not be supported. It was a remarkable gain at a time when expansion of the beach-head was badly needed, but there just were not the additional infantry available to give the Division the backing required in close country of this type — nor was there that element of good fortune which might have made just the difference.

During the morning of the 14th a good deal of shelling was directed on to the 22nd Brigade's areas and many vehicles were brewed up. Hull-down positions for the tanks were hard to find, for the woods and orchards were thick and the slope of the ground unfavourable; further, the enemy were able to overlook much of the position from north, south and west of Villers Bocage. In the afternoon enemy patrolling became more active and about 2p.m. an attack was put in against the 7th Queens by infantry supported by tanks. The left-hand platoon of the forward company, "C", was over-run, but a counter attack by the rest of the Company put this right. The mortars and the 5th R.H.A. put down heavy concentrations of fire and the enemy were driven back. "'C' Company fought a fine action this day despite their weariness." There was plenty of artillery and a large reserve of armour, but the anxiety was the shortage of infantry for counter-attacks. Another worry was the cutting of the centre-line, but this was finally secured by the 1st Tanks and a company of the 6th Queens.

The most difficult part of the withdrawal plan was the question of the composition of the rearguard. It was finally decided to make it up of tanks carrying one company of the Rifle Brigade and one company of the 7th Queens with a detachment of the 5th Queens, the infantry being carried on the tanks of the 5th Royal Tanks and the 8th Hussars. Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Holliman, of the former Regiment, was to command the rearguard, and the rear party was to be composed of "B" Squadron of the 8th Hussars who had been in position about Amaye, with the men of the 5th Queens who had been with them for local protection. This Squadron had been engaged during the day and had lost their Squadron Leader, Major N. G. F. Dunne, wounded, and an officer and some men killed — they had knocked out two Tigers.

About 7 p.m. the Germans put in a fierce attack from the south on the rear portion of the Box with two battalions supported by about thirty tanks. The country was so thick that it was possible to see only to the next hedge. Colonel Gregson brought down his full artillery resources with devastating effect, both on to the attacking troops and on to their probable forming-up places. The attack was completely shattered and the perimeter was ringed with burning German tanks "brewing up merrily" — the anti-tank gunners claimed eight. It was thought that the enemy losses amounted to a thousand infantry and a dozen tanks—there was no doubt that they had been struck a heavy blow, for there was no more trouble from them for the rest of the night. By 9 p.m. all was quiet.

The Brigade had about six miles to go and the move began, as planned, half an hour after midnight. Arrangements had been made for the R.A.F. to carry out a heavy raid on Villers Bocage, both to distract the enemy's attention and to cover the noise of the move. This was done and was of great assistance; "we felt very naked when the air attack ended," said one who was there. "C" and "D" Companies of the 7th Queens remained in their positions until 2a.m. and then pulled out on the tanks of the 5th Royal Tanks. This Battalion had had a gruelling two days and had distinguished themselves, and it was appropriate that they' should be the last to leave the main positions. They had lost eight officers and 120 rank and file in the past thirty-six hours.

Finally, the rear party of the 8th Hussars and 5th Queens formed up, mounted and moved slowly back in pitch dark and clouds of dust to the steady clanking of the tracks and the dull roar of the Rolls-Royce engines. It seemed too much to hope that the Germans would let them go unmolested, but the enemy had been hit too hard — he had had enough.

The tail of the rearguard passed through Briquessard at 5.50a.m. Further north a traffic block developed, so Brigadier Hinde diverted the latter part of his column through Caumont. The move had been no easy one, officers and men were dead tired, the way was hard to find and the dust appalling. It is recorded that the dust created by the S.P. anti-tank guns was incomparably worse than that I any other armoured vehicles; the Norfolk Yeomanry were enveloped in a blinding dust-cloud, and it is a tribute to their driving and to the driving of those following them that there was no serious accident and that the road was never blocked. By contrast the small amount of dust kicked up by the Cromwells was a welcome feature.

June 15th to 30th

After the successful withdrawal from Tracy Bocage and Amaye, new positions were taken up, the right being in touch with the Americans a mile or two east of Caumont and the line running through Briquessard and Torteval. There was a gap of about three miles between the Rifle Brigade on the Division's left and the nearest troops of the 50th Division. This was covered by the tanks of the 8th Hussars who, despite the difficulties of patrolling in a noisy machine like a tank, did very good work until an advance by the 56th Brigade improved the situation. On the 17th there was a sharp fight in Briquessard and "C" Squadron of the 8th, who were supporting the 6th Queens, lost five tanks and had an officer and seven men killed. The advantages of holding Briquessard, which was forward of a fairly high ridge, were outweighed by the casualties which were bound to be incurred, so General Erskine withdrew the line in this area to behind the Briquessard ridge.

Here the Division remained for the rest of the month and it was a trying period. The frontage was wide, infantry were scarce and the hard work fell on all of them all the time. They lived in slit trenches and there was a steady drain of casualties from shelling and mortaring. The nights were short, with morning Stand-to at 4:15 and evening Stand-to at 10:15, so there was little sleep even for those who did not have to go out on patrol. Large numbers of men were required for this and the work was made more difficult by the enemy's posts constantly changing their positions. Gaps through lie almost impenetrable hedges were generally mined, trip-wires and booby traps abounded, and altogether it was nervy and anxious work with little to show for it. On the 26th Colonel Forester was wounded and command of the 6th Queens went to Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Mason. The armour had to be held back, for there no real task for them. The Rifle Brigade re-formed their "A" Company in the transport area. Major F. A. Dorrien-Smith went to command, but he, Lieutenant J. V. Caesar and Captain G. S. W. Talbot were all killed by some random shelling one day.
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BFBSM · Nov 13, 2014

From “The Desert Rats – 7th Armoured Division 1940 – 1945” Robin Neilands, George Weidenfield & Nicolson Ltd, 1991

Lt. Derrick Watson was at Villers-Bocage with the 1/5th Queen's.
“The bocage is a maze of small fields and numerous orchards, surrounded by high-backed hedges of pollarded trees. We advanced through this country on foot, impeded at first only by snipers and spasmodic shelling.

“Our first casualties included Lt. Randolph Churchill of "A" Coy, and the C.O's batman, who was wounded doing the C.O's laundry in the comparative safety of Battalion HQ. Also wounded at this stage was Lt. Keith McEwan of "A" Coy while on a forward probing patrol. Spotting a Spandau post, McEwan ordered his platoon to cover him while he moved round to a flank to throw a grenade. Unfortunately, the Germans were aware of these tactics and put a burst through his throwing arm. At this point, Major Elliott called for support, as he was pinned down, so I rode up in a tank to be greeted by three ringing cheers from the men dug-in at the edge of the wood. They were my old platoon.

“The next alarm was from "B" Coy, who reported a Tiger tank in the woods no more than 50 yards from their position. On orders from the C.O. I directed an M4, a self-propelled gun - the only one with enough power to deal with a Tiger - to the area. The M4 stalked the Tiger, and in a very few minutes brewed it up. I subsequently inspected the damage and a very grisly sight it was.

“At this stage, the information came through that our leading Tank Regiment, the 4th City of London Yeomanry, the CLY, had run headlong into Tiger tanks in numbers. They were later identified as belonging to 501st SS Heavy Tank Battalion, five of them commanded by Captain Michael Wittman, who was responsible for one of the most devastating single-handed actions of the war, but that was not known at the time. The last message received from Lt.-Col Lord Cranley, the C.O. of the 4th CLY, was, we were told, "Burn your tanks and get out."

“Meanwhile, our sister battalion, the 7th Queen's, arriving to support the 4th CLY, spent the day in desperate fighting, deployed amongst the houses, to meet a new German armoured and infantry attack on the town of Villers itself. The 7th Queen's had an hair-raising experience in Villers-Bocage. As they made contact with the reserve squadron of the CLY, a Tiger tank suddenly appeared from a side road and proceeded to blow down a corner house in the main square, where the troops were assembled. With Piats and anti-tank guns, the Germans were beaten off, with the loss of 9 tanks.

“While the 1/7th Queen's were fighting desperately in Villers-Bocage, the 1/5th Queen's had taken up a battle position to the east of Tracy Bocage, and enemy tanks were seen and heard to be forming up. Almost immediately the forward companies were attacked by two battalions of Panzer Grenadiers. Owing to the terrain it was a close range battle, and I recall a battery of RHA cheek by jowl with Ba.HQ engaging the enemy infantry over open sights with air burst and Bren guns. The forward Coys were in close contact with the enemy, so from Brigade the order came for the reserve "D' Coy to move over to the right flank in support. Major "Boy" Burton, the 2 i/c, ordered me to take my Intelligence Section, reinforced by one of the Cooks and a Storeman (who were both able to find their rifles for the occasion) and occupy the positions vacated by "D" Coy. I was then to report back to him. Moving off to carry this out, we were met by a white-faced straggler from "D" Coy, who said that the roads just vacated by that Coy were occupied by hundreds of Germans and advised us not go there! Undeterred (or at least not much), we pushed on through thick woods until we came to our slit trenches. The woods were silent, although we could still hear the battle raging in the area we had just left. I was on the horns of a dilemma then - had Ito abandon these 6 riflemen without any communication in accordance with the orders given to me, or should I stay with them far from the action? No problem really - leaving George Offiles, (a schoolmaster before the war) in charge, I returned to my post at B.H.Q. As soon as I could contact Col. Wood, I reported all was quiet on the former "D" Coy front, and could I bring the six men back? The C.O. replied somewhat testily, "Good God! Are they still there? Bring them back immediately." I returned to the woods, still perfectly silent, and when approaching the position of my men was immensely relieved to behold George Offiles puffing away happily at his pipe. He reported "All Quiet" and we returned without undue haste to Ba.HQ, where there was a temporary lull.

“The Panzer Grenadiers suffered severe casualties and 8 Mark IV tanks were destroyed. The 1/7 Queen's, on the other hand, lost 8 officers and 120 men at Villers, destroying 9 enemy tanks. There being no infantry reinforcements available, we became an "island" with long lines of communication back to the beachhead. We were withdrawn from Villers-Bocage and its environs to enable heavy bombers of the RAF to bomb the town and Aunay-sur-Odon further south, firstly into a Brigade box and then further back on reverse slopes just north of the shattered village of Livry, in an area which was "bocage" at its worst. There was no real task for the armour. It was a trying period for us, to say the least, as infantry (no longer lorried), living in slit trenches in the rain, suffered a steady drain in casualties from shell and mortar fire, and occasionally from snipers. All the time enclosed in the damp prison of the bocage, the lines of sight bounded by a hedge two hundred yards away. At night there was the constant anxiety of patrolling through close hedges, which were often mined, to pin down or identify an elusive enemy.”
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Clive Wiley · Nov 13, 2014

Many thanks for all this extra info BFBSM for all this extra info . This really shows what they went through.

Tom OBrien · Nov 13, 2014

Gents,

From WO171/1366

11 June 1944 T819743
At 0700 hrs Bn moves via Bayeux, S along Tilly sur Seulles Rd.
At 0900 hrs Bn established in area around 819743.

12 June 1944 T834695
At 0245 hrs Bn moves S along Tilly Rd.
At 0500 hrs Bn established at Pont de La Guillette 8369.
“B”, “D”, “A” Coys pushing S.W. around Tilly with CL of advance track 834694 – 832682 are held up particularly by Spandau nest at 832685.
At 1310 hrs all Coys form defensive position just east of this strong point.
From 2145 hrs Bn retires to concentration area around X Rds 821726.
5 x O.Rs wounded. Lt. D. Sadler and 22 O.Rs reinforcements received.
2nd Flight sail in convoy from West India Docks.

13 June 1944 T782580
At 0230 hrs, Advance Party and at 0520 hrs Bn moved via St Paul du Vernay 742701 to St Honorine de Ducy 730652.
At 0900 hrs Bn H.Q. at 728632.
At 1145 hrs Bn H.Q. at 734620.
At 1515 hrs Bn moved via X rds 732617 to St Germain 775579, arriving approx 1530 [?] hrs.
1 x O.R. wounded.

14 June 1944 T782580
Coy patrols night 13/14 and during morning (strong opposn) show enemy in close contact all along our front.
At 1640 hrs + 1730 hrs enemy inf reported moving forward.
At 1735 hrs to 2000 hrs many enemy tanks, armd cars + inf (1 Bn) advancing on our front + being engaged.
At 2020 hrs attack in full swing on a 2 coy front (A + B Coys).
At 2030 hrs “A” Coy hard pressed. Bn H.Q. personnel moved to their support. 1 R.T.R. + 65 A/Tk Regt brew up some enemy Tks.
At 2048 hrs slight enemy infiltration between “A” + “B” Coys.
At 2056 hrs line holding everywhere. “D” Coy at Bn H.Q. for counter attack role.
At 2100 hrs infiltration dealt with successfully by carriers + 4 CLY.
At 2126 hrs AGRA D.F. fire falls short and inflicts casualties on us.
At 2215 hrs Brig. M.S. Ekins reports “Attack is over”.
6 x O.R. killed, 2 offrs (Capt. V. Tweedie + Lt. R. Churchill) and 36 x O.Rs wounded.
5 x O.Rs reinforcements received.
2nd Flight lands during morning.

15 June 1944 T742614
At 0030 hrs Bn retires via Briquessard and at 0200 hrs arrives at Livry.
2 P.Ws brought in but patrols unable to contact enemy.
2nd Flight rejoins Bn.
5 x O.Rs wounded.
Capt. D. Barton + 62 O.R.s reinforcements received.

Clive Wiley · Nov 14, 2014

Thanks Tom.

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1/5 Queens Royal West Surrey's Stretcher Bearers note book from Villers Bocage to 26 July

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1/5 Queens Royal West Surrey's Stretcher Bearers note book from Villers Bocage to 26 July

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