Hi All, Don't really know where to start with this.I know my late father in law was in this regiment in El Alemain,but dont know much more. I know he was under the command of a Captain Leslie Meek,anyone help with any info.Thanks
Nigel, I had a quick search for 51st recce war diaries at the National Archives but couldn't find any for North Africa. The best I could do were these two home forces dairies: WO 166/634, DIVISIONS: 51ST. DIVISION: Reconnaissance Battalion. (1941 Jan.-Dec.) WO 166/6342, DIVISIONS: 51 DIVISION: 51 Reconnaissance Regiment. (1942 Jan.- May) Lee
Hello Nigel, The 51st Recce was formed in February 1941 from the 15th Bn Highland Light Infantry. It arrived in N Africa in August 1942 and as you say it fought at El Alamein in October/November 1942; but out of the Recce role. It was reformed shortly thereafter and transferred back to the infantry in January 1943, as the 14th Bn Highland Light Infantry. It looks like the War Diary for June to December 1942 would be the most interesting, if available. Best, Steve.
Good find Andy. TNA catalogue lists it as "Reece Regt." instead of "Recce Regt." (plus another 28 records). Something I will correct in the Arcre search engine. Lee Here's the diary for Africa - WO 169/4171 51 Recce Regt. 1942 Aug.- Dec.
A transcription from 'Only the enemy In Front (Every other beggar behind...), Richard Doherty, Pages 26 to 31: "Another reconnaissance regiment had fought its way through the El Alamein battle. This was 51st, the 'eyes' of the famous 51st (Highland) Division. Born in January 1941 in circumstances similar to those of 44 Recce, 51st had been formed from the brigade anti-tank companies of its division. (The division itself had been re-formed as the original 51st Division had been captured by the Germans at St Valery in 1940.) A Squadron had been 152 Anti- Tank Company made up of Camerons and Seaforths; B Squadron had been 153 Company with Black Watch and Gordons, while C Squadron had been 154 Company whose men had been Black Watch and Argylls. The CO was Lieutenant Colonel E.H.Grant, an Argyll, and the strong ethos of the division was reflected in his regimenL The Highland Division's recce regiment was one of those to adopt a distinctive appearance through its use of the highland infantry bonnet, the Tam O'Shanter, and the Hunting Stewart flash worn below the right shoulder; the divisional sign, the letters HD in white against blue, wasworn below the left shoulder. The division embarked for India in June 1942 but the North African situation meant a change in destination to Egypt. HMT Stratheden was home for divisional headquarters and 51 Recce until their arrival in Egypt almost two months later. The voyage was uncomfortable for most of the men: as a luxury liner in peacetime the ship normally carried about 800 passengers; in its wartime role it was carrying almost 5,000 although the highlanders found the shipboard catering standards more agreeable than the Home Counties men on board the Santa Elena. Disembarking at Port Tewfik, 51 Recce entrained for Qassasin; the regiment's vehicles were later landed at Haifa. In the meantime training had begun with lectures on desert warfare and navigational exercises using sun compasses. On 22 August the Prime Minister and General Brooke, CIGS, inspected the Division and, two days later, Colonel Grant went to Cairo to discuss and reconnoitre positions to be occupied by the regiment in the event of an Axis attack on Cairo around the right flank of Eighth Army. It is interesting that such a plan existed, for Montgomery in his memoirs castigated General Auchinleck for having prepared plans for the defence of the Delta in the event of Axis forces breaking through the Alamein line. Nowhere in his writings did Monty mention that such plans continued after the Auk's removal and yet this was the case; the Highland Division was to form South Delta Force with 51 Recce responsible for the defence of Gezira Island and the four bridges connecting it with the mainland. On 25 August squadron commanders were ordered to Cairo to reconnoitre positions for the defence of Gezira and the bridges across the Nile; Highland Division Headquarters and 239 Field Park Company, Royal Engineers, were placed under 51 Recce for this task. At the same time there was soul-searching about the role of a recce regiment in this theatre and, according to a note in Regimental Orders of late August: Until the role of a Recce Regt in the Middle East has been definitely decided, it is not possible to lay down anything but a provisional policy.5 While that uncertainty existed training continued with route marches, compass work, judging distances in the desert, patrols, moving into defence harbour on foot - vehicles had yet to arrive - and close order and battle drills. For the first five days of September the regiment, less a mobile squadron under Major Hutchison, was given the task of defending the canal from Beni Yusif to the River Nile; the mobile squadron created a divisional reserve and patrolled until it ceased to exist on the 5th. After participating in an exercise, 51st Division was ordered to join XIII Corpsand moved to XXX Corps' area for training at which time the Hunting Stewart and HD flashes were taken into use by 51 Recce. Soul-searching about the regiment's role continued: as the Humber LRCs were unsuitable for desert conditions Colonel Grant suggested to the divisional commander that the regiment should be equipped with heavy armoured-cars for recce work, or be converted into a divisional cavalry regiment with cruiser tanks and carriers - again in the recce role. Then, towards the end of the month, came another proposal: to create a carrier regiment with a HQ squadron and three carrier squadrons. This would ;1 have paralleled the experience of 44 Recce. But none of these proposals was put into effect and the first weeks of October found the regiment preparingfor its part in the forthcoming offensive; this required re-organisation. The regiment re-formed into two distinct elements, a composite squadron and an infantry squadron. The divisional plan of attack for Operation LIGHTFOOT was received on 19 October and, two days later, the composite squadron moved to Tel El Alamein. On the evening of 23October, 11 and 17 Assault Troops were to cover sappers gapping enemy minefields but, whereas 44 Recce had been engaged on the southern flank of the line, 51 operated on the northern flank.The composite squadron suffered its first casualties from enemy mortar fire almost as soon as it moved into action and one man was killed. By 11.3Opm the squadron was moving into the gaps under heavy shellfire.There were many mines and Lieutenant Jocker, commanding the RE party, dismantled mines until he was wounded in the legs. A sapper sergeant then took over until he too was wounded. Captain R.R.Park of 51 Recce then went out to rescue both men. Park later returned to the minefield and re-appeared some time afterwards with 30 Italian prisoners: These casualties caused delay, with the result that the main RE party, escorted by A Scout Troop, caught up with the Assault Troops. TheGermans had placed wire only on their own side of their minefields and the carriers entered it without knowing it was there. One was blown up.The RE main party then went on with the gapping while the AssaultTroops protected them from the enemy side of the minefield. As soon as an eight-yard gap had been made, the Assault Troops went forward, and A Scout Troop (Lt Gall) took up the positions they had vacated. BScout Troop (Lt Burt) came up to the British side of the field and lit the way to the gap. Meanwhile, the Assault Troops had encountered the second enemy minefield. The RE Recce party recce'd it. As soon as a 24-yard gap had been completed in the first field, A Scout Troop escorted the main RE party forward to the second minefield, which they gapped. This operation was directed by Lt Jocker, who carried on from a Jeep although he was badly wounded in the legs. As soon as an eight-yard gap had been made, the Assault Troops advanced 600 yards to the Iying-up position from which the attack on the objective NAIRN was to be launched. During this period, both Assault and Scout Troopswere under constant enemy shell, mortar and MG fire. AlSo, they had by this time almost caught up with our own barrage, and one of our guns firing short caused several casualties. A Scout Troop lit the way from the gap to the lying-up position. As soon as the 24-yard gap had been made in the second minefield, the tanks went through and formed up ready for the attack ct approximately 0300 hours.6 The tanks, from 50th RTR were to 'attack, capture and annihilate' objective NAIRN. The recce men were in support of the tanks with A Scout Troop to the right, B to the left and all three Assault Troops accompanying the tanks; C under Lt Hofman had ridden forward on the tanks. As the tanks began their attack, enemy fire intensified and the first anti-tank fire appeared from the right flank. One tank was knocked out by an 88 and the others withdrew, putting down smoke. As this was happening, A Scout Troop was working forward on the right flank but, as the wind was blowing from the right, the smoke drifted behind them, silhouetting them for the enemy gunners. The German anti-tank crews switched their attention to the troop's carriers and knocked out four in seconds. When the smoke cleared the tanks had withdrawn, leaving three behind disabled; B Scout Troop had lost a carrier and A had only one carrier left.The wounded were evacuated on that carrier and the squadron retired to where their most recent attack had started, west of the last enemy minefield. There they dug in at first light and medical officers of 50 RTR and 51 Recce (Captain Jolly) did sterling work treating and evacuating wounded under intermittent shelling. Early that afternoon the tank regiment commander ordered an officer and 30 men- to support a tank attack; the soldiers were to ride into battle on the tanks. No further details were given but eventually Lieutenant Roberts and 30 men accompanied tanks in an assault on German anti-tank guns and machine-guns at the northern end of the NAIRN area. The armour was within 250 yards of the objective when the leading six tanks were hit and immobilised; the others withdrew. Almost all Roberts's men of the Composite Squadron had been on the leading tanks and they took cover behind them and engaged the enemy; the crews of the immobilised tanks continued to shell and machine-gun the enemy positions. This battle continued for about an hour and distracted German attention from an attack by Seaforths on the right. The immobilised tanks were being constantly hit by light anti-tank shells; after an hour their ammunition was exhausted and, one by one, they stopped firing, their crews making their way back to the mobile tanks which were out of range of the German guns. The last tank to stop firing was that of the captain commanding the squadron; he ordered Roberts and his men to withdraw and covered their withdrawal with the last of his ammunition before escaping himself-Lieutenant Roberts and his men returned to their own positions at 6.00pm from where, half an hour later, the Composite Squadron moved into reserve. The reserve position was between two British minefields in the area of Divisional Tactical HQ. The Divisional Commander, Major General Wimberley, was quick to congratulate them on the work they had done. The last days of the month were spent in the line with 154 Brigade. Intermittent shell and machine-gun fire continued until the squadron was relieved by South African troops and returned to Divisional Tactical HQ. One officer and 15 other ranks had been killed and five officers and 50 other ranks wounded. In early November, as Eighth Army moved forward in the first stages of the pursuit that was to lead to Tunisia, the Composite Squadron was ordered to hold part of the line formerly held by 24th and 28th New Zealand Battalions. The Infantry Squadron now came into the picture: formed from men who had been left out of battle or engaged as PoW escorts, it was commanded by Captain Stratton and moved to relieve the Composite Squadron, which was now assigned to 153 Brigade for its advance to El Daba. The squadron recce'd for the brigade advance which met with no opposition and, with El Daba airfield secured, deployed to cover sappers clearing mines from the coast road between El Daba and Galal. In the meantime the Infantry Squadron had moved with 154 Brigade to Tel El Aqqaqir. On 6 November the Composite Squadron was on the move again, carrying out reconnaissance for 51st Division on the coast road to Fuka. The squadron moved beyond Fuka to a point three miles west of Sidi Haneish, taking 500 prisoners on the way. Most were very demoralised and only the first batch encountered put up a half-hearted fight before surrendering. Beyond Sidi Haneish, 8 NZ Armd Brigade were encountered from whom the squadron learned that the road was clear with only mopping-up to be done to the east. Squadron HQ was set up five miles west of Fuka where Lt Gen Sir Oliver Leese, commanding XXX Corps, congratulated its personnel on their day's work. The Infantry Squadron had moved up to El Daba and on to Galal where the Composite Squadron and RHQ rejoined on 7 November. A week later the regiment re-organised to a more conventional pattern and moved to Sidi Haneish. From there they expected to move with 51st Division to Tobruk or Benghazi but the order was cancelled. Colonel Grant had gone to GHQ in Cairo and returned with the news that the regiment was to become a motorised infantry battalion and would move to Cairo to re-organise and train.That news was bad enough; worse was to come: on 14 January 1943 the regiment was redesignated 14th HLI. In spite of its title the HLI was a lowland regiment and conversion to a battalion of such a regiment was the worst fate that could befall a regiment of highlanders. The Jocks' disapproval was voiced at a parade to mark their conversion. In thepresence of senior HU officers and members of the General Staff from Cairo they responded to the call for three cheers "with three hearty boos." Thus ended the service of 51 Recce. Although the Highland Division would later be given another recce regiment this would be 2nd Derby Yeomanry which was not part of the Recce Corps. The three recce regiments committed to the desert campaign had been sent to fight in conditions entirely unsuited to them. By dint of improvisation they had performed excellent service and although this was hardly in their intended role it had shown the qualities of adaptation and courage for which their Corps would become famous." Hope this helps! Best, Steve.
