Landing Heavy Bombers at Night - Any Pilots?

Not sure if NVGs were available to air crew in 1941, but you never know!

.......
As mad as it seems I have driven to the top of a bleak hill at night (and half moon) to stare over a three mile void down 150 feet or so to where my friend was waiting with a small lit paraffin lamp!! I wanted to see what the pilot may have seen for myself! Disaster! The relief map didn't show the gently rolling ground that prevented a line-of-sight between me and my friend. Worse, 10 feet from the car, even with a torch, the ground twisted and slipped away from under my feet - my car disappeared completely in the dark, At the last minute I realised I may have no mobile coverage!


I will try again, but I could see street lights and car headlights from 4 to 5 miles away quite clearly, but they are very bright, have parabolic reflectors, and there were lots of them!


The first night vision devices came into use during WW 2, but on the Allied side the US Army lead the way and in 1941 they were probably not available, at least not for aircrew needing both hands on throttle and stick - size of device at that time prohibited any helmet mounting.

I doubt you'll be able to simulate the landing light configuration in any helpful way in the field, as long as you can't play the total black-out.

 

(Crumbs - you don't get much typing time on here before you get logged off!)

James, Tick the remember me box, when you log in. Saves you being logged out automatic.

 

According to No7 Squadron history,this aircraft was intercepted by a Junker 88 intruder and set on fire while in circuit.This event occurred at the worse possible time for a pilot who would have quite a work load in handling the aircraft and lining it up with the runway in use.At this time,there were no approach devices to inform the pilot that his angle of approach was correct in order to execute a safe landing.It was a matter of a pilot having experience and better,experience of the local surroundings of an airfield.

The highest structure reported for Oakington was the church steeple which was in line with Runway 190.The height at Dry Drayton is not mentioned but the height referenced must have been a contour height above sea level.Having passed Dry Drayton many times,I cannot recollect a hill or knoll.I will have to look again.

I think the loss of the aircraft was due to a low level approach possibly the result of handling a crippled aircraft,a causation of many flying accidents.Undershooting an airfield was relieved to some extent,at the runway threshhold by having about 250 yards of grass available to compensate for undershooting.However there was little help for an approach error made some miles out from the runway to be used.

As regards,navigation home.The navigator would be helped by the planning route to and fro the target.However the navigator would provide the pilot with a fixes for their postion on demand and after leaving the target or on a decision to divert,would provide a course for home or diversion.Thus the navigator had little time on a air operation,other than being a continous infeed of information to the pilot,ensuring changes of course required by "legs" were undertaken and any winds were accounted for to ensure that the aircraft was not thrown off course.

The interesting aspect of "Night Bombers" is that the film was made by Air Commodore H I Cozens when he was Station Commander at Hemswell and as I see it,through his own initiative and as such without No1 Group authority.Cozens had a background using photography for documentary purposes and was a member of the British Arctic Air Route Expedition of July 1930.I found out recently that the equipment used was a Bell 16mm cine camera which he had used on the Arctic Expedition.(as told by his widow to a former RAF serviceman).The documentary coincided with the return to Group air operations against the enemy,of Hemswell, when No1 LFS had wound down and No 150 and No 170 Squadron became operational from Hemswell in November 1944.

 

I have to confess that the box of surplus had brand new instruments in their boxes and greased paper wrappings that you would give your right arm for now!!


James[/QUOTE]

RAF Radar and Radio spares had their own unique preservation method.The grease proof paper you mention would be the wrap for lanolin stored equipment.The only way of removing the lanolin and cleaning up the spare was by using CTC (Carbon Tetrachloride) as a solvent, now banned for its danger to human beings.Squadron service in the day of piston engined bombers was of dope in the hangar and the wiff of CTC in the Radar/Radio workshop.We used the substance without warning of the likely effects on humans.

Once had to clean up a Rebecca aerial spare on first line servicing and it was a hell of a job to clean up the spare in a bath of a CTC.

Both fumes from these substances could be addictive. A long time ago I saw a report where in an illicit relationship,a chap administered CTC to his mistress as she became high on the substance.Alas he went too far and the woman died of CTC poisoning.

James.Sorry for the digression.

 

Hi Harry

Thanks for your posts - sorry I haven't been back sooner - I thought I had the post notification option set.

I have the ORBs for the incident and they do indeed record the words “believed attacked enemy A/C” However, no mention of the aircraft type, so are the No.7 Records more complete than the ORBs I wonder? I would really like to get a copy of such records. I have tried to get in touch with members of the aerodrome who were there at the time but no-joy.

Finding more records is important to me as the AM1180 and the 765c forms contradict the assertion that the aircraft was attacked. Also there are no Luftwaffe claims of a kill. I know the aircraft was on fire (on the ground) that night (because my Mother and Aunt were watching it through their bedroom window) so I know that the crash would have been visible to an intruder from miles away, and claims would have been made I think, however I have quickly realised that research is an ‘open-mind’ exercise, the attacking aircraft may have been shot down later that night perhaps?

On an OS map of the area Dry Drayton is about 150 feet and the field at Oakington is shown at about 10 feet ASL, the high land falls away to the North East of Dry Drayton. I have been to the crash site and you don’t really notice the ground level changing dramatically – the locals tell me that they are pleased to be on a ‘hill’ as it marks them out from the flat land of Cambridgeshire.

One of the topics of my research is a mini crash investigation; I’m looking at all the possible reasons why the plane crashed where it did so I’m looking at all possible evidence and background information. I’m trying to find a hill above a 3 mile stretch of land so I can see what the pilot may have seen! Surprisingly this isn’t easy unless you are prepared to walk cross-country in the pitch dark!

Can I also refer readers back to my original questions too?


Cheers
James

 

Hi All

My first post!
My first post, too!

I'm investigating the crash of a Stirling Bomber which was landing at Oakington in May 1941. There seems no obvious reason why it crashed as the AM1180 for the incident reports that the pilot had spoken to the tower on the R/T and had nothing special to report.
I am not a bomber pilot but I do have pilot experience and many years in Flight Ops.

First, if it was shot down I suppose one would have seen signs of this on the wreckage. You don't mention if it came in alone or with other aircrafts. They would eventually have seen this.

At that time in the war there were no landing aids at Oakington and the lights were just Gooseneck Flares. The aircraft had its undercarriage down and was trimmed for landing. It just got too low, too soon, apparently. Cambridge is very flat but the place where the aircraft crashed is an unusual 150 feet above the level of Oakington field. He was 3 miles from the runway. My questions are:

1. How would he have known how high/low he needed to fly on his approach? I assume it was virtually pitch black so visual sighting seems unlikely. Did he need to know the level of the land on the approach? Where would he have learned this?
He would know the terrain from briefings before the flight if he was not familiar with the airfield. The pilots always have landing charts onboard covering the most probable fields to be used on a specific flight, original destination as well as probable alternatives. These give information on obstacles around the airfield, altitude above ground and runway directions and lengths.

2. Could he have seen the runway flares from 3 miles away, given that they were just flickering parafin lights?
That would depend on the visibility at the given time. If the visibility was fairly good he would see them.

3. I understand that he would have been 'stacked' before making a final circuit to land, but what would the radius of that circuit have been? Would it have been greater than three miles?
I am not sure what you mean by "stacked", it indicates that more aircrafts were in the circuit.

4. When stacked would the pilot have made the circuits just by watching the runway lights and flying round them or would he have needed dead reckoning to circle?
No dead reckoning if you see the airfield and they would have to see something to start the final approach. Dead reckoning, or a navigational aid, such a radio beacon, take you to the point where you start the letdown. If they saw the lights they could fly direct in because they knew the runway direction. If they came in with a tailwind they would overfly the runway and a make a so-called procedure turn or fly a downwind/base pattern. The radius of the procedure turn depends on the speed of the aircraft but correctly executed it would bring it back on the correct heading for landing. It is performed at a constant altitude depending on the terrain to be overflown.

He was on a 'bee-line' for the runway, a very accurate heading for landing so it seems that whatever he was using to get home it was a good method. So many questions about landing, not much on the web about it - was it such a dull part of the whole tour?
There are several points to consider here. They might be perfectly situated at the glidepath, sidewise, but they would either have to estimate their altitude by their pants or the altimeter. Anyway, 3 miles out they should be much higher than 150 feet. During the conditions, estimating the altitude by the pants can be difficult in the dark, particularly if the pilot was tired. Did they return from a bombing mission or a routine training flight? How experienced was the pilot? If they flew in on the altimeter they would depend on having the correct barometric pressure. This they would normally get from ground control. If not, they could have been lower than they thought they were. If they had been on a long flight this could have changed quite a lot. Then you have weather, particualty wind. They could have more headwind on the approach than expected. Flying with a constant driftdown would then take them lower than they should be. They could hit a windshear, a sort of turbulence, or downdraught. Also, they could have lost (cut) an engine on the approach. While a Stirling didn't have a problem (enormous wings) to keep up with three engines, there would always be a lot of of commotion in the cockpit to compensate for this and they wouldn't necessarily have time to report this to the control tower.


Anyway appreciate any help!

Cheers
James

 

I see now a few postings I didn't see before........sorry about that..

Fred

 

Hi,

As a licensed glider pilot, I would agree with Stormbird.

Yes, there is certainly a possibility that an intruder attacked the Lanc immediately prior to landing. But an inordinate number of crashes (I believe) were the result of a long flight in changing weather conditions.

If an aircraft took off from England in good weather (i.e. high pressure), flew 8 or hours to the target and back, and a low pressure region had blown in from the west during the Lanc's absence, this could easily spell disaster. It would cause the aircraft's altimeter to read somewhat higher than reality, making the pilot believe that he was several hundred feet higher than he actually was. With no visual reference to the ground, this could have (and MAY have, in this case) spelled disaster. The pilot may have believed he was higher than he really was, and while descending towards base, simply flew it into the ground.

This was apparently the cause of many bomber crashes in England during the war.

But the sad reality is, we'll likely never know what happened to the poor buggers.

Marc

 

Hi Fred and Marc

Thanks for your responses, very detailed Fred and much to think over.

The Pilot had 900 flying hours of which 200 were at night but only 17 on Stirlings. He was a Cranwell graduate. But rather than immediately speculate on the events of that night - which could have been from any number of causes, I'd like to concentrate on the general procedures - without knowing these I can't really analyse any particular scenario.

I've since re-examined AP 129 Which is the RAF Flying Training Manual, my copy is a reprint dated June 1938. I'm annoyed at myself as it's just as if I hadn't read it at all!

Chap III section 215 implies that night flying isn't much different from day flying, except for landing! It implies that a pilot who can 'land well on a mark' during the day will be able to land at night with the aids provided as long as he is smooth with the controls.

Apparently he would have been at 1000ft and joined the 'left-hand' circuit at about 95-100mph. Then he should ask permission to land. Then lowering his flaps he should lose hieght slowly keeping the aircraft carefully trimmed at the normal gliding speed. When at right angles to the final line of approach the throttle is closed, the aircraft trimmed again and then turned into the landing track to glide to a spot just short of the first runway light.

At this point floodlights should have been turned on to illuminate the ground. If the flood light wasn't available then the pilot was to use the angle of the flare path to determine his approach.

AP129 mentions a 350W landing light on the aircraft and how to adjust it, I guess the idea is the same as the floodlights, to light up the ground in front of the aircraft. The Stirling did indeed have two monster lights on the wing. The lamp should illuminate the ground clearly from 500ft apparently but only 30-40 ft in bad weather.

Interestingly there is no mention of using the altimeter at all except for entering the airspace at 1000ft.

What is missing is how the pilot knows he is actually circling the aerodrome. You would have to suppose that he could simply see the runway lights to his left, but then if he could, he would have been able to judge his hieght from the layout of the flares. If he couldn't because of the weather surely he would have stayed high and kept an eye on what his landing light was illuminating?

(I can't find out either if the 'circuits' are flown as squares or circles!)

The way the pilot would keep an eye on the field, or know where he is navigationally, is important for other reasons which I won't go into as it will bias the review of normal procedures. I've read about 'procedural turns' which seem quite modern and rely on time and headings. Would the pilot have done something similar?

The answers are subtle and keep driving me to get out in the countryside to check on visibility in 'real life' or of course, ask a WWII bomber pilot.

All the Forum feedback is great, I am keeping all the feedback to re-read later as a quiet review often reveals things I hadn't noticed before!

Cheers
James

 

If an aircraft took off from England in good weather (i.e. high pressure), flew 8 or hours to the target and back, and a low pressure region had blown in from the west during the Lanc's absence, this could easily spell disaster. It would cause the aircraft's altimeter to read somewhat higher than reality, making the pilot believe that he was several hundred feet higher than he actually was. With no visual reference to the ground, this could have (and MAY have, in this case) spelled disaster. The pilot may have believed he was higher than he really was, and while descending towards base, simply flew it into the ground.


Wouldn't the W/O have called in and obtained local barometric readings for the pilot to adjust his altimeter?

 

If an aircraft took off from England in good weather (i.e. high pressure), flew 8 or hours to the target and back, and a low pressure region had blown in from the west during the Lanc's absence, this could easily spell disaster. It would cause the aircraft's altimeter to read somewhat higher than reality, making the pilot believe that he was several hundred feet higher than he actually was. With no visual reference to the ground, this could have (and MAY have, in this case) spelled disaster. The pilot may have believed he was higher than he really was, and while descending towards base, simply flew it into the ground.


Wouldn't the W/O have called in and obtained local barometric readings for the pilot to adjust his altimeter?
That would have been normal procedure as I indicated in my first posting. It's actually usually given from ground control without asking.

As for flying a lefthand downwind pattern, he could not have done this if he was 3 clicks out when he crashed (if he wasn't far out on the downwind leg, but dangerously low) as the left base turn usually starts just after you have passed the threshold flying in the opposite direction. If you are flying the pattern at 90-100 mph you are not very far from the field, as a matter of fact only a little more than what you would see on a present-day lightplane.

Had he been cleared to land?

 

Hi Fred and Marc

Thanks for your responses, very detailed Fred and much to think over.

The Pilot had 900 flying hours of which 200 were at night but only 17 on Stirlings. He was a Cranwell graduate. But rather than immediately speculate on the events of that night - which could have been from any number of causes, I'd like to concentrate on the general procedures - without knowing these I can't really analyse any particular scenario.

I've since re-examined AP 129 Which is the RAF Flying Training Manual, my copy is a reprint dated June 1938. I'm annoyed at myself as it's just as if I hadn't read it at all!

Chap III section 215 implies that night flying isn't much different from day flying, except for landing! It implies that a pilot who can 'land well on a mark' during the day will be able to land at night with the aids provided as long as he is smooth with the controls.

Apparently he would have been at 1000ft and joined the 'left-hand' circuit at about 95-100mph. Then he should ask permission to land. Then lowering his flaps he should lose hieght slowly keeping the aircraft carefully trimmed at the normal gliding speed. When at right angles to the final line of approach the throttle is closed, the aircraft trimmed again and then turned into the landing track to glide to a spot just short of the first runway light.

At this point floodlights should have been turned on to illuminate the ground. If the flood light wasn't available then the pilot was to use the angle of the flare path to determine his approach.

AP129 mentions a 350W landing light on the aircraft and how to adjust it, I guess the idea is the same as the floodlights, to light up the ground in front of the aircraft. The Stirling did indeed have two monster lights on the wing. The lamp should illuminate the ground clearly from 500ft apparently but only 30-40 ft in bad weather.

Interestingly there is no mention of using the altimeter at all except for entering the airspace at 1000ft.

What is missing is how the pilot knows he is actually circling the aerodrome. You would have to suppose that he could simply see the runway lights to his left, but then if he could, he would have been able to judge his hieght from the layout of the flares. If he couldn't because of the weather surely he would have stayed high and kept an eye on what his landing light was illuminating?

(I can't find out either if the 'circuits' are flown as squares or circles!)

The way the pilot would keep an eye on the field, or know where he is navigationally, is important for other reasons which I won't go into as it will bias the review of normal procedures. I've read about 'procedural turns' which seem quite modern and rely on time and headings. Would the pilot have done something similar?

The answers are subtle and keep driving me to get out in the countryside to check on visibility in 'real life' or of course, ask a WWII bomber pilot.

All the Forum feedback is great, I am keeping all the feedback to re-read later as a quiet review often reveals things I hadn't noticed before!

Cheers
James


Hi James,

Sadly, as a glider pilot, I've never done any night landings (although I think that MIGHT be legal, but I honestly cannot remember). I certainly do recall reading that everything (when landing) looks different at night, and a great deal of practice is needed to get it right.

I believe that radio silence (from the aircraft) was the order of the day, in order to avoid giving a helping hand to intruders looking for some action. So a later post that says that the tower would have broadcast the local barometric pressure regularly makes much more sense to me.

Landing clearance (I believe) was generally given by use of coloured flares. But it sounds as if your aircraft was too far from the field for that.

Circuits are generally flown as rectangles with rounded corners.

Marc

 

Looking at the timeline I don't now if this would have any bearing on the incident.

From RAF Oakington

The choice of grass-surfaced Oakington to base Stirlings when hard-surfaced runways were available elsewhere in No. 3 Group is puzzling. Oakington's fen soil had under drainage of the landing ground but it was no place for such a heavy aircraft in winter, and the soft surface put added strain on the Stirling's ungainly undercarriage resulting in a spate of landing and take-off accidents during the winter of 1940-41. Nevertheless, No. 7 Squadron sent out its first sorties on February 19, 1941 to attack Rotterdam docks. However, the airfield was so often unservicable that the Stirlings had to take off light and bomb-up at drier Wyton to carry out operations. During 1940 a perimeter track and at least 26 pans and six square-shaped hard standings were put down, two of the former being lost when two T2 hangars were erected on the north-west side of the technical area. Bomb stores were off to the north.

Hard runway construction began at Oakington during the spring of 1941 but No. 7 Squadron remained in residence while work was in progress laying concrete parallel to the grass strips. The main runway OS-23, 1,700 yards long, was completed first but the other two were not finished until the spring of the following year, the 01-19 being 1,300 yards and 10-28 1,400 yards. Thirty pan hardstandings were provided.

 

Hi Fred

I don't have any positive proof that he had been cleared to land but the AM1180 states that the pilot had nothing unusual to report in an R/T conversation with the tower. I guess that he could have turned left after completing the downwind leg and then sharp left to line up with the runway, but would he have wanted some time on the approach to adjust height and generally get ready? At 90mph his flight time to the ground would have been just 2 minutes.

I'm going to do a 3D animation of the event as this will be easier to discuss than text I feel


Hi Marc

As above there was conversation on the R/T. Flares could have been used according to AP129 but before that the pilot would have used the signal lights on the top and bottom of his aircraft to signal his aircraft code (D for Dog) This would have brought a green Morse code repeat from the ground if he had permission. If he did speak to the Tower you would imagine that radio silence was broken - at least on that night. The circuit shape is what I thought it would be, which is great.

Hi Leccy

The runway at Oakington seemed woefully inadequate but the interesting thing for me is the runway lighting, because that is the likely thing he would be navigating by and using to land. I believe that they only had gooseneck flares at that point, though they could have had Glim lights. The landing procedures could also have included floodlights to light up the ground where the pilot was to touch down. Either way I want to find out if being 3 miles out was a like normal position for him to be in.


All
I'm hoping to post a 3D animation soon - but if anyone can fill in any gaps or know any WWII Bomber pilots - I'm still hungry for that information!


Cheers
James

 

Hi James,

One other possibility comes to mind, after reading your last post.

It is well known (among pilots) that there is a tendency, when turning from base onto final, to start to believe that one has overshot the centerline of the runway. In that case, the usual action is to tighten up one's turn, and get back to the centerline as quickly as possible. If this is done while already low and slow, it is exceedingly easy to stall the aircraft, since stall speed increases in a turn (the portion of the wing generating lift parallel to the ground is shorter in a turn).

So, if the pilot in question stalled at low altitude while turning onto final, this could explain the crash.

This is a very common accident cause, especially among pilots with low time in type.

Marc

 

Hi Marc

That's an interesting point, I'll add it to the list of 'possibles'.

I've just finished a first run animation and the 350W landing light seems to be a very useful tool for keeping away from the ground. It would have been easy to see that he wasn't on smooth ground with it on. But of course he may not have had it on - it may have been broken - he may not have thought he was low enough to want to switch it on, etc!

The more I find out, the more 'possibles' there are but they are driving away the 'just don't know' feeling and making the event more of an experience!


James

 

Part of the reason I posted about the new concrete runway being constructed in the spring of 1941 alongside the grass runway was would this have any bearing to the crash in May 1941.

A new concrete runway can almost shine in moonlight and can be visible for a long way out even without lights. Was the concrete runway operational at this time or was it still only grass strip. If the pilot was lined up on the wrong runway or disorientated (not many night landings in Stirlings and how many at this field), could these have been factors.

 

Hi Leccy

I'd be happier if the writer had defined what the actual date was when he wrote 'spring'. Actually having some concrete laid down could have been quite a while after construction was 'begun'. I've chased the topic for a while on the Airfield Information Exchange forum but not much joy as the records are not very good. I'm rubbish with dates and the seasons - to me if it's cold you put on a coat, seems that other people will discuss whether it should be cold or not!!

I've just had to look up 'spring' and it looks as if May is the last month of spring so in theory the runway could have been down or as you say partly down.

I'll look into it more deeply - there is more chance of a proper electric light system being in place if the runway were completed.

Indeed the number of landings in Stirlings may have been a contributory factor. He flew Wellingtons in his previous squadron (No. 149), they had some Stirlings too at some point. I'm currently looking into his prior experience. Interesting too to remember the very tall nature of the Stirlings undercarriage. This is another possible I have on my list.


James

 

Regarding the question about the information contained in an ORB.ORBs have to be considered in the context of the wartime background that they were made up.The ORB can be regarded as a log written up, usually, by a squadron adjutant from the facts known and information available at the time.

Information relating to the fate of crews whose aircraft was lost outside Britain and British occupied territory only became available from informationfrom official enemy sources and that channelled via the IRC or through the conduit of the Protecting Power,in the British case,Switzerland.The fate of crews landing in neutral countries would be made known through diplomatic channels and repatriation would follow diplomatic negotiations.Aircraft and their crews lost in Britain and British occupied territory would be subject to an exacting scutinythrough investigations such as Courts of Inquiry.These investigations would look at all aspects relating to the loss of the aircraft and if neccessarywould make recommendations,if neccessasy to prevent a recurrence.The findings were precise and to the point.I would say that there is likely to be an entry in the Oakington station ORB indicating the setting up of a Court of Inquiry on the loss of the aircraft along with the members who were convened for the Inquiry.Following that, there should be a record of the Court of Inquiry's findings into the loss of the aircraft.

Deeper information above the scant information sometimes related by an ORB has only come about through the efforts of researchers,assisted by the highlighting of the fate of aircraft and crews from information supplied by witnesses and local reports.Many at the time were thought not recoverable in what was thought to be unstable ground and left for some considerable time due to the priorities prevailing during wartime.Squadron historians have played their part over the years in revealing the events that may have contributed to the loss of an aircraft.The best source of infomation regarding the circumstances relating to the loss of an aircraft and the fate of its crew,are survivors.Such evidence was always sought officially from crew survivors who returned home from captivity and were put through the process of debriefing.

As regards F/L Cruikshank's aircraft, there were no survivors,at least the one survivor did not probably live long enough to be questioned.The main fact emerging from the loss of the aircraft was that the aircraft was attacked by a J88 intruder while in airfield circuit,according to the No 7 squadron history, a very informative publication by Tom Doherty entitled "No 7 Bomber Squadron RAF in World War 11."

It has to be accepted that the intruder would have probably attacked the aircraft as soon as the aircraft navigation lights were switched on.The reponse from ATC would be to immediately extinguish runway lighting and the visual beacon.Any aircraft about to land would be turned away and aircraft unable to abort the would be left to their own resources.

At the time of the loss of the aircraft,Oakington was still on grass runways.Its concrete runways were in the progress of construction and its going was particularly heavy,so heavy that the squadron regularly despatched its aircraft for bombing up at the nearby airfields of Newmarket and Wyton, both of which also had grass runways but were lighter going.The attraction of Newmarket was that it had the longest runway of all BC airfields,being 2300 yards long.

F/L Cruikshank's aircraft would appear to have been attempting to land on what would eventually be, the 05/23 runway.Provision was made to land on grass adjacent to the main runway under construction.He would be on his final approach from roughly the south west of the circuit.Depending on his entry in to the circuit,he may have had to clear the high ground of the Madingley slope and proceed to the runway threshhold over Dry Drayton into Oakington.Is there a possibility that the high ground that the aircraft hit,was the Madingley "slope", now site of the US Military Cemetery.

Incidentally,there is a No 7 Squadron Association whose Sectretary can be contacted at Bartonbury Croft,Stroud Road,Circencester,Gloucester.GL7 1UZ

 

Hi Harry

It hasn't taken me long to realise that in research such as this you need to collect all the information you can and then get more before you set your mind in any direction.

For example, a major author on Stirlings has an 8th member of the crew parachuting from the plane before it landed but he is not listed on the crew in any of the ORBs, equally I haven't found the source that states it was a JU88 that attacked the plane - the ORB only states 'believed attacked by enemy a/c' but no type is given. Where does the JU88 part come from? It's easy to let poetic license creep into the telling of a story - and it's my job to weed it out again - if it was poetic license that is

I do know the spot where the aircraft crashed as I have surviving witnesses who still live there, it wasn't at Madingley.

I have recently spoken to a W/O who flew Stirlings from 1940 and later Lancasters after talking to him I now suspect that the pilot was flying directly to the runway and would not have bothered to circle as only his and one other aircraft was returning to base that night.

The Pilot would have contacted the Tower on a TR9 radio which had a range of 50 miles in the air, there wouldn't really be much point in circling as he could have gotten permission to land from miles away, however the AM1180 states that he was 'circling'. But set against that he was 3 miles from the airfield which I am led to believe wasn't what would normally have happened, the pilots circled much closer to the strip, apparently, or did they?

Or perhaps none of the above is true!? It would be good if there were other records held by the Squadron but I haven't been able to find any hard reference to them.

This illustrates the reason for talking to a pilot really, I am after a great deal of detail to try to flesh out the possible and practical and possibly use that to eliminate the improbable to leave the likely!! I know I have little chance of knowing what did happen exactly on that morning, but I can find out lots about procedures, habits and equipment.

I've just got a copy of AP1660 for example and now I know that the landing lights were a pair of 350W lamps which would have been angled down and lit by the Pilot on approach - these should have picked out the ground and trees and showed him that he wasn't at 500ft! Did he have them on? Perhaps he was attacked by an enemy a/c?

Did he just run out of fuel? Possibly, but the other aircraft in his flight arrived behind him and landed 15 minutes later - he didn't run out of fuel. But then perhaps his bomb load was different?

It's much more interesting to explore a single crash in detail than many in brief I am finding, each time I come to a halt and run out of leads, some more appear!

I have to say that it's due in no small part to the many helpful people on forums that I have gotten this far. So thanks to you all and keep it coming!


James