My readings on the "eastern front" have been limited. I am aware of the pre-war offensive/preemptive strike Operation Matador, but was there one for the opposite scenario: the evacuation of Malaya and Singapore? Was one developed during the war? By the end of January 1942, the RAF/RAAF/RN had all been pretty much neutralized, Japan either controlled, had invaded, or had occupied Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Borneo, and other various parts of the Dutch East Indies (with more to follow as the Battle of Singapore started and furthermore soon after), essentially almost surrounding Singapore. I imagine that Wavell and co. could see the writing on the wall and the situation was hopeless. Did they plan for the worse, a "Dunkirk of the east" if you will? On the flip side, were the troops (once it became obvious there was no hope for them) needed to be - for lack of a better word - sacrificed to avoid giving up a colony and prestigious base without a fight due to the political ramifications of doing so? For example, I recently read that a small number of Sri Lankan nationalists mutinied as they saw the Japanese offensive highlight the weakness of the British and potential independence etc.
I have read, in the past, about this theatre and the fall of Singapore - I cannot now recall any mention of contingency plans if Singapore fell. The only exception being the SIGINT and intelligence function / station did evacuate staff beforehand, including a number of women civilian staff. I am currently following 'Fatboy Coxy', a member here, who has a lengthy alternative history thread and that may contain the information sought. See: Malaya What If
There was no Dunkirk style evacuation plan for the military because Singapore was never expected to fall in pre-war planning or even after the Japanese invaded Malaya on 8th Dec 1941. In fact there were still troops arriving as late as 5th Feb 1942 (Singapore surrendered on the 15th). The Singapore-convoys As ships from those convoys sailed out they were filled with civilians and key military personnel. Any vessels remaining in and around Singapore were ordered away around 10th Feb but suffered tremendous losses. The Naval Evacuation of Singapore - February 1942 - Naval Historical Society of Australia. A quick look at a map of the region reveals the problems faced by such an evacuation. It would have been impossible even if you could find the shipping. Dunkirk was a quick hop across the Channel. Singapore was an ocean voyage of over 1,600 miles that took a week or more. And the exit routes were via Malacca Strait (with the Japanese holding one side) or the narrow and difficult to navigate Sunda Strait (between Sumatra & Java) where ships had already been bombed. Withdrawal to Java / Sumatra would only delay the inevitable (the Japanese invasion of southern Sumatra began on 14th Feb). There were some 85,000 personnel to move. Dunkirk used many destroyers and smaller naval vessels to carry out the evacuation. With the war in the Med having priority, there was a severe shortage of such vessels in the Indian Ocean throughout 1942. I’d recommend this book for the background to what happened. https://www.amazon.co.uk/Royal-Navy-Eastern-Waters-1935-1942/dp/1399096540/ref=sr_1_1?crid=335044XQ7GQ9S&keywords=the+royal+navy+in+eastern+waters&qid=1699004413&s=books&sprefix=The+Royal+Navy+in+easter,stripbooks,198&sr=1-1 It debunks some of the myths surrounding events in the Far East.
The inter-war Singapore Strategy is described here. Singapore strategy - Wikipedia The real threat to Malaya didn't arise until the end of July 1941 when the Japanese moved to occupy southern French Indochina. By then it was too late to late to identify the necessary reinforcements AND organise shipping them to the Far East, even if British strategy was changed to swing away from the Med to the Far East.
