I was very interested in the previous thread about Operation Fortitude intended to mislead the Germans into believing an invasion of the Pas de Calais was imminent and noted the debate it generated about whether the subterfuge worked. I would add this covert operation was also referred to as Fortitude South. I played a part in Fortitude North. The 52nd (Lowland) Division under the guidance of Norwegian officers and NCOs underwent intensive training in high altitude warfare in the Scottish Highlands. As a young officer with the 7th/9th Royal Scots my Battalion trained in manoeuvring and fighting in hilly and mountainous terrain. We all did ski training and a selected group were earmarked to form a fast-moving strike force. Infantrymen tackled rock climbing and to survive in icy and snow conditions whilst using mules for our heavy equipment. It hardened us and made us proficient to the extent that we did not question the belief that we were a Mountain Division destined for Norway. It was known that the Germans in Norway were taking an active interest in what we were doing. We knew they could intercept our radio signals during training and our unwitting occasional breaches of radio discipline provided them with varying intelligence that we were being trained to liberate Norway. They not only listened to conversations but could through surveillance techniques detect our locations and track our movements. Directional finding systems using a searching antenna could tune into a radio station and when it had obtained its best signal strength claimed they could pin-point the transmitter’s location with accuracy to less than one degree wrong. Having established there was a Mountain Division capable of fighting in Norway, Fortitude North in the build-up to Operation Overlord used these well-established enemy systems of listening and location detection to deceive the Germans that the Division was moving from the Scottish Highlands south towards the Tay and Forth Estuaries to ports that could be used for embarkation to Norway. 52 (Scottish) Division headquarters organised a structured signals exercise and provided the various infantry battalions (and support troops?) with 19 Wireless Sets operated by Royal Signals – usually used for communication between Brigade Headquarters and Battalions and from Brigades to Division - each battalion having to man a number of these 19WS with two officers. I was one of them and along with a major we accompanied the WS19 signals truck and 15-cwt. admin vehicle and set off to fulfil a programme of orchestrated signals traffic as we travelled south. Our various stops during the exercise were planned as were the principal signal messages to be sent, these being interspersed with spontaneous radio traffic in response to routine messages that were also transitted. I undertook to respond on the 19WS to transmissions normally dealt with by a staff officer and the major would come to the set when Sunray (commander) was called. All of us in the Battalion and those taking part were completely unaware why the exercise was being carried out, except – and this was most unusual - it was being directed by Divisional Headquarters. We did not learn of its intent until after the War. Amongst Hitler’s many intuitions was his belief ‘Norway would be a sphere of destiny’. Certainly no troops were removed from Norway to reinforce the Russian front, and this may indicate the existing force was considered the minimum necessary to hold the country, which by its nature had isolated major centres making it difficult to manoeuvre reserves to meet contingencies in its defence. [History of Cossac, Merriam Press (USA) (2008) pp 34-35 refers.] However, it is to be noted that even six weeks after Normandy some 150,000 German troops were still in Norway. I would argue that the real intent and value of the well conceived and executed Fortitude South and North was the sense of bewilderment that it created; the German High Command having to cope with Normandy and the seemingly imminent landings in the Pas de Calais and Norway. I believe we were in the market to buy uncertainty, indecision and hesitation, knowing that any delay in the commitment of reserves would be of the utmost value during the vulnerable days of fighting to secure and consolidate our bridgehead in Normandy. Joe Brown
