The 14 part message sent from Tokyo to Washington on December 6 1941 (Washington time). The message was intercepted by the US Navy intercept station at Bainbridge Island, Seattle, 6 December. The message was encrypted with the PURPLE cipher machine, the plain text language of the message is English. Intended to be delivered to the US Government, by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, before the attack commenced - it arrived late. SPYBOOKS - the bigest internet archive of security and intelligence topic
Last line of their communique says it all, doesn't it. It will be a chilly day on the river tomorrow as we remember with our American cousins at the Coast Guard base. We will remember them. phil
The fourteen part message was considered to be preliminary to a formal breaking of diplomatic relations, which would be followed by a declaration of war. As Rufus Bratton said, "We thought nothing would happen while that document was still in the (Japanese) Embassy safe. People frequently claim it was supposed to be delivered before the attack on Hawaii, but Yamamoto only allowed it to be sent after making sure it would not interfere with the surprise. There was no mechanism to stop the attacks if the message had not been delivered on time, and, indeed, Khota Baru was attacked before the scheduled time, so it was "game on" from that point. The premise that it was fair play also fails to consider the times required. I wrong this for another place, but the points remain valid: The 14-part message was not a declaration of war. It did not break off negotiations with the US. It was not an ultimatum. The declaration of war is here: 269 The 14-part message is here: [Secret] The timing of the delivery of the 14-part message, 1/2 hour before the attack on Pearl Harbor, ensured that it would have no effect on the attack. For a warning to occur based on that message the following events would have had to happen: Japan delivers note on time. Hull reads note. Hull responds to Nomura and Kurusu. They reply, etc. Hull talks to FDR, explains note. FDR correctly interprets this as a war warning. FDR advises SecWar and SecNav to alert all forces. SecWar and SecNav compose warning message. Warning messages are handled through military channels, if available, to all commands. Local commanders assimilate warning message and act properly. On the other hand, if the US had acceded to every demand in the 14-part message: Japan delivers note on time. Hull reads note. Hull responds to Nomura and Kurusu. They reply, etc. Hull talks to FDR, explains note. FDR agrees to completely change US policy without consulting Congress. FDR communicates this to Hull. Hull explains things to Nomura and Kurusu. They discuss any fuzzy details. Nomura and Kurusu return to their embassy to contact Tokyo. (Originally they were ordered to destroy all codes, but got permission to retain one low level code.) Somehow they get the information to Tokyo. Gaimudaijin receives message. Foreign Minster interprets message correctly. Foreign Minster goes to Prime Minister and explains message. Prime Minister contacts SecWar and SecNav, who contact their forces to halt attack. In both the above cases you can see that more than 1/2 hour was needed. So the timing issue is just a farce.
Excellent post, OpanaPointer. I've never seen the actions that would have followed delivery of the final message detailed like that. Good work. Dave
Separate Files, Indices, etc. We've "broken out" the individual Exhibits from the PDFs so they'll be easier to find. Check the file above for links. (Only 5,000 pages or so, you'll be done in no time.)
