Does anybody know when the RAF at squadron level began to use the German finger four tactic system in 1940? Did squadrons begin to use the Luftwaffe tactics during the Battle of Britain?
This is an extract from a 2007 thread http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=116161on the subject: During 1940 there were several leading RAF pilots who recognised the value of the German fighter tactics and tried to bring about change within the RAF, but to no effect. Tuck, Malan, Dutton and Crossley all introduced local variations within their own Squadrons but got no further. The RAF hierarchy was against variation of the standard Vic formation (Bader by the way always used the Vic formation in the September and October battles of 1940). Ultimately RAF Fighter Command did modify it's tactics in 1941 under the leadership of Sholto Douglas, who finally recognised the raised angry voices of many Squadron Commanders. Bader was by that time a very vocal supporter, but only one of many. Interestingly though RAF Fighter Command could not just accept that German tactics were superior to their own. Consequently the official use of the 'finger four' (a term coined by an anonymous person) went through several mutations eg the Weaver, then the Trail (or line astern). The finger four was finally officially introduced into the training regime in early 1942 - by which time it was long being used by frontline Squadrons. I don't know the original source of the information nor whether the views expressed are in line with current thinking. Regards Pete
Found reference to 152 Squadron being among the early adopters here: http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol051dt.html
In aug/sep 1940 different squadrons used their own methods having kicked into touch the parade ground vic's of three, A comment from a well known Squadron Leader who was on 609 Sqdn we where flying Finger Four formation what the other squadrons were flying I do not know but they had also got rid of the vic's. It seems as if it was made up as they went along.
Craig, Just remembered that I promised a note sometime ago on RAF Fighter Command structures. To get back to the topic, a good reference,I have found is a pocket hand book "The Spitfire Pocket Manual" all Marks in Service.1939-1945 based on information issued by the Air Ministry.ISBN 978-1-84486-120-0.The publication was complied by Martin Robson who has a background in defence studies There is an entire chapter devoted Fighting Tactics for Squadron Formations of Fighters and Bombers and Tactical Papers published by the Air Ministry after the war based on experience of air combat. The other point regarding the Luftwaffe " rotte" system was that this was adopted to some extent after Dunkirk but the practice was left for the Battle of Britain to individual squadron commanders.The rigid vic formation with the leader and two wingmen within four sections of three was the prewar formation doctrine.Others adopted the practice of three section of four in line astern which freshmen pilots felt vulnerable as the last man in the formation in which the pilots had to be ever vigilant in order the maintain clearance safety. The "finger four" formation as used by the Luftwaffe was recognised by Sailor Malan as the best formation to deal with the enemy and he instituted this in his air combat rules "Ten Rules for Air Fighting" to be adopted by his subordinates. His number 8 rule emphaises this as "When diving to attack always leave a proportion of your formation above to act as a top guard". This was to be developed for pairs when of the pair, one acted as the leader and one as the wingman.A tactic still in use today....used to see USAF A10s utilising this tactic down the River Trent...one attacking "targets" on the river,while his wingman rolled about above for surveillance.Once saw A10s using traffic on the M62 in East Yorkshire as imaginary targets as we motored down from the Wolds...would not think that the M62 traffic would have been aware what was happening but from a greater elevation,it was all too apparent.
Hind sight is a wonderful thing. It wasn't as easy as just saying the Squadron command could decide against the big bad uncomprehending organisation. Big organisations are like the proverbial super tankers. It take s time to change. Fighters were part of Dowding's system against bombers from Germany. Pilots were trained to make formation attacks that allowed a section of three to concentrate the fire of their rifle calibre weapons on bombers. The fact that the Luftwaffe would be deployed in France and accompanied by single seat fighters escorts was a new factor. Flying a wingman and finger four system was a complete change to the way the RAF operated. Since WW1 it had built up its units from sections of three and not pairs. It takes time to learn to fly as pairs rather than Vics, to learn why it works better than vics and how to fly in pairs and pairs of pairs. Robert Shaw had yet to write the big book on fighter combat. Squadrons Commanders in the Battle of Britain did not necessarily have the luxury of taking time out to experiment with new formations. Nor did the pilots grasp the full implications of finger four. Sailor Malan preferred four aircraft flights, but wrote about flying in line astern. Maybe he did not understand the benefits of manoeuvring in pairs - or maybe he did and didn't think his pilots could use the technique.
Arrived here after perusing the new thread on British Army - Doctrine Development and noted: which I first came across in the margins of considering Boyd's OODA Loop quite a long time ago. Anon, herewith: Also smiled at: having watched Hogs do just this whilst picnicking at Julian's Bower, Alkborough, thirty years ago and wondered at the time if the old WW2 bombing range on the 'flats' below had been reactivated. Back to the Light Blue, anyone know when the first TATs were formed? Were there WW2 predecessors? I remember being extraordinarily impressed when first visiting what is now the museum at RAF Uxbridge (would recommend it to those who haven't been yet) and learning about the Dowding System. Very, very, clever; but wondered if some of the issues raised above sprung from a mindset based on this fix: ......?
