Morning Pak75, You say that the route taken to achieve victory is open to question. I guess it is easy to so question these matters, some 70 years on and from the comfort of one's armchair. I tend to accept that they were difficult times, our armies were largely conscripts and working with imperfect war materiel, and that in war things don't always go as planned; that's certainly the case for the loser(s). I celebrate what was achieved in the circumstances. So, the Allies had/developed a plan for Normandy that was largely a battle of attrition, drawing the bulk of the enemy might onto the British/Canadian front, in order to fix it/destroy it and enable the Americans to 'breakout' in the west. It was perhaps a crude plan and opportunities were no doubt missed, but 'so what' - the BIG plan worked exceptionally well. Surely Operation Goodwood in isolation (and not as part of the bigger and successful plan for Normandy), and Monty and Dempsey's roles in it, can only be judged against the 'Operational Directive' issued by Monty and the derivative orders issued by Dempsey. Ergo, what did they want to achieve and did they achieve it? I don't give a stuff about what, for example, Tedder, Eisenhower, Patton, certain German Generals, The Times opinion column or the Beano, thought was the intention of Goodwood or what it should have achieved, only in the 'Operational Directive' and what was achieved against it. This 'Operational Directive' is key to determining whether Goodward was successful (in isolation). Has anyone got a copy? Best, Steve.